La tesi di dottorato su “La tutela dei soci e dei creditori nella fusione concordataria” si compone di tre capitoli. Nel primo, il lavoro muove dalla constatazione della (apparente) marginalità dell’istituto oggetto di indagine, rispetto al quale scarsa è stata finora l’attenzione dedicata dalla letteratura italiana ed alquanto esigua risulta la casistica giurisprudenziale. Viene, quindi, individuata nella carenza di coordinamento normativo tra la disciplina (ed i procedimenti) di diritto societario e diritto concorsuale la causa della trascurabile diffusione pratica dell’istituto e la conseguente necessità di un lavoro di ricostruzione interpretativa tutt’altro che agevole. La revisione critica dell’istituto muove – quindi ed inevitabilmente – dalla valutazione dell’ammissibilità di una fusione concordataria nell’ambito di concordati aventi finalità tanto conservative, quanto liquidative; e ciò considerando sia la possibile applicazione analogica dell’art. 2499 c.c., che in tema di trasformazione consente la realizzazione dell’operazione solo in quanto compatibile con le finalità e lo stato della procedura; sia la modalità in cui le altre (principali) esperienze giuridiche hanno affrontato le problematiche connesse alla fusione come strumento di soluzione concordata della crisi. Tale questione viene positivamente risolta, da un lato, sottolineando l’importanza sistematica e l’innegabile valore innovativo degli artt. 124 e 160 l. fall., per la parte in cui disciplinano la vasta gamma di soluzioni di cui il soggetto proponente dispone nella redazione dell’offerta concordataria: e ciò, in particolare, se si considera che le procedure di auto-regolamentazione della crisi o dell’insolvenza rappresentano soluzioni alternative al procedimento fallimentare e, quindi, derogatorie dello stesso; dall’altro lato, ponendo l’accento sulle soluzioni, tutte tendenzialmente positive, accolte dagli altri ordinamenti giuridici in ordine alla possibilità di contemplare un’operazione di fusione come modalità esecutiva di un piano di regolazione della crisi o dell’insolvenza. Il lavoro passa - nel secondo capitolo - ad individuare gli interessi coinvolti dall’operazione e ne trae spunto al fine della preventiva indicazione dei problemi posti dalla fusione concordataria. Si distinguono, al riguardo, due differenti serie di interessi: quello dei soci della società in procedura, e quello dei suoi creditori sociali. Quanto ai primi, il pregiudizio alla loro posizione è riconducibile alla risalente controversia sulla conservazione della qualità di socio, alla luce della inevitabile riduzione del valore (quantomeno) contabile del patrimonio dell’impresa in procedura. Viene innanzitutto valutata l’ipotesi in cui il valore contabile del capitale risulti azzerato, con la conseguente ammissibilità dell’operazione di fusione solo nel caso in cui il valore reale del patrimonio risulti più elevato di quello contabile e quindi idoneo a consentire la compenetrazione (non solo patrimoniale, ma anche) delle relative compagini sociali; quindi, viene esaminata la diversa circostanza in cui - sebbene il patrimonio dell’ente in concordato conservi un valore anche contabile positivo - alcuni soci si ritrovino a possedere, all’indomani della concentrazione e per effetto della determinazione di un determinato concambio, una partecipazione inferiore al minimo convertibile, venendo così di fatto “esclusi” dall’ente incorporante o risultante dall’operazione. In entrambe le vicende, viene poi affrontata (e risolta positivamente) l’ammissibilità di una decisione maggioritaria dei soci, pure da taluno revocata in dubbio in favore del principio unanimistico, là dove venga leso il diritto di ciascuno alla conservazione della status soci: e ciò, sia in considerazione della previsione legislativa che limita il conguaglio in denaro al dieci per cento delle partecipazioni assegnate, con ciò indirettamente escludendo la possibilità di conguagli totalmente compensativi della posizione di singoli soci, cui non venga riservata alcuna partecipazione nella società post-fusione; sia considerando che la congruità del concambio, la conformità alle regole previste a protezione dei diritti (informativi) dei soci e, in ogni caso, la presenza di contesti in cui sono esperibili i rimedi societari destinati (dal legislatore) assicurano il “ristoro” per eventuali pregiudizi sofferti dai titolari di quote minime di partecipazione al capitale. Quanto al rischio cui sono esposti i creditori della società in concordato, l’analisi viene condotta su due differenti “binari”: i creditori che concorrono all’approvazione del piano restano infatti esposti al rischio che la proposta in cui hanno riposto (con l’approvazione) speranza di soddisfazione subisca una battuta d’arresto a causa della mancata approvazione assembleare del progetto di fusione; i creditori contrari alla proposta di concordato corrono invece il rischio che le decisioni maggioritarie di approvazione della proposta possano (eventualmente) pregiudicare