Esta dissertação apresenta o sentido ético do cuidado de si voltado aos ambientes competitivos de trabalho, a partir das obras de Sêneca, intituladas Da tranquilidade da alma, A brevidade da vida, A vida feliz e Cartas a Lucílio, tendo como apoio teórico as interpretações feitas por Michel Foucault, no livro A hermenêutica do sujeito. O estudo das referidas obras de Sêneca permite demonstrar suas inter-relações com o cuidado de si e com o cuidado do outro, bem como, com o significado do cuidado de si, no contexto estoico desse filósofo. Diante da questão sobre qual o sentido do cuidado de si em ambientes competitivos de trabalho, os quais podem não se limitar apenas à extensão do espaço físico, mas se estender à dimensão da vida do indivíduo, examina-se o sentido de cuidado de si, pelo olhar ético de Sêneca, e se o relaciona aos ambientes competitivos de trabalho. Por meio da análise da teoria de Sêneca e do entendimento sobre a constituição dos ambientes competitivos, amparados na obra de Herbert Marcuse, A ideologia da sociedade unidimensional, e nas obras de Foucault, Microfísica do poder, Vigiar e punir e As palavras e as coisas, é possível refletir se o cuidado de si e a competição são um paradoxo para o homem que exerce seu trabalho, seja para garantir seu sustento ou para buscar níveis mais elevados de desempenho e realização pessoal. / This dissertation introduces the ethical sense of self-care focused to the competitive work environments, from the works of Seneca, entitled From tranquility of the Soul, The brevity of life, The happy life and Letters to Lucilio, having as a theory support, the interpretations made by Michel Foucault, in the book The Hermeneutics of the Subject. The study of the mentioned works of Seneca allows to demonstrate their interrelations with self-care and with care of others as well as with the meaning of self-care in the unfailing context of this philosopher. Faced with the question of what is the meaning of self-care in competitive work environments, which can not be restricted only to the extention of physical space, but extend to the dimension of the individual's life, intended to consider the sense of self-care, by the ethical look of Seneca and relate it to competitive work environments. Through analysis of Seneca’s theory and understanding of the competitive environments' formation, supported in the Herbert Marcuse's work, The ideology of one-dimensional society and in the works of Foucault, Monitor and Punish and Words and Things, you can reflect if the self-care and the competition are a paradox for the man who does his job, to guarantee his sustenance or look for higher performance's levels and personnel achievement.

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In this thesis ”The Dialectics of Technology: Ambivalences and Ruptures in Herbert Marcuses’ Philosophy of Technology” I present a thorough analysis of Herbert Marcuses’philosophy of technology as it developed from the late 1940s until his death in 1979. Whereas, previous studies have tried to reduce his philosophy of technology to one coherent project, I argue that his philosophy of technology is characterised by ambivalences and ruptures and therefore cannot be reduced to such a coherent totality. Marcuses’ philosophy of technology vacillates between what I, with Andrew Feenbergs’ concepts, callan instrumentalist and substantialist notion of technology. An instrumentalist notion is one where technology is understood merely as a tool to be wielded by external actors, in Marcuses’ case that of the capitalist class and the state. In contrast to this, Marcuse also precents a substantialist philosophy of technology, where it is imbued with its own agency and direction.The previous scholarship has largely reduced Marcuses’ philosophy to one of these positions, rather than emphasising how both of them are present through out the text. Furthermore, I argue that his substantialist understanding of technology itself is characterised by ruptures and ambivalences, where technology is viewed both as inherently emancipatory and as inherently subjugating. It is in regard to this duality I argue that his philosophy of technology should be understood as dialectical, in the sense that technology at the same time can be a central part of human subjection and one of the most important vehicles for emancipation. In relation to this, I agree with Samir Gandesha that one of the most fruitful directions Marcuses’ philosophy opens is an understanding of technology as bearer of a historical substance, that is to say that technology is imbued with certain goals, desires and world-views beyond those of the wielder, while at the same time understanding that this substance can be changed through historical processes. Beyond the more exegetic presentation of Marcuses’ philosophy and the critique against the previous scholarship, I argue for critical theory, and especially Marcuses’, relevance for current debates around technology and automation. In the current debates between left wing accelerationist cheerleaders of technology and those radicals more sceptical of technologies emancipatory potential, an investigation into the nature of technology itself is severely lacking. While, the former uncritically embraces the technology arisen in capitalist society and views it as a direct path towards a utopian post-scarcity communism,the latter solely focuses on technology as a tool of capitalist class power. In relation to this, I argue that the historical and dialectical understanding of technology that can be salvaged from Marcuses oeuvre would be a welcome and useful addition to the debate.

