Den svenske lagstiftaren har under de senaste decennierna ökat polisens och åklagarens möjligheter till förundersökningsbegränsning som innebär att alla brott inte behöver utredas i enlighet med 23 kap. 4 a § RB. Samtidigt har Europadomstolen tolkat Europakonventionen om mänskliga rättigheter i en allt mer brottsoffervänlig riktning. Det betyder att reglerna om förundersökningsbegränsning rört sig ännu mera i riktningen mot mera av samhällelig effektivitetshänsyn medan konventionen gått mer åt att stärka brottsoffrens roll. I en rad rättsfall har Europadomstolen slagit fast att staterna har positiva förpliktelser gentemot brottsoffer, att se till att deras grundläggande rättigheter respekteras. Det betyder att de anslutna staterna måste skydda brottsoffren. Det gäller i synnerhet mot grova brott men domstolen har också öppnat för att offer för mindre allvarlig brottslighet måste få en chans till upprättelse. Samtidigt förundersökningsbegränsas, nedlägges, brottsutredningar av den typen med stöd av 23 kap. 4 a § RB dagligen i Sverige. / The Swedish legislator has during the three last decades extended the possibility for the police and the prosecutors to use preliminary enquiry limitation. That means that according to chapter 23, paragraph 4 a of the code of judicial procedure, the police and prosecutors does not always have to investigate crimes.   In the meantime, the European court of human rights has eventually interpreted the European convention on human rights, the ECHR, in a more crime victim friendly way. This study shows that the convention states need to consider positive obligations of the ECHR towards crime victims. The main aim of the convention is to protect individuals from violations of their rights committed by representatives of the states. But although it is not clearly written in the convention, the court of human rights has several times interpreted that article 8 of the convention includes positive obligations that demands the convention states to take measures in order to protect individuals and guarantee them their rights to personal and family life.

La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme a, en 1968, dès son cinquième arrêt au principal, établi que des droits civils et politiques pouvaient générer des obligations d'action à la charge des États. Cette affirmation venait remettre en cause la définition traditionnelle de ces droits. En effet, ils étaient classiquement considérés comme mettant à la charge des États uniquement des obligations négatives. En revanche, les droits économiques sociaux et culturels étaient présentés comme imposant seulement des obligations positives. Le juge européen a, depuis lors, mis au jour un nombre croissant d'obligations positives prétoriennes. Plusieurs techniques ont été développées pour ce faire. Cette étude vise à analyser ce que nous avons dénommé la technique des obligations positives, c'est-à-dire l'usage par la Cour des termes « obligations positives » ou « mesures positives ». Cette technique permet non seulement au juge européen de dégager des obligations d'action à la charge des États, mais également de reconnaître sa compétence pour contrôler l'exécution de ses propres arrêts, de conférer un effet horizontal à la Convention ou encore d'étendre la notion de juridiction au sens de l'article 1 CEDH. Elle est également un moyen de moduler son contrôle en permettant tantôt d'accorder une large marge nationale d'appréciation, tantôt de la réduire à néant. Cette diversification croissante de l'usage de la technique dans la jurisprudence européenne est toutefois source d'incohérences.La thèse défendue vise à démontrer que la technique des obligations positives est un outil d'adaptation de la norme juridique conventionnelle à l'évolution des États démocratiques et libéraux européens. / As early as 1968, the fifth merits judgment of the European Court of Human Rights established that civil and political rights could generate action obligations on the European States. This judgment was challenging the usual definition of those rights, which were traditionally considered as charging the public authorities with only negative obligations. In contrast, economic, social and cultural rights were positioned as imposing positive obligations on the public authorities. The European Court of Human Rights has since created an increasing number of positive obligations and several techniques were developed for this purpose. This study aims to explore the “positive obligations technique”, that is to say, the Court's use of the terms “positive obligations” or “positive measures”. This technique not only allows the Court judge to impose action obligations on the European States, also recognizes the Court judge's competence to monitor the implementation by the public authorities of its own decisions, to give a horizontal effect to the Convention and to extend the concept of "jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. This technique also permits to modulate the Court's control over the European States, granting a wide margin of appreciation or reducing it to nothing. The increasing diversification of the use of this technique in European case law is however a source of discrepancy.. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the technique of positive obligations is a tool for adaptation of the conventional norma to the changes of the democratic and liberal European States.

