The purpose of this study is to investigate how South African and Swedish legislation as wellas case law regarding domestic violence and punishment against children is presented in both legal systems. Two methods are used as help to answer the two core questions in this thesis.The result of the study showed that the definitions of physical, psychological and sexual abusein both countries are listed as the same assaults and each country has an obligation to relocate children that have been exposed to those forms of violence. Many children in both countries have experienced some type of domestic violence during their childhood which makes the institutions whom work and have qualifications in questions regarding abused children to protect them from all forms of violence and have to strive more in order to make a better living for the next generations forward. When it comes to decision making courts and authorities in both countries have an obligation to always act in the child’s best interest which clearly appears in both constitutions.

Public liability regarding violations of the European Convention on HumanRights (ECHR) in Sweden is a given fact; member states, including Sweden, responsiblefor such violations are liable to compensate the individuals whoserights have been violated. Since 2014, a right to compensation for certain stateviolations of the second chapter – the human rights chapter – in the Instrumentof Government (1974:152), one of Sweden’s constitutional laws, has been establishedin case law. In 2020, a Swedish Government Official Report was published,which examined whether a basis for compensation should be establishedin the Tort Liability Act (1972:207) for violations in general of the second chapterof the Instrument of Government. The parliamentary committee investigatingthe matter concluded that such a basis should be established as it wouldstrengthen legal certainty and increase the state’s accountability for violations ofhuman rights stated within the constitution. However, as the inquiry was limitedto the second chapter of the Instrument of Government, the question of thestate’s liability concerning violations of other chapters in the Instrument of Governmentremains unanswered.This thesis examines the state’s liability in violations of certain articles in thefirst chapter of the Instrument of Government from a public law perspective,using a legal doctrinal method. Accountability in this thesis is not limited to tortsand therefore include other ways to attain non-pecuniary reparation, as torts isthe last resort for individuals in terms of effective remedies. To examine suchaccountability, the thesis firstly surveys the evolution of public liability in violationsof the second chapter of the Instrument of Government, which is basedon obligations following the ECHR. Secondly, application of Articles 1, 2 and 9in the first chapter of the Instrument of Government is accounted for. Thirdly,the relation between principles and rights within the first chapter of the Instrumentof Government and the ECHR is examined.The findings within the three parts are thereafter brought together to determinehow public liability in violations of the first chapter of the Instrument ofGovernment works, concluding that accountability relating to that of the secondchapter of the Instrument of Government might be enforceable although thelack of case law and practice in general makes the prospect too uncertain for legalrepresentatives to strive for. Hence, leading to the final conclusion that the matterneeds to be inquired upon to a more extensive level – preferably in the formof a dissertation or as a Swedish Government Official Report.

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There has, for the past few decades, been an increasing tendency from states to hold social media and other information intermediaries liable for the illicit or undesirable speech of their users. Much less debated, however, has been the question of intermediary responsibility for the freedom of speech and information of internet users. In the EU, as well as the US, there are no clear legal safeguards for protecting freedom of speech on privately owned networking platforms – albeit the exponential growth of these platforms as spheres for public expression and discourse. This thesis argues that the content moderation practices and policies of some of the largest social media platforms, in several respects, correspond poorly to Swedish and European freedom of speech standards, as established in human rights law. Considering the rationale behind speech rights, as well as the increasing significance of social media for public discourse, the thesis suggests alternative legal measures to establish corporate responsibility and ensuring online freedom of speech.

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The need to collect electronic communications for foreign intelligence purposes has increased in the past two decades, primarily due to the increase of international threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, digitalization and technical innovation have given rise to new possibilities for government surveillance and expanded the scope of the types of communications that may be collected. This gives rise to issues concerning the balance between effective foreign intelligence activities and the protection of personal integrity. This thesis performs a comparative analysis of the protection of personal integrity in signals intelligence in Sweden and the United States, by examining the protection of personal integrity under the Swedish Instrument of Government and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention) compared to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the requirements for signals intelligence under the Swedish Act (2008:717) on Signals Intelligence in Defense Intelligence Operations (the Surveillance Act) and § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA, as amended). The analysis further includes a review of the safeguards adopted in each legal system to limit the collection of communications and to ensure that personal integrity is considered in signals intelligence operations. In regard to the protection of personal integrity, the analysis concludes that Swedish law, combined with the European Convention, offers a wider and more extensive protection for individuals when compared to the United States’ framework. However, all provisions include a requirement of proportionality or reasonableness intended to balance the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of personal integrity. The analysis further concludes that the Fourth Amendment has limited impact on signals intelligence carried out under § 702 FISA due to its limitations to the people of the United States, and that individuals' ability to exercise their rights is greater under the European Convention. The European Convention further offers protection beyond Sweden's borders, resulting in some protection for non-Swedish persons. As for the signals intelligence conducted under the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA, several similarities and differences are identified. Both regulations limit the signals intelligence to be carried out for certain purposes. However, a notable difference is that, while signals intelligence under both the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA are limited to foreign conditions, Swedish signals intelligence may be conducted on communications that cross Sweden’s borders. Meanwhile, collection under § 702 FISA may only target non-US persons outside of the United States. Despite this difference, signals intelligence under both regulations result in the collection of communications of the country’s own citizens. To limit the collection, both the Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment (Sw. Försvarets Radioanstalt, FRA) and the United States National Security Agency (NSA) apply certain safeguards. These include the use of search terms in Swedish signals intelligence and selectors in American signals intelligence. While they are both used to make relevant selections in the collection of communications, there are some notable difference between the two. For example, selectors consist of, inter alia, an email address or phone number, while search terms should not, as a general rule, target a specific individual. Further, there is no warrant requirement for collections under § 702 FISA compared to the Surveillance Act, which requires court approval. Lastly, in regard to the control and review of Swedish and American signals intelligence, the analysis concludes that such activities are conducted in different manners in both legal systems. This includes both internal and external controls. However, the Swedish control units appear to have greater opportunities to intervene by, for example, controlling the FRA's access to signal carriers and interrupting an ongoing collection if needed.

