This thesis will examine the Combating Violence, Disorder and Looting and Law Enforcement Protection Act of Florida's discriminatory nature, vague provisions, and constitutional violations under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In carrying out this examination, this thesis will analyze case law, law reviews, bill analysis as provided by the Florida legislature, and similar legislation that has been proposed both by other states as well as on the federal level.

No description available.

No description available.

The overall aim of this thesis is to explore freedom of speech and aspects of credibility related to the Internet. The phenomenon freedom of speech is seen and examined principally from a communicative perspective. Theoretically the thesis is based on three key concepts: Internet, freedom of speech, and credibility. Four studies are included; each of them focuses on the main problem from different angles using different methods. In the first study, two websites on the Internet, both having reference to the Holocaust, are examined. The aim is to identify some kind of hypertextual dialogue between Living history [Levande historia], representing a serious project about human respect and democracy, and True history [Sann historia], a plagiator expressing a revisionist opinion. The second study examines a media debate about freedom of speech and censorship related to the Internet found in newspaper articles published during 1997-1999, to see which issues these newspapers emphasise, and how the role of the Internet is described. The third study focuses on how university students writing essays assess the credibility of scientific information in web-based environments. In a questionnaire, the students estimate the importance they attach to 24 different elements. The fourth study seeks to increase the understanding of the function and dynamics of Wikipedia as a collaboratively shaped wiki-encyclopaedia. In e-mail interviews, active users are asked about their impressions and experiences. Based on the studies, some reflections on what could be considered as special with the freedom of speech on the Internet are presented. These reflections, in terms of seven aspects, are referred to as the hypertext structure, the collage effect, boundless identities, shift in responsibility, parallel worlds and hyper reality, the compensating effect, and the leaching effect. A concept, denominated the hypertextual dialogue, has emerged during the work on this thesis. This concept has a technical, an intertextual and a discursive level. The discussion deals with the news media’s approach towards the Internet, what their possible agenda could be, and the impact they have on people. Internet’s pluralism and its consequences are discussed. Wikipedia could serve as a model by showing how committed individuals interact to create a competitive product. When users interact with and within the hypertextual structure, the construction of meaning, as well as the responsibility for the consequences, would move from the texts’ original authors to the users. Perhaps the Internet requires the involvement of some kind of homo navigare who is able to function within, outside and between digital arenas. / Avhandlingens övergripande syfte är att utforska yttrandefrihet och trovärdighet relaterat till Internet. Fenomenet yttrandefrihet betraktas och studeras ur ett kommunikativt perspektiv där Internet utgör arenan för kommunikationen som är möjliggjord av den digitala tekniken. Teoretiskt baseras avhandlingen på tre begrepp: Internet, yttrandefrihet och trovärdighet. Fyra studier ingår, var en har sitt specifika närmande och sin metod. Den första studien berör två webbplatser på Internet, båda går att hänföra till Förintelsen. Syftet är att identifiera en slags hypertextuell dialog mellan Levande historia, som är ett seröst projekt om demokrati och medmänsklighet, och Sann historia, som uttrycker ett revisionistiskt synsätt. Den andra studien undersöker en mediedebatt, förd i dagstidningsartiklar 1997-1999, relaterad till yttrandefrihet och censur på Internet. Avsikten är att urskilja de beskrivningar av innehållet på Internet som tidningarna lyfter fram samt att se hur Internets roll berörs. Den tredje studien undersöker uppsatsskrivande studenters bedömning av trovärdighet vid sökandet efter vetenskaplig information i webbaserade miljöer. En enkät där studenterna skattar 24 olika element har använts. Den fjärde studien avser att utifrån intervjuer med Wikipedias användare öka förståelsen för Wikipedias funktion och dynamik som wiki-uppslagsverk. I studierna framskymtar, på ett mer övergripande plan, aspekter av Internet som arena vilka gör att yttrandefriheten kan ses som förhållandevis speciell. Dessa aspekter diskuteras i termer av hypertextstruktur, collageeffekt, gränslösa identiteter, ansvarsförskjutning, parallellvärld och hyperrealitet, utjämnande effekt, samt urlakningseffekt. Ett egenkonstruerat koncept presenteras i den hypertextuella dialogen. Diskussionen tar upp nyhetsmediernas förhållningssätt till Internet, vad som kan tillskrivas den bakomliggande agendan, samt mediernas påverkan på människor. Dessutom berörs Internets pluralism och hur den kan inverka på sättet att se på ”sanning”. Wikipedia framhålls som en förebild genom att visa på hur engagerade användare tillsammans kan skapa en konkurrenskraftig produkt. På Internet sker interaktionen inom och med den hypertextuella strukturen vilket påverkar meningsskapandet och förskjuter ansvaret från texternas ursprungliga skapare till användarna. Möjligtvis behövs någon slags homo navigare som kan fungera inom, utom och emellan digitala arenor.

