Sammanfattning Examensarbete, Civilekonomprogrammet Titel: Accounting Hocus-Pocus - En studie över de oberoende styrelseledamöternas påverkan på resultatmanipulering. Bakgrund: De principbaserade regelverk som börsnoterade företag tvingas följa, skapar utrymme för ledningen att manipulera redovisningen. Utöver dessa möjligheter kan ledningen dessutom genom manipulation av kassaflödet, justera företagets resultat. När dessa resultatmanipulationer används med fel avsikt riskerar de att minska informationsvärdet av företagets redovisning. Vi ställer oss frågande till hur styrelsens oberoende kan förklara resultatmanipulering. Syfte: Studien avser att förklara i vilken utsträckning resultatmanipulering i svenska företag påverkas av styrelsens oberoende. Metod: Genom användning av tvärsnittsstudie med en deduktiv ansats har studien granskat huruvida resultatmanipulering påverkas av styrelseledamöternas oberoende, samt av olika attribut som anses förstärka ledamöternas övervakande effekt. Studiens hypoteser formulerades med hjälp av teorier som PAT, Agentteorin och Stewardshipteorin som sedan testades mot data insamlad från företag på Stockholmsbörsen för år 2017. Slutsatser: Studien finner avvikelser mellan resultaten för redovisningsmanipulation och kassaflödesmanipulation. Resultatet visar att oberoende styrelseledamöter i svenska styrelser har en negativ relation till kassaflödesmanipulering, medan relationen till redovisningsmanipulation är positiv. / Abstract Master Thesis in Business Administration Titel: Accounting Hocus-Pocus - A study of the independent directors effect on earnings management Background: The principle-based regulation that listed companies are obliged to follow gives the management opportunities to manipulate the accounting with discretionary accruals, and thereby changing the reported earnings of the company.  The management could also manipulate the earnings through real activities manipulation. When these acts of earnings management are used with the wrong intentions it could reduce the information value of the company’s financial reports. We are questioning how different board dependence and -independence could explain earnings management. Purpose: The study aims to explain to what extent earnings management in Swedish companies is affected by board independence. Method: By using a cross-sectional study with a deductive approach our study has researched how earnings management is affected by board independence, and how different attributes is to enhance the independent board members monitoring. Hypotheses were formed through theories such as PAT, Agency theory and Stewardship theory which later was tested with data gathered from companies of the Stockholm stock exchange of the year 2017. Conclusions: Our study finds a difference between the results of manipulation through the discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. The result show that independent directors have a negative effect on cash flow manipulation while they have a positive effect on accounting manipulation.

O gerenciamento de resultados, conforme definição da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), órgão regulador do mercado de capitais brasileiro, é o julgamento arbitrário no processo de reportar as demonstrações financeiras, com o objetivo de influenciar ou manipular os números apresentados, ainda que dentro dos limites prescritos pela legislação contábil e fiscal. Esta tese teve como objetivo principal delinear o perfil das empresas brasileiras com maior propensão ao gerenciamento de resultados. Com este objetivo, foi investigado se existe um padrão de accruals discricionárias (proxy de gerenciamento adotada) entre categorias de variáveis qualitativas e quantitativas que representam os incentivos das empresas a praticar o gerenciamento. As variáveis analisadas incluíram indicadores econômicos, de mercado, medidas de concentração acionária e tamanho, características relacionadas à qualidade da governança, relacionamento com a auditoria, remuneração de executivos, captação de recursos em bolsa estrangeira e sanção do órgão regulador. A amostra analisada abrangeu empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, não financeiras, com ações negociadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BOVESPA). O período de estudo foi 1997 a 2006. Os dados foram analisados