A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals, September 2017 / The cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad on the front cover of various issues of the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, leading up to the 2015 terrorist attack have been seen by many to be harmful and offensive. This report argues that, from a liberal perspective, the cartoonists did not do anything morally wrong by publishing these cartoons. In fact, it is argued that the cartoonists were morally justified in publishing these cartoons because they were protecting the liberal value of free speech. I argue that both the act of publishing these cartoons, as well as the actual content of these cartoons were morally justifiable. Arguments against the cartoons pertaining to both harm and offence are proven to be unsound. Furthermore, when balancing the seriousness of the offence with the reasonableness of the cartoons, it becomes clear that the offence is not as serious as some may think. / XL2018

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gisela Barroso Istamati.pdf: 571052 bytes, checksum: c8761afbeb7d9fd7a9e54014c8dc2235 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-11 / The debate regarding the limits of expression have always been present in several scopes of discussion, whether political, social or academic. Notwithstanding, the analysis of the humoristic manifestation of this right is proposed when it concerns politicians, the people s legal representatives, thus questioned: does humor directed to politicians have constitutional limits? In this sense, the hypothesis of this work is that it shall have a greater tolerance in relation to the comunicative excesses of humor when concentrated to politicians and candidates. To verify if this work theory is subject to being concrete, the solid theoretical base exam was developed to comprehend the concept regarding the right to freedom of expression considering, essentially, of four focuses: a) negative and positive freedom; b) instrumental and constructive justification; c) prima facie preferential position; and d) internal and external theory to the limits of the fundamental rights. Furthermore, it is verified to which interpretation the Supreme Federal Court grants this right. Subsequently, these aspects examined were confronted with being applied to the analysis of the Direct Action of Inconstitutionality No. 4.451 ( jornalistic humor on candidature case ). With this, in conjunction with the theorical base developed, I seek to provide an adequate answer to the problem proposed in this work and, thus, verifying if the hypotheses becomes concrete in face of the Brazilian judicial order / O debate sobre os limites da liberdade de expressão sempre esteve presente em diversos âmbitos de discussão (políticos, sociais ou acadêmicos). Não obstante, o que se propõe é a análise da manifestação humorística deste direito quando se volta a políticos, representantes legais do povo, assim problematizado: o humor direcionado a políticos tem limites constitucionais? Neste sentido, a hipótese deste trabalho é que deve haver uma maior tolerância em relação aos excessos comunicativos do humor quando concentrado aos políticos e candidatos. Para verificar se esta hipótese de trabalho é passível de ser concretizada, desenvolveu-se o exame de sólida base teórica para compreender o conceito acerca do direito à liberdade de expressão a partir, essencialmente, de quatro enfoques: a) liberdade negativa e positiva; b) justificação instrumental e construtiva; c) posição preferencial prima facie; e d) teoria interna e externa aos limites dos direitos fundamentais. Ainda, verifica-se qual interpretação o Supremo Tribunal Federal confere a este direito. Em seguida, estes aspectos examinados foram aplicados à análise da Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade nº 4.451 ( caso humor jornalístico sobre candidaturas ). Com isso, em conjunto com a base teórica desenvolvida, busco fornecer uma resposta adequada ao problema proposto neste trabalho e verificar, assim, se a hipótese se concretiza frente ao ordenamento jurídico brasileiro