The sub judice rule is a media law practice that is currently often in the spotlight. Editors and journalists are constantly furiously speaking out against this rule that limits their freedom of expression in an attempt to assure the accused's fair and proper trial. Practitioners of the law, on the other side, say the sub judice rule is indispensable to the proper administration of justice. The rule, which much prevents the media from interfering with a pending case, causes confusion under journalists, as it is not consistently applied. Judges often warn the media against the violation of the rule during a high profile case, but those who do break the rule are not charged with contempt of the court. The aim of this study is to determine how Beeld, the Afrikaans daily newspaper, applies the sub judice rule in his reporting. The way in which this leading paper handles the rule is of importance to other journalists as well as the readers. The origin, development and function of the rule are also examined. It was established that Beeld did not contravene the sub judice rule as unceremoniously as a few other newspapers. Beelds violations of the rule were different experts' nuanced interpretations thereof. These violations is more based on the perception that the court's independence and worthiness must be upheld in the public eye than on the rule's actual function to guard against the interfering in the due course of a case. / Thesis (M.A. (Communication Studies))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2007

This thesis examines the views of freedoms of press and speech held by the twelve earliest justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Sedition Act of 1798 raised their earliest First Amendment questions including the breadth of those freedoms and of seditious libel. The thesis discusses three aspects of the early justices' views, which add to existing studies. First, the context of those justices' views was growing challenges to the restrictive Blackstone and Mansfield definition of freedom of press as only freedom from prior restraint (licensing) and as not also freedom from subsequent restraint such as seditious libel prosecution. Those challenges were reflected in broad language protecting freedoms of press and speech, and in the absence of language stating that the English common law of rights or of seditious libel was left unaltered. That crucial context of growing challenges has not been detailed in existing literature. (Chapter 3.) Second, the views of each early justice on press and speech are chronicled for the period 1789-1798. That discloses express commitments to those freedoms, which are absent from existing literature, and no adoption of the Blackstone definition before the 1798 crisis. (Chapters 4-5.) Third, the cases and reasoning of the six sitting justices upholding the Sedition Act of 1798 are chronicled and assessed, along with the views of the six remaining justices. That reveals that most remaining justices and also a significant minority within the Federalist party rejected the Sedition Act. Yet positions on the Sedition Act have been only cursorily discussed for four sitting justices and have been overlooked for the other eight justices, as well as for the Federalist party's minority, for the critical period 1798-1800. (Chapters 6-7.) The thesis proposes reasons for that divergence between the pre-1798 commitment of all justices to freedoms of press and speech, and the support given by most sitting justices to the Sedition Act, in contrast to apparent opposition by most remaining justices. The primary reasons are their opposing positions on several connected issues: the extent of rights to dissent, the challenges to the Blackstone definition and to seditious libel, the effect of new state and federal constitutions on seditious libel and on common law rights, strength of attachment to freedoms of press and speech and to seditious libel, and most sitting justices' changes of position to embrace the Blackstone definition. The thesis calls into question conventional views in existing literature on each of those three aspects. First, Levy and others express the dominant view that freedom of press in state declarations of rights and the First Amendment 'was used in its prevailing common law or Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints and a subjection to subsequent restraints for licentious or seditious abuse,' so that contrary evidence 'does not exist,' and that 'no other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798' existed. Instead, opposition to the essence of seditious libel had been mounting over the decades. Second, the early justices are usually portrayed as having nothing to say about freedoms of press and speech before 1798. Instead, nearly all exhibited commitment to those freedoms before that crucial year, though half the early justices upheld the Sedition Act during 1798-1800. Third, the Federalist party, the early justices, and the states except Virginia and Kentucky are all usually described as unanimously supporting the Sedition Act. Instead, the Federalists divided over the Act, and the early justices did as well, with an unrecognized but significant minority of the party, and nearly half of the early justices, opposing the Sedition Act, as did several additional states.

