Esta dissertação é parte integrante das atividades para a obtenção do título de Mestre em Artes pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação Interunidades em Estética e História da Arte da Universidade de São Paulo (PGEHA-USP). Nela deseja-se identificar alguns conceitos presentes na Fenomenologia Existencial de Jean-Paul Sartre que podem se situar dentro da estrutura de formação do Projeto Moderno na Arquitetura e no Design. O pensamento moderno na arquitetura e o pensamento existencial na filosofia são, ambos, reflexos singulares de uma transformação muito mais ampla e radical na história do mundo ocidental. Porém este período - o final do século XIX e no início do século XX representa para a filosofia e para o campo artístico um momento de ruptura sem precedentes. Este pensamento transformador que gemina tanto na filosofia existencialista quanto na arquitetura moderna associados a estas transformações se evidenciam através dos manifestos, dos tratados e dos escritos desta época. Esta dissertação busca portanto encontrar, através da análise destes dois conjuntos teóricos, alguns conceitos que podem ser inter-relacionados. Ao final do processo espera-se, contudo, que as análises produzidas possam contribuir para ampliar, de um ponto de vista bastante específico, a percepção da formação movimento moderno na arquitetura e no design. / This work is part of the activities to obtain the title of Master of Arts from the Graduate Inter Program in Aesthetics and Art History at the University of São Paulo (USP-PGEHA). It is desired to identify some concepts present in the Existential Phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre that may be located within the training structure Modern Design in Architecture and Design. The modern thinking in architecture and existential thought in philosophy are both unique reflections of a much broader transformation and radical in the history of the Western world. But this time - the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century - is to philosophy and the artistic field a moment of unprecedented disruption. This transformer thought gemina both existentialist philosophy as in modern architecture - associated with these transformations - are evident through the manifestos, treaties and the writings of this time. This paper therefore seeks to find, through the analysis of these two theoretical sets, some concepts that can be interrelated. At the end of the process it is hoped, however, that produced analysis can contribute to enlarge, to a very specific point of view, the perception of training modern movement in architecture and design.

Le solipsisme a été thématisé comme un préalable pour fonder la connaissance au dix-septième siècle. Cette doctrine suggérait, qu’en vue de la certitude, il fallait admettre transitoirement la concevabilité d'un doute portant sur l'existence du monde extérieur en totalité et des autres esprits. L'existence du monde extérieur a pu ainsi être tenue pour établie à l'occasion de preuves de l'existence d'un créateur unique ou tenue pour assurée à l’aide d'une déduction transcendantale. En comparaison, rien ne semble pouvoir prouver l'existence des autres. D'une part, rien ne semble compter comme une preuve a posteriori de l'existence d’autrui, puisque ce doute ne peut s'appuyer sur l'expérience. D'autre part, une preuve permettant de lever ce doute ne peut être produite a priori, puisque l'absence empirique généralisée des autres est concevable a posteriori. Ainsi, rien ne semble exclure la possibilité d'une découverte a priori de son unicité. Cette thèse entreprend de mettre au jour le traitement de cette difficulté par Sartre et Wittgenstein. Les deux philosophes se sont confrontés à l'illusion de confinement qui est le corollaire de l’admission, à titre de possibilité pertinente, de l'absence généralisée des autres esprits. Sartre propose dans L'être et le néant une preuve conceptuelle de l'existence d'autrui pour montrer que ledit problème théorique de l'existence d'autrui est un faux-problème, tandis que Wittgenstein propose dans le Tractatus de dissoudre les problèmes philosophiques de l'existence du monde extérieur et des autres esprits par le biais d'une réflexion sur les conditions d'intelligibilité de l'expression. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit de dissiper l’apparence d’un doute portant sur le monde en totalité et du même coup sur les autres esprits. Non seulement une preuve de l'existence d'autrui est impossible, mais elle est en plus superflue. Ainsi, requérir une telle preuve ne peut que conduire à manquer l’obviété de nos engagements envers les autres, et par là au déni de leurs existences. / Solipsism was conceived as a preliminary to grounding knowledge in the seventeenth century. This doctrine suggested that, in order to achieve certainty, one had to temporarily admit the conceivability of doubt about the existence of other minds and the external world as a whole. The existence of the external world was then taken to be established by means of proofs of the existence of a unique creator, or assured by means of transcendental deduction. By comparison, nothing seems to prove the existence of others. On the one hand, nothing seems to count as proof a posteriori of the existence of others, for the doubt it would dispel cannot be grounded in experience. On the other hand, nor can a proof which would dispel such doubt be produced a priori, for the empirical and generalized absence of others is conceivable a posteriori. Thus, nothing seems to exclude the possibility of an a priori discovery of one’s unicity. This thesis endeavours to bring out the similarity of the treatment of this difficulty by Sartre and Wittgenstein. Each of these philosophers confronted the illusion of confinement that presupposes admitting the generalized absence of others. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a conceptual means to establish that the theoretical problem of the existence of other minds is a pseudo-problem. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein proposes to dissolve the philosophical problems of the existence of the external world and the existence of other minds via reflexion on the intelligibility conditions of expression. Both cases involve dispelling the appearance that doubt about the world and other minds is possible and required. Not only that proof of the existence of other minds is impossible, it is also superfluous. To require such a proof therefore can lead to nothing but missing the obviousness of our commitments to others, and thereby to denying their existence.