i propri interessi, privi (in assenza di classi) di qualsiasi rimedio endo-concorsuale ed esposti al mancato riconoscimento del rimedio oppositivo previsto – in ambito squisitamente societario – dall’art. 2503 c.c. Una volta individuati gli eventuali pregiudizi cui sono esposti i soci ed i creditori della società in concordato, vengono ricostruiti i rimedi tesi alla tutela delle rispettive posizioni; e proprio a tale profilo è dedicato il terzo capitolo, suddiviso in due sezioni. Nella prima, ci si sofferma sulla questione se la perdita della qualità di socio possa essere in qualche modo evitata o, ricorrendo determinate condizioni, se tale pregiudizio possa trovare adeguato ristoro: viene, quindi, dapprima accreditata la tesi – sostenuta dalla prevalente dottrina – secondo cui la sussistenza di un danno derivante dalla perdita della qualità di socio potrà ravvisarsi solo qualora, all’esito del vaglio giudiziale, venga riscontrata l’incongruità del rapporto di cambio prescelto ovvero, più in generale, un abuso del potere deliberativo della maggioranza. In questo contesto, due sono i principali strumenti predisposti dal legislatore a difesa della posizione dei soci di minoranza; il primo, di stampo “precauzionale”, relativo all’esercizio consapevole del diritto di voto da parte della maggioranza del capitale, e correlato alla disciplina degli adempimenti pubblicitari fissati dagli artt. 2501-ter, comma 3, c.c. e 2502-septies, comma 1, c.c.; il secondo, invece, tipicamente societario, attinente all’impugnativa della delibera (consiliare ovvero assembleare) di approvazione del progetto ex artt. 2373 e 2391 c.c. e, dopo l’iscrizione camerale dell’atto, all’azione di risarcimento ex art. 2504-quater, comma 2, c.c. Movendo dalla constatazione che il ventaglio di rimedi previsto dal diritto societario può apparire soluzione poco attenta alla posizione dei soci di minoranza anche qualora l’operazione di fusione sia del tutto estranea agli scopi concordatari – dal che i tentativi dottrinali di consentire al socio di minoranza l’esercizio dell’azione di risarcimento in forma specifica e per equivalente, da ingiustificato arricchimento ovvero da responsabilità da voto – viene valutata la possibilità che, allorquando la fusione rappresenti lo strumento di attuazione di una soluzione concordata della crisi, la figura dei soci possa assumere tutt’altro rilievo, fino quasi ad assimilarsi a quella dei creditori; ciò, naturalmente, nei limiti in cui la posizione degli stessi venga coinvolta o addirittura “compromessa” dal processo concordatario, dal quale l’attuale disciplina concorsuale li esclude completamente. Sebbene tale “riqualificazione” sembri inattuabile in ambito nazionale, viene valutato (e criticato) un recente disegno di legge del Governo federale tedesco (Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung), che riserva la tutela della posizione dei soci ai soli rimedi concorsuali, disattivando – una volta ammessa la società al concordato – quelli previsti in via generale dalla disciplina societaria. Nella seconda sezione viene esaminata la modalità di tutela dei creditori che approvano il concordato e, successivamente, la protezione dei creditori contrari alla proposta. Quanto ai primi, più che ricorrere a ricostruzioni dottrinali (in particolare, tedesche) tese a ridurre il potere deliberativo dei soci, si affronta la possibilità di affidare la tutela delle aspettative dei creditori sociali al coordinamento del procedimento decisionale previsto in ambito societario con l’iter procedurale del concordato. Risulta infatti evidente che il pericolo che il diniego assembleare leda gli interessi del ceto creditorio si manifesta solo nel caso in cui l’adozione delle delibere societarie richieste per l’attuazione della fusione venga rinviata alla fase esecutiva del concordato, assegnando così all’offerta concordataria un valore meramente programmatico. E - si osserva - tali “inconvenienti” potrebbero essere evitati avviando il procedimento assembleare contestualmente ovvero nel corso della procedura concordataria, condizionandone peraltro l’esito finale al perfezionamento definitivo del concordato. Passando alla modalità di tutela dei creditori che non concorrono all’approvazione della proposta, viene prospettata la possibilità che la difficoltosa conciliazione delle regole che disciplinano l’approvazione a maggioranza del concordato (artt. 128, comma 1°, e 177, comma 1°, l. fall.) e la normativa societaria che, in tema di fusione, riconosce invece ai creditori il diritto individuale di opposizione (art. 2503 c.c.), venga risolta mediante il disconoscimento di tale diritto, affidando la tutela del ceto creditorio ai soli rimedi previsti in ambito concorsuale. Non diversamente degli obbligazionisti, i creditori concorsuali costituiscono infatti una sorta di “comunità accidentale”, dal momento che è loro vietato di agire individualmente nei confronti del patrimonio sociale ed è prevista un’organizzazione di gruppo (i.e. concorsuale) tesa