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As society grows, increasing populations and urbanisation also increase the risks diseases spreading. Tight living spaces, deforestation and global travel make it easier for these diseases to travel and spread across the world. The obligation for states to protect the lives and personal safety for its citizens include an obligation to do what is necessary to control the spread of these diseases. However, when these measures to control diseases cause intrusions in the private lives and freedom of movement of individuals in the state, the balance of interests must be carefully considered. This thesis aims to analyse the Swedish system of disease control and the principle of free will present therein, and how these are protected both under normal circumstances and under extraordinary circumstances such as a pandemic. Regarding all measures that constitute forced interventions, the principles of free will and proportionality are fundamental. This thesis discusses whether the considerations and balancing of interests in the Swedish system of disease control are satisfactory, or if changes should be made to either allow more intrusive measures or prohibit these further.

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Swedish environmental law stipulates an extensive obligation to provide information to regulatory authorities. This obligation can also be combined with different penalties. This is concerning in cases where an individual has committed a crime. On one hand the refusal to provide information might result in penalties, on the other hand the individual risks self-incrimination. Thus, the obligation to provide information in Swedish environmental law raises a fundamental problem in procedural law, namely the contradiction between efficiency and procedural safeguards. A reasonable balance is required between the two interests. How this balance is to be made, however, is neither stated in law nor in the legal literature. The aim of this paper is therefore to analyse if the obligation to provide information in Swedish environmental law violates the right against self-incrimination. To achieve the purpose of the paper, the applicable law must initially be determined. The legal situation is described by mapping, systematizing, and interpreting relevant sources of law. These sources are mainly Swedish law, legislative history, case law and legal literature. The material is assigned a decreasing value in the order as just mentioned, where law is given the highest value. The analysis also includes some material that traditionally does not fall into any of the mentioned categories. This material is assigned a value after an assessment of its quality. Furthermore, the paper takes an internal comparative perspective since Swedish rules are compared with each other. The paper shows that the right against self-incrimination includes both a right to be silent and a right to be passive. Furthermore, the right only becomes relevant when someone is accused of a crime, as stated in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the paper reveals that it is possible for someone to be accused of a crime in Swedish environmental law, and thereby the right against self-incrimination is actualised. Moreover, it is concluded that the very existence of the environmental law's obligation to provide information does not conflict with the right against self-incrimination. However, there is a risk of violation in individual cases. At present, Swedish law does not allow authorities to combine an injunction with fines when it can be suspected that a crime has been committed. However, there is no legislation regarding the other penalties available to the authorities, even though these penalties can be equated with fines in many cases. In conclusion the paper indicates that the obligation to provide information in Swedish environmental law risks conflicting with the right against self-incrimination in individual cases. This is mainly the case when the obligation is combined with a penalty and there is a suspicion of crime.

