This thesis is basically an attempt to discuss the intrinsic intersubjective nature of the so-called ideal sciences, i.e. geometry or arithmetic. Based upon a thorough analysis of Husserls The Origin of Geometry and Derridas Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: an Introduction this thesis takes geometry as an example of an ideal science. The main question of the thesis is how an ideal science or object is constituted. The thesis consist of two main chapters - “Geometry and Historicity” and “Language”- and a concluding discussion. "Geometry and Historicity” reflects upon the relationship between the ideal sciences, using geometry as an example, and historicity, time and traditionality." The “Language” chapter discusses the need for language to make communication within an intersubjective space possible", and further which implications writing has upon the formations of ideal structures. To conclude the thesis demonstrates how geometry is far from a 'neutral' science but is constituted and idealized within the intersubjective space. The thesis argues that geometry has been “traditionalized” as an authentic and, as it is conceived, true form of knowledge through a historical process of human relations. This is made possible with the intrinsic “objectifying” ability within language and more specifically the human literacy, which is essential for this “idealization” process. As a consequence our understanding of science needs further reflections on how language, historicity and ultimately human relations have played an essential part in its formation.

Zugl.: München, Univ., Habil.-Schr., 2008

Phenomenology systematically clarifies the structures and processes that make possible different experiences of communication based on pre linguistic foundation. This article explores this perspective and argues that it allows a deeper comprehension of experiences of personal and social reintegration through the interaction with animals of inmates and children with autism. Also, this article follows the thesis of David Abram: that the re discovery of the amplitude od the communicational possibilities in the human beings opens up alternatives of solution to the cultural discomforts that are growing deep in contemporary urban cultures of the world. / La fenomenología aclara sistemáticamente las estructuras y procesos que hacen posible las diversas experiencias comunicativas desde sus estratos fundamentales prelingüísticos. El artículo argumenta que esta perspectiva permite una comprensión más profunda de las experiencias de reintegración personal y social de reclusos y niños autistas a partir de la interacción con animales. Sostiene, siguiendo las tesis de David Abram, que el redescubrimiento de la amplitud de las posibilidades comunicativas en los seres humanos abre alternativas de respuesta a los malestares culturales que se van profundizando en las culturas urbanas contemporáneas.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Michelle S Cabral.pdf: 1060781 bytes, checksum: b88fc5e113d9ff36c876bfbcf2c52bdd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-27 / Fundação Araucária / The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the statute of the notion of world in Husserl‟s phenomenology. It starts of an analysis of the elements involved in the characterization of this as universal objective correlate of the transcendental life. To do so, it was necessary to examine the notions of conscience and epoché, insofar as the understanding of its unique and original sense is determinative to a full apprehension of the proposed question. The notion of conscience is elaborated by Husserlian phenomenology in a radically opposing meaning to the modern conceptions of it, in which it was conceived, in general, as psychic interiority that articulates ideas or psychological data from incoming from stimulations received from the outside. According to Husserl, the true subjectivity should be described as ideal- transcendental field that encloses the constitution of both the poles involved in any experience. Its basic characteristic will be drawn by intentionality operative that ensure the direct correlation between possible subjects and possible objects. The method that allows to have access such field, becoming possible the pure description of the reference apriórica of the noetic acts its respective noematic correlates, is the method of epoché. The validation of this as appropriate procedure and demanded by the character of the inquiry is indispensable within the Husserlian thought. The process of eidetic variation and the role of the fantasy are also highlighted in function of its importance in the whole operation. The conception of the world drew from the use of this methodology that invalidates the natural attitude of consideration, while an naive and insufficient procedure to establish the knowledge, is extracted, first, in a movement of refutation to the concept modern of world. The conception of world as a horizon of meaning for each and every experience is based only through the overcoming of the traditional figures of conscience and idealism. The new meaning, established by phenomenology, brings as specificity determinative the essential character of the analysis, resource that allows it to raise it to the transcendental attitude of inquiry abandoning, concomitantly, the facticity imposed by natural consideration. The meticulous examination of the essential structure present in any one experience allows the verification of the horizons involved in each individual lived. The interconnection of these in an indefinite system of new experiences eidetically predetermined from the internal and external horizons of each objectivity individually taked, leads to the total horizon of the world. The world then will be characterized as the horizon of horizons or, still, as correlative infinite idea to infinities of possible experiences in the unity of one same life. It is, at last, to understand the world as sense Omni-encompassing that involves each individual experience in order to determine the indefinite possibility experiences possible according to the telos of agreement and sedimentation. / O objetivo da dissertação é investigar o estatuto da noção de mundo na fenomenologia de Husserl. Parte-se de uma análise dos elementos implicados na caracterização deste como correlato objetivo universal da vida transcendental. Para tanto, fez-se necessário examinar as noções de consciência e epoché, na medida em que a compreensão de seu sentido inédito e original é determinante para uma plena apreensão da questão proposta. A noção de consciência é elaborada pela fenomenologia husserliana numa significação radicalmente oposta às concepções modernas da mesma, nas quais era concebida, em geral, como interioridade psíquica que articula idéias ou dados psicológicos provenientes de estímulos recebidos do exterior. De acordo com Husserl, a verdadeira subjetividade deverá ser descrita como âmbito ideal-transcendental que abrange a constituição de ambos os pólos implicados numa experiência qualquer. Sua característica fundamental será traçada pela intencionalidade operante que garante a correlação direta entre sujeitos possíveis e objetos possíveis. O método que permite acessar tal âmbito, tornando possível a descrição pura da apriórica referência dos atos noéticos aos seus respectivos correlatos noemáticos, é o método da epoché. A validação deste como procedimento cabível e exigido pelo caráter da investigação se mostra indispensável no interior do pensamento husserliano. O processo de variação eidética e o papel da fantasia também são destacados em função de sua importância no todo da operação. A concepção de mundo haurida a partir do emprego desta metodologia que invalida a atitude natural de consideração, enquanto um procedimento ingênuo e insuficiente para fundar o conhecimento, é extraída, primeiramente, num movimento de refutação ao conceito moderno de mundo. A concepção de mundo como horizonte de sentido para toda e qualquer experiência somente encontra fundamento através da superação das tradicionais figuras de consciência e de idealismo. A nova acepção, instaurada pela fenomenologia, traz como especificidade determinante o caráter essencial da análise, recurso que lhe permite alçar-se à atitude transcendental de investigação abandonando, concomitantemente, a faticidade imposta pela consideração natural. O exame meticuloso da estrutura essencial presente em uma experiência qualquer permite a constatação dos horizontes implicados em cada vivido singular. A interconexão destes num sistema indefinido de novas experiências, eideticamente pré-determinadas a partir dos horizontes interno e externo de cada objetividade tomada individualmente, leva ao horizonte total do mundo. O mundo será então caracterizado como horizonte dos horizontes ou, ainda, como idéia infinita correlativa às infinidades de experiências possíveis na unidade de uma mesma vida. Trata-se, enfim, de compreender o mundo como sentido omni-englobante que envolve cada experiência individual de modo a determinar a possibilidade indefinida de experiências possíveis segundo o telos de concordância e sedimentação.