O trabalho analisou os projetos de regulação das atividades da imprensa brasileira, discutindo a recepção, pelos jornais e no Parlamento, das legislações apresentadas e aprovadas durante o período republicano, nos anos de 1923, 1934, 1953 e 1967, e também o projeto rejeitado em 1956. Todos esses regulamentos, propostos por diferentes governos ao Congresso Nacional, foram discutidos e salientados ao público através de informações divulgadas pelos jornais escolhidos e também nas reuniões promovidas pelos congressistas e registradas em documentos oficiais, o que tornou possível identificar os argumentos utilizados tanto pelos periódicos quanto pelo sistema político, demonstrando que o tema da liberdade de imprensa se constituiu como discurso retórico usado por ambas as partes – governos e jornais – em defesa de sua atuação social. O trabalho de produção de notícias e informações, desenvolvido pela imprensa, foi configurado por movimentos históricos originados no Iluminismo, que projetava essa atividade como forma de propiciar ao cidadão as ferramentas para atuar na esfera pública, desde que respeitadas proposições que permitissem que os diferentes discursos fossem levados ao conhecimento do público. No processo histórico que levou ao desenho institucional da imprensa brasileira, essa condição ficou prejudicada, dentre outros motivos por ter a imprensa se tornado objeto de interesse de grupos sociais específicos, o que produziu conflitos com os governos. A tese concluiu que o processo histórico de elaboração das leis que deveriam regular o trabalho da imprensa teve uma recepção negativa pelos jornais, que argumentaram ser essa legislação uma tentativa de obstruir o trabalho por eles desenvolvido. No entanto, como se demonstrou, o processo resultou da disputa política e social protagonizada pelos diferentes grupos de interesse – imprensa e jornais – colocando em lados opostos os governos e as organizações jornalísticas, em torno da liderança pela atuação como mediador entre os cidadãos e o Estado. / This paper analyzes bills intended to regulate Brazilian press activities, as well as discusses the receptivity of the legislation submitted and passed by newspapers and the Parliament during the republican period in the years 1923, 1934, 1953 and 1967, in addition to the bill which was rejected in 1956. All these regulations, which were submitted to the National Congress by different governments, were shown and highlighted to the public through information published in selected newspapers and meetings promoted by congressmen and recorded in official documentation, which enabled the identification of arguments used by both newspapers and the political system, thus demonstrating that the theme of freedom of the press was rather a rhetorical discourse used by both parties – governments and newspapers – in the defense of their social performance. The task of producing news and information developed by the press has been shaped up by historical movements originated in the Enlightenment period, which projected this activity as a way of providing the citizen with the tools to act in the public sphere, on condition that the propositions allowing that different speeches brought to the attention of the public were respected. In the historical process that led to the institutional design of the Brazilian press, this condition was impaired, among other reasons because the press became an object of interest of specific social groups, giving rise to conflicts with governments. The thesis concluded that the historical process of drafting laws which should regulate the work of the press was not welcome by newspapers, which argued that this legislation was an attempt to interfere with their work. Nevertheless, as it has been shown, the process resulted from a political and social dispute between different interest groups – press and newspapers – placing governments and news organizations on opposite sides as to who should lead the mediation between citizens and the State.

Este trabalho procura debater a liberdade constitucional de informação sob um viés não usual ao direito constitucional brasileiro. Seu ponto de partida é a proteção ao sigilo de fonte para jornalistas profissionais, consagrada pelo texto constitucional. Essa regra parece pressupor uma distinção possível e clara entre jornalistas e demais cidadãos. Mas como compreendê-la em um cenário atual no qual: a) as condições tecnológicas permitem que qualquer cidadão, a um custo baixo ou quase inexistente, publique informações para um número indistinto de pessoas, e; b) o Supremo Tribunal Federal tenha reconhecido que o Estado não pode exigir a obtenção de um diploma de ensino superior para diferenciar a categoria de jornalistas? Logo, o pano de fundo deste trabalho é a possibilidade de o Estado diferenciar jornalistas de demais cidadãos com relação à concessão de prerrogativas para o exercício da liberdade de informação. Nos Estados Unidos, esse é um debate relevante ao menos desde a década de 1970. São apresentados seus principais aspectos: por um lado, a jurisprudência de sua Suprema Corte, que se negou sistematicamente a diferenciar direitos próprios à liberdade de imprensa (Press Clause) em comparação com a liberdade de expressão (Speech Clause); por outro, as abordagens funcional e institucional à liberdade de imprensa, composta respectivamente por autores favoráveis e críticos àquela linha jurisprudencial. Ao final, a partir de uma perspectiva crítica e da adoção de fundamentos jurídicos, busca-se analisar a regra constitucional do sigilo de fonte e propor parâmetros interpretativos para sua aplicação. / This paper seeks to debate the constitutional freedom of information under an aspect not common to Brazilian constitutional law. The departure point is the reporters privilege, constitutionally protected for professionals by law. That rule seems assume a possible and clear distinction between journalists and other citizens. But how to understand it under a scenario where: a) the technological conditions allow any citizen, with very cheap or barely existing costs, to publish information for an indistinct number of people, and; b) the Supreme Federal Court has recognized that the State may not license journalists by a college degree diploma? Thus, the background subject of this paper is the possibility that the State differentiates journalists from other citizens in regard to the concession of prerogatives for the exercise of the freedom of information. In the United States, this has been a relevant debate at least since de 1970s. The main aspects are presented: on one hand, the Supreme Courts case law that has systematically denied to differentiate exclusive rights deriving from the Press Clause in comparison to the Speech Clause; on the other hand, the functional and institutional approaches to freedom of the press, respectively representing the authors favorable and critics to that judicial construction. Finally, taking on from a critic perspective and adopting legal fundaments, it seeks to analyze the constitutional rule of the reporters privilege and to propose interpretative standards for it.

