一九九八年台北市市長選舉中，影響選舉結果最大的是外省籍選民及新黨選民「分裂投票」現象。大量新黨選民在市長選舉中一面倒地投票給國民黨候選人馬英九，不過市議員、立法委員仍舊投給新黨則是導致這種現象出現的主因。常態下，擁有高滿意度的在位者，常能連任。而在任內施政滿意度常常保持在七成以上的市長陳水扁落選，是相當令人意外的。筆者認為這種現象值得作有系統的分析。 本文利用政治大學選舉研究中心的抽樣調查面訪資料，針對一九九八年台北市選舉中選民分裂投票的行為進行深入分析。本文歸納影響選民分裂投票的六個模型，利用六個模型經過對數成敗比模型的比較，在控制人口基本背景因素之後（性別、年齡、教育程度及籍貫），發現模型影響選民分裂投票的情況：一是政黨認同強度減弱的政黨解組作用導致選民分裂投票。雖然政黨認同在模型中具有明顯的影響力，但台北市近年來並未有政黨解組的趨勢，因此政黨認同減弱並非分裂投票的主因。二為選民的省籍，尤其是外省籍選民分裂投票行為相當明顯，其中年輕世代比年紀大的世代更形嚴重。第三則是統獨議題及相關的中國人/台灣人認同。研究結果發現統獨議題對選民分裂投票不具顯著影響力，但中國人/台灣人則對於市長與立法委員之間的分裂投票有明顯影響力；第四是候選人形象中的裙帶效應並不顯著，對分裂投票與否之間不具明顯差異。五為選民分立制衡觀念。在相同層級的市府及議會之間選民具有分立制衡的觀念，想藉政黨之間相互制衡的方式保護民眾的最大福祉，故採取分裂投票的行為。中央及地方制衡的觀念則不具影響力。第六則為新黨的選民策略投票是影響選民分裂投票的重要因素。新黨選民對於尋求連任的民進黨市長候選人陳水扁相當反感，且新黨市長候選人王建□當選機會不大的情況下，選擇轉投給國民黨馬英九之策略投票，並進而形成分裂投票。從六個模型最後推論的結果，真正決定選民分裂與否最重要的因素是選民的省籍背景導致的情感反應及新黨選民的策略投票。而這兩者的關聯又非常密切。 / Split ticket voting by New Party identifiers and Mainlanders had a crucial influence on the outcome of the 1998 Taipei City mayoral election. Large numbers of voters who identified themselves as New Party supporters voted for the KMT mayoral candidate. However, in the concurrent Legislative Yuan and City Council elections, they voted for New Party candidates. Normally, an incumbent with extremely high approval ratings will win re-election easily, but in this case Chen Shui-bian lost the mayoral race. This surprising result is worth researching. This thesis uses face-to-face interview data collected after the 1998 election. To analyze split ticket voting behavior, we consider six different logit models. After controlling basic demographic variables, including sex, age, education, and ethnic background, it is possible to discover what influences split ticket voting. First, weakening party identification can induce a dealignment process. This, in turn, gives rise to split ticket voting. In the data, the intensity of party identification has an obvious effect on split ticket voting. However, there has been no dealignment. Thus, weakening party identification is not the main reason for split ticket voting. The second factor is ethnic background. Mainlanders, especially young and middle aged voters, are more likely to split their tickets. Third, the related questions of unification or independence and Taiwanese or Chinese identification also have influence. The effect of the unification/independence position is not significant, but the respondents’ ethnic identity is. A fourth finding is that there is no significant coattail effect influencing split ticket voting. Fifth, many voters wish to balance the parties against each other, and so they split their votes. However, this only holds for offices at the same level (mayor and city council) and not for different levels (local and national). Sixth, strategic voting by New Party supporters was very important. New Party supporters were very opposed to Chen Shui-bian, and the New Party nominee did not have much chance of winning. As a result, many split their votes, voting strategically for the KMT mayoral candidate. After examining the six models, we find that the most important factors influencing split ticket voting are ethnic background and strategic voting by New Party supporters. These two factors are intimately connected, of course.

