[pt] A teoria republicana do Estado tradicionalmente destaca a centralidade da virtude inerente ao homem cívico. A presente dissertação investiga o problema da civilidade a partir de uma abordagem que distingue as potencialidades do homem comum. Elabora-se uma concepção de civilidade como competência. O trabalho transcende os limites disciplinares do Direito com o objetivo de (re)construir uma teoria mais compreensiva sobre o tema proposto. Basicamente, dois movimentos teóricos são realizados: de um lado, uma reconstrução da noção de competência humana; de outro, o apontamento das implicações desse marco-teórico para o desenho de uma teoria política alicerçada na idéia de que a civilidade é gerada por um estado mental específico potencialmente presente em todos os homens comuns. Propõe-se, no final, que a civilidade é revelada em processos ordinários de interação social focalizada que demandam o exercício de competências discursivas para a resolução de problemas. / [en] The republican theory of the State traditionally focuses on the centrality of virtue inherent to the civic man. The present dissertation investigates the problem of civility from an approach that distinguishes the potentialities of the common man. It elaborates a concept of civility as competence. The work transcends the disciplinary boundaries of Law with the objective of (re) constructing a more comprehensive theory about the theme proposed. Basically, two theoretical movements are undertaken: on the one side, the reconstruction of the notion of human competence; on the other, the signaling of the implications of this theoretical framework for the design of a political theory based on the idea that civility is generated by a specific mental state potentially present in al common man. It proposes, in the end, that civility is revealed in ordinary processes of focalized social interaction which demand the exercise of discursive competences for the resolution of problems.

Philip Pettit claims his neorepublican theory of freedom as non-domination is preferable to the liberal ideal of non-interference, and he is right. But the reasons why he is right run deeper than is apparent if we attend solely to his arguments defending non-domination in negative terms. In fact, embedded in the three benefits that Pettit claims non-domination can offer (which non-interference cannot) lie significant resonances with a positive idea of freedom concerned with a person’s sense of agency. We find such an idea in Charles Taylor, where freedom as self-realization is intricately linked with his “significance view” of human agency. By adopting this Taylorian lens and assessing Pettit’s non-domination, I show that non-domination does have much to offer those of us who think of freedom primarily in positive terms and, more generally, to all those of us who believe that freedom and agency are inextricably linked and must be treated as such.

L’objectif de notre étude est d’examiner la philosophie tocquevillienne de la démocratie par rapport au libéralisme et au républicanisme. Dans la première partie, nous essayons de déterminer les principes de l’aristocratie et de la démocratie dans la philosophie politique de Tocqueville. Nous tâchons également d’éclaircir l’idéal de la démocratie et sa conception de la liberté. Dans la deuxième partie, nous examinons les difficultés que Tocqueville repère dans les conceptions libérale et républicaine de la démocratie. Dans la troisième partie, nous cherchons à approfondir les solutions qu’il propose pour remédier aux défauts de la démocratie. Pour ce faire, nous retenons en particulier les trois solutions suivantes : associations, décentralisation et représentation. En même temps, nous analysons en profondeur les réflexions de Tocqueville sur la doctrine de l’intérêt bien entendu pour mieux éclaircir sa position par rapport à la problématisation républicaine du libéralisme. Selon nous, l’analyse des trois solutions permet de penser que la philosophie tocquevillienne de la démocratie peut être appréhendée comme une tentative de suppléer à des défauts de la démocratie libérale en la corrigeant par des remèdes républicains, mais qu’elle est simultanément une critique libérale du républicanisme : Tocqueville applique certains correctifs républicains au niveau local, mais il maintient fermement les principes libéraux au niveau national. / The objective of our study is to examine Tocqueville’s philosophy of democracy with regard to liberalism and to republicanism. In the first part, we try to determine the principles of aristocracy and democracy in his political philosophy. We also endeavour to clarify what is for him the ideal democracy and his conception of freedom. In the second part, we analyze the difficulties spotted by him in the liberal and republican conceptions of democracy. In the third part, we try to go deeper into the solutions which he proposes to overcome the defects of democracy. In particular, we pay attention to the three following solutions: associations, decentralization and representation. At the same time, we analyze in depth Tocqueville’s reflections on the “doctrine of the enlightened self-interest” in order to better explain his position concerning a republican problematization of liberalism. In our view, the analysis of the three solutions allows to think that Tocqueville’s philosophy of democracy can be considered as an attempt to compensate some weaknesses of the liberal democracy by correcting them with republican remedies. However, this philosophy is simultaneously a liberal criticism of the republicanism: Tocqueville applies some republican correctives at a local level, but he claims the liberal principles at a national level.