a risolvere gli eventuali conflitti di interessi tra gli stessi creditori. Dal che l’applicazione a questi ultimi dello stesso regime (di esclusione dal diritto di opposizione) riservato espressamente agli obbligazionisti dall’art. 2503-bis c.c. Tale soluzione viene, infine, confortata da ulteriori considerazioni concernenti, da un lato, la modalità di espressione della volontà dei creditori concorsuali nelle forme della mera partecipazione alla volontà del gruppo e, dall’altro, il combinato disposto degli artt. 2503, comma 1, c.c., e 128, comma 1°, e 177, comma 1°, l. fall., ai sensi del quale il consenso dei creditori anteriori all’iscrizione camerale del progetto di fusione deve considerarsi prestato qualora l’offerta concordataria (implicante la fusione) risulti approvata dai creditori che rappresentano la maggioranza dei crediti. / The doctoral thesis, about “The protection of shareholders and creditors in the merger as a means of insolvency arrangement”, consists of three chapters. In the first one, the work moves from the observation of the low use of the transaction under investigation, to which the Italian scholars and case law have devoted little attention. The lack of coordination between the regulatory framework (and processes) company law and insolvency law is identified as the main reason of the limited practice of the institution and the consequent need for an interpretative work of reconstruction. The critical review of the institute moves by evaluating the eligibility of a merger as a means of an insolvency arrangement with both conservation and the claims settlement purposes; and this is realized through the possible application by analogy of article 2499 c.c., which in terms of transformation allows the transaction only to the extent compatible with the purposes and status of the procedure; or through the implementation of solutions made in the other (main) foreign experiences. This issue is resolved positively, on the one hand, by emphasizing the importance of systematic and innovative articles 124 and 160 l. fall., to the extent they deal with the wide range of solutions in which the proponent can choose; on the other hand, focusing on solutions, all basically positive, accepted by other jurisdictions in order to contemplate the possibility of a merger as a way of an executive plan of adjustment of the crisis or insolvency. The work goes on - in the second chapter - to identify the interests involved in the transaction distinguishing them, in this regard, in two different sets: the shareholders of the company in the procedure, and that of its creditors. As for the former, the prejudice to their position is due to the controversy over the dating of membership retention, in the light of the inevitable reduction in the value (at least) of the company's assets in the accounting procedure. It’s first evaluated the situation in which the value of the capital is zero, resulting in eligibility for the merger only if the real value of the assets is more than that amount; then, it evaluates the different circumstances in which - even though the entity's shareholders agreed to retain a positive value even accounting - some members are found to possess, after the merger and because of the determination of a particular exchange, a share less than the minimum convertible, thus in effect being “excluded” by the surviving or resulting company. In both events, it is then addressed (and answered in the affirmative) the eligibility of a majority decision of members, also called into question by some in favor of the unanimity, where it is breached the right of everyone to the conservation status of the members: and this, both because of the legislative provision limiting the cash compensation to ten percent of the shares allocated, thereby indirectly excluding the possibility of fully compensatory adjustments of the position of some members; whereas both the fairness of the exchange, in compliance with the rules laid down for the protection of rights (information) of the shareholders and, in any case, the presence of contexts in which the general remedies for corporate can be used. As for the risk faced by creditors, the analysis is conducted on two different “tracks”: the creditors that contribute to the approval of the plan are in fact exposed to the risk that the proposal they put (with the approval) satisfaction hopes suffer a setback, due to the failure to approve the merger by shareholders; and the creditors against the proposal agreed, which are instead exposed to the risk that the majority approval decisions of the proposal would (eventually) affect their interests. In the third chapter, divided into two sections, the remedies are identified to claim protection of their positions. In the first, we focus on whether the loss of membership can be somehow avoided or, under certain conditions, if such injury can find suitable refreshment: it’s endorsed the first argument - supported by the prevailing doctrine – in which the existence