This thesis investigates three exemplars of uxorial substantive privileges in the criminal law: the marital coercion doctrine, the intraspousal conspiracy exemption, and the uxorial post-offence accessorial immunity. Their history, choreography and variations are comparatively investigated across the common law jurisdictions including the impact of statutory interventions. The principal argument is that the judicial and legislative treatment of these uxorial privileges has been inconsistent or erratic so that they are not the products of any systematic, modern development in the criminal law. This thesis proposes that there is no justification for their continued retention in common law legal systems. Archival, Parliamentary, and other sources have been used to identify the factors impinging upon the creation of specific statutory uxorial privileges. The diaspora of these laws throughout the other common law jurisdictions is investigated. The discussion is illustrated by examination of the particular issues raised by polygamy, customary law concubinage as well as by gender-reassignment. This thesis examines whether both gender-specific and marriage-specific criteria are valid constituents within the parameters of substantive criminal law. It traces the genesis of these special defences within the criminal law available exclusively to women, from the time of King Ine of the West Saxons c712, to examine the current status of such laws throughout common law jurisdictions. The investigation explores factors shaping the creation of a statutory defence of marital coercion by the British Parliament in 1925 and outlines the challenges generated by that law and its extraordinary resilience. This thesis demonstrates the failure of the criminal law to provide an overarching construct to implement emergent gender equality.

Submitted by Andréia Caetano Brito (andreia_brito@icloud.com) on 2017-09-26T16:47:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Andréia Brito_versão revisada.pdf: 1893857 bytes, checksum: 066fa46712f08b8600ef0f3ed0d1041b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2017-09-26T16:50:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Andréia Brito_versão revisada.pdf: 1893857 bytes, checksum: 066fa46712f08b8600ef0f3ed0d1041b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-27T12:07:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Andréia Brito_versão revisada.pdf: 1893857 bytes, checksum: 066fa46712f08b8600ef0f3ed0d1041b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-15 / The Brazilian civil procedural law is going through a moment of extreme importance, with the regulation, by Law nº 13.105/2015, of our theory of precedents. In pursuit of ensuring the aimed legal certainty and predictability, clear rules have been introduced in our legal system to standardize jurisprudence, which require respect for judicial precedents, in particular, its determinant foundations (ratio decidendi). Faced with this new scenario, in which judicial decisions will be considered binding precedents, if they have certain characteristics defined by the New Code of Civil Procedure (CPC/2015), we believe that it is of utmost importance to assess whether decisions, rendered in the judgment of repetitive Appeals under the CPC/1973’s rules, are capable of being considered as precedents and binding judges and courts. Thus, in this paper, we will confront, in an exemplary way, decisions rendered in repetitive demands under the CPC/1973 system, with the mechanisms introduced by the CPC/2015 for the creation and application of binding precedents. As will be seen, in the cases analyzed, it was not possible to identify the for the mechanisms implemented in Brazilian procedural law and, therefore, we understand that the law enforcers have the duty to provoke the Supreme Courts to review their understanding, in order to ensure that these decisions are not binding, mechanically, as we have already seen. / O direito processual civil brasileiro passa por um momento de extrema importância, com a normatização, pela Lei nº13.105/2015, da nossa particular teoria dos precedentes. Em busca das tão almejadas segurança e previsibilidade, foram introduzidas, no nosso ordenamento jurídico, regras para induzir a uniformização jurisprudencial, que impõem o respeito aos precedentes judiciais, em especial, aos seus fundamentos determinantes (ratio decidendi). Ante a esse novo cenário, em que decisões judiciais serão consideradas precedentes vinculantes, caso portem determinados requisitos definidos pelo Novo Código de Processo Civil (CPC/2015), entendemos que é de suma importância avaliar se as decisões, proferidas em sede de julgamento de recursos repetitivos, na vigência da Lei nº 5.869/1973 (CPC/1973), estão aptas a serem consideradas precedentes e a vincular juízes e tribunais. Assim, no presente trabalho, confrontaremos, de forma exemplificativa, decisões proferidas em demandas repetitivas na sistemática do CPC/1973, com os mecanismos trazidos pelo CPC/2015 para a criação e aplicação de precedentes vinculantes. Conforme se verificará, nos casos analisados, não foi possível identificar o respeito aos recentes mecanismos introduzidos no direito processual brasileiro e, por isso, entendemos que os operadores do direito têm o dever de provocar os Tribunais Superiores para reverem seu entendimento, a fim de garantir que essas decisões não sejam dotadas de natureza vinculante, de forma mecânica, como, inclusive, já temos verificado.

