Master of Arts / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / On 16 January 1991, a coalition of nations led by the United States launched a series of air strikes against Iraq to force that country to withdraw from Kuwait. What followed was an intense aerial bombardment of Iraqi military and civilian infrastructure which lasted until 24 February when the coalition began a ground offensive. After four days of ground fighting Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. American pictorial print media created a historical interpretation of the 1991 Persian Gulf War in the sense that selected images were immediately published to a broad audience and these images provided an acceptable story of the war. Perceptions of an Air Campaign examines the cultural meanings of the air war and how these meanings took shape in the narrative pictorial print media produced. The narrative is intricately related to the legacy of the Vietnam War. For generations, Americans viewed contemporary war, politics, foreign affairs, and culture through their memories of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. President George H.W. Bush guaranteed the U.S. public that the Gulf War was consciously being constructed to avoid a conflict similar to Vietnam. According to the president, the United States was going to war with enough resources for a swift and decisive victory, thereby avoiding the Vietnam pitfall of an open-ended conflict. Pictorial print media articulated a narrative displaying U.S. military strength and dominance that fulfilled Bush’s promise.

Imperial powers have employed a range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over foreign territories and communities. As deploying military forces from the home country is often costly – not to mention logistically stretching when long distances are involved – many imperial powers have used indigenous forces to extend control or protect influence in overseas territories. This study charts the extent to which Britain employed this method in its informal empire among the small states of Eastern Arabia: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States (modern day UAE), and Oman before 1971. Resolved in the defence of its imperial lines of communication to India and the protection of mercantile shipping, Britain first organised and enforced a set of maritime truces with the local Arab coastal shaikhs of Eastern Arabia in order to maintain peace on the sea. Throughout the first part of the nineteenth century, the primary concern in the Gulf for the British, operating through the Government of India, was therefore the cessation of piracy and maritime warfare. Later, British interests were expanded to suppressing the activities of slave traders and arms traffickers. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain also sought to exclude foreign powers from gaining a foothold in the area. It was during this time that the British government assumed full responsibility for the external relations of these shaikhdoms and that Britain conferred the status of ‘protected state’ upon them. Up to this point, when Britain needed to protect these interests or use force to compel local rulers to comply with its wishes, naval power usually sufficed. By the midpoint of the twentieth century, Britain’s interests in the area had swelled and migrated inland – first because of the establishment of air stations servicing the imperial route to India, then as a result of oil exploration and production. At the same time, growing international opposition to colonialism and a steady reduction in Britain’s ability to project military power overseas made it more and more difficult for Britain to discharge it security duties in the Gulf. So how did Britain bridge this gap? Studies of British security policy towards the Gulf have focused almost exclusively on Britain’s formal military architecture. Using India Office records and British Government archival documents, this study provides a reinterpretation of the means by which Britain sought to maintain order, protect its interests in the region and discharge its defence obligations. The records, it will be shown, point to a broad British policy before 1971 of enhancing the coercive instruments available to the local rulers. Rather than having to revert to using its own military forces, Britain wanted the Gulf rulers to acquire a monopoly over the use of force within their territories and to be in a stronger position to defend their own domains against cross-border raiders and covetous neighbours. This policy was not always successful; Britain was progressively drawn into the internal security affairs of a number of ITS protégés, especially after the Second World War. The security forces that emerged – armed police forces, gendarmeries and militaries – varied considerably, as did Britain’s involvement in their establishment and running. Nevertheless, taken as whole, a trend emerges between 1921 and 1971 of Britain pushing the Gulf states to take over more and more of the security burden. Indeed, at a time when its traditional sources of global power were fading, indigenous security forces were an important tool in Britain’s pursuit of its interests before its military withdrawal from the Gulf in December 1971. This aspect of Britain’s approach to security in the Gulf has largely been overlooked.

