Notre thèse offre une lecture des clivages philosophiques à l’arrière-plan de la trajectoire sociale-démocrate. Nous dégageons ainsi deux modèles interprétatifs des institutions sociales-démocrates : le modèle du compromis et celui du libéralisme égalitaire. Sortie de l’orbite marxiste orthodoxe et sur fond d’antinomie entre capitalisme et socialisme, la social-démocratie classique a bien été mise en place dans une logique de compromis par des partis sociaux-démocrates attachés au principe d’appropriation socialiste. Nous avançons qu’il est également possible de réinterpréter le résultat de cette trajectoire historique à partir des exigences rawlsiennes de la justice comme équité, à condition de les étendre à la gouvernance d’entreprise. Ces deux modèles interprétatifs s’opposent sur la question du pluralisme des conceptions de la justice et engagent chacune une conception spécifique de la justice sociale. De plus, ils entraînent des réponses distinctes à la crise contemporaine de la social-démocratie. Le modèle du compromis adapte son projet au nouvel équilibre des forces résultant d’une sociologie politique renouvelée : c’est la piste empruntée par le New Labour. Le modèle libéral égalitaire invite plutôt, sur la base d’une défense de la teneur rawlsienne des principes de justice, à une adaptation des institutions permettant de garantir ou de restaurer leur stabilité. Au final, l’écart entre ces deux identifications possibles constitue l’une des questions majeures auxquelles la tradition sociale-démocrate devra répondre pour clarifier le modèle qu’elle souhaite assumer au XXIème siècle. / In spite of a vast number of political studies on social democracy, little attention has been devoted to its underlying philosophical principles. This doctoral thesis sets out the philosophical distinctions which are crucial to understanding the social-democratic trajectory. It identifies two models through which social democracy can be interpreted, the first centred on the idea of political compromise and the second on liberal egalitarianism. The former echoes the historical development of social democracies. Social democratic parties diverged from Marxist orthodoxy whilst retaining the socialist principle of just appropriation. In this context, social democratic institutions took shape as social democrats compromised with capitalist interests. We suggest, in the second model, that the institutions born through this process are consistent with the Rawlsian perspective of justice as fairness, provided we expand its scope to corporate governance. These rival interpretations of social democracy differ in their conception of social justice and in their stance on the pluralism of conceptions of justice. Moreover, they provide distinct answers to the contemporary crisis of social democracy. The model based on compromise adapts its programme to a new balance of political power resulting from a renewed political sociology – the path followed by the New Labour. The liberal egalitarian model seeks instead to adapt those institutions that can restore support for the Rawlsian principles of justice. Ultimately, the tension between these two interpretations is one of the major questions social democrats need to address to clarify the model they want to put forward in the 21st Century.

There is circumstantial and scientific evidence of nepotism in Europe and USA, and among politicians, judges and other elites. Despite this, an access to positions of power in a liberal democracy is restricted in the sense that occupational following in the offices is subject to public scrutiny. There is a conflict between a personal obligation to promote one's kin and a public obligation to promote liberty. This public duty emerges from a duty to allow access to offices of power to those who have the misfortune of not being born as dynastic followers. It is based on John Rawls's original position which is a thought experiment establishing an impartial environment to detect chief principles adjudicating conflicts of moral doctrines, fairly. In it, the condition of impartiality is achieved by means which are found in this dissertation to be excessive. Its blanked ban on biases immolates even those biases which contribute to fairness, despite their partiality. When nepotism is partly considered an expression of altruism, it shows a capacity to increase cohesion, impede free-driving and improve economy. In order to preserve these virtues, an improved condition of impartiality is offered to enhance Rawls's theory and to classify instances of nepotism according to their effects on improving or hampering...

John Rawls‟s stated intergenerational justice scheme, known as the just-savings principle, does not include an institutional concern for the environment and is therefore incomplete and incapable of maintaining meaningfully just relations between generations. The theory‟s emphasis on economic theory and capital accumulation demonstrates a misinterpretation of environmental issues and concerns as well as their underlying causes and repercussions. This lapse in Rawls‟s intergenerational scheme exposes flaws in his larger theory of justice by leaving the stability of society in question and placing arbitrary burdens on generations and peoples without institutional recourse. However, by supplementing justice as fairness (JAF) with Rawls‟s other writings, such as The Law of Peoples, a more satisfactory outline for justice between generations can be achieved and a more comprehensive scheme of intergenerational justice can be incorporated into Rawls‟s theory of justice