Republicanism is often divided into neo-Roman and neo-Athenian versions. However, both traditions considered separately can provide only a limited and narrow understanding of republicanism and thus deprive the republican political theory of valuable insights. On the contrary, this thesis argues that it would be preferable, both historically and theoretically, to conceive of the neo-Roman and the neo-Athenian strands as branches of a single integrated republican tradition. The thesis begins with a methodological discussion focused on how such an integrated account might be formulated and explains its preference for a conceptual approach that follows the morphology-oriented methodology developed by Michael Freeden. The thesis proceeds to track down the earliest formulations of republican concepts in ancient Greece, then turns to the Roman usage of these concepts and analyses the similarities and differences between the two earliest appearances. The next part concentrates on development of these concepts during the early modern era of classical republicanism in Italy, England and America. Afterwards, the most prominent neo-Athenian and neo-Roman approaches are analysed and interrelated. The last chapter summarises and synthesises the most important findings: (1) Two separate narratives of the...

The recent years have seen the revival of neo-Roman republicanism through the works of Philip Pettit, who has replaced Isaiah Berlin’s taxonomy of positive/negative liberty with freedom as nondomination. This essay compares the neo-Roman conception of nondomination to the liberal conception of noninterference, with the purpose of clarifying whether nondomination is a distinct concept of liberty and preferable to that of noninterference. The essay highlights the exchange between Pettit/Skinner and Carter/Kramer, wherein Carter and Kramer make their case for ‘pure negative liberty’, which is claimed to be the proper articulation of negative liberty. Pure-negative theorists believe that nondomination is a strand of negative liberty, adding nothing new to the concept, whereas their republican counterparts disagree. My essay argues that nondomination is a distinct, preferable concept of liberty, thanks to its view on fundamental unfreedom and the mere presence of arbitrary power, which the pure negative view fails to account for satisfactorily.

Depuis la loi interdisant le port de signes religieux "ostensibles" dans les écoles publiques (2004), un changement progressif s'est opéré en France. De l'interdiction du port du foulard intégral dans l'espace public (2010) aux mesures touchant les parents d'élèves (2012) et les employées des crèches privées (2014), les femmes portant le foulard islamique ont graduellement été exclues de différents espaces publics. Ces mesures sont souvent justifiées au nom de la nécessité de défendre la République ou de revitaliser les valeurs qui la sous-tendent. À travers quels processus politiques y compris discursifs l'exclusion des femmes voilées est-elle devenue une composante de la promotion des valeurs républicaines ?Ma recherche se penche sur cette question à l'aide d'une approche conceptuelle et discursive de l'étude des idéologies politiques. Plus précisément, en ancrant mon analyse dans les discours publics entourant quatre "affaires du voile", ma recherche met en lumière la transformation graduelle du républicanisme français – une construction complexe à travers laquelle les concepts politiques acquièrent un sens. Cette analyse de l'idéologie républicaine française dans le contexte des "affaires du voile" révèle et continuité et changement. Continuité, car les anciens principes de liberté, égalité et fraternité y demeurent centraux ; et changement, car de nouveaux idéaux ont modifié la signification de son noyau conceptuel. Dans le chapitre 4, "Le foulard de l'étudiante : Le succès du sécularisme", j'analyse le début de ce processus. En examinant la controverse publique au sujet du port du foulard islamique dans les écoles publiques, je démontre comment les acteurs politiques français ont graduellement construit la question de l'égalité des sexes – qui, historiquement, a été plutôt marginale dans la pensée républicaine française – comme une valeur contiguë au principe de la laïcité, ouvrant ainsi la porte à d'autres redéfinitions. Dans le chapitre 5, "La burqa dans l'espace public : L'ordre social républicain", mon analyse démontre comment les hommes politiques et les juristes, en visant à interdire le port du voile intégral, ont revivifié et transformé la notion de l'ordre public à travers la construction d'une nouvelle définition de l'ordre social. Dès lors, le républicanisme français s'oriente vers la protection de "valeurs communes". D'un point de vue théorique, je soutiens que ce glissement implique une transformation naissante au sein même du noyau républicain : la priorisation de fraternité aux dépens de liberté et d'égalité. Le chapitre 6, "Baby-Loup et l'emploi privé : de discrimination à la cohésion sociale", et le chapitre 7, "Mères 'voilées' et sorties scolaires : une extension de la norme sociale républicaine", analysent la consolidation et les conséquences du noyau républicain transformé : la priorisation de l'intérêt public au détriment des droits et libertés individuels. Ces chapitres démontrent comment les acteurs politiques et juridiques ont appliqué ce républicanisme remanié aux nouveaux espaces et aux nouveaux groupes. Ce faisant, ils ont contribué à l'émergence et à l'enracinement d'un nouveau discours de cohésion sociale, imprégné par l'exigence de neutralité religieuse individuelle et conditionné par l'exclusion des femmes "voilées" d'une variété d'espaces publics. / Since the law prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools (2004), a gradual development has taken place in France. From the law banning full-face covering in public space (2010) to measures concerning the parents of students (2012) and the employees of private nurseries (2014), women wearing the Islamic headscarf have step-by-step been excluded from different spheres of public life. These measures have been publicly justified by the necessity of defending the French Republic or of reinvigorating its underlying principles. Through which political including discursive processes did the public promotion of republican values come to signify the exclusion of headscarf-wearing Muslim women from public spaces?My research tackles this question by employing a conceptual and discursive approach to the study of political ideology. More specifically, by focusing on the public discourses surrounding four so-called "veil affairs," my research sheds light on the gradual transformation of French republicanism – a complex construct through which political concepts gain meaning. Examining contemporary French republicanism through the context of the "veil affairs" reveals both continuity and change. Continuity, because the age-old principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity still form its cornerstone; and change, because newer ideals have modified the meaning of its conceptual core. In Chapter 4, "The Student's Headscarf: The Success of Sexularism," I analyze the beginning of this process. By examining the public controversy surrounding the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public schools, I show how French political elites gradually constructed the question of gender equality – which, historically, has been rather marginal in French republican thought – as a value adjacent to the principle of laïcité, thereby opening the door for further redefinitions. In Chapter 5, "The Burqa in Public Space: The Republican Social Order," my empirical analysis demonstrates that, in aiming to ban face-covering veils, French political and legal actors ended up reviving and transforming the notion of public order through the construction of a new definition of republican social order. Thus, French republicanism took an important turn towards the protection of "shared values." From a theoretical point of view, I argue that this shift implies a nascent transformation within the very core of the republican-ideological construct: the prioritization of fraternity over liberty and equality. Chapter 6, "Baby-Loup and Private Employment: From Discrimination to Social Cohesion," and Chapter 7, "'Veiled' Mothers and School Outings: Extending the Republican Social Norm," examine the consolidation and consequences of the transformed republican-ideological core: the prioritizing of the "common good" (intérêt public) over individual rights and freedoms. These chapters shed light on how political and legal actors applied the transformed republican ethos to new spheres and new groups of people. In doing so, they contributed to the emergence and entrenchment of a new discourse on social cohesion – one permeated by the requirement of individual religious neutrality and dependent on the exclusion of headscarf-wearing Muslim women from a variety of public spaces.