Denna studie bygger på kvalitativa intervjuer med verksamma samhällskunskapslärare angående kontroversiella frågor i samhällskunskapsundervisningen. Bland respondenterna arbetar vissa lärare på yrkesinriktade och andra på studieförberedande gymnasieskolor. Resultatet visar att respondenterna ställer sig positiva till att arbeta med kontroversiella frågor, samtidigt som de uppfattar det som ett svårt ämne. Samtliga respondenter har erfarenheter av kontroverser som uppstått i klassrummet och har därför fått arbeta aktivt med kontrovershantering. I studien klargörs vad kontroversiella frågor är, hur man kan arbeta med det i klassrummet samt vad de tillfrågade anser vara viktigt i det arbetet. Detta kopplas till internationella forskningsresultat såväl som svenska. / This study is based on qualitive research interviews with actively working teachers in the subject civics about controversial issues in civics education. Among the respondents some work in labour-oriented upper secondary schools and others work in preparatory upper secondary schools. The result indicates that the respondents are positive about the work with controversial issues, meanwhile viewing it as a difficult topic. All of the respondents have experiences from controversial issues that has risen in the classroom, and therefore been dealing actively with controversial issues management. In the study the term controversial issues is clarified as well as how to deal with it in the classroom and what the respondents view as important in the process. This is connected to international as well as Swedish research findings.

租稅的徵免之於大眾傳播媒體，正如載舟之水，亦能覆舟。在現代民主社會，各國政府為了鼓勵民眾消費大眾傳播媒體產出，扶助媒體發展，莫不以營業稅免稅為手段，介入媒介經濟。值此之際，如何讓營業稅的徵免能夠恰如其份地達成目標，又不至於對新聞自由造成妨害，則是一個傳播法律研究上饒富趣味的問題。大眾傳播媒體營業稅徵免並不是單一的法律問題，也不能獨立於媒體所處的社會、政治、經濟環境來觀察。尤其在媒體免稅的理由及目的的研究上，必須結合傳播理論、經濟學以及財政學，以鋪陳出媒體免稅之基礎理論。簡言之，大眾傳播媒體營業稅免稅之理由是因為媒體具有外部利益，因此具有營業稅免稅之必要，其目的在於減輕閱聽人的租稅負擔。至於在免稅的範圍上，因為媒體市場具有「雙元產品市場」的性質，則必須釐清免稅之範圍應當與媒體與閱聽人直接發生對價關係的項目為限，並不及於廣告及其他營業項目。在營業稅法討論上，則分別以法意解釋，目的解釋、合憲解釋與比較解釋，探討現行法律中有關媒體營業稅徵免的目的、範圍及階段之規定是否妥適。透過法意解釋，可以發現過去立法者與稅務機關並未認清媒體免稅之目的。所以在進行營業稅法之解釋上，應特重目的解釋，方不至在解釋上發生混淆。我國憲法揭示之「租稅法律主義」以及憲法基本權限制，都是媒體營業稅徵免法律不得牴觸者。除了透過上述解釋方法外，為求全面性檢討我國現行法免稅範圍的妥當性，以及對傳播新科技的適應，尚透過法律比較解釋，比較美國、英國、德國以及法國之媒介制度以及租稅法規，以求瞭解大眾傳播媒體營業稅徵免法制的全貌。

<p>This paper concerns the freedom of speech in our democracy and the principles underlying the restrictions. The study is aimed at using a descriptive theory to provide a useful basis for analyzing a justification of the role behind freedom of speech and its limitations. The analysis is made on the basis of the Swedish parliament debate in the form of motions and the non-governmental organization Swedish Helsinki Committee's report. The study has a focus on the law of hate speech and will be done with an idea centred analysis. On the basis of democratic theory, the central role of freedom of speech was clarified on the basis of a clear need for a reliable communication. An absence of this process could disrupt the democratic order. The theoretical function of restrictions is to maintain that reliable communication process where, for example, special circumstances, threats of violence and certain types of information were seen as examples of situations where the process could be in danger.</p><p>The empirical result was largely in line with the theoretical conclusions. The ability to argue and keep open debates was seen as important building blocks in a democratic society and therefore implies the benefits of a reliable communication process. Justification for the restrictions was made with regard to harmful information, threatening circumstances and xenophobic organizations, who were examples of counter-productive expressions to the democratic order. However, the study showed that parliamentary motions and the Swedish Helsinki Committee often focused their justifications on different fundamental views which partly could be explained by the concepts of positive and negative freedom and the perception of minority rights. The findings indicated that the issue of restrictions on freedom of speech is extremely complex because of the varied opinions in the drafting of the law of hate speech. The dilemma of freedom of expression can therefore be seen as relevant up to this day.</p>