Dans ce travail de thèse, nous cherchons à faire dialoguer Sartre et Bataille dont la confrontation dans les années quarante et cinquante a la signification, à notre sens, d’une rencontre entre deux pensées de l’expérience et de l’existence que nous proposons d’appeler respectivement « pensée de la liberté » et « pensée de la souveraineté ». Il s’agit, dans un premier temps, d’esquisser comment ces deux pensées ont pu se rencontrer sous forme de confrontation et, pour ce faire, de restituer l’horizon à partir duquel elles ont pu se formuler : si Sartre a reproché à Bataille d’avoir confondu dans L’expérience intérieure l’attitude scientifique et l’attitude existentialiste et d’avoir décrit ainsi une expérience nullement intérieure, c’est qu’en adoptant une méthode phénoménologique pour décrire la rencontre concrète de l’existence par elle-même en tant qu’existence temporelle, il entend par « expérience » ce que les phénoménologues allemands appellent « Erlebnis » et ce qui est dans son essence une sphère d’immanence radicalement infusionnable avec d’autres sphères du même type, tandis que l’expérience intérieure telle que Bataille la définit culmine précisément dans une fusion de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur que celui-ci considère d’ailleurs comme exigence fondamentale d’une phénoménologie de l’esprit développée et en vue de laquelle il exige une existence immédiate, sans délai, enfoncée dans l’instant. L’enjeu d’une telle divergence sur le sens de l’expérience et, corrélativement, de l’existence est d’autant plus profond que ces deux penseurs ont tous pour dessein d’établir une morale à ceci près qu’il s’agit, pour l’un, d’une morale de la souveraineté dont le sens est paradoxalement hypermoral et, pour l’autre, d’une morale de la liberté qui ne peut être atteinte qu’au terme d’une conversion radicale. En quoi consistent-elles ces deux morales ? Comment sont-elles accrochées à deux pensées différentes voire opposées de l’expérience et de l’existence ? Telles sont les deux questions auxquelles nous tenterons, en dernière instance, de répondre pour mieux mesurer l’enjeu de la confrontation entre Sartre et Bataille et, par là, établir un dialogue qui est de prime abord improbable. / In this dissertation, we seek to construct a dialogue between Sartre and Bataille whose confrontation in the forties and fifties should be considered, in our view, as an encounter between two ways of thinking experience and existence that we would like to call, respectively, « thinking of liberty » and « thinking of sovereignty ». We are going to, firstly, outline how these two thinkings could encounter with each other in a confrontational way and, for this purpose, to restore the horizon from which they were able to formulate themselves : if Sartre criticized Bataille for confusing, in The inner experience, the scientific attitude with the existentialiste one and, therefore, describing an experience which is not inner at all, that’s because in adopting a phenomenological method to describe the concrete encounter of existence – which is temporal – by itself, he understood « experience » as what the German phenomenologists called « Erlebnis », namely a sphere of immanence which is radically infusionnable with other spheres of the same type, while the inner experience as Bataille defined it culminates precisely in a fusion of the inner and the exterior that he considered as the fundamental demanding of a developped phenomenology of mind in responding to which he required an immediate existence, that is to say an existence without daly, immerged in the instant. What’s at stake in such a divergence on the meaning of experience and, correspondingly, of existence has much further implications in that both of these two thinkers had the very intention to establish the morality except that for one, it’s a morality of sovereignty whose meaning is paradoxically hypermoral while for the other, it should be a morality of liberty that can only be reached through a radical conversion. What could we learn from these two moralities ? How are they linked to two different, even opposite ways of thinking experience and existence ? These are the two questions that we will try, finally, to respond in order to better measure the stakes of the confrontation between Sartre and Bataille and thus to establish a dialogue which seems prima facie improbable.

