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1	Limites à vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas / Limits to bind managers to shareholders agreement. Silva, Thiago José da 29 April 2014 (has links) Esta dissertação analisa os limites e a conveniência da vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas. Com a promulgação da lei nº 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, foram incluídos os §§ 8º e 9º, ao art. 118 da lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (LSA), que indisputavelmente passaram a vincular os administradores de companhias aos termos dos acordos de acionistas arquivados em suas sedes. Desde então, inexiste consenso doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca dos limites de tal vinculação. A dissertação analisa, pois, as principais posições doutrinárias que variam desde a vinculação genérica, até a vinculação relativa. A primeira é capaz de abranger todos os atos da administração; a segunda, por sua vez, limita a possibilidade de vinculação da administração apenas com relação aos atos que não sejam de sua competência privativa previstos em lei ou pelo estatuto e, ainda, preserva o poder (dever) finalístico do administrador, previsto no art. 154 da LSA, de buscar e privilegiar o interesse da companhia. A dissertação tece, ainda, diversos comentários e posicionamentos sobre a conveniência de se vincular administradores. / This dissertation analyses the limits and the convenience of binding administrators to the shareholders\' agreement. With the promulgation of law nº 10,303, of October 31, 2001, §§ 8º and 9º were included to the article 118 of law nº 6,404, of December 15, 1976 (LSA), which indisputably began to bind companies administrators to the terms of the shareholder agreements filed in their headquarters. Since then, there is no consensus in the doctrine or the precedents about the limits of such binding situation. The dissertation analyses, thus, the main doctrinal positions ranging from the generic binding form until the relative one. The first is able to cover all acts of the administration; the second, on it turn, limits the possibility of binding the administration only with respect to acts that are not part of its competence provided for by law or by companies by-laws, and also preserves the finalistic power (duty) of the administrator provided for in article 154 of the LSA, of pursuing and giving priority to the companies interest. The dissertation also weaves several commentaries and positions on the desirability to bind administrators. Acionista Acordos comerciais Administrators fiduciary duties Assembleia geral Binding of adminstrators Companiesinterest Corporate groups Principle of non- delegation Shareholders' agreement Sociedade anônima
2	Limites à vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas / Limits to bind managers to shareholders agreement. Thiago José da Silva 29 April 2014 (has links) Esta dissertação analisa os limites e a conveniência da vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas. Com a promulgação da lei nº 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, foram incluídos os §§ 8º e 9º, ao art. 118 da lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (LSA), que indisputavelmente passaram a vincular os administradores de companhias aos termos dos acordos de acionistas arquivados em suas sedes. Desde então, inexiste consenso doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca dos limites de tal vinculação. A dissertação analisa, pois, as principais posições doutrinárias que variam desde a vinculação genérica, até a vinculação relativa. A primeira é capaz de abranger todos os atos da administração; a segunda, por sua vez, limita a possibilidade de vinculação da administração apenas com relação aos atos que não sejam de sua competência privativa previstos em lei ou pelo estatuto e, ainda, preserva o poder (dever) finalístico do administrador, previsto no art. 154 da LSA, de buscar e privilegiar o interesse da companhia. A dissertação tece, ainda, diversos comentários e posicionamentos sobre a conveniência de se vincular administradores. / This dissertation analyses the limits and the convenience of binding administrators to the shareholders\' agreement. With the promulgation of law nº 10,303, of October 31, 2001, §§ 8º and 9º were included to the article 118 of law nº 6,404, of December 15, 1976 (LSA), which indisputably began to bind companies administrators to the terms of the shareholder agreements filed in their headquarters. Since then, there is no consensus in the doctrine or the precedents about the limits of such binding situation. The dissertation analyses, thus, the main doctrinal positions ranging from the generic binding form until the relative one. The first is able to cover all acts of the administration; the second, on it turn, limits the possibility of binding the administration only with respect to acts that are not part of its competence provided for by law or by companies by-laws, and also preserves the finalistic power (duty) of the administrator provided for in article 154 of the LSA, of pursuing and giving priority to the companies interest. The dissertation also weaves several commentaries and positions on the desirability to bind administrators. Acionista Acordos comerciais Assembleia geral Sociedade anônima Administrators fiduciary duties Binding of adminstrators Companiesinterest Corporate groups Principle of non- delegation Shareholders' agreement
3	Správa a řízení společnosti / Corporate Governance Berg, Jaroslav January 2009 (has links) Diploma thesis Corporate governance in Prague Stock Exchange is summarization of expanding and the most significant models of Corporate Governance around the World. Define position of a joint-stock companies in the Czech republic, describe all kinds of administrative bodies and commitees of joint- stock companies. Research relationships between top management and administative bodies of Joint- stock and research effectiveness and productivity of Prague Stock Exchange in connection with changing of ownership in the year 2008.