La procéduralisation des droits substantiels est un phénomène désormais incontournable du système conventionnel qui ne cesse de se développer et de s’étendre. Néologisme d’origine doctrinale, cette notion semble pourtant difficilement saisissable. La procéduralisation des droits substantiels appelle en ce sens différentes interrogations liées tant à sa définition qu’à sesimplications pour le mécanisme conventionnel. Que désigne cette notion complexe et hétérogène ? Comment le juge a-t-il réussi à la mettre en place alors que ce procédé était initialement totalement absent du texte de la Convention ? À quoi est-elle destinée ? L’hypothèse retenue est que la procéduralisation des droits substantiels est une technique juridique spécifique au sein du mécanisme conventionnel, qui permet au juge d’atteindre une meilleure effectivité des droits. Toutefois, loin d’être limitée à ce seul cadre, la procéduralisation s’avère inscrite au contraire dans une dimension beaucoup plus vaste touchant à des aspects institutionnels en étant au service de la réalisation d’un projet politique particulier. / The “procéduralisation” - or procedural processing - of substantial rights has become an unavoidable phenomenon in the conventional system and it keeps growing and spreading. Originally a doctrinal concept, this neologism seems somehow hard to grasp. The “procéduralisation” of substantial rights raises many questions about both its definition and implications for the conventional process. What is this complex and heterogeneous notion refering to ? How did the judge succeed to establish it, whereas this process was initially totally ignored by the European Convention ? What is it intended for ? We argue that the “procéduralisation” of substantial rights is a specific legal technique in the European case law, which enables the judge to achieve a better effectiveness for the rights. Nevertheless, the “procéduralisation” is not bounded inside this framework, but has proven on the contrary to fit into a much wider dimension related to institutional questions, being dedicated to the fulfilment of a specific political project.

Although women’s rights have been widely recognized in the international agenda, violence against women in the private sphere does not seem to decrease. Women are still suffering today from not enjoying the most basic human rights. States fail often to recognize domestic violence as a human rights violation because it is committed in the private sphere by non-states actors. Because of this the European Court of Human Rights decided to develop the due diligence standard in 2008 to combat violence against women. This thesis examines the European Convention on Human Rights law regarding domestic violence and the meaning of member states positive obligation and the concept of due diligence. The European Court has established that member states have several positive obligations to fulfill in order to address the issue of violence against women in the private sphere. However states fail too often to exercise the due diligence by not living up to the standards that has been established by the Court. It has been proven that the Convention articles are inconsistent. The Court needs too clarify exactly which measures states should take to address the issue of violence against women and send a clear message how much effort it takes to fill the scope of the due diligence standard. This inconsistency allows states to take stand in the law enforcements, which are contemplated to be dominated by male norms. The consequence of this is that women are usually disadvantaged in state law enforcement when it comes to violence in the private sphere. It is therefor of great importance to pay attention to women’s rights when it comes to domestic violence, as well as analyzing states approach in the domestic violence cases. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze domestic violence as men’s violence against women from a critical gender perspective by highlighting elements that effects states actions in the cases. The point of departure is to recognize similar behavior in states actions by focusing on the concept male norm and private and public sphere. The results revealed a clear pattern of the concepts. In each case signs of male norms expressed in a male position, where men are superior to women were shown. States divisions of the private and public spheres were also proven in the cases. States would prefer not to intervene when a woman was exposed to violence in the private sphere. This leads to women being suppressed and unable to reach legal protection in the private sphere.

