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11	Marina maktdemonstrationer och tvångsutövning : En studie om örlogsfartygs påverkan på utfallet av marint tvång. Blandford, Petter January 2023 (has links) Present naval disputes indicates that naval compellence has endured since imperial expansionism and is still an active part of nation’s maritime diplomacy and strategy. In this study, I argue that sea power is more than a symbol of the aggressor’s national power and have a substantial impact on the outcome of naval compellence. Due to the exclusiveness of specific types of warships, the strategic prioritisation creates strategic cost that can signal resolve and credibility as sunk cost. Submarines also creates the opportunity for private signalling, without public transparency. Combining data from multiple datasets that compares the outcome of naval compellence between 1918-2011 with the naval power of the aggressor, this study presents systematic evidence that battleships increase the probability of successful naval compellence while carriers, conventional and nuclear submarines can’t be proven to have a significant impact on the outcome. Marin diplomati marint tvång kostsam signalering marina maktdemonstrationer sjömakt Övrig annan samhällsvetenskap
12	Ekonomiska sanktioner ur ett sjömaktsteoretiskt perspektiv Elmberg, Andreas January 2015 (has links) Fleets have the ability to affect an adversary’s use of the seas for transportation. Nations have in numerous occasions exercised this power in order to ravage their opponent’s trade in times of conflict with the purpose of diminishing their military might. Great naval thinkers like Mahan and Corbett have described this use of seapower during conflicts in great depth but theories regarding the use of seapower to affect a nation’s peacetime economy in order to achieve limited political goals is lacking. This thesis attempts to analyze the use of seapower in the form of economic sanctions to answer the question; “How is seapower exercised in economic sanctions?” in order to remedy this. The results show that seapower is mostly used to halt the inward flow of goods to a nation and general sanctions are more often used than sanctions targeting specific commodities. What these sanctions aim to achieve is often to limit military capacity and to disrupt military aggression. This thesis comes to the conclusions that a force capable of operating anywhere on the globe for an extended period of time is vital for the effectiveness of economic sanctions, seapower is a necessary part of the enforcement of economic sanctions and that naval theory has been too preoccupied with large scale conflicts and neglected the use of seapower to achieve limited political goals with economic measures during times of peace. Economic Sanctions Guerre de Course Seapower Mahan Corbett Commerce warfare Ekonomiska sanktioner Guerre de Course Sjömakt Mahan Corbett Handelskrig
13	"Åtgärder som befrämja rikets försvar och överensstämma med flaggans värdighet" : En undersökning av Sveriges marinstrategi våren 1941 Strömgren Lasell, Victor January 2021 (has links) Denna uppsats undersöker Sveriges marinstrategi i händelse av krig med Tyskland respektive Sovjeteunionen våren 1941 utifrån Chefen för Marinens instruktioner för krigsfall I respektive II. / This paper explores Swedish naval strategy during the Second World War (1939-1945), an area that has not seen significant research. This paper focuses on how Swedish maritime forces were to be used in case of war with Germany (War Plan I; Krigsfall I), and with the Soviet Union (War plan II; Krigsfall II). This paper focuses on Swedish planning during the spring of 1941. The period after the fall of France (June 1940) and before the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941) was a period where both Germany and the Soviet Union possessed what could be described as strategic freedom of action. This means large parts of their armed forces could have been used for operations against Sweden. The basis for each potential conflict was different: Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and could launch a ground invasion of Sweden directly; meanwhile Sweden and the Soviet Union were still separated by Finland and the Baltic Sea. Maritime forces would therefore play very different roles in the two War Plans. No official plans in case of war with the western Allies existed at the time, and hence this has not been explored here. The conclusion of this paper is that Swedish naval strategy at the time was somewhat offensive and focused on gaining sea control, at least in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Bothnia, to maintain freedom of action to be able to conduct troop movements along the Swedish coast, to the island of Gotland, and to Finland. Sweden 1941 World War two Second world war WW2 naval strategy strategy see power naval power war planning defence planning Nazi Germany Soviet Union Finland Ruotsi 1941 Toinen maailmansota Strategia Laivasto laivaston strategia puolustuksen suunnittelu Natsi-Saksa Neuvostoliitto Suomi Schweden 1941 zweites Weltkrieg Marine Strategie Marine-Strategie See-Strategie Flotten-Strategie Verteidigungsplanung Kriegsplanung NS-Deutschland Deutschland Sowjetunion Finnland Sverige andra världskriget 1941 flottan marinstrategi strategi krigsplanering flottstrategi sjömakt försvarsplanering Nazityskland Sovjetunionen Finland History Historia Other Humanities not elsewhere specified Övrig annan humaniora

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