através de técnicas univariadas e multivariadas. Verificou-se que maiores níveis de accruals podem ser associados a empresas com maior expectativa de crescimento, maior exposição ao risco e menor concentração acionária. Para as variáveis rentabilidade patrimonial, operacional, endividamento e rentabilidade do acionista, maiores valores de accruals foram associados tanto a menores como a maiores níveis destas variáveis. Encontrou-se que são mais propensas a praticar o gerenciamento as empresas não listadas nos segmentos especiais da Bovespa, que não apresentam programa de ADR, que têm plano de opções, que apresentam contratação de serviços não relacionados à auditoria junto ao auditor independente, com valor superior a 5% dos serviços de auditoria e que têm parecer de auditoria com ressalva. Adicionalmente, foi investigado o perfil das empresas brasileiras solicitadas a republicar suas demonstrações financeiras (DF) pela CVM. Estas empresas, de acordo com pesquisas em gerenciamento, podem ser tomadas como intencionalmente envolvidas em manipulação. Observou-se que, em relação às empresas não solicitadas a republicar suas DF, as empresas que foram objeto desta solicitação apresentaram maior endividamento, menor liquidez contábil, menor rentabilidade patrimonial, maior (quando medida pela margem de ebitda) e menor (quando medida pelo retorno sobre as vendas) rentabilidade operacional, menor rentabilidade para o acionista, menor exposição ao risco, menor expectativa de crescimento, maior concentração acionária, menor volatilidade dos retornos das ações e menores accruals discricionárias. No exercício para o qual o refazimento foi solicitado, a maioria não era listada nos segmentos especiais da Bovespa, não apresentava programas de ADR, não tinha plano de opções, foi auditada por Big Four e obteve parecer sem ressalva do auditor. / Earnings management, as the brazilian capital market regulator defines, is the arbitrary judgement in the financial statements reporting, with the goal to influence or manipulate the accounting numbers, even if it remains between the limits of tax and accounting legislation. The main goal of this work was to investigate the profile of the brazilian firms with more incentives to practice the earnings management. With this goal, it was investigated if there is a pattern of discretionary accruals between categories of quantitative and qualitative variables that represent the incentives to practice earnings management. It was investigated if there is relation between earnings mangament and levels of accounting and market based measures, ownership concentration and size. Aditionally it was investigated if the governance quality, the relationship with auditors, the executive compensation, the existence of ADR programs and restated financial statements influences the earnings management practice. The sample analised was non-financial brazilian public traded companies, with stocks traded in the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa). The investigation period was from 1997 to 2006. Univariate and multivariate analysis was applied to the data. It was found that higher accruals levels can be associated to companies with higher growth expectation, higher risk exposure and lower ownership concentration. It was found that companies with both higher and lower levels of operating profitability, equity profitability, stockholder profitability and debt have higher accruals levels. Companies not listed in the governance levels of Bovespa, without ADR programs, with option plans, with non-relating auditing contracts with their auditors and with qualifed opinion have more probability to practice the earnings management. It was also investigated the restated brazilian firms profile. This companies, according to earnings management research, are intentionally involved in manipulation. It was found that this companies, related to the not restated firms, have higher debt levels, lower liquidity, lower equity profitability, higher and lower operating profitability, lower stockholder profitability, lower risk exposure, lower growth expectation, higher ownership concentration and lower discretionary accruals. The most of them wasn´t listed in the Bovespa governance levels, don’t have ADR programs, option plans, was audited by Big Four and had unqualified opinion in the time of the restated.

