L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

RÉSUMÉ FRANÇAIS Ce mémoire fait l’étude du régime de prévention et de sanction des conflits possibles entre les intérêts de la municipalité d’une part et de ceux de ses élus de l’autre. L’objet de recherche est abordé selon une approche historique et éthique basée sur le régime juridique actuel. Le mémoire est divisé en 3 chapitres : (1) la notion de conflit d’intérêts ; (2) le cadre juridique à la base du régime de sanction des conflits d’intérêts et (3) celui sur le régime de prévention des conflits d’intérêts dans le domaine municipal. Le chapitre préliminaire situe l’objet de recherche à l’intérieur des grandes tendances de la recherche juridique sur la question et présente un cadre de réflexion sur la notion de conflit d’intérêts. L’examen des conflits d’intérêts repose avant tout sur un questionnement et sur un jugement de nature subjective : ce qui a été considéré comme un conflit d’intérêts autrefois ne l’est pas nécessairement de nos jours et ce, en dépit du fait que le cadre juridique évolue aussi dans le temps. On ne peut donc pas dégager avec exactitude et pour toujours ce qui constitue un conflit d’intérêts de ce qui n’en constitue pas un. Le chapitre premier est divisé en 4 sections. On y traite notamment de la règle relative à l’interdiction pour un élu municipal de contracter avec la municipalité. On y démontre que l’origine de cette règle remonte aux premières lois municipales du XIXe siècle et que cette dernière a subi assez peu de modifications au fil des ans. La troisième section porte sur les cas de malversation, d’abus de confiance et les autres inconduites prohibées par la Loi sur les élections et référendums dans les municipalités (L.R.Q. c. E-2.2). Une quatrième section sur les accusations criminelles d’abus de confiance et de corruption vient clore le premier chapitre. Chacune de ces sections est abordée notamment en faisant l’historique des dispositions législatives en cause ainsi qu’en faisant certains parallèles avec la législation des autres provinces canadiennes. Le chapitre 2 sur le régime de prévention des conflits d’intérêts est divisé en 4 parties. La première section porte sur l’obligation pour un élu de déclarer annuellement ses intérêts pécuniaires. Cette obligation n’est pas unique au Québec puisqu’elle est présente dans quelques législations provinciales canadiennes. La deuxième section porte sur l’obligation pour cet élu de dénoncer verbalement son intérêt dans une question abordée par le conseil municipal réuni en séance ou en comité. Là encore, l’origine de cette approche préventive est fort ancienne et a longtemps été considéré comme le seul moyen de dénoncer son intérêt sans subir les sanctions prévues par la loi. Une troisième section s’intéresse au cadre juridique entourant les soumissions publiques et qui vise à éliminer toute situation possible de favoritisme ou de patronage. Une quatrième section aborde la question des codes d’éthique et de leur utilité ainsi que les développements récents sur cette question avec le dépôt en 2009 du rapport du Groupe de travail sur l’éthique dans le milieu municipal. Une conclusion vient clore le mémoire en présentant une synthèse de l’étude assortie de commentaires personnels sur les conclusions du Groupe de travail précité. / ENGLISH SUMMARY The objective of this master’s paper is to review the system of prevention and sanctions in the area of possible conflicts between, on the one part, the interests of the municipality and on the other, that of the elected officials. The research approach to the subject is both historical and ethical and is based on the existing legal system. The study is divided into three (3) chapters: (1) the concept of conflict of interest (2) the legal basis of the system of sanctions for conflicts of interest (3) the system of prevention of conflicts of interest in the municipal field. The preliminary chapter sets the research subject within the broader field of legal research on the question and presents a framework of thought on the notion of conflicts of interest. The examination of the concept of conflicts of interests begins by the questioning and making of subjective judgments: what has in the past been considered as a conflict of interest is no longer seen the same way today and this despite the fact that the legal system also evolves with the times. We cannot therefore identify permanently and with precision that which constitutes a conflict of interest and that which does not. It depends on the facts and the circumstances in each case. Chapter 1 is divided into 4 sections. We will review in particular the rules relating to the prohibition against an elected official contracting with the municipality. We will show that the rule takes its origin in the first legislation relating to municipalities dating back to the 19th century and that these rules have not been greatly modified since. The third section deals with misappropriation breach of trust and other misconduct prohibited by la An Act respecting Elections and Referendums in Municipalities (L.R.Q. c. E-2.2). A fourth section dealing with criminal charges for breach of trust and corruption brings the first chapter to an end. In each one of these sections we review the history of the legislation in question and by making certain comparisons with legislation in other provinces. Chapter 2 dealing with the system of prevention of conflicts of interest is divided into four (4) parts. The first section deals with the elected official’s obligation to make an annual declaration of pecuniary interests. This obligation is not unique to Quebec; it is also found in legislation in other Canadian provinces. The second section covers the obligation of an elected official to declare his or her interest in any question that is under study by council either in full session or in committee. Here again the origin of this preventative approach is quite ancient and has long been considered as the only means of declaring one’s interest without having to face the consequences provided at law. A third section deals with the legal system covering public tenders. This system is not only meant to insure healthy competition but also to eliminate any possible situation of favouritism or patronage that an elected official might be tempted to pass on to a supporter. A fourth section explores the matter of Codes of Ethics and their usefulness as well as recent developments in the area following on the tabling of the report in 2009 of the Groupe de travail sur l’éthique dans le milieu municipal. The conclusion presents a summary of the study including personal comments on the conclusions of the said study group.

