Sustainability has started to play a greater role on the financial market and a larger number of investors are searching for financial products that contribute to the environment and the sustainable development. However, the numerous definitions of sustainable investments and green funds make the investment decision-making process difficult for investors and allow companies to “greenwash” their products. In order to facilitate the investment process for investors and at the same time contribute to sustainable development, the EU adopted the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) on 10 March 2021 as part of the Union’s sustainable finance strategy. The SFDR introduces a set of harmonized rules for financial market participants regarding their integration of sustainability-related aspects in their investment process, including different product classification levels, such as “light green” and “dark green”. Apart from the fact that the regulation means enhanced transparency, it is possible that the new product classifications will have an impact on the definition of sustainable funds and the environmental, social, governmental (ESG) investment strategies currently used by financial market participants. Additionally, the appropriateness of the new product classes in view of the aims of the SFDR could be discussed. The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the product specific disclosures of the SFDR and their implications on funds integrating sustainability, by using the legal dogmatic methodology and the EU teleological methodology. In order to be classified as an art. 8, or light green, it seems as if it is not enough for a fund to simply integrate ESG aspects into the investment process, rather the fund has to apply several investment strategies that consider ESG. For funds wishing to be considered as an art. 9, or dark green, it appears as if impact investing or sustainability themed investing could be two applicable approaches. Moreover, the sustainable investment-definition provided by the regulation contains explicit criteria, thus making it easier for investors to understand sustainable investments. Furthermore, the increased regulation and reporting requirements might contribute to less greenwashing, which in turn will benefit the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement. However, while the product specific disclosures appear to be aligned with the objectives of the SFDR, there are several uncertainties related to the definitions and classifications that prevent the regulation from fully achieving its goals. / Hållbarhet har kommit att spela en allt större roll på finansmarknaden och allt fler investerare efterfrågar nu finansiella produkter som bidrar till miljön och den hållbara utvecklingen. Men de många definitioner som finns gällande hållbara investeringar och gröna fonder försvårar beslutsprocessen för investerare samt gör det möjligt för företag att använda sig utav ”greenwashing”. För att underlätta investeringsprocessen för investerare och även bidra till den hållbara utvecklingen antog EU den s.k. Förordning om hållbarhetsrelaterade upplysningar som ska lämnas inom den finansiella tjänstesektorn (SFDR) den 10:e mars 2021, vilken utgör en del av Unionens strategi för en hållbarare finansmarknad. SFDR innehåller harmoniserade regler för finansmarknadsaktörer gällande integreringen av hållbarhetsaspekter i investeringsprocessen, inklusive olika produktklassificeringar, såsom ”ljusgröna” och ”mörkgröna” produkter. Förutom att den nya regleringen innebär ökad transparens är det möjligt att de nya produktklassificeringarna kommer att ha en inverkan på definitionen av hållbara fonder samt de investeringsstrategier finansmarknadsaktörer i dagsläget använder sig av för att integrera hållbarhet. Utöver detta kan även produktklassificeringarnas lämplighet diskuteras mot bakgrund av förordningens ändamål. Syftet med detta arbete har varit att undersöka de produktspecifika upplysningskraven i förordningen och dessas inverkan på fonder som beaktar hållbarhetsaspekter, med hjälp av den rättsdogmatiska metoden samt den EU-rättsliga teleologiska metoden. För att klassas som en art. 8, eller ljusgrön fond, förefaller det som att det inte är tillräckligt för en fond att enbart integrera hållbarhet i investeringsprocessen utan snarare måste fonden använda sig utav flera olika hållbarhetsstrategier. För fonder som önskar att bli klassificerade som en art. 9, eller mörkgröna, verkar det istället som att s.k. ”impact” fonder eller tematiska fonder med hållbarhetsfokus är typiska exempel. Utöver detta innehåller förordningen en definition med uttryckliga kriterier gällande vad som är en hållbar investering, vilket underlättar investerares förståelse för hållbara investeringar. Dessutom kan den ökade regleringen och rapporteringskraven bidra till mindre ”greenwashing”, vilket i sin tur gynnar FN:s globala hållbarhetsmål och Parisavtalet. Men samtidigt som produktklassificeringarna tycks vara i linje med SFDR:s mål innehåller både definitionerna och klassificeringarna ett flertal oklarheter som hindrar förordningen från att helt uppnå sina mål.

Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em curso - dos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. / Most of the large listed companies outside USA and UK have a controlling shareholder. The dominant control structure in each country is the result of multiple determinants, many of them arising from the legal system. The gradual convergence of ownership patterns around the world from the extremes of the total concentration and separation of ownership and control to the intermediate scenario of significant blockholdings held by institutional investors - has not been accompanied by a relevant shift in the control structures in listed companies of most of the countries, specially those in the Brazilian Novo Mercado. This Doctorate Thesis presents a specific subset of legal factors contributing for that outcome: the legal instruments separating voting rights from cashflow rights.

Les sociétés cotées constituent un monde à part. Il existe environ 5 000 sociétés cotées sur les marchés réglementés des bourses de l’UE. Même si elles représentent moins de 1 % des entreprises européennes, leur capitalisation boursière s’élève à plus de 70 % du PIB. Parce que ces sociétés ont une importance systémique pour l’économie, la compréhension de leur régime juridique s’avère cruciale. Nous traçons d’abord les contours du droit qui leur est applicable, en partant du niveau supranational parce que le droit européen est la plus importante source à la fois de convergence et de divergence. Cette approche nous permet de discuter si le niveau supranational devrait s’investir de nouveaux secteurs ou pousser l’harmonisation dans ceux déjà réglementés et de faire des prédictions quant à la direction probable ou souhaitable des réglementations. Nous analysons ensuite la causalité de la convergence, ce qui fait ressortir trois types de convergence : imposée, par pression et par rapprochement des circonstances factuelles dans lesquelles les sociétés cotées de l’UE exercent leurs activités. Nous concluons qu’il existe à présent une convergence en matière de droit applicable aux sociétés cotées de l’UE en dépit d’une harmonisation seulement partielle opérée au niveau supranational et que cette convergence s’approfondira sous l’impulsion des forces et des facteurs qui en servent de cause. Cette conclusion appuie la systématisation future des droits nationaux en fonction d’une nouvelle summa divisio entre sociétés cotées et sociétés non cotées. / Listed companies are a world apart. There are approximately 5 000 companies listed on the regulated markets of the EU stock exchanges. Although they represent less than 1 % of the European businesses, their market capitalization amounts to more than 70 % of GDP. Because they have a systemic importance for the economy, the comprehension of their legal regime is crucial. We first establish the boundaries of the applicable law, starting from the supranational level because EU law represents the most important source of both convergence and divergence. This method allows us to establish if the supranational level should extend to new areas of regulation or push for further the harmonization in the areas already regulated and to make predictions regarding the probable or desirable future directions of the regulations. We then analyze the causality of convergence, which shows three main types of convergence : imposed, by pressure and by approximation of the factual circumstances of the environment in which EU listed companies operate. We conclude that presently there is a convergence of national regulations applicable to EU listed companies despite only partial harmonization at the supranational level and that this convergence will deepen as a result of its forces and factors of causality. This conclusion reinforces the arguments for a reorganization of national laws based on a new summa divisio between listed companies and non-listed companies.

Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em curso - dos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. / Most of the large listed companies outside USA and UK have a controlling shareholder. The dominant control structure in each country is the result of multiple determinants, many of them arising from the legal system. The gradual convergence of ownership patterns around the world from the extremes of the total concentration and separation of ownership and control to the intermediate scenario of significant blockholdings held by institutional investors - has not been accompanied by a relevant shift in the control structures in listed companies of most of the countries, specially those in the Brazilian Novo Mercado. This Doctorate Thesis presents a specific subset of legal factors contributing for that outcome: the legal instruments separating voting rights from cashflow rights.