Esta tese tem o objetivo principal de demonstrar empiricamente que as companhias abertas brasileiras "gerenciam" os seus resultados contábeis como resposta a estímulos do mercado de capitais. Inicialmente, é elucidado o significado de alguns conceitos, tais como "gerenciamento" dos resultados contábeis e acumulações discricionárias. Discute-se o perfil do mercado de capitais brasileiro e as circunstâncias ambientais nas quais são gerados os relatórios contábeis financeiros das companhias abertas brasileiras, enfatizando-se o papel dos órgãos reguladores e da legislação comercial e tributária. A seguir, depois da revisão da literatura brasileira e estrangeira na área de "gerenciamento" dos resultados contábeis, documentaram-se evidências para as companhias abertas brasileiras do "gerenciamento" dos resultados contábeis para: a) Evitar reportar perdas, b) Sustentar o desempenho recente e c) Reduzir a variabilidade dos resultados. O período de estudo foi os anos entre 1995 e 1999, tendo como base de dados principal a Economática. Empiricamente, foi implementado um modelo de regressão múltipla para estimar as Acumulações Discricionárias, que são proxy do valor discricionariamente alterado dos resultados contábeis. Com base na pesquisa, verificou-se que as empresas brasileiras com resultados muito ruins os manejam de maneira a piorá-los ainda mais, visando melhores resultados no futuro. Em termos de desempenho no mercado, constatou-se que empresas que manejam "artificialmente" os resultados conseguem no curto prazo seduzir os investidores; entretanto, no longo prazo, o mercado identifica o procedimento e essas ações são penalizadas com os piores desempenhos acumulados. Nos apêndices, é estudada a influência da Governança Corporativa e da Auditoria Independente na propensão à prática do "gerenciamento" dos resultados contábeis, bem como é estimado o coeficiente de resposta dos retornos das companhias abertas brasileiras aos resultados contábeis. / This thesis has the main purpose to present empirical evidence that Brazilian public companies practice earnings management as a response to capital market incentives. Initially, some important concepts are elucidated, such as earnings management and discretionary accruals. In addition, specific aspects of Brazilian capital market, as well as its financial reporting environment are briefly discussed. After a literature review in this area of Earnings management, it will be documented evidences that Brazilian public companies manage their earnings to: a) Avoid reporting losses; b) Sustain recent performance and c) Income smoothing. The study period of the empirical analysis is between 1995 and 1999, and the most important source of information is Economática. As part of the research, It was implemented a multiple regression model to estimate discretionary accruals, that are