Journalists use the term Arab Street to describe what they often imply is a volatile Arabic public opinion. This photo story travels through four Arab areas or Jordan, Qatar, Israel/Palestine and Egypt in order to show the diversity and complexity of each. The media’s tendency to lump all Arabs into one political block is detrimental to a true sense of cultural understanding that is required for peace. / text

This thesis is about British disengagement from the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. Britain never had colonies in the region, but had held significant imperial sway over nine Protected States since the nineteenth century. The informal empire remained intact until the Labour government (1964-70) announced its intention to leave, in consequence of which Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates became independent in 1971. This thesis attempts three things. First, it draws on extensive archival research to provide the fullest possible account of British withdrawal: why it had to leave, how it did and what followed. The Gulf rulers wanted to maintain British protection for their own security, but Britain decided nonetheless on military retreat, because it needed to placate the domestic constituency in order to push forward the reversal of social reforms due to economic retrenchment. The Gulf rulers responded quickly, yet unsuccessfully, in deciding how many states would be formed as they achieve independence. It was only after the Gulf rulers and the British diplomats on the ground made late and mutually acceptable compromises about coming together that the nine Protected States became three new independent sovereign states. In the end, Britain was able to leave the Gulf peacefully, and the new states retained close relations with Britain. Second, the study of an informal empire illuminates the enduring collaborative relationship between Britain and the Gulf rulers, characterised by the nominal sovereignty given to the Protected States. This relationship not only helped Britain maintain its imperial sway at little cost, but also made possible a peaceful withdrawal and the orderly emergence of the new states. Third, this informal empire characterised by collaboration and nominal sovereignty laid the structural foundations for the later international society in the region – a point more generally telling for the study of international relations.

La présente thèse de doctorat consiste en une enquête globale sur la participation du Golfe à plusieurs systèmes spatiaux, - politico-administratifs et économiques, régionaux et mondiaux -, et sur la constructionprogressive qui en résulte. L’enquête a ainsi cherché à renouer les fils de deux « histoires » généralement conçues comme distinctes et à éclairer les interactions qui en procèdent. La première est celle de l’impérialisme britannique et anglo-indien dans le Golfe, de son fonctionnement, de ses implications spatiales, idéologiques et de son imaginaire au XIXe siècle. Il s’est donc agi de retracer la construction politicoadministrative mais aussi géo-historique, d’un espace, le Golfe. La seconde s’est attachée à démontrer l’insertion du Golfe à différents espaces économiques, macro-régionaux et mondiaux, par l’étude de divers flux de produits. Le propos est organisé en deux grandes parties, subdivisées en 5 chapitres chacune, et il s’y s’ajoute une importante série d’annexes. Le Livre premier (chapitres 1 à 5), intitulé « Espaces, pouvoirs etviolences », porte sur la mise en place, par plusieurs « outils » majeurs, de l’impérialisme britannique et angloindien dans le Golfe. Le Livre second (chapitres 6 à 10) a pour titre « Flux, connexions et internationalisation ». Il se concentre sur l’internationalisation croissante du monde khalijien au cours du XIXe siècle et sur la progressive création de cet espace composite appelé le « Moyen-Orient », qui est centré autour du Golfe, et dont nous soutenons qu’il fut empiriquement inventé aux Indes. Est également mise au jour l’insertion économique du Golfe dans ce que les historiens ont appelé « the expanding world economy », à travers le double effet d’un désenclavement accentué au fil des décennies et d’une progressive augmentation quantitative des flux commerciaux, tout en ne perdant pas de vue les liens marchands et les interpénétrations avec les espaces macro-régionaux, fortement actifs au cours du XIXe siècle. / This thesis is a comprehensive study of the Arabo-Persian Gulf’s involvement in various ‘spacesystems’ —politico-administrative, economic, regional, and global— and the ensuing construction of the Gulf as a space. It aims to gather together the threads of two stories that are generally seen as separate, thereby illuminating the interactions between them. First, this thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of British and Anglo-Indian imperialism in the Gulf: its operation, its spatial and ideological implications, and the ‘imaginaries’ it created. It reveals the politico-administrative and geo-symbolic creation of a space, the Gulf. Secondly, the aim is to emphasise, by examining various flows of products, the insertion of the Gulf into different economic areas, both at a regional and global level. The first volume (chapters 1 to 5), entitled“Spaces, Powers and Violence”, explains the setting of British and Anglo-Indian imperialism in the Gulf, through the use of different tools. The second volume (chapters 6 to 10), entitled “Flows, Connections and Internationalisation”, focuses on the growing internationalisation of the Gulf during the long nineteenth century, and on the gradual creation of what was, in the opinion of the author, a “composite” space, the Middle East. It is argued that the Middle East, centred on the Gulf, was empirically invented in India. Further, this second volume emphasises the insertion of the Gulf into what historians term “the expanding world economy”, through an on-going opening up of the region, and an increase in trade flows. At the same time, it recognises that economic links and interpenetrations with macro-regional areas remained strong.