This thesis investigates the role of prior use in common and statutory trade mark law. In the United States a pertinent requirement is priority of use. In the United Kingdom and South Africa, a reputation must be present. In the United Kingdom a plaintiff is required to have goodwill in the country, but in the United States and South Africa it is not required. The conception of a mark does not qualify for protection. It is not required that a business must have actually entered the market. In the United States the general approach is that a plaintiff will not receive protection in a remote area, but regard must be had to zones of natural expansion. British and South African law is the same, and protection may be obtained in areas where there is no trading. Where a dual reputation exists, neither party will be able to act against the other. The mere fact that the user of a mark was aware of the use thereof by another person, does not exclude protection. A trade mark application can be opposed on the basis of another application, combined with use of a mark, or on the ground of prior use. In some instances the fact that a mark has been filed will influence the burden of proof. In general, a registration can be expunged on the same grounds as would constitute grounds of opposition. The concurrent use of a mark can form the basis for the registration of a mark. In the United States, the use must have taken place prior to the filing date of the other party, but in the United Kingdom and South Africa, prior to the own filing date. In the latter two countries, knowledge of a mark is not necessarily exclusionary. Prior use is generally accepted as a defence to an infringement action. It is, however, noted that in various countries, it is only use prior to the relevant date that will be protected, and there is not necessarily a right to extend the scope of use concerned. / Mercantile Law / LL.D. (Mercantile Law)

Text in Afrikaans / Summaries in English and Afrikaans / The statutory definition of the lock-out encompasses certain acts (inter alia termination of contracts of employment) which must be executed by the employer with a certain purpose. The Appellate Division has recently found that the employment relationship not necessarily terminates similarly to the common law contract of employment, but may subsist after termination of the contract of employment. The industrial court does not easily accept that it has been deprived of its unfair labour practice jurisdiction where terminations of employment take place in consequence of a lock-out. The motive of the employer seems to be decisive. In line with both the trend in first world countries and principles established by the courts in South Africa, the Constitution and especially recent labour legislation significantly curtail the bargaining power of the employer because it is progressively being believed that the employer has sufficient economic power to his disposal. / Die omskrywing van die uitsluiting in wetgewing omvat sekere handelinge {onder andere beeindiging van dienskontrakte) wat deur die werkgewer met 'n sekere doel verrig moet word. Die Appelhof het onlangs beslis dat die diensverhouding na beeindiging van die dienskontrak kan bly voortduur en nie noodwendig soos die gemeenregtelike dienskontrak ten einde loop nie. Die nywerheidshof aanvaar ook nie geredelik dat hy in geval van diensbeeindiging wat volg op 'n uitsluiting van sy onbillike arbeidspraktyk jurisdiksie ontneem is nie. Die motief van die werkgewer blyk hier deurslaggewend te wees. In lyn met sowel die ne1g1ng in eerstew~reldse lande, asook beginsels reeds deur die howe in Suid-Afrika gevestig, word die bedingingsmag van die werkgewer ingevolge die Grondwet en veral onlangse arbeidswetgewing betekenisvol ingekort omrede toenemend aanvaar word dat die werkgewer oor voldoende ekonomiese mag beskik. / Law / LL.M.

Law / LL.M.

