In this thesis there have been identified that there is a window in research between the two phenomena on (1) how pirates have influenced the global economy and (2) how tactics adaptation between the actors in the Gulf of Aden and around the Somali basin have affected each other. The purpose is to investigate this relationship between the fundamental capabilities and the cost of tactical adaptation. With a theory-developing approach I try to explain how these two phenomena affects our ways of distinguishing maritime tactic effectiveness. The result of the paper is that there is a difference between the tactically effective and the most cost-effective tactical adaptation. The theory of the fundamental capabilities boundaries to cost, illuminates which tactical adaptation to be the most efficient, both cost-effective and tactically efficient and that is passive measures.

The thesis covers foreign military interventions in Somalia (1992-1995) and former Yugoslavia (1999). First, the definition of the humanitarian intervention is presented as well as factors influencing the success of intervention. Then both cases are analysed using the factors defined earlier. The success of the intervention is sought in two realms. First, whether the relevant case corresponds with the definition of the humanitarian intervention. Second, whether the aims set at the beginning of the intervention were achieved. According to the author the intervention in Somalia did not succeed, although it had better prospects to achieve the aims than the bombing of Yugoslavia at first sight. The Kosovo case was, on the contrary, a successful humanitarian intervention, although it was a very controversial example of the use of military force.

This paper presents the complexity of peacebuilding by looking at different types of peacebuilding models. To understand the peacebuilding models, this paper reviews different scholarly pieces of literature on the topic of peacebuilding. Furthermore, the paper focuses on the case of Somalia to determine the suitable peacebuilding model for Somalia. Somalia has faced one of the longest civil wars in Africa after the collapse of the government. To propose suitable peacebuilding for Somalia, the paper reviews different types of peacebuilding attempts that were conducted in Somalia by both international organizations and local peacemakers. These processes include an UN-led top-down approach and a bottom-up approach initiated by elders and local respected individuals. From reviewing different types of peacebuilding literature, the finding reveals conflict resolution specifically Ramsbotham et al (2011) as the best suitable peacebuilding model for Somalia.

Contemporary peace operations are deployed to increasingly complex, high-risk environments where localised armed groups, often those that can influence the trajectory of the conflict are not at the table, at the same time militaries are mandated to facilitate social, economic and political transformative processes in recovered areas. By the opening of the twenty-first century, the distinction between peacebuilding and military interventions converged both in policy and practice and increasing pressure are placed on the troop-contributing countries to adapt to the dynamics of ‘multidimensional peace operations. Drawing upon the intersection between the academic bodies of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, this research argues that there is a growing amount of empirically grounded literature that seeks to critically assess missions’ peacebuilding capability, and more specifically its impact on local settings. Yet, most studies tend to be framed in relation to conflict abatement along reductionist approaches to development rather than analysing how and in what ways such missions aid in providing a stable polity, thus suggesting a need of further investigation about the phenomena. In contribution to the community of practice(s), this research draws upon the latest theoretical trend of peacebuilding, abiding to a system perspective of the 5 Capabilities Framework (5Cs). This, in order to attain an increased understanding of military actors’ involvement and ability to undertake early peacebuilding tasks, by studying the case of the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Jubbaland region. Moreover, the research was operationalised through an on-ground collection of data in Kenya and Somalia, using unstructured and semi-structured interviews and draws upon a purposive sampling method to gather perspectives from a variety of actors involved in peace operation affairs. The study finds that the AMISOM KDF has played a key role in shaping the organisation’s peacebuilding policy, with a diverse portfolio engagement of both top-down and bottom-up character. Working predominantly through informal structures, much of their engagement is not aligned with the AMISOM civilian headquarters, in response to an environment with many challenges, resulting in a patchwork of practices with sectoral difference. Analytically, the 5Cs framework posit that an organisation must strike a balance between all capabilities in order to produce social value, something that the Kenyan contingents have struggled to achieve. While this unpacks a view of moderate, to low capacity for peacebuilding, it also generates an overall critique to the framework as it promotes a scenario which seems impossible to realise. Despite its ‘system-wide’ contribution, questions remain regarding the value of the framework in analysing local peacebuilding engagement in peace operations.