Esta tese volta-se à análise crítica da garantia institucional de independência do Ministério Público brasileiro sob dois aspectos: de um lado, a sua independência em relação às esferas organizacionais dos poderes clássicos do Estado; e, de outro, os limites da independência funcional que visa a assegurar, para os seus membros, o livre desenvolvimento das funções institucionais. Sob o influxo do processo de reconhecimento universal dos direitos humanos a partir da Declaração de 1948, o valor da dignidade da pessoa humana representa o fundamento central do Estado Democrático de Direito da Constituição Federal de 1988, constituindo a fonte jurídica do vasto conjunto de direitos fundamentais dela constante. A proteção dos direitos fundamentais da pessoa humana é indissociável de um regime político democrático, que não pode prescindir de um sistema eficaz de controle do exercício do poder político para a persecução de tal desiderato. Daí a importância da efetividade dos mecanismos de controle recíproco entre os órgãos estatais, no comando do princípio fundamental projetado por Montesquieu que, atualmente, não mais se reduz à formula tríplice de distribuição das funções legislativa, executiva e judicial. É nesse contexto que se pretende introduzir a análise da garantia institucional de independência do Ministério Público, à luz, especificamente, de determinadas funções que lhe foram atribuídas para o controle de decisões de outros órgãos estatais, sobretudo do Executivo, envolvendo a tutela dos direitos fundamentais de proteção da dignidade da pessoa humana. A hipótese é a da existência de aspectos organizacionais condicionando o funcionamento do Ministério Público em dissonância de sua plena afirmação como novo ator político; quais sejam: a) a ausência de limites precisos à garantia de independência funcional no desenvolvimento de suas atividades; b) um sistema autocrático de gestão orientando as decisões sobre todas as políticas institucionais; c) a manutenção dos vínculos que prendem a instituição ao Executivo do Estado, concebido como o ramo hegemônico do regime político brasileiro. O trabalho pretende investigar as causas das incorreções, correlacioná-las e apontar os seus equívocos, para a identificação dos pontos relevantes sujeitos a uma pronta alteração de cunho organizacional, de modo a serem reproduzidos no funcionamento do Ministério Público brasileiro os valores republicanos e democráticos que devem informar um regime político como Estado Democrático de Direito. / This thesis offers a critical analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Brazilian Public Attorney\'s Office regarding two aspects: on one hand, its independence concerning the organizational spheres of the classical branches of the State; on the other hand, the limits of the functional independence that aims at securing free development of the institutional functions to the members of the Public Attorney\'s Office. Due to the process of universal acknowledgement of human rights since the Declaration of 1948, the value of a human being\'s dignity represents the central basis of the Democratic Rule of Law of the 1 988 Federal Constitution, establishing a legal source for the vast set of fundamental rights contained in it. The protection of the fundamental rights of a human being is intrinsic to a democratic political system, which cannot dispense with an efficient procedure to control the use of political power for pursuing such desideratum. Hence the importance of the efficiency of the mechanisms of checks and balances among state agencies, in carrying out the fundamental principle proposed by Montesquieu that is no longer limited nowadays to the triple distribution formula of legislative, executive and judiciary functions. It\'s in this context that the present work intends to introduce the analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Public Attorney\'s Office, specifically examining certain functions attributed to it for the control over decisions by other state agencies, particularly in the executive branch, that involve the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of protection of a human being\'s dignity. The hypothesis is the existence of organizational aspects stipulating the operation of the Public Attorney\'s Office in discordance with its full role as new political agent, such as: a) absence of precise limits to guarantee functional independence in the development of its activities; b) an autocratic ruling system guiding decisions on all institutional policies; c) maintenance of the bonds linking the institution to the executive branch, which is conceived as the hegemonic branch of Brazil\'s political system. This work intends to investigate the causes of those problems, correlate them and pinpoint mistakes, in order to identify the relevant points that would be subject to a swift alteration in terms of organization, so the republican, democratic values that ought to conduct a political regime as a Democratic Rule of Law may be reproduced in the operations of the Brazilian Public Attorney\'s Office.