In the autumn of 2022 Sweden stands before a pivotal moment in its migration policy. A new government intends to impose significantly stricter requirements on immigration to the country and thereby adapt the regulatory framework to the minimum level provided by EU law. Yet action towards this adaption was taken already in 2016, when an extended maintenance requirement for family reunification was introduced in Law 2016:752 concerning temporary restrictions on the granting of permanent residence permits for asylum seekers. The requirement meant that a third country national living in Sweden, who wanted a family member to live in the country, had to be able to financially support both themselves and the family member. They would also have to provide a home of sufficient size and standard for them all to live in.  In 2021 the extended resources requirement was introduced as a permanent feature in the Swedish Aliens Act. At that time several referral institutes had advised against this implementation in the preparatory works before the law, raising questions as to whether the requirement would be so strict that it would effectively prevent family reunification and reinforce marginalization. Even the government conceded that the extended resources requirement would affect women and men differently, potentially causing women sponsors to fail to live up to the requirement and women migrants to become more financially dependent on their partners. From this conflict of interests sprung the purpose of this thesis, which is to examine the relation between the extended resources requirement in the Aliens Act and the right to family life for adult sponsors and their adult family members from a gender law perspective.  The thesis finds that the introduction of the extended resources requirement in the Swedish Aliens Act marks a permanent adaption of the provision to a level close to the minimum standard provided in the Family Reunification Directive. According to article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Member States wanting to limit the right to family life need to undertake a proportionality analysis before imposing such restrictions on individuals. For limitations in family reunification to be justified, they thus need be to be duly motivated. While no negative obligation to enable family reunification for Member States can be ascertained through this article, it still ascribes a certain positive duty for Member States to ensure the reunion of families. In this respect the extended resources requirement does not appear to be entirely satisfactory. The implementation of the requirement in 2021 was motivated by a will to adapt the requirement to the minimum level provided in the Family Reunification Directive, to encourage integration and to lower public costs. While the adaption of the requirement to the minimum level provided by EU law seems correctly executed, queries can be raised whether it causes the prohibiting of family reunification to such an extent that it undermines the purpose of the directive. This contention is supported by research suggesting that reuniting with one’s family is a key factor behind immigrants’ motivation to integrate in a society. In this respect, the extended resources requirement does not appear to fully comply with article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  Research also indicates that women are disproportionally affected by the extended resources requirement. Women sponsors work temporary and insecure jobs to a greater extent than men, and thereby risk failing to comply with the extended resources requirement. Simultaneously, women relatives risk becoming financially dependent on their partners when they immigrate to Sweden and are supported by them from the start, causing these women to stand even further away from the job market and other integrational measures. In its essence, the extended resources requirement enforces existing dichotomies between the state and the individual, the public and the private, notions of “us” and “them” and the inherent meaning of “man” and “woman” that contribute to enforcing gender roles and disintegration. This implies that the requirement does not live up to its proposed integrational effects and subsequently, that the extended resources requirement is not entirely purposeful.

Denna uppsats har till syfte att klargöra om lagen (1976:511) om omhändertagande av berusade personer m.m. (LOB) är förenlig med Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna (EKMR). Uppsatsen undersöker dels om 1 § LOB är förenlig med art. 5(1) EKMR, dels om förmansprövningen i 5 § LOB är förenlig med art. 5(4) EKMR. 1 § LOB möjliggör för polisen att omhänderta den som är så pass berusad att han inte är kapabel att ta hand om sig själv eller utgör en fara för sig själv eller annan. Tiotusentals människor berövas varje år friheten med stöd av denna lag. Utöver frihetsberövandet kan ett omhändertagande leda till ytterligare åtgärder från myndigheternas sida, exv. att körkort eller vapentillstånd återkallas. Den polisman som verkställt ett omhändertagande anmäler detta till sin förman som i sin tur kontrollerar om omhändertagandet utförts korrekt och om det ska bestå. Någon domstolsprövning sker inte trots att ett omhändertagande innebär ett stort ingrepp i den personliga integriteten. LOB har utsatts för kritik där det bl.a. har ifrågasatts om lagen är förenlig med EKMR. Polisen har även i vissa fall kritiserats för att tillämpa LOB godtyckligt eller felaktigt. Art. 5(1) EKMR stadgar att ett frihetsberövande måste passa in under någon av de kategorier som finns i art. 5(1) p. a–f och ske ”i den ordning lagen föreskriver”. Jag kommer fram till att 1 § LOB är förenlig med art. 5(1) EKMR. Frihetsberövandet som finns i 1 § LOB faller in under kategorin ”alkoholmissbrukare” som finns i art. 5(1) p. e. Kriteriet ”i den ordning lagen föreskriver” innebär bl.a. ett krav på att en lag måste vara av viss kvalité. Även på denna punkt anser jag att 1 § LOB är förenlig med EKMR, främst p.g.a. att förarbetena till LOB har fyllt ut de relativt vaga kriterierna som finns i 1 § LOB. Art. 5(4) EKMR anger att den som frihetsberövats snabbt ska få frihetsberövandet prövat i en domstol. Ett organ som inte utgör en domstol enligt nationell rätt kan betraktas som en domstol om Europeiska domstolen för de mänskliga rättigheternas (ED) krav på oberoende och rätten till vissa rättsäkerhetsgarantier är uppfyllda. Enligt min mening uppfyller inte 5 § LOB dessa kriterier då förmannen inte kan anses vara oberoende och då den omhändertagne saknar väsentliga rättssäkerhetsgarantier. Uppsatsen avslutas med en de lege ferenda-diskussion.