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die eiendomsklousule soos vervat in Artikel 28(1) van die Grondwet waarborg regte in eiendom. Daar word na die tradisionele eiendomsparadigma verwys, asook die leemtes in die konsep. Die "new property"-konsep word vervolgens in oenskou geneem. Sowel die gemenereg as die inheemse reg word, met verwysing na die begrippe "regte" en "eiendom", behandel. Daarna volg 'n bespreking van die konsep "regte in eiendom", wat die inhoud en omvang van die konsep aandui. In 'n afsonderlike hoofstuk word regte in grand bespreek. Die vraag of 'n konstitusionele reg ten aansien van huisvesting bestaan, geniet oak aandag. Ten slotte word regsvergelykend te werk gegaan en na buitelandse regsbronne verwys wat moontlik in die toekoms 'n rol by die uitleg van die Grondwet kan speel. Daar word gepoog om aan te dui dat die Grondwet as geheel ge"interpreteer en toegepas behoort te word. Die korrekte interpretasie en toepassing van die Grondwet word van uiterste belang beskou ten einde aan die doel van die Grondwet te voldoen. / The property clause is contained in Section 28(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees rights in property. The tradisional property paradigm is referred to, as well as its deficiencies. Thereupon the "new property" concept is taken account of. The common law and the customary law are dealt with, with reference to the concepts "rights" and "property". Subsequently a discussion of the concept "rights in property" follows, denoting this concept's contents and extent. Thereupon rights in land is dealt with. A constitutional right to housing is also attended to. Finally a comparative overview is given with reference to foreign case law, which may in future play a role in the interpretation of the Constitution. Attempts are made to indicate that the Constitution should be interpreted and enforced as a whole. In its correct interpretation and enforcement it is of utmost importance to have due regard to the objects of the Constitution. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Picketing, a method used by employees, collectively, to assert their demands against employers, is a controversial subject arising from the conflict of interest existing between labour and employers! Previously, South African law neither forbade nor regulated picketing. Consequently, no immunity from civil liability existed in relation to a person's conduct during a picket. Presently, picketing is regulated by section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of19% (right to picket) and section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which provides for a protected picket (one that complies with the requirements of section 69) whereby immunity from civil liability attaches to a person's conduct during a picket. These provisions and their coexistence is examined, comparing foreign law where relevant, in an attempt to provide a foundation for a topic relatively disregarded. Section 69 reveals elements of uncertainty and vagueness. / Law / LL.M.

This thesis argues that the twin concept of separate personality and limited liability from its historical beginnings, has entrenched corporate irresponsibility. It assesses the role that these concepts have played in tackling corporate irresponsibility from their historical origins to the present day, commenting on the lessons learnt. Whilst the institution of the company as a legal person is unquestionably the bedrock of modern company law,1 this thesis examines these concepts not necessarily from the position of disputing the philosophical, economic, or political imperatives, all of which are incredibly important – but from the viewpoint that historically, the principle of separate personality and limited liability entrenches corporate irresponsibility. As such, this thesis suggests a partial abandonment of the separate personality principle because it provides a mechanism for dishonest directors to escape liability for their fraudulent conduct. It also argues that the existing judicial evasion and concealment2 principles and the statutory fraudulent and wrongful trading provisions under the Insolvency Act 19863 are too restrictive, and ambiguous in combating corporate abuse. It is concluded that the existing common law and statutory rules geared towards combating abuse of limited liability provides no coherent format upon which the courts and legislature may effectively curb abuse of the corporate form. As such, these laws in light of their inability to make dishonest directors personally liable for their fraudulent conducts ought to be challenged. There is a need to challenge the existing rules in order to show the effect abuse of limited liability has on creditors, the public and the economy. This research indicates that there ought to be an adequate and effective alternative law which provides balance and support for genuine enterprise whilst providing a robust system whereby those who abuse the corporate form can be easily made liable for corporate debts.