Contemporary peace operations are deployed to increasingly complex, high-risk environments where localised armed groups, often those that can influence the trajectory of the conflict are not at the table, at the same time militaries are mandated to facilitate social, economic and political transformative processes in recovered areas. By the opening of the twenty-first century, the distinction between peacebuilding and military interventions converged both in policy and practice and increasing pressure are placed on the troop contributing countries to adapt to the dynamics of ‘multidimensional peace operations’. Drawing upon the intersection between the academic bodies of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, this research argues that there is a growing amount of empirically grounded literature that seeks to critically assess missions’ peacebuilding capability, and more specifically its impact on local settings. Yet, most studies tend to be framed in relation to conflict abatement along reductionist approaches to development rather than analysing how and in what ways such missions aid in providing a stable polity, thus suggesting a need of further investigation about the phenomena. In contribution to the community of practice(s), this research draws upon the latest theoretical trend of peacebuilding, abiding to a system perspective of the 5 Capabilities Framework (5Cs). This, in order to attain an increased understanding of military actors’ involvement and ability to undertake early peacebuilding tasks, by studying the case of the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Jubbaland region. Moreover, the research was operationalised through an on-ground collection of data in Kenya and Somalia, using unstructured and semi-structured interviews and draws upon a purposive sampling method to gather perspectives from a variety of actors involved in peace operation affairs. The study finds that the AMISOM KDF have played a key role in shaping the organisation’s peacebuilding policy, with a diverse portfolio engagement of both top-down and bottom-up character. Working predominantly through informal structures, much of their engagement is not aligned with the AMISOM civilian headquarters, in response to an environment with many challenges, resulting in a patchwork of practices with sectoral difference. Analytically, the 5Cs framework posit that an organisation must strike a balance between all capabilities in order to produce social value, something that the Kenyan contingents have struggled to achieve. While this unpacks a view of moderate, to low capacity for peacebuilding, it also generates an overall critique to the framework as it promotes a scenario which seems impossible to realise. Despite its ‘system-wide’ contribution, questions remain regarding the value of the framework in analysing local peacebuilding engagement in peace operations.

This master thesis deals with the approaches of international actors, especially UN, EU and USA, to the concept of failed states, which are demonstrated on the illustrative example of a state of this category, i.e. Somalia. We think of failed states as a security threat, with which the international community provisionally cannot deal. The master thesis discusses how the international actors deal with this issue in terms of its solution and how they think of the failed states in terms of sovereignty. On the selected case of Somalia it is subsequently illustrated that approaches of selected international actors are not very heterogeneous. The international community agrees to support the central government, although it is not recognized in the whole territory of the state, and endeavors to rebuild a functional state. Although the state is internally totally dysfunctional, its external sovereignty is still recognized.

Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit der Reaktion der Europäischen Union (EU) auf den so wahrgenommenen Zerfall des somalischen Staates. Sie nimmt sowohl den dominierenden Diskurs zu Somalia als auch die politische Praxis der EU gegenüber Somalia sowie gegenüber Somaliland und Puntland, die hier als neue soziale Räume bzw. De-facto-Staaten diskutiert werden, in den Fokus. Es werden Kerndokumente der EU-Somalia-Politik und Aussagen des mit Somalia betrauten Personals im Hinblick auf Raum- und Territorialitätsbezüge diskursiv analysiert. Die empirische Untersuchung hebt darauf ab, den internationalen Umgang mit Somalia – insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Politik- und Handlungsfeld der Entwicklungskooperation und seine Akteure – innerhalb eines spezifischen Spannungsfelds zu analysieren. Dieses Spannungsfeld ist durch politische Kontinuität in Form staatszentrierter Politikansätze auf der einen Seite und pragmatische Anpassungen an veränderte räumliche Realitäten in der politischen Praxis auf der anderen Seite gekennzeichnet.