This paper considers the way Herbert Marcuse’s re-formulation of the instrumental reason as a technical reason can be understood as an intensification or acceleration of some of the themes presented by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer in The Dialectics of Enlightenment. By reading Marcuse´s The One-Dimensional Man in dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, the paper explores a thesis that Marcuse draws on concepts from Heidegger, especially Ge-stell and Bestand, in his notion of the “technical reason” and “technological rationality” to think and think beyond modern technology. By positing modern technology as the focal point of the instrumentalization of reason, Marcuse sheds light of historical and contemporary problems with human thinking. The staging of this conversation with Marcuse and Heidegger that never really took place allows the paper to fully explore and understand Marcuse’s invoking of the aesthetical dimension, as well as his re-appropriation of Freudian terminology, as a model to re-establish negative thinking as a necessary counteraction to the one-dimensional positive thinking that is dominating private and public sphere.

Le 6 février 2015, la Cour suprême du Canada a rendu un jugement historique, unanime et anonyme. Dans l'arrêt Carter c. Canada (Procureur général), la Cour reconnaît que l'interdiction mur à mur de l'aide médicale à mourir porte atteinte aux droits constitutionnels de certaines personnes. En effet, les adultes capables devraient pouvoir demander l'aide d'un médecin pour mettre fin à leur vie s'ils respectent deux critères : consentir clairement et de façon éclairée à quitter ce monde et être affecté de problèmes de santé graves et irrémédiables leur causant des souffrances persistantes et intolérables. Or, cette décision constitue un renversement juridique, car un jugement inverse avait été rendu en 1993. En effet, vingt-deux ans auparavant, la Cour suprême avait jugé à cinq contre quatre que l'interdiction du suicide assisté était constitutionnelle. Dans l'arrêt Rodriguez c. Colombie-Britannique, la majorité avait statué que la protection du caractère sacré de la vie dans toute circonstance, tant pour les personnes vulnérables que pour les adultes capables, était une raison suffisante pour ne pas accorder de dérogation aux articles du Code criminel qui concernent le suicide assisté. Les juges majoritaires craignent alors que toute ouverture à l’aide au suicide entraine un élargissement progressif des critères d’admissibilité, ce que plusieurs appellent l’argument du « doigt dans l’engrenage ». Dans le cadre de ce mémoire, le renversement juridique Rodriguez-Carter sera analysé à la lumière du débat entre H. L. A. Hart et Ronald Dworkin. Alors que le premier défend une nouvelle version du positivisme modéré, le second offre une théorie nouvelle et innovatrice, nommée l’interprétativisme. L’objectif est simple : déterminer laquelle de ces deux théories explique le mieux le renversement juridique canadien concernant l’aide médicale à mourir. L’hypothèse initiale soutient que les deux théories pourront expliquer ledit renversement, mais que l’une le fera mieux que l’autre. / On February 6th 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an anonymous, unanimous landmark judgment. In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court recognized that a blanket prohibition of physician-assisted dying violates the constitutional rights of certain individuals. Indeed, a competent adult person should be allowed to seek help from a doctor to end her life if she meets two criteria: clearly consent to the termination of life and have a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring suffering that is intolerable to the said individual. This legal decision constitutes an judicial overrule, because a reverse judgment was made in 1993. In fact, twenty-two years ago, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favour of the ban on assisted suicide. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the majority ruled that the protection of the sanctity of life in all circumstances, both for vulnerable people for capable adults, was reason enough not to invalidate the sections of the Criminal Code concerned with assisted suicide. The majority then feared that any opening to assisted suicide would cause a gradual widening of the eligibility criteria, what many have called the argument of the “slippery slope”. As part of this thesis, the Rodriguez-Carter judicial overrule will be analyzed in light of the debate between H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. While the former is known for his defence of a new version of soft positivism, the latter offers a new and innovative theory, named interpretivism. The goal is simple: to establish which of these two theories best explains the Canadian legal overrule regarding physician-assisted dying. The initial hypothesis is that both theories may explain said reversal, but one will do so better than the other.

My thesis draws connections among Herbert Read’s aesthetics, his anarchism, and Carl Jung’s aesthetic theory. I discuss Jung’s concept of individuation and its importance in his theory of the creative process of life. He distinguished between personalistic and archetypal art, and argued that the latter embodies primordial symbols that are inherently meaningful. Archetypal art, he believed, symbolizes unconscious knowledge, which can promote self-awareness and impact on society, if an individual is able to discern its relevance and integrate this into an ethical lifestyle. Jung emphasized the importance of rational discernment and ethical choices along with free creativity. I show how Read used these Jungian concepts to explain aspects of his aesthetic and political emphasis on freedom. According to Read, art creates reality and as such it is both personally transformative and socially activist: he believed that aesthetics are a mechanism of the natural world, and that art is a unique type of cognition that manifests new forms. Art communicates new versions of reality because perception is holistic, allowing people to perceive both the essence inherent in forms and the relationships among them. Further, I consider Read’s belief that cognition and society are both organic, and should be allowed to evolve naturally. Therefore, according to Read, society must be anarchist so that creative freedom and aesthetic consciousness can be adequately supported. Finally, I conclude by highlighting the pivotal role of creative freedom in Jung’s and Read’s theories of personal and social change. I illustrate that Jung and Read concurred that the unique individual is the site of transformation, living out the organically creative nature of life.