LL. M.(With specialisation in Private Law))

Expropriation används för att med tvång ta mark i anspråk för att tillgodose allmänna behov. Bestämmelserna kring detta återfinns i expropriationslagen (SFS 1972:719) där det specificeras vem som får expropriera, hur det går till, vilka ersättningsmöjligheter som finns m.m. Lagen var i princip oförändrad sedan dess införande i början av 1970-talet och 2005 tillsattes på uppdrag av regeringen en grupp för att utvärdera reglerna. Syftet var att stärka äganderätten och resultatet blev huvudsakligen ändringar av tre bestämmelser, schablonpåslaget, toleransavdraget och presumtionsregeln.  Denna uppsats har som syfte att besvara frågan om varför det finns tvångsmöjligheter och hur detta går till. Vidare utvärderas också det aktualiserade ändringarna från 2010 och slutsatser dras kring deras påverkan på annan rätt, oklarheter och om de kan anses uppnå syftet med lagändringen. För att besvara dessa frågor baseras uppsatsen på existerande lagtext, förarbeten och annan juridisk text. Till hjälp används även relevant litteratur inom det markjuridiska området. Utöver detta så har även det svenska ersättningssystemet jämförts mot internationell rätt via ett par utvalda länder i Europa.  Slutsatser som kan dras är att lagändringarna huvudsakligen är positiva och tjänar det syfte som ursprungligen satts upp av de som är ansvariga för ändringarna. Dock finns vissa problem med lagstiftningen, såsom oklarheter i värdering och definitioner, inte helt kompletta följdändringar i andra lagar eller oförutsedda konsekvenser. Ändringarna i ersättningen av marknadsvärdet till ett högre värde än tidigare är den klart största förändringen och i jämförelse mot internationell rätt så har Sverige bland de mest generösa ersättningsreglerna. Vissa länder har börjat anpassa sin lagstiftning enligt samma principer som föranledde förändringar i den svenska lagstiftningen men har ännu inte nått lika långt. Detta kan vi troligtvis ses förändras inom den närmsta framtiden då individens rättigheter kommer i fokus samt att expropriation numera ofta används för andra ändamål än förr. / Expropriation (also known as compulsory purchase or eminent domain) is the method used for acquiring land by force to cater public needs. The regulations regarding this is in Swedish law is found in the Expropriation Act (SFS 1972:719) where it is specified who may use expropriation, how it works, how the compensation is decided, etc. The law has been mostly unaltered since its adaptation in the early 1970’s and in 2005 a group was assigned to investigate possible changes. This was to achieve the purpose of strengthening individual and ownership rights and resulted in three main changes. Firstly, the land compensation was raised from 100 % of the market value to 125 %, secondly a special tolerance deduction was removed, and thirdly the rule of presumption was also removed. This thesis aims to answer the question of why there are compulsory measures and how they work. It will also examine the changes to the Swedish expropriation act from 2010 to evaluate how it affected other parts of the justice system, what could be unclear and whether they achieved their own purpose. To answer this, existing legislation has been used, as well as its preparatory work and other legal documents. Furthermore, other relevant legal documents have been reviewed. A brief investigation into other international legal systems has also been conducted. In summary we can draw conclusions regarding these amendments and see that they are mainly positive and serves the purpose behind the changes. There are however certain problems with the legislation, such as difficulties with the valuation and definitions, certain follow-up changes to other legislation and some unforeseen consequences. The raised compensation for market value was the clearly biggest change and in comparison to international law, the compensation regulations in Sweden is among the most liberal. Some countries have begun altering their respective laws in accordance with the same principles used for the Swedish amendments but have yet to reach the levels that has been adapted here. This is probably something that will change further in the near future as individual rights are more in focus and because expropriation these days is used for different purposes than before.