4	The Open Stock Corporation: some ideas for the reform of its legislative treatment / La Sociedad Anónima Abierta: algunas ideas para la reforma de su tratamiento legislativo Payet Puccio, José Antonio 12 April 2018 (has links) In this paper, the author focuses on the study of the legal institution of the Open Stock Corporation, analyzing the way how it has been treated in our legislation over time. Furthermore, he analyzes its current regulation in the General Law of Corporations, the Securities Market Law and some isolated legal provisions. Finally, he provides some ideas for the necessary reform of this institution. / En el presente artículo, el autor se centra en el estudio de la institución jurídica de la Sociedad Anónima Abierta, analizando la forma como ha sido tratada en nuestra legislación a lo largo del tiempo. Asimismo, analiza su regulación actual en la Ley General de Sociedades, en la Ley del Mercado de Valores y en algunas disposiciones legales aisladas. Finalmente, brinda algunas ideas para la necesaria reforma de esta institución. Open Stock Corporation general Law Of Corporations directory corporate Finance minorities Sociedad Anónima Abierta Ley General De Sociedades Ley De Mercado De Valores Junta General De Accionistas Directorio Finanzas Corporativas Minorías
5	L'exercice du droit de vote dans les sociétés / The exercise of voting rights in companies Rocher, Aurélien 05 December 2018 (has links) Le droit de vote est la prérogative politique suprême de l’associé. Si de nombreux débats se sont intéressés à son caractère essentiel et à ses conditions d’attribution, peu de réflexions se sont concentrées sur ses modalités d’exercice. Celles-ci font pourtant l’originalité de ce droit individuel qui ne peut s’exercer que collectivement et sont déterminantes de son effectivité, lui qui ne peut se manifester qu’épisodiquement au gré des réunions de la collectivité des associés. La recherche des principes gouvernant son exercice, sujet méconnu car relevant surtout de la pratique, devrait permettre de mieux cerner sa portée. Sur le plan individuel, le principe essentiel est celui de la liberté du vote, qui peut même neutraliser partiellement les règles de son attribution, comme en cas d’abstention ou d’activisme actionnarial. Cette liberté suppose toutefois que l’intégrité du vote et son caractère éclairé soient préservés. Or il peut être altéré par des pressions extérieures, motivées par la valeur économique du droit de vote, ce qui requiert des dispositifs renforcés de protection. Sur le plan de l’organisation collective du scrutin, l’accent est mis sur l’intérêt social, justifiant la prédominance de la loi de la majorité et venant tempérer la liberté du vote. Ces règles organisationnelles, tout en garantissant le droit de participer aux décisions collectives, promeuvent une certaine loyauté du vote, notamment en sanctionnant les abus du droit de vote, et une certaine éthique du vote, comme au travers du say on pay. Cette prise en compte croissante des intérêts collectifs lors du vote invite à renouveler certaines réflexions majeures du droit des sociétés. Elle interroge en particulier sur le rôle de l’associé et sur le bien-fondé de certains principes tels que celui qui prohibe les cessions de droits de vote. / The right to vote is the supreme political prerogative of shareholders. While many debates have focused on its essential nature and the conditions under which it is granted, little thought has been given to how it should be exercised. The mode of exercise makes the right to vote unusual in that it arises from an individual right which can only be exercised collectively and indeed is critical for its effectiveness since voting rights can only be utilized episodically within the framework of general meetings of shareholders. The consideration of the principles governing the exercise of voting rights, a relatively unexplored topic since most effort in this area refers to practical aspects, should clarify the impact of this mechanism. At the individual level, the freedom to vote is a key principle, which can even partially neutralize the rules of its allocation, as in the case of abstention or shareholder activism. However, this freedom presupposes that the integrity of the vote