Cette thèse se donne pour tâche d’expliciter et de déployer, à partir de l’œuvre de Husserl, les diverses conceptions phénoménologiques directrices du mouvement de la chair. En un premier temps, nous cherchons à préciser le contexte d’origine du concept de « kinesthèse », élaboré une première fois à l’été 1907 dans le cadre des leçons de Husserl sur la chose et l’espace. En un deuxième temps, il nous apparaîtra nécessaire d’élargir la signification technique et restreinte que possède le se-mouvoir dans la phénoménologie statique de la perception, afin de prendre en compte le mouvement en tant qu’action pratique du sujet dans divers horizons du monde. L’étude de certains textes qui relèvent de la phénoménologie génétique semble alors permettre de parler d’une co-constitution pratique entre la mobilité de la chair et la choséité, et ainsi de considérer à neuf l’hypothèse d’une historicité de la chair. Dans un troisième et dernier temps, il s’agira d’opérer une radicalisation de la compréhension du mouvement de la chair, afin de la ressaisir comme « geste », c’est-à-dire non plus simplement comme officiant des projets intentionnels de l’ego, mais bien comme origine et support des structures cardinales du monde. La lecture croisée de divers textes tardifs de Husserl et de Heidegger nous permettra de dégager une compréhension ontologique, et non plus strictement sensualiste ou pratique, de la mobilité charnelle. Au travers de ces études, le mouvement se révèle originairement impliqué dans les divers niveaux de la constitution de la mondanéité, mais aussi constitué en retour. / This thesis sets itself the task of clarifying and deploying the various phenomenological conceptions of bodily movement within Husserl’s work. As a first step, we seek to shed light on the context which guided the formation of the concept of “kinesthesis” in the 1907 summer lectures on thing and space. As a second step, it will appear necessary to expand the narrow and technical meaning that this “moving-oneself” has in the static phenomenology of perception, in order to take into account the movement thought as a practical action throughout various horizons of the lifeworld. Some texts pertaining to Husserl’s genetic phenomenology seem to allow us to speak of a practical “co-constitution” between the mobility of the flesh and the handiness of the thing and, in doing so, to consider anew the hypothesis of a historicity of the flesh. As a third and final step, we will operate a radicalization of the understanding of bodily movement, in order to grasp it as a “gesture”, that is to say, not only as a mere implement of the intentional projects of the ego, but as the very origin and support of the cardinal structures of the world. The cross-reading of different later texts by Husserl and Heidegger seems to support the project of setting forth an ontological understanding of mobility that is no longer in any way sensualistic or pragmatic. Through these meanings, bodily movement reveals itself as being originally involved in the various constitutive levels of worldliness.