L’approche des capabilités a été caractérisée par un développement fulgurant au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années. Bien que formulée à l’origine par Amartya Sen, détenteur du Prix Nobel en économie, Martha Nussbaum reprit cette approche dans le but de s’en servir comme fondation pour une théorie éthico-politique intégrale du bien. Cependant, la version de Nussbaum s’avéra particulièrement vulnérable à plusieurs critiques importantes, mettant sérieusement en doute son efficacité globale. À la lumière de ces faits, cette thèse vise à évaluer la pertinence théorique et pratique de l’approche des capabilités de Nussbaum, en examinant trois groupes de critiques particulièrement percutantes formulées à son encontre. / The capabilities approach has seen significant development over the past quarter century, branching out into a variety of fields and directions. Originally developed by Nobel Prize Laureate Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has sought to extend this approach beyond its mainly instrumental role into a tangible foundation for a full-fledged ethical-political theory of the good. However, this move has attracted a great number of criticisms levelled against Nussbaum’s specific version of the capabilities approach. In this thesis, I identify three main groups of observations under which said criticisms can be classified, and assess their respective strength and tenability.

La Valeur statistique de la vie humaine (VSVH) est un outil d’analyse économique, qui est définie comme la valeur qu’une personne est prête à payer (CAP) pour réduire le risque de mortalité ou de morbidité. L’intérêt d’un tel outil est d’estimer monétairement le bénéfice social d’un projet d’investissement destiné à réduire le risque, mais aussi d’établir un arbitrage entre plusieurs alternatives. Répondre à l’aléa moral dans un contexte de rareté des ressources est parfaitement adéquat avec la VSVH. Avec l’estimation des personnes de leurs capacités de paiement en fonction de leurs perceptions du risque et de leur niveau de revenu, les personnes sont positionnées comme les seules juges de la valeur de leurs vies. Parce que, les personnes déterminent librement les CAPs en fonction de leurs préférences personnelles et que ces préférences sont intégrées dans la détermination d’un choix social, la VSVH ne contredit pas le cadre normatif d’établissement d’une décision. Néanmoins, le welfarisme comme une source des méthodes d’estimation de la VSVH est en relation directe avec l’utilitarisme. Au final, la valeur estimée par la VSVH est de nature subjective. Dans le domaine de la santé, la VSVH doit dépasser le cadre subjectif d’une estimation pour répondre à l’éthique normative qui décrit la pratique médicale, notamment la prise en considération de l’autonomie personnelle, la notion personnelle de la bonne vie et la notion universelle de la personne. L’objectif de notre travail est de rechercher les arguments d’établissement d’une valeur de référence de la VSVH qui endosse un cadre normatif. Cela nécessite une analyse approfondie au sein de la théorie économique du bien-être. / The value of statistical life (VSL) is an economic analytical tool, which is defined as the value that a person is ready to pay (WTP) in order to reduce the risk mortality or morbidity. The advantage of such a tool is to monetarily estimate the social benefit of an investment project which is made to reduce the risk, but also to establish an arbitrage between several alternatives. Respond to the moral hazard in a context pertaining to the scarcity of resources, which is perfectly in keeping with VSL. With people’s estimation on their willingness to pay, depending on how they perceive risks and their income level, people are positioned as the sole judges as for the value of their lives. Because people freely determine the WTP depending on their personal preferences and these preferences are included in order to determine a social choice. The value of statistical life doesn’t contradict the normative framework of establishing a decision. Nonetheless, welfarism which is a source of estimating methods of VSL is directly related to utilitarianism. Eventually, the estimated value by VSL is subjective nature. In the health sector, the VSL needs to surpass the subjective framework of an estimation in order to answer the normative ethic which describes the medical practice, especially by taking personal self-sufficiency into account but also the personal notion of a good life and the universal notion of the person. Researching establishing arguments of reference value pertaining to VSL which takes on a normative framework and this is objective when it comes to our work. This theoretically requires an in-depth analysis within the economic theory of well-being.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ALVARO LUIZ TRAVASSOS DE AZEVEDO GONZAGA.pdf: 394187 bytes, checksum: c7fe350cb81c24acab2362c3498a25ff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-02-02 / The present work intends to study the change in the platonic doctrine from the Young Dialogues to the Average Dialogues, concerning the Theory of the Cardinal Virtues (Justice, Moderation, Courage and Wisdom). We will analyze the unicity of the Virtues in Protagoras, as well as the possibility of their dissociation in The Republic. Still in The Republic, we shall explore how Justice is constructed in the idealistic platonic city. Finally, we will approach the possibility of the conflict between the soul and the acrasia / O presente trabalho predispõe-se a estudar a mudança da doutrina platônica, dos Diálogos Jovens para os Diálogos Médios, no que diz respeito à Teoria das Virtudes Cardinais (Justiça, Temperança, Coragem e Sabedoria). Analisaremos a unicidade das virtudes na obra Protágoras, bem como a possibilidade de sua separabilidade na obra A República. Ainda em A República, será estudado como se constrói a Justiça na cidade ideal platônica. Por fim, abordaremos a possibilidade do conflito da alma com a acrasia