and the right to information related to it are preserved. However, these features can be altered by external pressures motivated by the economic value of voting rights, which leads to a requirement for reinforced protection measures. At the collective level of the organisation of the ballot, the emphasis is placed on corporate interests, justifying the predominance of the majority rule and tempering the freedom to vote. These organisational rules, while guaranteeing the right to participate in collective decisions, promote a certain loyalty, in particular by punishing abuses of the right to vote, and via the application of a collective ethical approach (e.g. say-on-pay). This growing influence of collective interests in the voting process invites us to reconsider certain major company law principles. In particular, questions are around the role of the shareholder and the validity of certain of those principles such as that prohibiting the sale of voting rights. Droit de vote Liberté de vote Intérêt social Valeur du droit de vote Conventions de vote Loi de la majorité Assemblée générale d’actionnaires Agence de conseil en vote Gouvernement d’entreprise Voting rights Freedom to vote Corporate interest Value of voting rights Voting agreements Majority rule General meeting of shareholders Proxy advisors Corporate governance 340
6	Le gouvernement d’entreprise en droit européen et brésilien comparé Laranjeira, Rodrigo de Almeida 08 September 2016 (has links) Corporate Governance hat einen radikalen Wandel in Europa seit den 1990er Jahren durchgemacht. Der Wandel ist konsolidiert und ist nun Teil des Rechts der modernen Aktiengesellschaften. Brasilianisches Recht wird immer durch die europäische Gesetzgebung inspiriert. Unsere Studie fragt, aus einer vergleichenden Sicht, ob sich das brasilianische Unternehmensrecht auf die europäische Corporate Governance bezieht. Wir konzentrieren uns in Europa auf das deutsche Recht, das englische Recht, das französische Recht und das europäische Recht. Unsere Analyse geht über die Herzen der Unternehmensführung und umfasst Teile, die dem Kapitalmarkt- und dem Umweltrecht angehören, da sie selbstverständlich auch eine Verbindung mit der Corporate Governance und dem Aktienrecht haben. Das Verständnis des Kerns der Unternehmensführung, welcher die Organisation der Verwaltungsorgane der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft ist, hängt von der Analyse der rechtlichen Behandlung von Neben-Themen, die aber verwandt sind, ab, wie die Regeln über die Haftung. / Corporate governance has undergone a radical change in Europe since the 1990s. Change has now consolidated and is part of the company law. Brazilian law has always been inspired by European legislation. Our study asks, from a comparative perspective, if the Brazilian corporate law relates to the European corporate governance. In Europe, we focus on German law, English law, French law and Community law. Our analysis goes beyond the heart of corporate governance and includes parts of capital markets law and environmental law, because they obviously also have a connection with corporate governance and company law. The understanding of the core of corporate governance, which is the organization of administrative bodies of the listed company on a regulated market, depends on the analysis of the legal treatment of incidental subjects, but related, as the regime of liability. Rechtsvergleichung Haftung Vorstand Corporate Governance Aufsichtsrat Unternehmensführung Aktiengesellschaft brasilianisches Recht deutsches Recht englisches Recht europäisches Recht französisches Recht Gesellschaftsrecht Kapitalmarktrecht Umweltrecht Soft Law Board of Directors Verwaltungsrat Hauptversammlung institutionelle Anleger Organisierung Vergütung Übernahme Insiderrecht Konzern European Law corporate governance liability German law board of directors comparative law public limited company Brazilian law English law French law company’s law capital markets law environmental law soft law supervisory board executive board general meeting of shareholders institutional investors organization remuneration takeover insider trading corporate group 340 Recht 19 Recht QP 341 ddc:340

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