used as proxies for the amount of earnings management. Among several observations, it was verified that Brazilian companies practice big bath accounting, so in case of bad results, the companies manage their earnings to report even worse losses, in order to have better future earnings. In terms of performance in the stock market, it was documented that companies that artificially manage their results, towards income decreasing or income increasing, can fool the market in the short run, but in the long run the investors realize the procedure, and their stocks will underperform the market. In the appendixes of this thesis some factors that can reduce earnings management are discussed, such as Corporate Governance and Independent Auditing. Other short analysis is the estimation of the earnings response coefficient for Brazilian public companies.

基於資本市場先天資訊的不對稱，企業內部人本就享有私有資訊之絕對利益，再加上風險分攤的觀念，透過證券市場向投資人募集資金的方式多為企業的首選。而主管機關為防止投資人權益受損，對於企業現金增資審核之嚴謹門檻，卻導致企業盈餘管理的動機。國內研究對於上述因果及衍生問題已有相當多的研究，但未見針對現金增資目的與盈餘管理動機及工具之關聯性進行探討。 一般而言，公司可能為了補充營運資金、償還負債、擴充產能或購併他公司等目的申請現金增資。理論上，不同的增資目的其資金需求之迫切程度應不同，且不同的增資目的之資金需求也應透過財務報表中不同的會計科目來表達。本研究主要的實證議題有二：（1）現金增資的決策提供盈餘操縱的動機，而盈餘操縱的強度是否因增資目的不同而互異？及（2）不同的增資目的是否搭配不同的盈餘操縱工具，期使現金增資目的與財務報表所顯現出的現金需求相允合？ 實証結果顯示：（1）上市公司增資前確實傾向於採用增加盈餘之裁決性應計項目，同時配合操控業外收益來增加盈餘，但以資產或收益調整之裁決性應計項目之操縱行為並不顯著。（2）補充營運資金及償還負債二種增資目的盈餘操縱強度只有在增資前一季是大於其他增資目的，其他測試期間並無顯著不同。（3）補充營運資金之增資目的並不傾向採用裁決性應計項目作為盈餘操縱工具。（4）償還負債之增資目的傾向利用業外收益作為盈餘操縱工具。（5）補充營運資金及償還負債二增資目的之盈餘操縱動機之強度並無顯著差異。

地雷股係因本土性金融風暴而產生，眾多的股市投資人因此受到巨額損失，進而質疑財務報表的允當性及會計師、主管機關的監督不夠周嚴。因此，本研究主旨在探討地雷公司在遭遇本土性金融風暴時，財務報表是否具有資訊價值以及地雷公司會採用何種模式來管理盈餘，以穩定股價或隱藏財務風險。 本研究以股價行為的模式來定義地雷股，研究樣本包括有地雷股和相對同一產業的非地雷股樣本，研究方法主要以Modified Jones Model推估裁決性應計項目，並依常態性檢定之結果，以t檢定及Wilcoxon Sign Rank檢定，分析地雷公司和非地雷公司的可裁決應計項目和營業外項目變動情形，以檢驗地雷公司是否有盈餘管理的情形。 實證結果顯示：(1)本研究以地雷公司在亞洲金融風暴後地雷爆發前會發生盈餘管理假說，在實證上獲得支持，但是非地雷股也會有盈餘管理的情形產生。(2)地雷股盈餘管理的時點大多發生在民國八十七年第一季、第二季時。(3)地雷股盈餘管理的工具是傾向於使用營業外損益項目，相較之下營業項目是較不顯著的。

本研究旨在觀察國內上市公司因經營不善、財務困難而遭管制機構處以降類、變更交易方式或終止上市之處分前，是否進行盈餘管理。由於遭降類等處分後，不僅其公司經理人有遭撤換的可能，更使公司形象、信譽受損，故本研究由實是性會計理論的觀念推衍，並參考相關的法令規定，推論經營不善之上市公司，其管理當局會有強烈的動機進行盈餘操縱，以避免遭降類等之噩運。 　　本研究利用可裁決性應計項目(discretionary accruals)在降類等事件日前後的尺度是否具顯著性差異，來偵測財務困難公司是否在降類等處分前利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘操縱。本研究總樣本共64家，涵蓋14種產業，其中降類公司樣本25家，變更交易方式公司樣本26家，下市公司樣本13家。樣本期間為民國66年至83年，每個樣本財務資料涵蓋7個年度。經過實證分析後獲致下列結果： 　　1. 股票遭降類公司，降類前的可裁決性應計項目有大於降類後之現象，其中尤以降類前一年度最為顯著。 　　2. 股票遭變更為全額交割公司，變更前的可裁決性應計項目有大於變更後的現象，其中尤以變更前一年度最為顯著。 　　3. 股票遭下市公司，其下市前的可裁決性應計項目與下市後的差異並不顯著。 　　綜合上述實驗結果，本研究可獲以下結論： 　　1. 第一類股票上市公司因經營不佳而遭變更為第二類股前有利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘管理之情形，尤以降類前一年度最為明顯。 　　2. 上市公司因財務困難而遭變更為全額交割股前，有利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘管理之情形，尤以變更前一年度最為明顯。 　　3. 公司下市前利用可裁決性應計項目進行盈餘管理的情形並不顯著。究其原因，可能係由全額交割股至下市這一過程乃一不算短的時間，由於應計項目具有迴轉的特性，或因公司財務結構、獲利能力的日趨惡化，使盈餘操縱的空間愈小，使公司已無能力於下市前進行盈餘操縱。