A questão da justiça é tema sempre presente nas perquirições da filosofia do direito. Como tema recorrente deve ser submetido a novas investigações à luz de paradigmas teóricos alternativos e inovadores. A teoria dos sistemas de Niklas Luhmann representa um marco teórico capaz de inaugurar novos percursos investigativos no estudo da função do direito e de sua relação com a justiça, ora como função, ora como capacidade de adaptação. A ideia da autopoiese e sua elaboração na teoria dos sistemas de Luhmann torna possível observar essa relação entre direito e justiça dentro do contexto do aumento da complexidade e da contingência na sociedade moderna. A presente tese busca produzir uma investigação jusfilosófica, com inspiração interdisciplinar ao combinar-se com especulações teoréticas da sociologia jurídica de inspiração luhmanniana. Ao utilizar uma metodologia fundada na pesquisa bibliográfica primacialmente nos idiomas originais, a tese persegue a reconstrução da teoria da justiça na perspectiva do funcional-estruturalismo de Niklas Luhmann. Na consecução deste projeto, a tese utiliza a metáfora do horizonte, de matriz fenomenológica, para propor a dualidade entre justiça operativo-funcional e justiça adaptativo-mutante. Dualidade que servirá de baliza para conclusões desta tese que poderá trazer uma contribuição original à cultura jurídica nacional. / The problem of justice is an ever-present issue in the investigations of philosophy of law. As a recurring theme, it should be subjected to further investigation in the light of alternative and innovative theoretical paradigms. The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann is a theoretical framework capable of opening new routes for studies and researches on the role of law and its relation to justice, either as function either as adaptability. The idea of autopoiesis and its elaboration in Luhmann´s systems theory makes it possible to observe the relationship between law and justice within the context of the increased complexity and contingency in modern society. This thesis aims to produce an investigation in the philosophy of law with interdisciplinary inspiration when combined with theoretical speculations of legal sociology of luhmannian inspiration. Using a methodology based on a primary bibliographic research in works in their original language, the thesis pursues the reconstruction of the theory of justice from the perspective of functional-structuralism as thought by Niklas Luhmann. In pursuing this project, the thesis uses the metaphor of the horizon, in its phenomenological matrix, to propose the duality between justice as operation and adaptation (mutant). This duality will serve as a beacon for the conclusions produced in this thesis that can bring an original contribution to legal culture.

Nous proposons dans cette thèse une approche critique de la philosophie politique de Jürgen Habermas, qui vise à interroger la conception du discours sur laquelle elle se fonde. De ses premiers textes sur «l’espace public» à la théorie politique et du droit qu’élabore Droit et démocratie, Habermas approfondit l’intuition selon laquelle c’est à travers une certaine pratique du discours argumenté que se forment les espaces de communication, de délibération, et de décision, sans la vitalité desquels la démocratie ne saurait être «radicale». Il convient dès lors de reconstruire cette théorie du discours qui sous-tend sa pensée politique, aux différents niveaux où elle est opératoire : la pratique du langage ordinaire qui est la nôtre lorsque nous communiquons dans la vie de tous les jours ; celle que nous mettons en œuvre en tant que sujets politiques lorsque nous revendiquons des droits dans l’espace public ; celle enfin qui nous permet d’argumenter selon un point de vue moral lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer les principes de justice. Nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle les normes fondamentales du discours, qu’Habermas établit à un niveau quasi transcendantal, doivent être reconduites à une hétéronomie qui est celle des conditions matérielles du discours. La philosophie sociale d’inspiration matérialiste qu’Horkheimer s’emploie à construire dans les années 1930 ouvre la voie d’une telle analyse. Nous reconstituons à cet effet le débat interne à l’École de Francfort sur la question de savoir comment le matérialisme critique de Marx doit être interprété. / In this dissertation I offer a critical examination of Jurgen Habermas’s political philosophy while questioning the conception of discourse which it is grounded in. From his first texts on the “public space” to the legal and political theory elaborated in Law and Democracy, Habermas explores the intuition that it is through a certain practice of argumentative discourse that spaces of communication, deliberation and decision are formed, the vitality of which is crucial to a truly “radical” democracy. The theory of discourse underpinning his political thought must hence be reconstructed at the different levels it operates on, including the practice of ordinary language through which we communicate in everyday life, the discourse we apply as political subjects when we claim rights in the public space, and the discourse which enables us to form arguments from a moral point of view when principles of justice need to be determined. My thesis supports the idea that fundamental norms of discourse, which Habermas establishes on a quasi-transcendental level, must be confronted to the heteronomy of material conditions of discourse. The materialist-derived philosophy which Horkheimer strove to reconstruct in the 1930s paves the way for this analysis. I therefore reconstitute the debate within the Frankfurt School on the question of how Marx’s historical materialism should be interpreted.