This thesis assesses three United States Supreme Court opinions, engaging in an inductive approach to generic criticism, in an attempt to discover whether or not there are similarities and/or differences in these decisions. This study focuses on draft card, flag, and cross burning cases argued before the Court in order to discover the potential genre's characteristics.

This paper aims to examine the different portrayals in Swedish journalism about a case with a controversial topic. The analyzed case in this study focuses on the provocative rapper Mr Cool and his song about sexual intercourse with a child and the following mediated debate about freedom of speech and morality. The research questions examined were: How does the media frame the meta-debate about Mr Cool? We picked 16 articles and analyzed them with a qualitative content analysis method using framing theory and argumentation techniques in order to be able to examine how the debate were portrayed by the media. We also used the moral panic concept to get a deeper understanding of the mechanics of topics the society is concerned with. We have found that the participants of the debate handled the subject differently and with different strategies, depending on which side they would support. The central discussion was about personal taste, boundary making and the consequences of silencing what is thought to be offensive. The results of the analysis agrees with previous studies and theories in the field when it comes to moral panics and fear as a natural part of our society. History is likely to repeat itself but with other motives and other fears.

« On ne pense bien qu’aux extrêmes » disait Louis Althusser. Pourtant, loin d’évoquer la réflexion, la notion d’extrême semble davantage s’incarner aujourd’hui dans des menaces diverses. Al-Qaïda, Daech, Boko Haram, mais également extrême-gauche, extrême-droite, hooliganisme, Black Blocs etc. L’omniprésence du danger extrémiste tel qu’il est présenté par le discours médiatique et politique ne rend pas pour autant saisissable la notion. Largement oubliée par les textes législatifs et réglementaires, absente de la doctrine juridique et peu développée par la jurisprudence, la notion d’extrémisme n’est pourtant pas ignorée par le droit. Appréhendé ponctuellement, pour ne pas dire émotionnellement, par un ensemble de textes épars, l’extrémisme ne fait l’objet d’aucune approche générique en droit français. L’objet de ce travail de recherche n’est pas simplement de présenter les diverses manifestations de l’extrémisme telles qu’identifiées par le droit, mais de vérifier, par une approche globale rarement retenue, le postulat selon lequel, à l’instar des approches sociologique ou politique, le discours juridique appréhende l’extrémisme comme une remise en cause de l’ordre démocratique. Or, la sauvegarde de cet ordre démocratique, au fondement de tout l’ordonnancement juridique des démocraties libérales, apparaît ambivalente et paradoxale. Si l’État de droit est l’un des vecteurs fondamentaux de l’ordre démocratique, celui-ci ne devrait pas connaître de limitation juridique. Pourtant, confronté à sa remise en cause, l’État démocratique se doit d’organiser sa défense. Dès lors, pour lutter contre les divers extrémismes qui contestent leurs principes ontologiques, les démocraties vont être conduites à limiter l’exercice de droits qui forment pourtant leur socle, plaçant cette lutte au cœur d’un véritable paradoxe démocratique. / « We think best in the extreme » said Louis Althusser. However, the notion of the extreme seems more than ever to evoke various menaces in today's world. Al-Qaïda, Daech, Boko Haram, but also far left, far right winged politics, hooliganism, Black Blocs etc. The omnipresent danger of extremism as it is presented in the media and in politics has kept us away from its true meaning. Heavily forgotten by laws and regulations, absent from legal doctrine, and seldomly brought up in jurisprudence, the notion of extremism is however not ignored in Law. Apprehended occasionally, even emotionally, by a variety of texts, extremism is not considered in a global manner in French law. Within a global approach, this study presents the various manifestations of the extremism in order to verify if the legal discourse, like sociological and political approaches, apprehends extremism as a questioning of the democratic order. However, the safeguarding of this democratic order, the foundation of the whole legal system of liberal democracies, appears ambivalent and paradoxical. If the Rule of law is one of the fundamental vectors of democratic order, it mustn’t know any juridical limitations. However, confronted to its questioning, democratic State must organize its defense. Thus, to fight against the various extremisms which contest their ontological principals, democracies will be led to reduce the exercise of rights which constitute their base, placing this struggle in the center of a considerable democratic paradox.