本研究係探析保險業在監理管制下，若有違監理標準之虞時，其經理人是否興起盈餘管理的動機，以避免不必要的監理成本。蓋保險監理最重要的目的為預防保險公司失卻清償能力，以保障被保險人的權益，並維持金融安定。在實施風險基礎資本制前，邊際清償能力的標準仍以保險法第143條第一項之規定為依歸，即保險業認許資產減除負債之餘額，未達實收資本之45%時，主管機關應命其於限期內，以現金增資補足之。若保險業不依第143條規定限期增資補足者，保險法第149條第二項授權主管機關應依情節輕重，分別處以派員監理、撤換負責人或有關人員、限期改組、甚至命其停業或解散。故本研究預期清償能力不佳的保險公司，其經理人會動用裁量性應計項目調整財務狀況，以跨過清償能力標竿，避免受到監理機關的注意與查核。另外，保險法對於保險業資金運用管道有所縮限，以驅使保險公司穩健地運用資金，預防保險公司因巨額投資損失致使清償能力敗壞。但隨著產業競爭度增強與低利率時代的來臨，保險公司在經營績效與保單預定利率的壓力下，是否會安於目前的投資限制，而放棄賺取投資報酬的機會。據此，本研究預期年度中持有短期有價證券總額超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人會選擇處分位於利得部位的短期有價證券，以規避超過保險法第146條之1第一項第二款的門檻限制。同理，年度中持有合格的公司股票及公司債超過或可能超過35%資金門檻的保險公司，其經理人可能會選擇出售位於利得部位的股票或公司債，以規避超過146條之1第一項第三款的門檻限制。 　　在研究設計上，為捕捉各類操縱財務報表的淨影響，本研究採用總裁量性應計項目作為代理變數。在所有可用的裁量性應計項目估計模型中，研究指出Modified Jones模型顯示了相對較強的檢定力(Dechow et al. 1995)。因此本研究援引Modified Jones模型估計裁量性應計數字。其次，將該模型析出的裁量性應計數字與各類監理門檻距離組成一迴歸模型，以測試其關聯性強弱。實證結果如下：一、在產險業，保單持有人盈餘與實收資本之45%的距離愈小者，其盈餘管理幅度愈大。二、壽險業比較沒有利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機。但依公司規模來看，大小公司行為仍有所差異，即相較於大公司，小公司利用裁量性應計項目來達到監理標準的動機較為強烈。根據本文實證研究結論，建議監理機關與被保險人應特別注意產險業及小壽險公司的財務狀況，並確認其清償能力之品質。 / This paper examined whether insurance companies have incentives to manipulate accounting accruals to appear more solvent and less risky. In Taiwan, virtually all industries are regulated to some degree, but insurance industry faces regulatory monitoring that is explicitly tied to accounting data. Insurance regulators required that insurers meet conditions for minimum financial health. It is frequency asserted that such regulations create incentives to manipulate financial statement to avoid regulatory intervention The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the incentive to manipulate financial statement is a decreasing function of the insurers’ difference between policyholders’ surplus and 45% of capital. This paper assumes that insurance managers use their reporting discretion to achieve solvency goal and avoid exceeding investment limits. Following Healy (1985), accruals-based measures are wide employed in test of earnings management hypothesis. In the past, the most frequency used techniques for estimating discretionary accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the modified Jones model. In this paper, the magnitude of earnings management is proxied by the discretionary accruals which are estimated by using a cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model and regressed by three differences of regulatory requirements which measure the insurers’ behavior under the regulation. The evidence indicates that when policyholders’ surplus of property-casualty insurers is closer to 45% of capital, the incentive to manipulate financial statement is stronger. On the other hand, life insurers have less incentive to manipulate financial statement, but relative to big size insurers, small size insurers have stronger incentive to meet regulatory requirements.