This DPhil thesis analyses the Takeover Bid Directive in the light of EU Law and examines the extent to which this Directive facilitates the exercise of the fundamental freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital in the internal market. Since the Directive is based on the EC Treaty chapter on freedom of establishment (Articles 43 and 44(2)(g) EC Treaty), it should in principle contribute to cross frontier corporate mobility in the internal market through takeover bids; this was the aim of the Commission in its various proposals. Takeover bids and the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment are closely related. The Directive forms part of the EU company law harmonization programme whose weaknesses and limits are also explored. However, the Takeover Bid Directive is an EU company law instrument with strong links to EU capital market law. The initial aims of the EU legislature were to establish an internal market for companies and to achieve market integration in the field of EU company law. However, the Takeover Bid Directive is a compromise and watered down version of a proposal which the Commission envisaged would lead to a more effective pan-European takeover regime than that which actually proved possible. The need for compromise was the result of the very different legal and policy approaches of the Member States in the field of takeover regulation. Some provisions of the Directive are obligatory for all Member States. These provisions include the mandatory bid rule, the squeeze-out right, and the sell-out right. All these obligatory provisions of the Directive are in their present form open to criticism. The two key provisions of the Directive have been made optional for Member States. These are the non-frustration rule, requiring the board to obtain the prior authorization of the general meeting of shareholders before taking any action which could result in the frustration of the bid; and the breakthrough rule, requiring that any restrictions on the transfer of securities or voting rights provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company or in contractual agreements between the offeree company and the holders of its securities or in contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company’s securities shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid. Nevertheless, Member States, which opt out, are obliged to allow individual companies to opt in. Moreover, a reciprocity rule was also adopted, which allows Member States to permit those companies, which apply these provisions, to opt out again if they are the target of a bidder, which does not itself apply the same takeover provisions. Additionally, the non-frustration and the breakthrough rule are not fully comprehensive and even when a company applies them, it might still be able to evade their application since some corporate and financial structures remain outside the Directive’s scope. Finally, this thesis discusses the extent to which obstacles to cross border takeovers addressed by the Directive, or indeed left intact by the Directive, are to be regarded as restrictions on the right of establishment stricto sensu, or simply as obstacles in practice to making a successful takeover bid. More specifically, it scrutinizes the horizontal direct effect of the EC fundamental freedoms and seeks to analyze the extent to which conduct of the board and articles in the corporate constitution might be said to constitute restrictions on the freedom of establishment and on the free movement of capital.

Le gouvernement d’entreprise a subi une modification radicale en Europe à partir des années 1990. Le changement est aujourd’hui consolidé et il fait partie du droit des sociétés modernes. Le droit brésilien s’est toujours inspiré des législations européennes. Notre étude pose la question de savoir, à partir d’une vue comparative, si le droit brésilien des sociétés se rattache au gouvernement d’entreprise européen. On se centre en Europe sur le droit allemand, le droit anglais, le droit français et le droit communautaire. Notre analyse dépasse le cœur du gouvernement d’entreprise et inclut des parties qui relèvent du droit des marchés de capitaux et du droit de l’environnement, qui ont évidemment aussi un lien avec le gouvernement d’entreprise et le droit des sociétés. Pour comprendre le cœur du gouvernement d’entreprise, à savoir l’organisation des organes d’administration de la société anonyme cotée sur un marché réglementé, il faut s’appuyer sur l’analyse du traitement juridique de sujets à la fois accessoires et rattachés, comme le régime de la responsabilité des administrateurs. Le gouvernement d’entreprise se partage principalement en gouvernements d’entreprise interne et externe. Le gouvernement d’entreprise interne est celui qui traite l’organisation des organes d’administration, les relations entre les administrateurs et les actionnaires. Il se préoccupe surtout des affaires internes des sociétés anonymes. Le gouvernement d’entreprise externe a plutôt à voir avec la société anonyme et ses relations externes, dans le cadre du droit des marchés de capitaux et du droit de l’environnement. La réglementation brésilienne n’a pas accompagné les évolutions du gouvernement d’entreprise interne, sauf par rapport à certains mécanismes de base, comme la publicité. Il y a une plus grande synchronicité dans le gouvernement d’entreprise externe, qui relève de sujets majoritairement poussés en priorité par un consensus international. Le Brésil devra, en fonction de l’évolution de la déconcentration de la structure de l’actionnariat, s’appuyer sur le droit européen et introduire davantage de concepts du gouvernement d’entreprise moderne. / Corporate governance has undergone a radical change in Europe since the 1990s. Change has now consolidated and is part of the company law. Brazilian law has always been inspired by European legislation. Our study asks, from a comparative perspective, if the Brazilian corporate law relates to the European corporate governance. In Europe, we focus on German law, English law, French law and Community law. Our analysis goes beyond the heart of corporate governance and includes parts of capital markets law and environmental law, because they obviously also have a connection with corporate governance and company law. The understanding of the core of corporate governance, which is the organization of administrative bodies of the listed company on a regulated market, depends on the analysis of the legal treatment of incidental subjects, but related, as the regime of liability.Corporate governance is divided into internal corporate governance and external corporate governance. Internal corporate governance deals with the organization of administrative bodies, the relationship between directors and shareholders. It is primarily concerned with the internal affairs of corporations. External corporate governance has rather to do with the corporation and its external relations, under capital markets law and environmental law. Brazilian law did not follow changes in the internal corporate governance, except with respect to certain basic mechanisms such as disclosure. There is a greater synchrony in the external corporate governance, whose main topics are first driven by an international consensus. Brazil will have to measure the evolution of shareholding structure. If the shareholding turns less concentrated, Brazil will have to rely on European law and introduce more modern concepts of corporate governance. / Corporate Governance hat einen radikalen Wandel in Europa seit den 1990er Jahren durchgemacht. Der Wandel ist konsolidiert und ist nun Teil des Rechts der modernen Aktiengesellschaften. Brasilianisches Recht wird immer durch die europäische Gesetzgebung inspiriert. Unsere Studie fragt, aus einer vergleichenden Sicht, ob sich das brasilianische Unternehmensrecht auf die europäische Corporate Governance bezieht. Wir konzentrieren uns in Europa auf das deutsche Recht, das englische Recht, das französische Recht und das europäische Recht. Unsere Analyse geht über die Herzen der Unternehmensführung und umfasst Teile, die dem Kapitalmarkt- und dem Umweltrecht angehören, da sie selbstverständlich auch eine Verbindung mit der Corporate Governance und dem Aktienrecht haben. Das Verständnis des Kerns der Unternehmensführung, welcher die Organisation der Verwaltungsorgane der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft ist, hängt von der Analyse der rechtlichen Behandlung von Neben-Themen, die aber verwandt sind, ab, wie die Regeln über die Haftung. Corporate Governance ist vor allem in interne und externe Corporate Governance unterteilt. Interne Unternehmensführung beinhaltet die Organisation der Verwaltungsorgane und die Beziehung zwischen Direktoren und Aktionäre. Sie ist in erster Linie die innere Angelegenheit der Konzerne. Die externe Unternehmensführung umfasst eher das Unternehmen und seine externen Beziehungen nach dem Recht der Kapitalmärkte und des Umweltrechts.

