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From the Proceedings of the 1974 Meetings of the Arizona Section - American Water Resources Assn. and the Hydrology Section - Arizona Academy of Science - April 19-20, 1974, Flagstaff, Arizona / The doctrine of prior appropriation used in the arid western states has encouraged rapid exploitation of our natural water resources. Those who beneficially used the water first, regardless of type of use or efficiency, obtained a perpetual right to always be first. As frontiers for exploiting our natural resources shrink, the Appropriation Doctrine is changing under the stresses of the 1970's. Our water allocations system is changing as new water -use priorities emerge along with changing quality standards. Government at all levels, along with planners and engineers, must understand the institutional and legal constraints put on water development by our historic water rights system so that intelligent decisions can be made in developing and maintaining our natural water resources.

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Traditionnellement, les biens immatériels sont qualifiés, tantôt de biens incorporels, tantôt de propriétés incorporelles ou intellectuelles, tantôt encore de biens d'exploitation, la plupart de ces qualifications étant insatisfaisantes. En réalité, cette catégorie de biens souffre d'une absence de définition. Pourtant, d'aucuns affirment qu'ils représentent une richesse économique, une source de crédit fantastique pour les débiteurs, et un gage de sécurité pour les créanciers. Or, la législation française semble avoir superbement ignoré les biens immatériels.En témoigne le droit des biens tout d'abord. En effet, à la lecture de l'article 516 du Code civil, selon lequel " tous les biens sont meubles ou immeubles ", force est de constater que les biens immatériels ne peuvent être valablement rattachés à la catégorie des meubles ou à celle des immeubles. Les biens immatériels s'opposent aux biens matériels (biens de la nature, matières premières, biens intellectuels tombés dans le domaine public ou dénués de protection au titre du droit de la propriété intellectuelle). Ils désignent les biens qui disposent d'une chose incorporelle et d'un corpus. Nous avons recensé deux natures de biens immatériels : les biens immatériels financiers regroupant les monnaies, les parts et actions sociales, les instruments financiers, les créances et les biens immatériels industriels regroupant les fonds de commerce et les propriétés intellectuelles.En témoigne le droit des sûretés réelles conventionnelles ensuite. Le projet de réforme du droit des sûretés qui a été confié à la Commission Grimaldi fondait de nombreux espoirs. Ayant fait l'objet de très rares modifications depuis l'origine du Code civil, l'édifice s'ébranlait et nécessitait une rénovation. Il s'ébranlait principalement pour trois raisons : la lisibilité notamment parce que le droit des sûretés réelles conventionnelles sur biens immatériels s'est développé en marge du Code civil, l'efficacité et la capacité des régimes envisagés quant à la préservation des intérêts du débiteur et du créancier. Depuis longtemps la pratique et la doctrine dénonçaient une telle complexification et appelaient de leurs vœux aux changements. Malheureusement, l'ordonnance n° 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006 portant réforme du droit des sûretés n'a pas su rassurer. En créant le nantissement comme la sûreté réelle conventionnelle sur biens mobiliers incorporels, sans l'accompagner d'un régime uniforme, elle n'a fait qu'accentuer les inquiétudes et les critiques patentes.Pourtant, nous sommes convaincus de ce que le droit français dispose des remèdes indispensables au sauvetage de la matière. En effet, le nouveau régime du gage, tel que modifié par l'ordonnance n° 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006, comporte désormais un régime adapté aux biens immatériels industriels. Quant à la fiducie-sûreté, consacrée par la loi n° 2007-211 du 19 février 2007, elle a révélé, à travers les expériences observées hors de nos frontières, sa pleine efficacité lorsqu'elle a pour assiette des biens immatériels financiers.

This examination of the common law obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement of commercial contracts in Australia seeks to achieve a number of objectives. First, to chart the historical development of the implied good faith obligation. Secondly, to identify a number of issues that remain unresolved at Australian lower court level. Thirdly, to consider five doctrinal approaches that could be adopted by the High Court when ultimately confronted by the competing claims and tensions that have proven divisive in the courts below. Fourthly, to assess each approach against three identified benchmarks. The essential thesis is that good faith should be implied, as a matter of law, in commercial contracts that are relational in nature with an additional call being made for the High Court to explicitly recognise that the underlying basis of the implied good faith obligation is the reasonable expectations of the contractual parties. This approach is the one approach that satisfies all three benchmarks and provides the most satisfactory resolution of the issues that presently bedevil the commercial good faith debate in Australia.