Le Conseil de sécurité est l’organe principal du système onusien chargé du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Face à une situation illégale, il ne peut donc l’ignorer et s’en désintéresser. Cependant, la perpétration d’un acte à la légalité controversée par l’un ou plusieurs de ses membres permanents peut nous laisser entendre que l’organe politique onusien aura des difficultés à remplir son rôle. Les membres permanents vont tenter d’instrumentaliser le Conseil de sécurité afin de diminuer l’illégalité de la situation. Ceci pose avec acuité le problème du contrôle de son activité en matière de maintien de la paix. L’accomplissement d’un acte illégal par un ou plusieurs membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité nécessite alors de réfléchir à des moyens d’ordre juridique pour limiter son pouvoir. Cette réflexion s’avère particulièrement pressante lorsque le Conseil est confronté à une occupation de guerre impliquant ses membres permanents ou, lorsqu’il crée ou autorise des opérations de paix de grandes envergures suite à un conflit armé impliquant ses membres permanents. Afin de limiter les prérogatives du Conseil de sécurité, le régime juridique de l’occupation tel qu’énoncé par le Règlement de La Haye (IV) de 1907 et la IVe Convention de Genève de 1949 devrait être appliquer par l’organe politique onusien lorsqu’il intervient dans une situation d’occupation de guerre impliquant ses membres permanents. L’objectif est d’éviter qu’il n’attribue aux puissances occupantes des missions qui dépassent le cadre juridique imposé par le droit des conflits armés. L’autorisation, par le Conseil de sécurité d’opérations de paix, telles qu’une administration civile transitoire ou une force multinationale avec un mandat de la paix avec recours à la force armée, suite à un conflit armé impliquant ses propres membres permanents, ouvre le débat sur leur réglementation. Alors, il sera proposé une interprétation progressiste de la définition de l’occupation telle qu’énoncée par le Règlement de La Haye (IV) de 1907 et la IVe Convention de Genève de 1949 afin d’y intégrer ces nouvelles formes d’occupations pacifiques, présentant de grandes similitudes avec les occupations de guerre. Ainsi, le régime juridique de l’occupation pourra leur être appliqué. / The Security Council is the primary body of the UN system responsible for peacekeeping and international security. In cases of violations of international law, the Security Council cannot turn a blind eye. Nevertheless, in cases when Security Council members are themselves perpetrators of international law violations one could conclude that this political body has difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. The danger exists that Security Council members in violation of international law will implicate the Security Council in justifying illegal decisions. This therefore raises the question of Security Council accountability. The violation of international law by a Security Council member therefore requires a legal mechanism to limit the powers of this body. This is particularly relevant for cases of occupation involving its permanent members, or, when the Security Council creates or authorizes large-scale peace-keeping operations following an armed conflict involving its own members. In order to limit the powers of the Security Council, this study proposes to impose a legal regime of administration as stipulated by the IV (1907) Hague and the 4th 1949 Geneva Convention, according to which the Security Council intervenes when a territory is administered by one of its permanent members. The goal is to avoid that the Security Council gives too much freedom to an administrative power during interventions which go beyond the legal framework defined by the law on administrated territories. The authorization by the Security Council of peace-keeping operations, such as transitional civil administration or multinational peace-keeping force mandated to use force, following an armed conflict involving its own members, opens the debate of their regulation. Consequently a progressive interpretation of occupation as defined by the IV (1907) Hague and the 4th 1949 Geneva Convention is proposed in order to encompass new forms of peaceful occupations which contain clear similarities with military occupations. Thus, they will fall under the legal mechanism of the latter.

La coopération internationale est inscrite sur l'acte constitutif de l'Organisation des Nations Unies du 26 juin 1945. Moyen d'échange et de dialogue entre acteurs internationaux, son objectif a été de trouver des solutions aux difficultés économiques, sociales, culturelles et sécuritaires de l'après-guerre pour sauvegarder la paix du monde. Elle s'est considérablement développée, allant de la forme bilatérale à celle multilatérale, dans tous les domaines et sur tous les continents. Parmi ses nombreux cadres d'échanges, le dispositif français de coopération, avec son assistance technique spécialisée dans tous les domaines, demeure une référence certaine. Il s'est déployé à travers une stratégie de géopolitique internationale où domaines militaire en plus grand et sportif en plus petit en constituent un des traits caractéristiques. La coopération française et internationale ont été un accompagnement décisif pour le continent africain après les indépendances, mais aussi un important moyen stratégique d'influence pendant la Guerre Froide. Le sport et la coopération sportive y joueront leur partition. Pour les Américains, Français, Anglais, Soviétiques et leurs partenaires respectifs, la coopération a été très efficace et a permis de sauvegarder leurs intérêts sur le continent africain. Elle demeure encore aujourd'hui un important moyen de pression sur la scène africaine, influant souvent sur les résultats des échanges et l'efficacité des actions de coopération. Finalement, c'est une coopération internationale de 1960 à 2010, avec ses réussites et ses échecs, d'une taille parfois limitée mais qui reste un moyen de dialogue pour le monde et surtout pour le continent africain engagé sur le difficile chemin de la démocratie. C'est par une approche théorique libérale et une méthode qualitative que cette recherche a été réalisée, sur le principal terrain du Burkina Faso avec ses particularités sociales et son histoire, qui constituent une grille de lecture idéale.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

Th.--Econ. polit.--Lausanne, 1978. / Bibliogr. p. 404-418.

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