Cette thèse cherche d’abord à confronter les prétentions respectives des méthodes phénoménologique et analytico-linguistique classiques à fournir chacune une explication de la connaissance a priori des nécessités d’essence qui soit aussi dépourvue que possible de présupposés et de pétitions de principe. Le problème précis autour duquel se noue cette confrontation est celui de la possibilité des vérités a priori matérielles. Dans un premier temps, nous proposons une lecture et une résolution méréologiques de ce problème en termes husserliens de touts composés des parties dépendantes, qui permet mieux de rendre compte des tels ensembles que la méréologie atomiste qui caractérise la plupart des ontologies formelles « analytiques » ; et nous proposons ce faisant une compréhension de la méthode d’intuition eidétique comme analyse méréologique. Dans un second temps, nous appliquons cette analyse à la méthode phénoménologique elle-même, comprenant la réduction transcendantale comme une variation méréologique sur l’a priori matériel de la corrélation qui caractérise la structure même de la relation entre l’ego et le monde, ce qui nous oblige de voir cette structure à son tour comme un tout concret intuitionnable dont les parties subjective et objective ne sont que des moments absolument dépendants, sans aucun privilège accordé au pôle sujet de cette structure. Ainsi, ce n’est qu’à la stricte condition que la phénoménologie se « désubjectivise » qu’elle puisse à la fois réfuter un certain nombre de dogmes analytiques et empiristes et fonder sa propre méthode dans une absence comparative de présupposés. / This dissertation takes as its point of departure a polemical comparison of the respective claims of the phenomenological and classical analytic-linguistic methods to provide an account of a priori knowledge of essential or necessary truth that is as free as possible of presuppositions and circular reasoning. The precise problem around which this confrontation crystalizes is the one concerning the possibility of material a priori truths. First, we propose a mereological interpretation of and solution to this problem in the Husserlian terms of wholes composed of dependent parts, which allows for a better account of such wholes than does the atomistic mereology that characterizes most “analytic” formal ontologies, and we propose an understanding of the method of eidetic intuition as mereological analysis. Secondly, we apply this analysis to the phenomenological method itself, understanding the transcendental reduction as a mereological variation on the material a priori of correlation that characterizes the very structure of the relation between the ego and the world; this obliges us to see this structure in turn as an intuitable concrete whole whose subjective and objective parts are merely absolutely dependent moments, without privileging the subject-pole of this structure. In this way, it is only on the strict condition that phenomenology “desubjectivize” itself that it might at once refute a certain number of analytic and empiricist dogmas and ground its own method without recourse to unnecessary and untenable presuppositions.

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Cette thèse examine la phénoménologie en tant que philosophie-en-travail, en tant que projet ouvert de recherche. Sa tâche principale consiste à déterminer la façon d'accomplir le travail phénoménologique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous examinons les analyses de la doctrine phénoménologique de l'attitude (Partie I.), de la doctrine de la méthode (Partie II.) et de l'architectonique " flexible " (Partie III.) de la phénoménologie. Ces élaborations nous permettent de thématiser la dé-limitation de la conscience, l'enrichissement de sens et l'institution du nouveau en tant que traits caractéristiques de la manière phénoménologique d'opérer. Cette recherche exige une oscillation constante entre une systématique ouverte de la philosophie d'Edmund Husserl et des analyses phénoménologues particulières.