Cette thèse a pour objectif d’établir certains principes d’une potentielle théorisation de l’écriture biographiques. En liant des exemples prosaïques du XIXe siècle à certaines bases théoriques du XXIe siècle, il est question d’explorer les récurrences qui ont contribué à faire de certaines biographies des succès ou des échecs. En tant que biographe, essayiste et critique, Giles Lytton Strachey (1880-1932) est un sujet d’étude idéal qui permet d’analyser la relation entre le biographe, le biographié et le lecteur. Puis, selon le schéma structurel de la métahistoire proposé par Hayden White, il est possible d’émettre l’hypothèse que la biographie peut être un genre à part entière autant du point de vue de la forme que du fond. / The objective of this thesis attempts to illustrate a series of principles which could potentially lead to a theorisation of biographical writing. By exposing prosaic literary examples of the XIX century and certain theoretical bases of the XXI century, it is possible to depict recurrences that have contributed to the success or failure of various biographical works. Giles Lytton Strachey (1880-1932) as a biographer, essayist and critic appears to be the ideal subject that enables one to analyse the relationship between biographers, biographees and readers. Furthermore, the structural scheme of metahistory, as suggested by Hayden White, brings us one step closer to the assumption that biography can stand as a full-fledged genre both in terms of form and substance.

Thesis (LLD (Public Law))—University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / Since the advent of constitutional democracy in 1994 South African courts have been faced with new interpretive imperatives.

我國早期發展之都市地區，隨時間經歷，無可避免地產生各種都市問題，因而有實施都市更新之必要。於現行法制下，除由政府主辦都市更新外，私人亦得自行實施都市更新，且一般認為政府應幫助私人進行都市更新，原因在於若無政府公權力介入，強迫相關權利人參與，將導致更新時程嚴重拖延，都市更新條例25條之1即明定得由實施者申請徵收少數不願參與都市更新者之土地或合法建築物。然而，政府公權力介入之程度與時機為何，亦應審慎考量。 由私人興辦都市更新事業，或許除了「私益」外，亦產生「公共利益」，惟此「公共利益」是否大至足以剝奪私人所有權之「私益」，則有待商榷。因而，政府有無權力為了辦理都市更新，以強制手段要求私人參與，甚至徵收不願參與更新者之財產，不無疑問。申言之，主要之問題在於都市更新是否具備足夠之公共利益，而具有剝奪私有財產之正當性；亦即運用徵收方式為辦理都市更新之私人實施者取得其無法以協議方式取得同意之土地，手段(徵收)是否適當，且目的(都市更新)有足以剝奪私人土地之正當性，有釐清及解決之必要。為探討此問題，本文由實施都市更新歷史悠久之美國加以取材，欲透過美國相關法制之研究，找出國內值得學習與借鏡之處。 本文第二章主要針對我國與美國關於都市更新及土地徵收法制之相關法制加以探討，並歸納我國與美國採徵收手段辦理都市更新時之相關規定。 研究發現我國與美國除更新、徵收程序之差異外，對於得以發動徵收之要件，我國係以「公共利益」稱之，美國則以「公共使用」加以規範，而判斷得否發動徵收之機構，於我國為內政部土地徵收審議委員會，美國則係由司法機關進行判斷。是故，第三章接著介紹美國採徵收手段之都市更新相關裁判概況與主要爭議問題點，並於第二至六節分別探討採徵收手段之都市更新相關判決之主要案例，最後於第七節將二至六節各判決案例中美國法院對於公共使用之判斷標準加以綜合分析。 第四章則對於我國以徵收方式實施都市更新之規範加以檢討，接著以第三章美國相關判決對公共利益之判斷基準為視點，探討我國之採徵收手段實施更新制度之適當性，以及得以徵收實施更新之情形為何。最後，第五章針對我國現行以徵收作為都市更新手段之規範提出改進方向，以提供都市更新條例及土地徵收條例修法之參考。

Thesis (M.A.) -- University of Montana, 2008. / Title from author supplied metadata. Description based on contents viewed on July 6, 2009. Includes bibliographical references.