Au cœur des intérêts stratégiques et économiques américains au Moyen-Orient, le golfe Persique occupe une « centralité paradoxale » dans la politique étrangère de Washington. Avec le pacte du Quincy en 1945, destiné à sécuriser l’approvisionnement pétrolier saoudien, les États-Unis se sont implantés durablement dans la zone. Une présence qui n’a cessé de se renforcer depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin et la disparition de l’Union soviétique. Enjeux stratégiques, sécuritaires et économiques font aujourd’hui de Washington le premier acteur étranger de la région. Alors que les attentats du 11 septembre et l’invasion américaine de l’Irak avaient remis plus que jamais la région au cœur des préoccupations de Washington, les conflits et les déstabilisations nés des conséquences du printemps arabe obligent désormais les États-Unis à renforcer encore leur présence dans la zone. Si Washington, qui rêvait de pivot vers l’Asie, se retrouve « prisonnier » de ce golfe Persique, obligé de traîner son boulet « de sable et de pétrole », les entreprises américaines ont, elles aussi, renforcé leur présence dans la région depuis les années 90. Entre obtention de contrats traditionnels et soutien à la transition des économies de la région, elles trouvent là d’importants relais de croissance. Quels sont les outils mis en place par les administrations successives pour soutenir et encourager les exportations américaines ? Comment la politique de Washington conforte-t-elle la place de ses entreprises auprès de ses partenaires régionaux ? Existe-t-il un modèle américain dont les économies européennes puissent s’inspirer ? C’est à ces questions que la présente thèse essaie de répondre en observant le fonctionnement de l’appareil d’État américain, l’environnement dans lequel il opère et l’évolution des politiques de ses administrations, de George H. Bush à Barack Obama. / The Persian Gulf occupies a “paradoxal centrality” in American foreign policy as it is at the heart of the United States’ strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The 1945 Quincy Agreement which aimed at securing access to Saudi oil ensured enduring U.S. presence in the region -- a presence that has grown in importance since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, the strategic, security and economic interests at stake have made the United States the leading foreign power in the region. While the 9/11 attacks and the American invasion of Iraq had already made the Middle East Washington’s major concern, the United States has had to reinforce its presence to face the conflicts and destabilization that resulted from the Arab Spring. If Washington had dreamt of a “pivot to East Asia”, it finds itself “imprisoned” in the Persian Gulf region, forced as it is to drag its heavy “ball of sand and oil”. American firms have consolidated their presence in the region since the 1990s thanks to huge contracts and their role in the process of transition of regional economies. For them, these markets represent major growth opportunities. What tools has Washington created over the years to support and stimulate American exports? How did U.S. policies strengthen U.S. firms’ market shares in Washington’s regional allies? Can we define an American model that could inspire European economies? Here are the questions this dissertation tries to answer. To do so it analyzes the “machinery” of U.S. foreign economic policy, its environment and the evolution from 1989 to 2014.

Att använda erfarenheter, i form av principer, vid militär planering är inget nytt fenomen. SedanNapoleontiden har det vuxit fram riktlinjer för militär planering och genomförande i form avKrigföringens grundprinciper och principer för att skapa en framgångsrik logistik. Exempel påprinciper och hur de ska tolkas finns i de flesta av världens försvarsmakters doktriner.Syftet med uppsatsen är att ge exempel på hur principer för logistik kan användas för att reflekteraöver de logistiska utmaningar, som en befälhavare eller stabsofficer ställs inför vid en militärplanering.Som empiri, för att värdera principerna mot, har Falklandkriget 1982 och Gulfkriget 1991, med ettbrittiskt/amerikansk perspektiv använts. De är båda konventionella krig med ett tydligt militärtslutmål, men har väldigt olika förutsättningar för logistiken i både en tid-, rum- ochstyrkejämförelse.Uppsatsen använder abduktion som metod. Fem principer för logistik bildar hypoteser förframgång som ställs mot empirin, i form av de två krigen. Krigen ställs mot varandra, medprinciperna som analysverktyg, och komparationens likheter och skillnader gör det möjligt attvärdera och dra slutsatser av principernas innebörd.Resultatet visar att principerna har ett värde och analysen ger vid handen ett flertal slutsatser somkan användas vid militär planering. Principerna ska inte ses som ett krav som måste uppnås för attnå framgång, utan som stöd och riktlinjer för att ta tillvara beprövad erfarenhet. / Using experience, in the form of principles, in military planning is not a new phenomenon. SinceNapoleon there has been development of guidelines for military planning and execution in theform of Principles of War and principles for creating successful logistics. Examples of principlescan be found in most of the world’s defense forces’ doctrines.The overall aim of the thesis is to give examples of how to use principles for logistics to reflecton the logistic challenges you face, as a commander or a staff officer, in military planning.The empirical material used to test the principles against are the Falkland War and the Gulf War,from a British/American perspective. They are both conventional wars with a clear military endstate, but differ a lot in the logistic requirements, both in a time-, space- and forces comparison.The thesis uses the method of abduction. Five principles of logistics make five hypotheses forsuccess that are contrasted with the empirical evidence, in the form of the two wars. The wars arecompared to each other, with the principles as analytic tools, and the similarity and thedifferences in the comparison make it possible to draw conclusions about the principles’ content.The result shows that the principles have value and the analysis gives a number of conclusionsthat can be used in military planning. The principles should not be seen as requirements forsuccess, but rather as a support of, and as guidelines for your planning in order to make use ofprevious experience. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09

