Erotic tokens or the so-called spintriae leave little to the imagination. These coin-like tokens depict acts of love making couples with Roman numerals on the reverse. The tokens are believed to have been in use during the 1st century A.D. and is often attributed to the reign of Tiberius. The material examined in the thesis are the four spintriae from Uppsala University Coin Cabinet. Due to the specific characteristics, scholars have been questioning the function of the erotic tokens. The most accredited hypothesis is that erotic tokens was used as payment in brothels. The purpose of this thesis is to discern whether the erotic tokens had a monetary value in Pompeii. The study also aims to examine if the tokens were used as payment in brothels instead of contemporary currencies and as to why the reason for this could be. To be able to discern a purpose, function and value of erotic tokens, three analyses on the basis of graffiti, iconography and ancient literature are made.

According to the orthodox priest John Meyendorff, the Byzantine dream consisted of the establishment of a universal Christian empire spiritually and politically governed by the emperor of Constantinople. This essay intends to shed light on the topic of Byzantine religious and political expansion in the context of Byzantine view on Barbaricum and the barbarians inhabiting it. The fundamental question asked is: how do the Byzantines view the barbarians outside the Byzantine Empire and in what sense, if any, does this view have implications for the Byzantine dream? To answer the question the essay examines four 6th century historians, namely: Procopius of Caesarea, Johannes Malalas, Menander Protector and Agathias of Myrina. The method being used is a hermeneutical method and the theoretical framework is made up of Edward Said’s Orientalism. The results indicate that the barbarians in Barbaricum were viewed upon with great distrust. The Byzantines considered the barbarians to be ontologically different from themselves. Furthermore, the Byzantines regarded the barbarians behaviour as uncivilized. The typical barbarian was deemed to be wild, cruel, irrational, mostly religiously backwards, lacking in education and, more often than not, displaying arrogance and boasting. At the same time they were mystified, and thought of as physically impressive beings capable of unnatural strength. Consequently, the barbarians were viewed upon as creatures of lust and physicality rather than, like the Byzantines, beings of rationality and sense. The conclusion can be made that the Byzantines regarded Barbaricum in much the same manner as the postcolonial powers regarded the Orient – through the construction of a dichotomy between the self and the other. Concerning the Byzantine adherence to the Byzantine dream as expressed by John Meyendorff, to spread the Byzantine Empire beyond its borders and consume Barbaricum by political and religious means, the results indicate that there are reasons to question Meyendorff’s assumption. It’s plausible that there indeed were Byzantine inclinations to transform Barbaricum. Furthermore, the results indicate that the Byzantine view of the barbarians played some part in shaping that inclination. It’s, however, also plausible that while the Byzantines may have strived to transform Barbaricum, it doesn’t neccessarily follow that it had to succumb to Byzantine imperial authority. The investigated sources seem to suggest that the primary Byzantine goal was solely to transform Barbaricum religiously and politically into something that resembled the Byzantine Empire but wasn’t necessarily a full fledged part of it.

Minority protection mechanisms in international law aim to guarantee certain individual rights to persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, such as freedom of culture, religion and language. These rights can be considered to be of collective interest for minority group identity and therefore often require the possibility of collective enjoyment. In addition to general human rights and principles of non-discrimination, minority protection can alternately be ensured through minority specific rights. However, minority specific rights would not operate effectively without evolving a concept of collective (or group) rights in international law. Hence, while this kind of approach can provide legal methods for balancing the interests of individuals, groups and the state, it creates the possibility of conflicts with the international framework of individual rights. The ottoman millet system sets a historical example of minority protection instruments based on a collective concept of human rights. Furthermore, the ottoman history offers an illustration of what could go terribly wrong with a collective rights model. By analyzing the millet system and the ottoman legal reforms in the nineteenth century I will discuss reoccurring issues with collective rights. I will argue that incorporating collective rights within a structure founded on individual rights is a problematic way of protecting individuals belonging to minorities and other vulnerably ethnic groups. Looking through the historical development of universal human rights some important aspects of its main principles will be brought up in this paper.

Uppsatsens syfte är att söka förklaring till varför den svenska regeringen valde att inte erkänna folkmordet på armenier/Seyfo samt undersöka på vilket sätt politiker använder sig av historia när de ska ta beslut i frågor som dels skett i en annan tid och som dels är obekväma att hantera. För att få svar på denna fråga har en kvalitativ metod använts. Argumentationsanalys samt kritisk diskursanalys har använts för att tolka de politiska argumentationerna och nyckelorden i den politiska debatten. Den utredning som regeringen beställde som underlag för sitt beslut har varit ett viktigt undersökningsmaterial. Vidare har intervjuer använts för att få en ökad förståelse av undersökningen. Syftet med uppsatsen har uppnåtts och förklaringen till varför den svenska regeringen valde att inte erkänna folkmordet på armenier/Seyfo är också en slutsats. Det fanns flera bakomliggande faktorer så som att inte stöta sig med en stor väljargrupp, inte riskera handelsrelationer dvs. ekonomiska intressen, dels flyktingfrågan mm. Dessa faktorer var dock inte de största utan den absolut största och även viktigaste orsaken var den som de inte tordes nämna. Denna faktor var att de var rädda för att ett erkännande skulle leda till påtryckningar och hot från Turkiet samt från olika intressenter i Sverige. / The purpose of the thesis is to seek an explanation as to why the Swedish government chose not to acknowledge the Armenian/Seyfo genocide and to investigate how politicians make use of history when making decisions on issues that have happened in another time and which are partly uncomfortable to manage. A qualitative method has been used to answer this question. Argumentation analysis and critical discourse analysis have been used to interpret the political arguments and keywords in the political debate. The investigation that the government ordered as a basis for its decision has been an important investigative material. Furthermore, interviews were used to gain a better understanding of the study. The purpose of the thesis has been achieved and the explanation as to why the Swedish government chose not to acknowledge the Armenian/Seyfo genocide is also a conclusion. There were several different underlying factors such as not clashing with a larger voter group, not risking trade relations i.e. financial interests, partly the refugee issue, etc. However, these factors were not the greatest, but the absolute greatest and also the most important reason was the one they did not dare mention. This factor was that they were afraid that recognition would lead to pressure and threats from Turkey as well as from various stakeholders in Sweden.