Almost four decades have passed since the European Court of Human Rights introduced the concept of positive obligations. Positive obligations mean that the member states must take affirmative action in order to secure the rights and freedoms provided for by the European Convention on Human Rights. Since then, the scope of positive obligations has extended tremendously, and today all substantive rights generally contain positive obligations. The reason behind the development is to maintain the full effectiveness of human rights enforcement within the European context, and it has been enabled, inter alia, through dynamic interpretation and because the European Convention on Human Rights is considered a living instrument.  The fact that European companies operating transnationally, i.e. in a non-European context, sometimes through its commercial activities violates human rights has given rise to discussion in legal doctrine on whether the scope of positive obligations should be further extended so that the member states to the European Convention on Human Rights will incur state responsibility for national corporates’ extraterritorial human rights violations. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to examine whether the European Court of Human Rights can and should proceed with such expansion. An expansion creates methodological and technical problems as it challenges the traditional notion of jurisdiction, however, it is not impossible. Whatever the European Court of Human Rights will decide to do, the thesis will provide arguments both for why home state responsibility for national corporates’ extraterritorial activities that violates human rights can and should be imposed, as well for why it is beyond its (the European Court of Human Rights) competence.

Le développement du droit international des droits de l’homme conduit le droit international public à réenvisager la question étatique. Loin de n’être que le relai fonctionnel permettant l’application effective du droit international, l’État devient en effet, par l’intermédiaire de son « appareil interne », un véritable objet de celui-ci. Se développe ainsi, par le biais de cette branche du droit international qu’est le droit international des droits de l’homme, un droit international de l’organisation de l’État. L’obligation structurelle est l’un des outils juridiques permettant cette évolution. Au-delà des seules références que le droit international des droits de l’homme peut faire à l’appareil étatique se développent des obligations internationales destinées à l’organiser d’une certaine façon. Ne pouvant être parfaitement saisies par le biais des typologies d’obligations existantes, une nouvelle typologie reposant essentiellement sur la nature et les effets de telles obligations devait être dressée puis confrontée à la pratique du droit international des droits de l’homme. / Contemporary evolution of international law of human rights leads the doctrine to reconsider the State question. Far from being a mere functional relay allowing an effective application of international law, the State’s ‘internal apparatus’ becomes one of its subject-matter. An international law of States’ domestic organization is therefore developing through this branch of international law. ‘Structural obligations’ is one of the legal tools enabling that evolution. Indeed, beyond simple references to institutional domestic aspects, obligations prescribing how States should organize themselves in order to fully respect their human rights commitments are emerging. These obligations could not be comprehensively described through classical typologies of obligations, so a new one needs to be elaborated and confronted with the international law of human rights practice.

Instrument d'échange économique par excellence, le contrat n'est pas, de prime abord, le terrain le plus propice à la satisfaction d'un idéal religieux. Il n'est pas rare, cependant, qu'un contractant se prévale de ses convictions et pratiques religieuses aux fins d'y adapter le contenu ou les conditions d'exécution d'une prestation. La tentation est grande de s'y montrer indifférent. D'un côté est invoquée, pour y parer, l'autonomie de la volonté. De l'autre, il est même suggéré de transposer le principe de laïcité aux relations privées pour obliger les contractants à faire preuve de neutralité. Or, ces dernières sont gouvernées par la liberté de religion. Ainsi, la contractualisation des convictions et pratiques religieuses doit être fortement encouragée. En outre, dans le silence du contrat, le juge peut imposer certaines obligations positives aux contractants, au nom de la liberté de religion et du droit à la non discrimination, au terme d'un processus de conciliation. / Prima facie, as the most representative economic instrument, contract is not favourable to the satisfaction of religious interests. Nevertheless, contractors frequently invoke their religious beliefs and practices in order to adapt either the content or the conditions of implementation of their duties. Indifference is sometimes considered as a tempting reaction to those claims. One the one hand, it is referred to contractual autonomy. On the other hand, it is suggested to extend secularism to private relations, for the purpose of compelling contracting parties to remain neutral. However, these ones are ruled by freedom of religion. As a consequence, individuals should be incited to include their religious convictions and practices to their contracts. Morerover, judges should be allowed to impose positive obligations, on behalf of both religious freedom and the right to non-discrimination, after a conciliation process.

Positive obligations of state arising from Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights focusing on persons with disabilities Absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is clearly set in article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. When assessing particular obligations, which are arising out of it, we need to look deep into the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. The aim of this thesis is to analyse positive obligations of state arising from article 3 focusing on persons with disabilities. This is achieved also with the aid of various human right bodies such as UN Human Rights Committee, UN Committee on Torture or UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Due to the fact that this area is not really covered yet, certain parts of this thesis are focused on defining important terms and putting them together. The approach is analytic with elements of comparison between the view of European Court of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights bodies. The thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapter One is introductory and defines the main terms such as ill-treatment, torture, scope of the article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in connection with rights of persons with disabilities and the concept of positive obligations...