of an injury resulting from the loss of membership will be seen in it, only if - the outcome of judicial scrutiny found in the incongruity of the chosen exchange rate or, more generally, an abuse of the decision-making power of the majority. In this context, there are two main instruments prepared by the legislature to defend the position of minority shareholders: the first mold “precautionary” for the aware of the right to vote by the majority of the capital, and related to the discipline the advertising requirements set by the articles 2501-ter, paragraph 3, c.c. and 2502-septies, paragraph 1, c.c., and the second, however, typically corporate, relating to appeals of the resolution (i.e. council meeting) to approve the project under articles 2373 and 2391 c.c. and, after signing the Chamber of the act, action for damages pursuant to art. 2504-quater, paragraph 2, Civil Code. Moving from the observation that the range of remedies provided for company law solution may appear inattentive to the position of minority shareholders even if the merger is entirely foreign to the arrangement purposes - the doctrine is evaluated the possibility that when the merger represents the tool for implementing a mutually agreed solution of the crisis, the figure of the partners can be assimilated to that of creditors, and this, of course, to the extent in which they are involved with “compromised” by the insolvency process. Although this “retraining” seems impractical at the national level, it is evaluated (and criticized) a recent bill of the German Federal Government (Bundesregierung Gesetzentwurf), which reserves to protect the position of shareholders in insolvency remedies just by turning off - once admitted the company agreed to - those generally provided by corporate regulations. The second section examines the mode of protection of creditors who approved the agreement and, subsequently, the protection of creditors against the proposal. As for the former, rather than resorting to reconstructions of doctrine (especially the German one) aimed at reducing the decision-making power of shareholders, we face the possibility of entrusting the protection of creditors ' expectations for the coordination of the decision-making procedure provided for the company with the procedural course of the arrangement. It is clear that the danger of the creditors occurs only if the adoption of corporate resolutions required to implement the merger may be delayed until the execution phase of the agreement, thus giving to the arrangement a merely programmatic rule. And these “problems” could be avoided by starting the process at the same meeting or during the insolvency procedure, however, influencing the final outcome to the improvement of the final agreement. Turning to the ways of protecting creditors which do not contribute to the approval of the proposal, the difficult reconciliation of the rules governing the approval of a majority arrangement agreed (art. 128, paragraph 1, and 177, paragraph 1, l. fall.) and that, in terms of a merger, recognizes the individual right of creditors to oppose (art. 2503 cc), can be settled by their failure to recognize this right, entrusting the protection class of creditors only remedies provided for in the field of competition. Like bondholders, creditors bankruptcy constitute in fact a sort of “community accidental”, since they are forbidden to go it alone against the assets of an organization and is expected to group (i.e. competition) aims to resolve any conflicts of interests between the creditors themselves.

El dret concursal és la resposta legal a una realitat financera que prové de l'economia del mercat. Els negocis poden fracassar. Quan les empreses i les persones fallen a l'hora de complir amb les seves obligacions de deute i els seus actius no són suficients per cobrir els crèdits, esdevenen insolvents i fan fallida. Per tal de regular les demandes dels creditors i resoldre el dilema dels creditors com a grup, la Llei concursal es converteix en un mètode ordenat per maximitzar els actius del deutor i protegir uns grups d'interès determinats. Aquesta dissertació vol contribuir a conèixer el problema concursal. Així mateix, té l'objectiu d'identificar factors clau per mesurar l'eficiència per mitjà dels costos de transacció utilitzant-ne de directes i d'indirectes, d'ex ante i d'ex post, com també els costos d'informació, de coordinació i d'execució, i després comparar-los amb un altre sistema, en aquest cas el règim colombià, i crear una metodologia per mesurar l'eficiència.La dissertació també tracta la racionalitat. La racionalitat concursal és maximitzar el valor dels actius del deutor per tal de pagar els seus deutes. També implica mantenir en el mercat companyies viables, tenint en compte en aquest cas que el valor de l'empresa insolvent com a unitat operativa és més elevat que com a liquidada, i retirar del mercat aquells negocis que no es poden mantenir com a empreses en funcionament.L'objectiu principal de