Equality before the law and equal access to justice are fundamental rights in a modern state governed by the rule of law. Access to justice refers to the essential notion that all people have the right to legal protection and a jucidial remedy and that no practical, legal or other obstacles should prevent individuals from exercising their rights. The main facets that constitute the essence of access to justice is the right to access to court, involving a right to effective access to a fair and public hearing for everyone. Applied to criminal proceedings, this includes the right to equality of arms and practical and effective legal representation, if it is needed in order to ensure effective access to court.  Access to justice as a fundamental right covers several European legal principles, the right to a fair trial in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms being the main focus. The provision aims particularly on the person being suspected of a crime. However, the overall principle of the right to a fair trial and access to justice also includes the victim of a crime. This means that the rights deriving from access to justice also must be respected in regards of the injured party.  In order for the injured party to be able to exercice his or her rights under access to justice, the rights for the victim under Swedish law must provide him or her with sufficient conditions for doing so. The injured party may, inter alia, institute a private claim for compensation in criminal proceedings as well as under certain conditions file an action in accordance with the rules on private prosecution. The police and public prosecutor have an obligation to inform the injured party on his or her rights. The victim of a serious crime may have the right to be represented by a counsel. The right to counsel for the injured party does not correspond to the suspect’s right do defense counsel, which can result in failure to ensure equality of arms between the victim and the suspect. A procedural imbalance that favors one of the parties at the expense of the other may cause that his or her right to access to justice is denied. In general, being represented by a counsel for the injured party increases the victim's chances of defending his or her rights in accordance with access to justice.

A number of people have criticized the fact that courts often over-rely on DNA- evidence and that the shortcomings of DNA-analyses are rarely addressed. One flaw with DNA-analyses is that they cannot distinguish whether the presence of the DNA-trace has been caused by a so-called secondary transfer. Secondary transfer, the occurrence of which has been confirmed by several scientific stud- ies, means that DNA is transferred in two stages via contacts. A transfer of DNA can thus first occur from one person to another, for example by shaking hands, and then from the other person to a material, for example by grabbing a weapon. This poses a risk that DNA from an innocent person can be transferred through another person to a crime scene. A fundamental principle of criminal procedure is that the full burden of proof should be placed on the prosecution. This principle is derived from the presump- tion of innocence in Article 6.2 of the ECHR. As a consequence, the defendant has a right to remain silent throughout the judicial proceedings. Should the de- fendant instead be required to explain some of the circumstances of the case, a burden of proof would fall on the defendant, a so-called burden of explanation. Thus, a requirement that the defendant explain some of the circumstances of the case conflicts with the principle of the prosecutor's full burden of proof. Given the criticism that the courts rarely consider the shortcomings of DNA- evidence, there is a risk that the responsibility falls on the defendant to point out that a secondary transfer of DNA has occurred and to actively work towards convincing the court of his or her innocence. The purpose of the paper is thus to investigate the courts' consideration of these objections from the accused. The question is if a burden of explanation is placed on the accused and whether this is compatible with the presumption of innocence. To fulfill the purpose, an empirical study was conducted in the form of an analysis of 16 district court and appellate court decisions. The results showed that the defendant was imposed a burden of explanation in several cases. An exami- nation of the case law of the ECHR showed that there is, in exceptional cases, a possibility to impose an explanatory burden on the accused. However, the cases in the study were not covered by the exception. In conclusion, the practical ap- plication of the burden of proof is not compatible with the presumption of in- nocence. There is thus a need to educate judges on the complex subject of DNA to draw attention to the drawbacks of the evidence and to correct the false per- ception of DNA evidence as infallible. Furthermore, there is a need for a new precedent from the Supreme Court clarifying how the burden of explanation should be applied in accordance with the ECHR.