A questão da justiça é tema sempre presente nas perquirições da filosofia do direito. Como tema recorrente deve ser submetido a novas investigações à luz de paradigmas teóricos alternativos e inovadores. A teoria dos sistemas de Niklas Luhmann representa um marco teórico capaz de inaugurar novos percursos investigativos no estudo da função do direito e de sua relação com a justiça, ora como função, ora como capacidade de adaptação. A ideia da autopoiese e sua elaboração na teoria dos sistemas de Luhmann torna possível observar essa relação entre direito e justiça dentro do contexto do aumento da complexidade e da contingência na sociedade moderna. A presente tese busca produzir uma investigação jusfilosófica, com inspiração interdisciplinar ao combinar-se com especulações teoréticas da sociologia jurídica de inspiração luhmanniana. Ao utilizar uma metodologia fundada na pesquisa bibliográfica primacialmente nos idiomas originais, a tese persegue a reconstrução da teoria da justiça na perspectiva do funcional-estruturalismo de Niklas Luhmann. Na consecução deste projeto, a tese utiliza a metáfora do horizonte, de matriz fenomenológica, para propor a dualidade entre justiça operativo-funcional e justiça adaptativo-mutante. Dualidade que servirá de baliza para conclusões desta tese que poderá trazer uma contribuição original à cultura jurídica nacional. / The problem of justice is an ever-present issue in the investigations of philosophy of law. As a recurring theme, it should be subjected to further investigation in the light of alternative and innovative theoretical paradigms. The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann is a theoretical framework capable of opening new routes for studies and researches on the role of law and its relation to justice, either as function either as adaptability. The idea of autopoiesis and its elaboration in Luhmann´s systems theory makes it possible to observe the relationship between law and justice within the context of the increased complexity and contingency in modern society. This thesis aims to produce an investigation in the philosophy of law with interdisciplinary inspiration when combined with theoretical speculations of legal sociology of luhmannian inspiration. Using a methodology based on a primary bibliographic research in works in their original language, the thesis pursues the reconstruction of the theory of justice from the perspective of functional-structuralism as thought by Niklas Luhmann. In pursuing this project, the thesis uses the metaphor of the horizon, in its phenomenological matrix, to propose the duality between justice as operation and adaptation (mutant). This duality will serve as a beacon for the conclusions produced in this thesis that can bring an original contribution to legal culture.

L’approche des capabilités a été caractérisée par un développement fulgurant au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années. Bien que formulée à l’origine par Amartya Sen, détenteur du Prix Nobel en économie, Martha Nussbaum reprit cette approche dans le but de s’en servir comme fondation pour une théorie éthico-politique intégrale du bien. Cependant, la version de Nussbaum s’avéra particulièrement vulnérable à plusieurs critiques importantes, mettant sérieusement en doute son efficacité globale. À la lumière de ces faits, cette thèse vise à évaluer la pertinence théorique et pratique de l’approche des capabilités de Nussbaum, en examinant trois groupes de critiques particulièrement percutantes formulées à son encontre. / The capabilities approach has seen significant development over the past quarter century, branching out into a variety of fields and directions. Originally developed by Nobel Prize Laureate Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has sought to extend this approach beyond its mainly instrumental role into a tangible foundation for a full-fledged ethical-political theory of the good. However, this move has attracted a great number of criticisms levelled against Nussbaum’s specific version of the capabilities approach. In this thesis, I identify three main groups of observations under which said criticisms can be classified, and assess their respective strength and tenability.