La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne a acquis une force juridique contraignante depuis l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne. Les institutions européennes et les Etats membres lorsqu’ils mettent en oeuvre le droit de l’Union européenne sont donc liés par ses dispositions. Mais les autorités publiques ne devraient pas être les seules à être soumises au respect des droits et libertés qu’elle garantit. En effet, les particuliers, parce qu’ils peuvent, à l’instar des pouvoirs publics, attenter aux droits primordiaux de leurs semblables, devraient également être tenus de respecter cet instrument juridique lorsqu’ils se trouvent placés dans une situation régie par le droit de l’Union européenne. Autrement dit, la Charte des droits fondamentaux devrait déployer des effets juridiques dans le cadre des relations de droit privé lorsqu’il existe un lien de rattachement avec le droit de l’Union européenne. Cet effet horizontal permettrait ainsi aux particuliers de jouir effectivement des droits et libertés consacrés par la Charte. On attend donc des autorités publiques, conformément à leurs obligations positives, qu’elles protègent les droits que les particuliers tirent de cet instrument juridique. La reconnaissance de l’effet réflexe de la Charte des droits fondamentaux aura ainsi pour conséquence de créer des obligations tant pour les institutions européennes et les Etats membres que pour les personnes privées. / The Charter of fundamental rights has acquired a binding legal force since the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, the institutions of the European Union and member states when they implement the law of the European Union are bound by the provisions of the Charter. But the addressees of this legal instrument should not be only public authorities. Individuals, whenever it could impinge on freedoms and basic rights, should be subject, to compliance with the Charter when the matter falling the scope of EU law. In other words, the Charter of fundamental rights should have legal effects in private law relations when there is a connecting link to EU law. Horizontal effect would allow individuals to have full enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Charter. Public authorities must therefore, in keeping with their positive obligations, protect the rights derive from the provisions of this legal instrument. Therefore, the recognition of horizontal effect of the Charter will create obligations for both institutions of European Union and member states and private persons.

L’effet horizontal implique l’application de la Convention EDH dans les relations interindividuelles. Justifiée par la théorie des obligations positives, cette construction jurisprudentielle permet la mise en jeu de la responsabilité internationale de l’État lorsque celui-ci ne prend pas les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir et réprimer les violations de la Convention commises par les personnes privées. La reconnaissance de l’effet horizontal par le juge européen a pour conséquence la prolifération des obligations substantielles et procédurales de l’État. La transposition de celles-ci dans l’ordre juridique interne astreint les autorités publiques, y compris les tribunaux, à intervenir dans les rapports privés. Nécessaire à l’effectivité des droits de l’homme, la diffusion de l’effet horizontal a pour contrepartie l’accroissement de l’intervention étatique dans la sphère privée et l’apparition des devoirs individuels fondés sur le respect des droits et libertés d’autrui. La Cour EDH, pionnière de l’ « horizontalisation », refuse d’en élaborer une théorie générale. Le défi est dès lors de délimiter l’extension des droits de l’homme aux relations interindividuelles afin que celle-ci ne devienne pas un facteur d’affaiblissement de la protection verticale des droits de l’homme. / The horizontal effect involves the application of the ECHR in interindividual relationships. Justified by the theory of positive obligations, this jurisprudential construction allows to establish the international responsibility of the State when it fails to take necessary measures to prevent and suppress violations of the Convention committed by private persons. Recognition of the horizontal effect by the European judge results in the proliferation of substantive and procedural obligations of the State. Transposing them into domestic law compels public authorities, including courts, to interfere in private relations. Necessary for the effectiveness of human rights, the diffusion of the horizontal effect generates, in return, an extension of State intervention in the private sphere and the emergence of individual duties based on the respect of the rights and freedoms of others. The European Court of Human Rights, pioneer of the « horizontalization », refuses to develop a general theory. The challenge is therefore to delimit the extension of human rights to relations between individuals so that it does not become a factor of weakening of the vertical protection of human rights.