The thesis in question is titled “Readjusting Orthodoxy”. It constitutes a discourse in UK constitutional law although legal theoretic, historical, politicial, philosophical, and EU-related complementary themes are also present. It is founded upon, and driven by, two fundamental, inter-related premises. First, that it is the orthodox reading of the UK Constitution which best describes and explains the present constitutional arrangement: the UK Parliament is a sovereign institution sitting at the apex of the UK Constitution and vested with the right to make and unmake any law whatsoever. In the second place, that, notwithstanding the above, this very reading of the UK Constitution is currently deficient in terms of internal cohesion, is plagued by ingrained anachronistic dogmas and enjoys only a limited adaptability. From these premises emerges a third proposition; namely, that the UK constitutional discourse as a whole would stand to lose greatly should alternative constitutional theories that are less suited to describe and explain the current constitutional arrangement replace the orthodox reading of the Constitution by exploiting these conspicuous drawbacks. Thus, the present treatise argues that the orthodox reading should after critical evaluation be readjusted in the various ways to be proposed so as to be rendered coherent, consistent, impervious to the numerous challenges it currently faces and, ultimately, capable of continuing to offer the canonical account of the ever-changing UK Constitution.

Cette thèse vise à appréhender la condition juridique des couples non mariés, à travers près de cinq siècles. Le droit canonique du mariage relégua le concubinage à un état permanent de péché, et, au XVIe siècle, le concile de Trente prescrivit des sanctions sévères à l'encontre des concubinaires. Les pères du concile édictèrent des règles encadrant la célébration du mariage. Puis, l'autorité séculière s'arrogea peu à peu la compétence en matière matrimoniale, par les lois et par la jurisprudence. La frontière entre mariage et concubinage était dorénavant strictement établie. Si l'ancien droit ne regarda pas le concubinage comme un délit, il fustigea les bâtards en les soumettant à un statut d'infériorité. Sous la Révolution, la sécularisation du mariage ne remit pas en cause la forme traditionnelle de l'union conjugale, toutefois, les législateurs accordèrent des droits aux enfants naturels reconnus. En 1804, le Code civil ignora absolument le concubinage. Le fondement de la famille était le mariage ; et, les enfants naturels furent, de nouveau, les victimes de la prééminence de l'union légitime. Dés le milieu du XIXe siècle, la rigueur du Code envers la famille naturelle fut atténuée grâce à un courant d'idées progressistes. Puis, au début du XXe siècle, la reconnaissance officielle du concubinage fut opérée par une série de mesures législatives lui conférant des effets juridiques, et la voie vers un pluralisme juridique des modèles familiaux se trouva ouverte. / The aim of this thesis is to understand the legal status of unmarried couples, over a period of time extending for nearly five centuries. The canon law of marriage relegated cohabitation to a permanent state of sin, and in the sixteenth century, the council of Trent prescribed severe penalties to punish cohabitation. The fathers of the council enacted rules governing the celebration of marriage. Secular authority then gradually arrogated jurisdiction in matrimonial matters by means of laws and jurisprudence. The line between marriage and cohabitation was now strictly drawn. Although the old law did not consider cohabitation as a crime, it castigated children born outside of wedlock by subjecting them to an inferior status. During the Revolution, the secularization of marriage did not call into question the traditional form of the marital union; however, legislators granted rights to recognized natural children. In 1804, the question of cohabitation was totally absent from the civil Code. Marriage represented the foundation of the family, and illegitimate children were once again the victims of the rule of lawful union. By the mid-nineteenth century, the rigor of the Code toward the natural family was mitigated by a current of progressive ideas. Then, in the early twentieth century, official recognition of cohabitation was brought about by a series of legally-binding legislative measures, and the path to legal pluralism in family matters found an opening.

In this project the various International Instruments, namely the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child; 1989, the Beijing Rules and the African Charter, relating to the guidelines of the establishment of a minimum age for criminal capacity are furnished. The developments regarding the issue of criminal capacity since 1998 in Australia, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong are highlighted. The historical position and the current position in South African law with regard to the issue of criminal capacity are discussed as well as the implementation thereof by our courts. The statistics on children under 14 years in prison over the past five years are furnished. The introduction of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 by Parliament and the deliberations following the introduction, focusing on the issue of criminal capacity is highlighted. The proposed provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 49 of 2002 codifying the present common law presumptions and the raising of the minimum age for criminal capacity are furnished. The evaluation of criminal capacity and the important factors to be assessed are discussed as provided for in the Child Justice Bill, 49 of 2002. A practical illustration of a case where the criminal capacity of a child offender was considered by the court is, discussed and other important developmental factors that should also be taken into consideration by the court are identified and discussed. Important issues relating to criminal capacity, namely, time and number of assessments, testimonial competency of the child offender, evolving capacities and age determination are discussed and possible problems identified and some solutions offered. The research included an 11-question questionnaire to various professionals working in field of child justice regarding the issue of criminal capacity and the evaluation thereof. / Criminal and Procedural law / D.Litt. et Phil. (Criminology)