Análise das revistas de cultura Critique e Les Temps Modernes por meio das resenhas sobre Henry Miller e Charles Baudelaire. A dissertação comenta o surgimento das publicações e suas influências (a poética de Georges Bataille e a filosofia de Jean-Paul Sartre). Apresenta o campo intelectual das revistas e editoras no pós-guerra francês (1945-46). Sugere uma reflexão e um vocabulário para definir este novo crítico, um leitor especializado que, pelo ato da escrita, desenvolve a crítica. Também comenta a resenha como gênero, e as referências estruturalistas e sartrianas em ambas publicações. / Analysis of French culture magazines Critique and Les Temps Modernes, through the reviews on the authors Henry Miller and Charles Baudelaire. The text comments the appearance of the publications and its influences (Georges Batailles`s poetics and Jean-Paul Sartre`s philosophy). It presents the intellectual field of the magazines and publishing houses in the French post-war period (1945-46). It suggests a thought and a vocabulary in order to define the new critic character, a specialized reader that writes and produces critic. Finally, comments the genre review and Structuralism and Sartrian references on both magazines.

Our master's thesis is an interdisciplinary study on the play No Exit by Jean-Paul Sartre and its film adaptations - the French one directed by Jacqueline Audrey in 1954, and the English one directed by Philip Saville in 1964. The work is divided into two parts - literary and cinematographic analysis. In the first part we will focus on the play No Exit in the historical, cultural and philosophical context, find its role among the other literary texts of Sartre and study in more detail the text itself - its form, main motifs, etc. In the second part we will analyze its cinematographic potential. Comparing the two adaptations with each other and with the play, we will start with the general characteristics and then move on to the comparative analysis of two chosen episodes.

No description available.

The aim of this diploma thesis is a philosophical interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 - 1980) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906 - 1995). In the first part, it deals with the conception of the Other in the Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness and analyzes (after a brief introduction to Sartre's philosophy) concrete aspects of Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity. This part ends with a critique of Sartre's theory, which enable us to interpret the Levinas's theory as an alternative conception of intersubjektivity. The analysis in the second part is based on the Levinas's book Totality and infinity. The final part sums up the main differences of both conceptions. Key words: intersubjectivity, the Other, existence, freedom, ethics, Sartre, Levinas

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University. / The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate, by an examination of four philosophic points of view, the nature of selfhood. Although their thoughts diverge, the common assumption of Ralph Barton Perry, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Soren Kierkegaard appears to be that the self, rather than society, nature, or God, is the root of morality. Perry's philosophy, operating from the springboard of his polemic against idealism, is an expression of his doctrine of scientific method: that reality, including the reality of the self, is best discovered when the distorting effects of the observing self are minimized. These distortions include the several "fallacies of idealism" as well as the general idealistic error of assuming that being and being known are synonymous. Removal of the distortions reveals a self integrated with nature; a) epistemologically, in that consciousness means a structural unity of the objects of consciousness without residue; b) naturalistically, in that responses of the self to its environment are those of a natural, organic entity; c) morally, in that interest is the determiner of value, and the consummation of values--harmonious happiness--is derivable from that interest.[TRUNCATED]