This study explores the “push-pull” dynamics of Shia migration from southwestern Iran (Fars, Khuzestan and the Persian Gulf coast) to Kuwait during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although nowadays Shias constitute thirty five percent of the Kuwaiti population and their historical role in building the state of Kuwait have been substantial, no individual study has delved into the causes of Shia migration from Iran to Kuwait. By analyzing the internal political, economic, and social conditions of both regions in the context of the Gulf sheikhdoms, the British and Ottoman empires, and other great powers interested in dominating the Gulf region, my thesis examines why Shia migrants, such as merchants, artisans and laborers left southwestern Iran and chose Kuwait as their final destination to settle. The two-way trade between southwest Iran and Kuwait provided a pathway for the Shia migrants and settlers into Kuwait. Moreover, by highlighting the economic roles of the Shia community in Kuwait, my thesis enhances our understanding of the foundation and contributions of the Shia community in Kuwait. Thus it fills a significant gap in Kuwaiti historiography. The research for this thesis draws from a variety of primary sources, including British government documents, the writing of western travelers, the Almatrook business archive, and oral-history interviews with descendants of Shia immigrants to Kuwait.

Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, announced in January 1968 that the British government would withdraw from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. For Britain, the decision indicated a re-prioritization of British global defense obligations. For the rulers of the Arab emirates of the Persian Gulf, Wilson‘s announcement signaled an end of British military protection, and the beginning of a process of negotiations that culminated in the establishment of the United Arab Emirates on December 3, 1971. An examination of the process by which the individual Persian Gulf states became a sovereign federation presents an opportunity to examine the roles of nationalism and anti-imperialism played in the establishment of the Union. This work demonstrates that Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf strove to establish their new state with close ties to Great Britain, which provided technical, military, and administrative assistance to the emirates, while also publicly embracing the popular ideologies of anti-imperialism and Arab socialism, which dominated the political discourse in the Arab world through most of the twentieth century. viii This dissertation draws on primary source materials from British and American government archives, speeches and government publications from the Arab Emirates, memoirs and a wide variety of secondary sources. These materials provide the basis for understanding the state-building process of the United Arab Emirates in the areas of pre-withdrawal development, the decision to withdraw, the problems of establishing a federal constitution, and the problems posed by the need for security in the post-withdrawal Persian Gulf. / text

This study explores the “push-pull” dynamics of Shia migration from southwestern Iran (Fars, Khuzestan and the Persian Gulf coast) to Kuwait during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although nowadays Shias constitute thirty five percent of the Kuwaiti population and their historical role in building the state of Kuwait have been substantial, no individual study has delved into the causes of Shia migration from Iran to Kuwait. By analyzing the internal political, economic, and social conditions of both regions in the context of the Gulf sheikhdoms, the British and Ottoman empires, and other great powers interested in dominating the Gulf region, my thesis examines why Shia migrants, such as merchants, artisans and laborers left southwestern Iran and chose Kuwait as their final destination to settle. The two-way trade between southwest Iran and Kuwait provided a pathway for the Shia migrants and settlers into Kuwait. Moreover, by highlighting the economic roles of the Shia community in Kuwait, my thesis enhances our understanding of the foundation and contributions of the Shia community in Kuwait. Thus it fills a significant gap in Kuwaiti historiography. The research for this thesis draws from a variety of primary sources, including British government documents, the writing of western travelers, the Almatrook business archive, and oral-history interviews with descendants of Shia immigrants to Kuwait.