This dissertation explores the point and process by which American colonists transformed from subjects to citizens. Upon learning of Boston radicals’ destruction of East India tea, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts, a collection of punitive measures designed to rein in that seaport town. In response, American communities from Massachusetts to Georgia drafted resistance resolutions calling on colonists to refrain from importing British merchandise, exporting American resources, and partaking in frivolous pastimes. Boston’s suffering, these communities declared, presented a threat to every colonist. Grassroots activists next called for a Continental Congress to coordinate and enforce a pan-colonial resistance movement to pressure Parliament’s repeal of the Coercive Acts. Once convened, delegates of the First Continental Congress drafted the Articles of Association which incorporated many directives already circulating in the town and county resolutions. Traditionally presented as a colonial boycott of British manufactures, the Association regulated cultural as well as commercial practices. It advised colonists to avoid waste and extravagance and singled out horse racing, cockfighting, theatergoing, and other displays of leisure as examples of moral decay. Echoing the grassroots resolutions, Congress also urged colonists to commit to nonimportation and non-consumption of British wares and nonexportation of American goods. Through these directives, Congress sought to achieve imperial reconciliation and colonial moral regeneration, yet its commitment to self-preservation reveals it focused more on restoring American virtue than returning harmony to the empire. To enforce the Articles of Association, Congress recommended towns and counties to create Committees of Inspection and Observation. Composed of locally elected men, these committees regulated their neighbors’ behavior and condemned violators of the Association as enemies of America. Using colonial newspapers, private letters, pamphlets, Congress’s official journals, Peter Force’s American Archives, and a wealth of other primary and secondary literature, this dissertation reveals how the Continental Association organized local communities of suffering. Members of these communities voluntarily suspended cultural and commercial practices to protect political identities they felt were in danger. In the process, those sacrificing in the common cause separated from the broader imperial community and formed an American political community. / History

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In 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected arguments that the freedom of association in section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereafter, the Charter) protected a positive right to bargain collectively over working conditions. Between 1987 and 2007, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on freedom of association was marked by certain tensions. In particular, the Court rejected arguments that freedom of association could have a collective dimension. In addition, the Court adopted a so-called negative approach to freedom of association, stating that section 2(d) of the Charter could not be used to create obligations for the state. The idea that freedom of association conferred negative (as opposed to positive) individual protection against state interference is typical of a liberal view of rights and freedoms. However, in 2007, in Health Services, the Supreme Court relied on underlying Charter values (specifically autonomy, liberty, equality, democracy and dignity) to extend constitutional protection to the right to collective bargaining. In 2015, this constitutional protection was extended to the right to strike. The use of moral values in constitutional adjudication is widespread. In Canada, Charter values are used both to interpret Charter provisions and to weigh competing rights, notably in the proportionality exercise under section 1 of the Charter. Using moral reconstruction as a methodological approach, this thesis examines the use of the values identified in Health Services throughout the Supreme Court's body of case law. From these values, the thesis develops a so-called republican reconstruction of freedom of association. While liberalism emphasises the freedom of the individual from the state, republicanism aims to ensure non-domination in both the private and public spheres. Equality, when considered from a republican perspective, becomes relational equality. Republicanism is particularly relevant to labour law, which is based on a relationship of subordination identified by republican theorists as a relationship of domination. The final chapter of the thesis explores alternative models for protecting republican freedom in the workplace.

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