State failure impacts international relations through the spill-over effects it has beyond the failed state. The international response to state failure: The case of Somalia attempts to answer the research question "Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)? This question is answered through descriptive-analytical research approach using the Neo-Realist theory within a globalised world. Concepts of legitimacy, authority and sovereignty in relation to the international response are explored where response takes the form of Intervention and humanitarian intervention that could be informed by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or go as far as nation building. Various annually published indices that examine and rank failed states are analysed which collectively and independently indicate that Somalia has been the number one failed state since 2008. Historically, the international response to Somalia prior to state collapse in 1991 forms the foundation to the response as well as accounting for the importance of complex internal clan politics. The background to how the international response has been, plays a key role in understanding where the international response‘s motives are positioned on scale of humanitarian versus security motives for intervention. The regional dynamics are explained through the Regional Security Complex (RSC). The security power political motives are seen through Anti-terror motives in a post 9/11 world and the various international responses to the different forms of attempts of interim governments and their opposition movements. Most notably, Al Shabaab, who formally merged with Al Qaeda in 2012, has been a focus point for the international response. The African Union (AU) mission in Somalia AMISOM is analysed from its humble beginnings to a force to be reckoned with. Due to the failure in Somalia for over 20 years, 14 per cent of its population form part of the influential Diaspora group. State building has emerged as one of the major international responses to state failure with the motive of avoiding nationwide humanitarian crisis. Yet the inaction of the past decade has lead to large spread famine in 2011. The security motive of regional and international players has overshadowed a pure humanitarian response in the past but the immensity of the crisis in 2011 has lead to a global humanitarian response. A new window of opportunity has presented itself with the appointment of the new president of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in September 2012. The international response to state failure has placed security first and has acted accordingly to limit the international economic and security effects of piracy, terrorism and refugee flows. Nation building has come second although, there have been attempts at achieving a uniform response to the failure in Somalia, neo realist real politik reigns. The ideal of a golden mean, where a balance is achieved between security and humanitarian motives, could only be achieved if Somalia starts addressing its internal issues that have caused and resulted from the failure, which is far from straightforward. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

After Berlin Conference in 1884 to 1885, Somalia was partitioned into five parts by Britain, Italy, and French. In 1960 two parts gained independence and formed the Somali Republic, and since then successive Somali governments sought to incorporate the other three parts of Somali territories under Ethiopia, Kenya and French Somaliland known as Djibouti into Greater Somalia.The aim of this study has been to explore and analyze the causes, and the impact of the Somalia’ irredentism on political stability in Somalia. In more specifically, the main objective has been to critically examine how Somali irridentism policy has been pursued, what challenges faced and how it has affected the political stability of the post-colonial Somali state from 1960 to 1990.The analysis presented in this study has shown that the causes of Somali irredentism are combined factors that helped rise Somali irredentism. The analysis has argued that Somalia’s quest for irredentism policy had a huge impact on Somalia’s political stability, including, but not limited to, creating enemies and alienating allies from neighbouring countries to western and eastern blocs, as well as interstate conflict with Ethiopia which ended with Somalia defeat. Finally, Somalia’s defeat, which resulted from irredentism’s venture, caused disunity among the national army, refugee crisis, financial burden and the rise of armed opposition movements that finally ousted the military regime led by Siad Barre. This was followed by state collapse and protracted civil war.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary approach that studies the relationship between power, language, ideology, and social structures in the various forms of discourse.  Fairclough’s three-dimensional model was employed as the foundation and van Dijk’s ideological square as an assist to deepen the analytical focus on the speeches held by George H. W Bush addressing Somalia and Kuwait. The size of conflict and period differ, this study sees the relevance of comparing the two speeches since they were given by the same person during his period as presidents of the United States and Commander in Chief. The results have shown how Bush uses language to lay arguments for U.S. military action in the out-group nations. By employing concepts such as national self-glorification, empathy, lexicalization, victimization, and polarization: He lay the grounds for the U.S. interventions through language. The results show that representing the United States in a positive light and the out-groups in a negative light e.g. as threat leads to the justification for U.S. intervention but also exposes the underlying power structures and inequality of power.