<p>Faktagranskning: Mats Bergquist, Docent i Statsvetenskap</p>

Abstract Sweden has had a long tradition of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Today the judicial area is regulated by the constitution of the press and the constitution of speech. The purpose of the two constitutions is to secure the right for every Swedish citizen to express their thoughts, opinions and feelings. The constitutions are designed to regulate the techniques with which the information is distributed and not to regulate the information in itself. This fact has caused a debate to arise on the subject whether the constitutions are still suitable to regulate the judicial area when the technical development causes the constitutions to get out of date and in need of constant updating. As a rule the usage of social media is not regulated by the constitution of speech the information distributed through these webpages can be included by the protection given by the constitution but very few of these webpages fulfill the criteria’s demanded by the constitution. The purpose of this essay is to ask the question whether the constitution of speech should be reformed to better regulate the technical development in the future. The essay examines whether a new constitution can be developed so that it no longer is tied to a certain technique and if it, in the future, should include all the information distributed through social media. It is the author´s conclusion that the constitution of freedom of speech should be concentrated on giving a special protection to professional companies’ whose occupation it is to distribute information to the public. This is the best way to preserve a regulation that is clear, consistent and easy to practice. A constitution that is given an area that is too wide to regulate will only restrain the freedom of speech and its founding principles and should therefore be avoided.

Ce mémoire de maîtrise présente une situation dans laquelle un citoyen ordinaire tente de diffuser sur Internet une opinion critique qu'il dirige contre une grande entreprise commerciale et tente d'analyser les éléments favorables à la diffusion de cette opinion critique ainsi que les embûches qui sont à prévoir. Cet exemple permet d'illustrer les forces et les faiblesses d'Internet en matière de liberté d'expression. Il permet de poser une mise en garde concernant les dangers de transposer les limites actuelles à la liberté d'expression des citoyens au contexte d'Internet. La première partie de l'analyse souligne les caractéristiques d'Internet et les différentes façons d'aborder la question de la liberté d'expression sur Internet selon les approches libertaire, libérale ou interventionniste, pour finalement faire le point sur l'apport d'Internet en matière d'information et de communication. La deuxième partie de l'analyse aborde la question de l'efficience en identifiant les éléments qui encouragent l'exercice de la liberté d'expression et ceux qui découragent les utilisateurs de s'exprimer sur Internet. L'exemple des critiques dirigées contre les oligopoles permet d'illustrer la nécessité d'établir des règles propres à Internet en matière de liberté d'expression. Cet exemple fait ressortir le caractère inadéquat des limites actuelles à la liberté d'expression établies par le droit de la presse, le droit de la radiodiffusion, le droit de propriété et le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. L'auteur vient à la conclusion qu'en matière de liberté d'expression, il serait souhaitable: 1) Que Internet soit considéré comme un espace public de discussion; 2) Que la préséance des intérêts économiques sur les intérêts démocratiques au niveau du développement de la société de l'information soit avouée; 3) Que les inégalités en termes d'opportunités d'expression soient reconnues; 4) Que les limites imposées en vertu des règles du droit de la propriété soient reconsidérées à la lumière des caractéristiques d'Internet. / This master thesis presents a case in which an ordinary citizen tries to spread on the Internet a criticizing opinion aimed at a large company, and attempts to analyse what are the elements in favour of this criticism broadcasting, as weil as the obstacles to be expected. This example allows us to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Internet in matter of freedom of speech. It also allows to put forward a warning concerning the risks of transposing current Iimits of freedom of speech in an Internet context. The first part of the analysis underlines the Internet's characteristics and the different ways to broach the subject of freedom of speech over the Internet, following severaI approaches, to finally focus on the Internet's contribution in matter of information and communication. The second part of the analysis deals with the question of efficiency, while identifying the elements that encourage the exercise of freedom of speech and those that discourage Internet users from expressing themselves. The example of criticism aimed toward large companies allows to illustrate the need to establish the Internet's own rules in matter of freedom of speech. What emerges from this example is the inadequate character of current limits to freedom of speech as set up by freedom of the press, broadcasting law, property and intellectual property law. The author concludes that in matter of freedom of speech, it wouId be recommended: 1) that the Internet be considered as a public forum; 2) that the predominance of economic interests over democratic interests in the development of the information society be admitted; 3) that the inequalities in terms of expression opportunities be recognized; 4) that the limits imposed in accordance with property law be reconsidered in an Internet context. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit option droit des technologies de l'information"