O presente trabalho tem como proposta discutir as repercussões da filosofia de Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) nos campos do direito e da política. A busca de Sartre por uma concepção concreta da liberdade é o fio condutor de sua trajetória filosófica. Ao constituir as bases de seu pensamento sobre o tema da liberdade, Sartre evidencia a vocação política de sua filosofa. Com isso, procuramos demonstrar que o desenvolvimento filosófico de Sartre é marcado pelo aprofundamento das noções de liberdade e projeto, não havendo, portanto, ruptura, mas continuidade entre as obras de Sartre. Sendo assim, desde suas primeiras obras (em especial em O Ser e o Nada), Sartre aponta para a construção de uma ética. À medida que o tema das possibilidades concretas da realização da liberdade se desenvolve, as reflexões de Sartre voltam-se mais e mais para o direito e a política. Assim, a tese foi estruturada em três unidades. A primeira propõe-se a estabelecer as bases do existencialismo e de as primeiras reflexões sobre a ética e o direito presentes em O Ser e o Nada e os Cadernos para uma moral; a segunda é dedicada ao estudo do pensamento de Sartre acerca da constituição das estruturas sócio-políticas. Neste ponto, em que a ênfase na História e o diálogo com o marxismo são cruciais, procuramos demonstrar como Crítica da razão dialética inicia amplas discussões sobre o problema da forma jurídica e de sua especificidade histórica. A terceira é última unidade é voltada à discussão da política em Sartre, com destaque para as relações entre legalidade e violência e a questão da democracia. / The present work has the purpose to discuss the repercussions of the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) in the Law and politic areas. The search of Sartre for a concrete conception of liberty is the conducting line of its philosophical trajectory. By constituting the basis of its thought on the subject of liberty, Sartre evidences the politic vocation of its philosophy. In this sense, we seek to demonstrate that the philosophical development of Sartre is marked by deepening the notions of liberty and project, thus, not having rupture, but continuity between the work of Sartre. Therefore, since its first work (in special in Being and Nothingness), Sartre aims the construction of an ethic. To the extent that the theme of the concrete possibilities of achievement of liberty develops itself, the thoughts of Sartre become more and more directed to the Law and politics. Thus, the thesis was structured in three unities. The first intends to establish the basis of the existentialism and the prime reflections on ethic and Law provided in Being and Nothingness and Notebooks for an Ethics; the second is dedicated to the study of Sartres though regarding the constitution of social-political structures. On this point, in which the emphasis in the History and the dialogue with the Marxism is crucial, we seek to demonstrate how Critique of Dialectical Reason begins wide discussions on the problem of the legal form and its historical specificity. The third and last unity is oriented to the discussion of politics in Sartre, with notability on the relations between legality and violence and the matter of the democracy.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 343433.pdf: 990917 bytes, checksum: 9d54061deb9a39bdca02783e0b957ae2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-01-10 / O conceito de m?-f?, concebido por meio da ontologia fenomenol?gica sartriana, permite buscar um caminho em dire??o a uma filosofia moral da exist?ncia. Tomando-se as premissas ontol?gicas sobre o modo de ser do Para-si-para-outro, a liberdade ? uma condena??o existencial. Essa condi??o pode ser assumida na ang?stia ou encoberta na m?-f?. Ao assumir a ang?stia, a consci?ncia assume a sua liberdade em situa??o. Ao mascar?-la, a consci?ncia faz um esfor?o para Ser que se mostra na situa??o e, portanto, traz implica??es para a Alteridade. A fim de aprofundar os reflexos que a conduta de m?-f? apresenta na rela??o com o outro, a obra sartriana ? tomada em todo o seu conjunto. Com isso, torna-se poss?vel identificar as condutas de m?-f? e descrever paradigmas de condutas inaut?nticas. Embora Sartre n?o tenha elaborado filosoficamente uma resposta sobre as conseq??ncias morais da m?-f?, h? no conjunto de sua obra elementos que permitem esclarecer o problema. A conduta aut?ntica coloca como fim a liberdade em situa??o frente ao outro. Justamente porque a m?-f? tem conseq??ncias morais que a autenticidade deve ser preferida e buscada por meio da convers?o moral.