Esta dissertação é dedicada à interpretação do direito à liberdade de expressão disponível na obra do filósofo Ronald Dworkin. No primeiro capítulo, abordo o sentido em que o autor fala de direitos, o significado das liberdades no seu pensamento, e o esforço por ele feito de integrá-las à sua concepção de justiça distributiva, a saber, a igualdade de recursos. O capítulo segundo é dedicado a aspecto importante da teoria do autor: a continuidade entre ética e moral, em especial à sua teoria da dignidade, seja na forma do que chama de modelo do desafio, seja na forma de dois princípios (do respeito-próprio e da autenticidade). Ele também explora consequências da teoria ética de Dworkin às liberdades e a integração entre ela e o valor da igualdade. O terceiro capítulo, então, é dedicado mais diretamente ao direito à liberdade de expressão como Dworkin o concebe: integrado à justiça distributiva e fundamentado no que chama de independência ética e na autenticidade que marca a igualdade de recursos, bem como a uma concepção de democracia, de que fazem parte, a depender da terminologia que adota em diferentes trabalhos, agência, e os princípios ou dimensões da sua concepção de democracia como parceria. Também faz parte do terceiro capítulo discussão de casos concretos, em que a generosidade de Dworkin em relação ao direito objeto da dissertação se evidencia. Discuto por que Dworkin inclui na liberdade de expressão o discurso de ódios e pornografia mas também por que, justamente pelo seu fundamento na dignidade do emissor, não inclui a liberdade de imprensa, a liberdade acadêmica, e os atos de expressão por empresas. A conclusão da dissertação é dedicada às suas ideias de cultura de liberdade e de cultura de independência. / This dissertation is dedicated to the interpretation of the right to free speech available in the work of philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In the first chapter, I dwell with the sense in which the author speaks of rights, with the meaning of liberties in his thought, and his effort to integrate them to his conception of distributive justice, namely, equality of resources. The second chapter is dedicated to an important aspect of the authors theory: the continuity between ethics and morals, especially his theory of dignity, either in the form o what he calls the model of challenge or in the form of two principles (of self-respect and authenticity). It also explores the consequences of Dworkins ethical theory to the liberties and integration between it and the value of equality. Then, the third chapter is dedicated more directly to the right of free speech as Dworkin conceives it: integrated to distributive justice and founded in what he calls ethical independence and in the authenticity that marks equality of resources, as well as in a conception of democracy, formed, depending on the terminology he adopts at different works, agency and the principles or dimensions of his partnership conception of democracy. It is also part of the third chapter discussion of concrete cases, where Dworkins generosity towards the right which is the object of the dissertation makes itself evident. I discuss why Dworkin includes in free speech hate speech and pornography but also why, precisely because of its foundation in the dignity of the speaker, does not include freedom of the press, academic freedom and expressive acts by companies. The conclusion of the dissertation is dedicated to his ideas of culture of liberty and culture of independence.