Esta tese tem por objeto a investigação dos aspectos legais decorrentes do comércio eletrônico, com ênfase na validade e obrigatoriedade dos contratos de adesão eletrônicos e os denominados termos e condições de uso. Estes negócios jurídicos eletrônicos podem ser divididos em três espécies: a) licenças do tipo shrink-wrap, terminologia reservada às compras de software no estabelecimento físico do fornecedor, cujos termos contratuais que vincularão as partes não podem ser visualizados antes da compra do produto, mas tão somente no decorrer da instalação do software, garantindo-se ao adquirente a possibilidade efetiva de devolução do produto se não concordar com os termos da licença; b) contratos do tipo click-wrap, contratos celebrados inteiramente em meio eletrônico, em que o consumidor tem a oportunidade de ler as cláusulas contratuais antes de manifestar, expressamente, sua anuência ou não, clicando em uma caixa de diálogo indicativa de expressões como eu aceito, ou outra semelhante; e, c) os termos e condições de uso, denominados pela doutrina estrangeira como browse-wrap, disponibilizados no canto inferior de uma página da internet em um hiperlink, vinculando toda e qualquer pessoa, que tão-somente acesse o respectivo site, sem ao menos chamar a atenção do usuário para a existência destes termos ou nem exigindo a manifestação da anuência a tais termos. Os tribunais estrangeiros têm enfrentado a problemática em torno da validade e obrigatoriedade destas práticas comerciais, em especial os browse-wrap, cujo formato em que são utilizados descaracteriza-nos com contratos ou condições gerais de contratação, pois o usuário nem ao menos tem consciência da existência de tais termos. Portanto, parte da doutrina e da jurisprudência entende que o browse-wrap não se encaixa na definição de contrato, mas são termos unilateralmente propostos por uma das partes sem que a outra possa ter efetivo conhecimento a respeito. Se, por um lado, há necessidade de reconhecer os efeitos obrigatórios dos contratos de adesão eletrônicos, fortalecendo o comércio eletrônico; por outro lado, a sociedade global exige a efetiva proteção dos consumidores e usuários contra abusos praticados por multinacionais, que operam sem fronteiras geográficas. Assim, juristas e doutrinadores enfrentam um enorme desafio: desenvolver um comércio eletrônico sustentável, equilibrando os interesses comerciais e os direitos dos consumidores. Este trabalho pretende determinar os requisitos jurídicos para a validade dos contratos eletrônicos de maneira científica, analisando o processo de formação contratual em meio eletrônico. Por fim, investiga-se a dúvida acerca da lei aplicável e da jurisdição na era digital, enfatizando a cláusula de eleição de foro, de escolha da lei aplicável e compromissória, bem como seu impacto no acesso à justiça do consumidor. Em suma, esta tese destaca a necessidade de uma legislação uniforme sobre comércio eletrônico e a proteção do consumidor, tendo em vista o alto nível de globalização, para que se possam tutelar os direitos dos consumidores aliados aos interesses econômicos do mercado. / This thesis intends to investigate some of the legal issues raised by e-commerce, specifically the validity and enforceability of the electronic adhesion contracts and the terms and conditions of use. Such electronic juridic acts can be grouped into three subspecies: a) the shrink-wrap licences, reserved for purchase in the store, but yet the consumer can not view the terms and conditions that she or he will be bound by, once the product (often a software) is installed; the consumer is granted with a period of time within she or he can return the product to the store if she or he does not agree with the terms and conditions; b) the click-wrap agreements are contracts presented to the consumer, when dealing on-line, stating the terms and conditions of the purchase, and then, once its read, she or he may point and click in a dialog box indicating her or his consent (such as I agree or some other synonymous expression); and c) the browse-wrap, composed by terms and conditions listed in a hyperlink on the bottom of a web page, which obliges the consumer only because she or he surfs on the Web, nevertheless it is not require that the consumer shows any kind of consent to the terms and conditions. Even though some courts have ruled in favor of the validity and enforceability of browse-wrap, it is very questionable to accept the fact of being bound by something that one never knew that it even existed. Thus, some other courts are of the view that browse-wrap is not technically a contract according to the legal doctrine. Instead it is a sort of private regulation of the disposal of products and services written by the supplier. On one hand, there is a need to enforce electronic commerce in order to stimulate and consolidate it by making electronic contracts binding on consumers. On the other hand, there is a need to protect consumers from the abuse of unequal bargaining power in such contractual relation, which may pit them against a multinational corporation, which operates throughout the world. Thus, jurists and academics must combine efforts to find a sustainable balance between these two sides. Besides there is a need for a uniform and scientific solution, given that a prerequisite to valid contract formation is the unequivocal meeting of the minds which may not happen in this means of contract formation, especially if the supplier does not require any clear and effective sign of assent from the consumer. The touchstone of e-commerce is the law and jurisdiction conflicts since such contracts often include a forum selection clause or a mandatory arbitration clause, which can deprive the consumers of their day in court. In short, it highlights the need for a uniform legislation and a strong consumer protection system to ensure the growth of ecommerce. This would foster a reliable electronic environment meeting the consumers expectations and the market standards.