Submitted by Hernani Medola (hernani.medola@mackenzie.br) on 2018-02-28T20:21:00Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Izabel Cristina Navarro Prado.pdf: 1340870 bytes, checksum: d21535395998afe311eae840600f2464 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Paola Damato (repositorio@mackenzie.br) on 2018-03-08T11:11:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Izabel Cristina Navarro Prado.pdf: 1340870 bytes, checksum: d21535395998afe311eae840600f2464 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-08T11:11:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Izabel Cristina Navarro Prado.pdf: 1340870 bytes, checksum: d21535395998afe311eae840600f2464 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-31 / Accountability is a means of controlling of acts of the Public Power that presents two main modalities: vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. The vertical accountability refers to the control carried out through the elections, where the voters express their judgment regarding the performance of the politician during the electoral mandate. The horizontal accountability deals with the relationship of reciprocal control between state agencies or powers or checks and balances. The application of accountability to the Judiciary is necessary not only due to the great independence of this Power, but also because, unlike the other powers, this power is not affected by vertical controls, since it is not an elected power. Before the creation of the CNJ, the Judiciary did not have an effective control over its performance. The CNJ is an administrative and disciplinary control body of the Judiciary. It is discussed in the research if the CNJ exercises a horizontal accountability role and if with its creation the Judiciary reached an adequate degree of accountability. / A accountability constitui um mecanismo de controle dos atos do Poder Público que apresenta duas modalidades principais: accountability vertical e accountability horizontal. A accountability vertical refere-se ao controle realizado através das eleições, onde os eleitores manifestam seu julgamento em relação à atuação do político durante o mandato eleitoral. A accountability horizontal trata da relação de controle recíproco entre os poderes ou agências estatais. A aplicação da accountability ao Poder Judiciário torna-se necessária não apenas pela grande independência desse Poder, como também pelo fato de que, ao contrário dos outros poderes, não sofre a incidência dos controles verticais, por não ser um poder eleito. Antes da criação do CNJ o Poder Judiciário não dispunha de um efetivo controle sobre sua atuação. O CNJ é um órgão de controle administrativo e disciplinar do Poder Judiciário. Discute-se na pesquisa se o CNJ exerce um papel de accountability horizontal do Poder Judiciário e se com sua criação este Poder alcançou um grau adequado de accountability.

The subject of this thesis is the presidential system as one of the distinguished alternatives of existing political systems in the present democratic society. This thesis is divided into three parts. The primary aim of the first part is to produce a brief overview of individual political systems and to outline their mutual differences through the description of their characteristics. The second part describes a specific political system in this world - namely the United States of America which became the source of inspiration for all subsequently established systems of this type. This part focusing on the United States is then divided into three separate chapters where each of them provides a view of particular branches of the government which form a constitutional system of the state together. These chapters offer not only the characteristics of these particular government branches and their central government bodies, but they also explain their mutual relationship and the control mechanism and particularly their relation to the President who is the key character of the entire presidential system, also his office and his powers. The main source of information, from which this part of the thesis proceeds, is the United States Constitution itself which is, as the supreme law of the state, the...

Submitted by ALVARO AMARAL DE FRANÇA COUTO PALMA DE JORGE (alvaro@palmaguedes.com.br) on 2016-03-04T16:27:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Disertação final 24-02-16 Digitalização.pdf: 1898367 bytes, checksum: 6933d11f9d4910e8468a2eb589ece7ad (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2016-03-28T18:17:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Disertação final 24-02-16 Digitalização.pdf: 1898367 bytes, checksum: 6933d11f9d4910e8468a2eb589ece7ad (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-03-30T13:38:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Disertação final 24-02-16 Digitalização.pdf: 1898367 bytes, checksum: 6933d11f9d4910e8468a2eb589ece7ad (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-30T13:38:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Disertação final 24-02-16 Digitalização.pdf: 1898367 bytes, checksum: 6933d11f9d4910e8468a2eb589ece7ad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-24 / Based on the fact that higher courts are assuming a greater role in Brazil today, as is the global trend in complex contemporary societies, in the shaping of public policy and regulation, the study aims to map the evolution – and progressive democratization – of the checks and balances structure established in the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, i.e., the selection process of justice for Federal Supreme Court, Brazil’s apex constitutional court. The text analyses the institutional/constitutional framework of the selection process for new justices, and exemplify changes in the profile of political players, in the network of competences of institutions involved in the process and in the social, political, economic and cultural context that pushed through the practical transformation of the institutional selection model without altering, however, the format originally established in the 19th Century. By mapping the origin and evolution of the constitutional formula for collaboration between the Executive and Legislative branches in choosing the members of the Judiciary’s highest court, the study finds the origin of the Brazilian model in the US experience, describing