<p>Nowadays, there exist two reporting regimes, rules-based and principle-based (comply-or-explain). In the rules-based environment, researchers have studied the relationship between internal control quality and accounting quality. Prior studies have suggested that reports on internal control are an effective way for investors to evaluate the quality of the firm‟s internal control. By having a sound system of internal control, it creates reliance upon the firm‟s financial reporting. Therefore, the condition of internal control has direct connection to the investors‟ decision making.  In  U.S., where the corporate governance has been known to be typically rules-based, most researches have shown a positive relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. In the comply-or-explain reporting regime, there has only been one research as far as we know, that investigates the relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. The research took place in Netherlands; their study provided positive association between internal control  reporting quality and accounting quality, particularly earnings quality. The result is consistent with other research in rules-based regime.    The Swedish code has  been enacted for  five years and it is in the same regime as Netherlands. However, under current Swedish code, we are not aware of any empirical research  that  has taken place to address the effectiveness of the code. Therefore, we conducted the study with 152 firms listed on Swedish NASDAQ OMXS to test internal control reporting quality and accounting quality. We used proxies for internal control reporting quality: effectiveness statement of  internal control, internal control reporting score and internal control proportion. Simultaneously, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy of accounting quality. Our result showed a negative significant relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals but this relationship is quite weak and sensitive. It is broken with the presence of one more variable in regression, such as size variable. The result could not give any evidence for relationships between either effectiveness statements or extent of internal control reporting with discretionary accruals. Although, the relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals is not tight, it still encourage the  notion  that firms with good internal control report will improve their accounting quality. Our research contributes knowledge to wide-range of concerned parties. Moreover, it also suggests valuable ideas for further studies in the same area.</p>

Nowadays, there exist two reporting regimes, rules-based and principle-based (comply-or-explain). In the rules-based environment, researchers have studied the relationship between internal control quality and accounting quality. Prior studies have suggested that reports on internal control are an effective way for investors to evaluate the quality of the firm‟s internal control. By having a sound system of internal control, it creates reliance upon the firm‟s financial reporting. Therefore, the condition of internal control has direct connection to the investors‟ decision making.  In  U.S., where the corporate governance has been known to be typically rules-based, most researches have shown a positive relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. In the comply-or-explain reporting regime, there has only been one research as far as we know, that investigates the relationship between internal control reporting and accounting quality. The research took place in Netherlands; their study provided positive association between internal control  reporting quality and accounting quality, particularly earnings quality. The result is consistent with other research in rules-based regime.    The Swedish code has  been enacted for  five years and it is in the same regime as Netherlands. However, under current Swedish code, we are not aware of any empirical research  that  has taken place to address the effectiveness of the code. Therefore, we conducted the study with 152 firms listed on Swedish NASDAQ OMXS to test internal control reporting quality and accounting quality. We used proxies for internal control reporting quality: effectiveness statement of  internal control, internal control reporting score and internal control proportion. Simultaneously, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy of accounting quality. Our result showed a negative significant relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals but this relationship is quite weak and sensitive. It is broken with the presence of one more variable in regression, such as size variable. The result could not give any evidence for relationships between either effectiveness statements or extent of internal control reporting with discretionary accruals. Although, the relationship between internal control reporting score and discretionary accruals is not tight, it still encourage the  notion  that firms with good internal control report will improve their accounting quality. Our research contributes knowledge to wide-range of concerned parties. Moreover, it also suggests valuable ideas for further studies in the same area.

公司名稱不僅僅是識別的代號，還具有深切的意義存在，且更名還需花費很大的成本、面對原有客戶流失的風險，故企業更名背後的真正涵義是值得深入探討的。 本研究旨在探討在CRSP有更名紀錄之美國上市公司，是否會透過實質交易或裁決性應計之方式進行盈餘管理。除了比較更名前後盈餘管理程度之差異，同時也以更名公司為實驗組，並選取未更名公司作為對照組，檢測在更名後，更名公司與未更名公司之盈餘管理程度是否有顯著差異。另外，為額外分析不同類型的更名原因，是否會採取不同的盈餘管理方式，依不同標準選取以下二類之更名公司：第一類為因業務範圍改變而更名；第二類為無原因之更名。 實證結果發現，更名公司在更名後，比起更名前及未更名公司，可能有以操縱銷貨來壓低現金流量、透過過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易行為，進行裁決性應計項目之盈餘管理也較為嚴重。額外分析不同原因的更名公司之實證結果則發現，無原因之更名公司在更名後，進行實質交易之情形較業務範圍改變之更名公司嚴重。 / This study investigates the impact of corporate name changes on earnings management. We examine earnings management behavior in the period leading to the passage of name change effective year and in the period following the passage of name change effective year, focusing on both real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. To make further investigations, we conduct analysis of firms that change name because of broader or narrower focus the firm’s scope of business versus firms that change name with no reason. The empirical results show that name change firms use more accruals and real earnings management after name changes when compared to similar firms. Furthermore, we also find that firms change name with no reason tend to adopt real earnings management when compared to the firms that change name because of broader or narrow focus.