Corporate Governance hat einen radikalen Wandel in Europa seit den 1990er Jahren durchgemacht. Der Wandel ist konsolidiert und ist nun Teil des Rechts der modernen Aktiengesellschaften. Brasilianisches Recht wird immer durch die europäische Gesetzgebung inspiriert. Unsere Studie fragt, aus einer vergleichenden Sicht, ob sich das brasilianische Unternehmensrecht auf die europäische Corporate Governance bezieht. Wir konzentrieren uns in Europa auf das deutsche Recht, das englische Recht, das französische Recht und das europäische Recht. Unsere Analyse geht über die Herzen der Unternehmensführung und umfasst Teile, die dem Kapitalmarkt- und dem Umweltrecht angehören, da sie selbstverständlich auch eine Verbindung mit der Corporate Governance und dem Aktienrecht haben. Das Verständnis des Kerns der Unternehmensführung, welcher die Organisation der Verwaltungsorgane der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft ist, hängt von der Analyse der rechtlichen Behandlung von Neben-Themen, die aber verwandt sind, ab, wie die Regeln über die Haftung. / Corporate governance has undergone a radical change in Europe since the 1990s. Change has now consolidated and is part of the company law. Brazilian law has always been inspired by European legislation. Our study asks, from a comparative perspective, if the Brazilian corporate law relates to the European corporate governance. In Europe, we focus on German law, English law, French law and Community law. Our analysis goes beyond the heart of corporate governance and includes parts of capital markets law and environmental law, because they obviously also have a connection with corporate governance and company law. The understanding of the core of corporate governance, which is the organization of administrative bodies of the listed company on a regulated market, depends on the analysis of the legal treatment of incidental subjects, but related, as the regime of liability.

This thesis evaluates and constructs a general, product-neutral legal concept and model of financial instruments, as opposed to the product-dependent definitions currently employed in contemporary capital markets law. Through a combination of law and economics perspectives, legal history, and comparative analysis, the study examines the various types of financial instruments currently and previously in use. The legal characteristics and features of these instruments are evaluated and compared, leading to the identification of commonalities that can be used to define a product-neutral concept. The thesis argues that such a concept is more beneficial to the function of the capital markets by removing obstacles for financial innovation while also providing a consistent way to ensure that new financial products are governed by the same regulatory framework as comparable instruments.The thesis also examines the historical evolution of financial instruments and how it has been driven by the evolution of international trade and the demand and surplus of available capital. The proposed concept is applied to current financial instruments, including equity and debt, as well as pre-modern markets, and evaluated in terms of regulation, practical use, and legal characteristics such as transferability and negotiability.The research of this thesis encountered several challenges and limitations. Firstly, the historical and comparative analysis proved difficult to carry out, due to limitation in available source material and language related restrictions, respectively. These limitations were overcome by limiting the scope and by employing contacts with law firms in the respective jurisdictions. Secondly, several key issues proved to require further research to be able to provide definitive conclusions. Such research would have been out of scope and as such, simplified explanations and models were employed. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the practical implications of the proposed concept, including its application to cryptocurrencies and similar assets, and identifies potential areas for future research.