the latter and making parallels between the two. Taking the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a milestone, the work demonstrates the even greater mobilization of political and social players concerning the selection process, especially in relation to the hearings and confirmation of appointments for the Federal Supreme Court by the Federal Senate Constitution, Justice and Civic Rights Commission (CCJ). Finally, the studies analyzes actual CCJ hearing sessions and some of the main discussions therein so as to draw lessons that may guide the debate on the evolution of the selection process of justices to the Federal Supreme Court , including as an early control tool used by those involved in the creation of future public policy through Federal Supreme Court decisions. / Partindo da constatação de que o Brasil acompanha hoje um fenômeno global de protagonismo das cortes supremas nas sociedades complexas contemporâneas, notadamente na criação de políticas-públicas e regulação, o estudo procura mapear a evolução – e progressiva democratização – de uma estrutura de freios e contrapesos prevista na Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988 ('Constituição'), qual seja, o processo de seleção dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ao longo do texto é analisada a arquitetura institucional e constitucional do processo de indicação e aprovação de novos ministros, bem como exemplificadas mudanças no perfil dos atores políticos, no plexo de competências das instituições envolvidas e no contexto social, político, econômico e cultural que forçaram a transformação prática do modelo de seleção institucional, sem alteração, no entanto, da formatação originalmente prevista desde o Século XIX. Mapeando a origem e evolução da fórmula constitucional de colaboração entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo para a escolha dos membros da cúpula do Poder Judiciário, o estudo identifica a origem do modelo brasileiro na inspiração da experiência norte-americana, descrevendo esta e os paralelos possíveis com aquele. A partir do marco central da Constituição, o trabalho procura demonstrar uma progressiva mobilização de atores políticos e sociais em relação ao processo de escolha, notadamente em relação ao momento em que os indicados para o Supremo Tribunal Federal são sabatinados pela Comissão de Constituição, Justiça e Cidadania do Senado Federal. Finalmente, são analisadas concretamente as sabatinas e algumas das suas principais discussões, buscando extrair lições que sirvam de norte colaborativo para a evolução da forma de seleção dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal, inclusive como instrumento de controle prévio de seus membros, futuros elaboradores de políticas-públicas.

Der Einfluss Internationaler Organisationen reicht angesichts der Herausforderung, für globale Probleme Lösungen zu finden, mittlerweile so weit, dass sich die Frage nach den in ihnen vorhandenen Machtbegrenzungsmechanismen stellt. Doch wie kann die Macht Internationaler Organisationen kontrolliert werden, wenn das aus dem nationalen Verfassungsrecht bekannte Gewaltenteilungsprinzip nicht auf die internationale Ebene übertragen werden kann?   Die Arbeit analysiert die dazu innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen (UNO) und der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) existierenden formalisierten Mechanismen anhand ihrer Gründungsverträge. Dabei werden drei Kategorien von Machtbegrenzungsmechanismen identifiziert: Kompetenzzuweisungen und -abgrenzungen, organinterne Mechanismen und schließlich Interaktion zwischen den Organen. Die in der Praxis bedeutsamsten Mechanismen stellen zum einen das Vetorecht im UN-Sicherheitsrat sowie der negative Konsens im Streitbeilegungsgremium der WTO dar, die zur Gruppe der organinternen Mechanismen gehören. Zum anderen besteht in der Kontrolle der Streitbeilegungs-Panel der WTO durch den Appellate Body eine wichtige Machtbegrenzung durch Interaktion.  Die Untersuchung dokumentiert das paradoxe Phänomen, dass die Mechanismen zur Begrenzung der Macht in vielen Fällen auch eine machtsteigernde Wirkung haben, indem sie die Effizienz, Akzeptanz und Legitimation der Organisation erhöhen. Die Verfasserin erklärt dies damit, dass das Augenmerk der Gründungsstaaten in der Entstehungsphase auf dem Funktionieren der Organisation als Gegengewicht zu ihren jeweiligen Mitgliedsstaaten lag. Dass Internationale Organisationen in der Zwischenzeit so stark an Einfluss gewonnen haben, dass ihre Macht nunmehr begrenzt werden sollte, ist eine neue Entwicklung, die jedoch in Zukunft deutlich an Bedeutung gewinnen wird. / In light of the challenge to find answers to global problems, the influence of international organizations nowadays goes so far that the question of existing checks and balances within these organizations arises. But how can power be controlled when the principle of separation of powers originating from national constitutional law cannot be transferred to the international stage? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze existing formalized internal mechanisms within the United Nations and the World Trade Organization on the basis of their founding treaties. The author identifies three categories of checks and balances: allowing and limiting competencies, mechanisms within the organs and finally interactions between the organs. In practice, the most important mechanisms of these organizations are on the one hand the power of veto within the UN Security Council and the negative consensus within the WTO dispute settlement body, which belong to the category of mechanisms within the organs. In addition, the control of the WTO dispute settlement panels by the Appellate Body is an important form of checks and balances through interaction. The analysis shows the paradoxical phenomenon, that checks and balances in many cases have the effect of increasing power by augmenting the efficiency, acceptance and legitimacy of the organization. The author explains this by reference to the intentions of the founding states during the developing phase to strengthen these organizations as a counterbalance to their respective member states. It is a new development that international organizations have now increased their influence so much that their power should be limited, but this will become significantly more important in the future.