This dissertation looks at the position of the unmarried father in South Africa with regard to obtaining access to his illegitimate child. The writer has focused on three distinct eras in South African family law: the position of unmarried fathers in terms of: the common law; Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act; and the Children's Act. The writer has further focused on a case study. This is to emphasis the difficulty which unmarried fathers have when attempting to go through the courts to have access to his child. In terms of South African common law, fathers of illegitimate children did not have any form of parental authority over the child. The mothers of illegitimate children have full parental authority over such children. Access in terms of South African common-law is seen as an incident of parental authority. Unmarried fathers nevertheless had the right to approach the high court to obtain access to their children, if the mother of the child refuses to allow the father to have such access. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, there was an overwhelming amount of applications brought by unmarried fathers in the high courts so as to obtain access to their illegitimate children. The case of Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) sparked victory for unmarried fathers when the learned judge held that all unmarried fathers of children have an inherent right of access to their children. This victory was short-lived. Subsequent case law and in particular the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) enforced the common law and held that unmarried fathers do not have an automatic right to their illegitimate children and that such fathers will have to apply to the high court for such access. Due to the increase in litigation in the late 1980's and early 1990's regarding a father's access to his child born out of wedlock the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act commenced on 4 September 1998. The South African legislature adopted the approach taken in the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) and rejected the approach taken in the case of Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) ie the common law continued to remain the approach taken in South Africa. Legislators recognised that the approach taken in the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act does not conform to the provisions of the African Charter of the Rights and the Welfare of the Child, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and equality and dignity provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. On 19 June 2006, the Children's Act was effected and will commence once promulgated in the Government Gazette. The writer then determines whether the Children's Act has in practice changed the position of the unmarried father. / JURISPRUDENCE / LLM

Text in Afrikaans / Artikel 35(5) van die Grondwet 108 van 1996 handel oor die uitsluiting van ongrondwetlike getuienis en bepaal dat sodanige getuienis uitgesluit moet word indien toelating daarvan sal lei tot 'n onbillike verhoor of tot nadeel sal strek vir die regspleging. Uit die bewoording van die artikel blyk dit dat die howe geen diskresie het ten opsigte van die toelaatbaarheidsvraag nie en 'n streng uitsluitingbenadering moet volg. Die doel van hierdie verha• ndeling is om ondersoek in te stel na die mate van diskresie .en die wyse ·waarop diskresie toepas word in hierdie besluitnemingsproses. Twee benaderings is deur die howe gevolg, naamlik 'n benadering waar 'n wye diskresie uitgeoefen word en 'n benadering waar 'n beperkte diskresie uitgeoefen word, dus 'n gekwalifiseerde uitsluitingsbenadering. Die skrywer doen aan die hand dat beide gronde vir uitsluiting van belang is en dat die howe verkeie faktore moet oorweeg ten einde 'n beslissing te vel oor die insluiting of uitsluiting van ongrondwetlike getuienis. 'n Balans moet dus gehandhaaf word tussen die belang van die beskuldigde op 'n billike verhoor en die belang van die gemeenskap daarin dat regspleging nie benadeel moet word nie en dat reg en geregtigheid moet geskied / Section 35(3) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 deals with the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence and stipulates that such evidence must be excluded if the admission would render the trial unfair or be detrimental to the administration of justice. From the wording of the section it seems that the courts have no jurisdiction in regard to the admissibility question and that a strict exclusionary approach must be followed. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the amount of discretion that the Courts have, and the manner in which this discretion is applied in the process of decision making. Two approaches were followed by the courts namely a wide discretionary approach and an approach where a strict discretion was applied. It is submitted that botR grounds for exclusion are of importance and that the courts must consider a variety of factors in deciding the question on the inclusion or exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. A balance must be struck between the interest of the accused in a fair trial and the interest of the community that the administration of justice must not be prejudiced and that justice must prevail. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Law)