Le droit de propriété est garanti par la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789 qui le qualifie de sacré. Ce caractère trouve une traduction laïque et républicaine(suggérée par la doctrine sociale de l’Église) dans la fonction sociale du droit de propriété.Cette fonction est reconnue à l’étranger (cours constitutionnelles, C.J.U.E., C.E.D.H.) comme en France (Conseil constitutionnel, Conseil d’État, Cour de cassation), elle ne relève ni d’une théorie isolée d’un auteur, ni d’une évolution du droit de propriété. Il y a une correspondance entre la conception théologique et la conception laïque et républicaine du droit de propriété :au domaine éminent du Créateur correspond le domaine éminent de la collectivité humaine(via le domaine éminent de l’État, la réserve de loi, le patrimoine commun de la nation), à la relativité du droit de propriété de la créature humaine correspond la relativité du droit de propriété privée, à la gérance de la création (stewardship) correspond la conservation de la diversité biologique et le développement durable. L’analyse du caractère sacré fait apparaître que la fonction sociale et la fonction écologique (ou environnementale) du droit de propriété font partie de la définition structurelle de ce droit. Dans sa traduction législative laïque et républicaine, la fonction écologique du droit de propriété s’illustre dans la participation des propriétaires à la conservation des ressources naturelles (via notamment les inventaires naturalistes) et la conservation de la qualité environnementale des biens immobiliers. / The property right is guaranteed by the Declation of the Rights of Man and of theCitizen of 1789 which calles it sacred. This quality finds a secular and republican translation(suggested by the Church’s social doctrine) in the social function of property right. This function is recognized abroad (constitutional courts, C.J.E.U., E.C.H.R.) and in France(Constitutional council, Council of State, Court of cassation), it is neither an isolated theory ofone author, nor an evolution of property right. There is a correspondance between thetheological assumption and the secular and republican concept of property right : to theCreator’s eminent domain corresponds the human community’s eminent domain (via theState’s eminent domain, the reserve of law, the common heritage of the Nation), to therelativity of the human creature’s domain corresponds the relativity of the private propertyright, to the management of creation (stewardship) corresponds the preservation ofbiodiversity and sustainable development. The analysis of this sacred feature reveals that thesocial function and the ecological function (or environmental) of the property right are part ofthe structural definition of this right. In its secular and republican legislative translation, theecological function of the property right is illustrated in the participation of owners to the conservation of natural ressources (particularly via naturalist inventories) and conservation of environmental quality of real estate and lands.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development purposes. The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when this question comes up again in future. The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for economic development. The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes. / South African Research Chair in Property Law, sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University / Cuicci bursary fund / Faculty of Law Stellenbosch University

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences. / Department of Government and Public Administration

The interpretations of the war of 1835 and the identity of the Fingo that were presented by the English settlers, have remained the mainstays of all subsequent histories. They asserted that the war of 1835 was the fault purely of 'Kaffir' aggression, that it was controlled by Hintza, the paramount chief, and that the ensuing hostilities were justifiable colonial defence and punishment of the Africans. The arrival of the Fingo in the Colony, it was claimed, was unconnected with the war. It was alleged that the seventeen thousand Fingo brought into the Colony in May 1835 were all Natal refugees who had fled south from the devastations of Shaka and the 'mfecane', and who had then become oppressed by their Gca1eka hosts. Both of these 'histories' need to be inverted. The 'irruption' of December 1834 was not unprovoked Rharhabe aggression, but the final response to years of the advance of the Cape Colony. Large areas of Rharhabe land had been expropriated, and their cattle regularly raided. Their women and children had been seized and taken into the Colony as labourers. The attacks were carried out by only a section of the Rharhabe on specific areas in Albany. The damage caused, and stock taken, was vastly exaggerated by the colonists. The Cape Governor, D'Urban, and British troop reinforcements arrived in Albany in January, and the Rharhabe were invaded two months later. D'Urban later invaded the innocent Gcaleka, took cattle, wreaked havoc and killed Hintza after he refused to ally with the Colony. The Fingo made their appearance at this moment. They were not a homogenous group. There were four categories within the term: mission and refugee collaborators (who were given land at Peddie and had chiefs appointed), military auxiliaries, labourers, and later, destitute Rharhabe seeking employment in the Colony. Only a small minority of the total Fingo were from Natal. The majority of the Fingo appear to have been Rharhabe and Gcaleka women and children, captured by the troops during the war and distributed on farms in the eastern districts to ameliorate the chronic labour shortage. Thus, instead of the year 1835 being one of great loss for the eastern Cape, as claimed by the settler apologists, it was a catalyst to the economic development of the area. All Rharhabe land was seized, to be granted as settler farms. Well over sixty thousand Rharhabe and Gcaleka cattle were captured and distributed amongst the colonists. The security threat of the adjacent Rharhabe and the independent Gcaleka was removed. And a large colonial labour supply was ensured.