qualsevol sistema concursal és protegir el crèdit i proporcionar un fòrum per als creditors perquè coordinin accions i, d'aquesta manera, redueixin els costos de transacció. La racionalitat bàsica del sistema és que aquests acords beneficien tots els creditors i es respecten les preferències donades per llei per a uns determinats tipus de creditors.Un sistema concursal eficient evitarà l'error del tipus 1 i l'error del tipus 2, és a dir, mantenir empreses inviables o liquidar empreses viables.La dissertació tracta de l'eficiència i la racionalitat a través de mitjans empírics. S'ha fet una revisió àmplia de la bibliografia en àrees com ara el reflotament empresarial, els costos de transacció, la racionalitat limitada, la teoria de jocs i la Llei concursal, per tal de seleccionar-ne variables i formular-ne hipòtesis. La recerca inclou 15 anys d'història peruana (1992-2007) sota quatre règims concursals diferents, i utilitza metodologia qualitativa i quantitativa.En l'etapa qualitativa, es van entrevistar setanta experts. Són jugadors clau en l'àmbit acadèmic Indecopi, bancs, companyies administradores, interventors. Les entrevistes van generar vuit categories útils per comprendre per què els diferents grups d'interès es comporten tal com ho fan.Es va tenir cura a l'hora de seleccionar codis clau per tal de provar-los posteriorment en l'etapa quantitativa.Les entrevistes semiestructurades als experts proporcionen un marc conceptual per comprendre la conducta que correspon a indústries regulades com ara la banca. Per tal de provar les hipòtesis, es van estudiar 359 empreses. L'estudi inclou una extensa documentació retrospectiva en els arxius centrals d'Indecopi. La mostra es va incrementar a 3.386 empreses a efectes de la mineria de dades.Les dades de les empreses es va extreure dels expedients oficials que es guarden a Indecopi. Es va emprar SPSS per provar les hipòtesis i Clementine per a la mineria de dades. Totes les companyies es van classificar per sector econòmic, és a dir, indústries extractives o primàries (mineria, pesca, agricultura, gas i petroli), indústries secundàries/manufactureres (tèxtils, fabricants d'automòbils, acereries), comerç (botigues per departament, venda de vehicles, mercats, supermercats) i serveis (transport, serveis públics). Els resultats mostren que el sistema concursal peruà és ineficient, irracional, impredictible i inconsistent. També mostra que no hi ha una correlació positiva entre el sistema concursal i el cost del crèdit. El sistema està dissenyat per incentivar el comportament estratègic dels creditors privilegiats.L'estudi mostra que la decisió final de liquidar o salvar una empresa depèn del sector econòmic i no de la viabilitat de l'empresa, més en línia amb els interessos dels creditors específics.L'etapa final de l'estudi proporciona unes premisses empresarials útils per als propietaris i els gerents de les petites i les mitjanes empreses respecte dels seus creditors. L'estudi limita la racionalitat al marc del dret econòmic que es va utilitzar per privatitzar el procés concursal al Perú, limitant l'acció i l'abast d'Indecopi.L'estudi subratlla la necessitat de coordinar les diferents regulacions legals que afecten els grups d'interès, principalment els bancs, que actuen més en resposta als accionistes i als dipositants. Si tenim en compte que tots els comportaments són el resultat d'una anàlisi cost-benefici, la manca d'un superprivilegi per al deute postconcursal, el craw down i altres mesures de reconstitució de capital de treball implicaran més liquidacions. Es proposen un conjunt de normes legislatives amb una anàlisi cost-benefici, entre les quals hi ha la reducció del percentatge del quòrum per reestructurar la firma i modificar l'ordre de prelació, derogar la liquidació automàtica per situació de balanç, crear la figura jurídica del promotor i permetre la difusió del procediment mitjançant una pàgina web. Pel que fa als procediments:Atorgar competències i facultats a les sales superiors comercials en els procediments concursals.Quant a la Superintendència de la Banca i les Assegurances, rebaixar el nivell de provisió bancària quan els crèdits reestructurats es considerin en la categoria normal. Proposar canvis en el reglament de valors d'empreses en concurs, privilegiant la negociabilitat lliure d'aquests crèdits, amb la finalitat de donar suport a les empreses viables i crear un fons de reactivació econòmica per incentivar el refinançament.Aquest estudi és útil per formular polítiques governamentals i també per a les polítiques d'empreses amb dificultats.L'ús indirecte de les mesures de recuperació i el gran nombre d'empreses amb dades incompletes són les limitacions d'aquest estudi. Les línies futures de recerca han d'abastar estudis comparatius en altres latituds sud-americanes utilitzant sistemes judicials i administratius, i després comparar països desenvolupats i no desenvolupats fent servir les mateixes variables i els mètodes per provar la metodologia. / El derecho concursal es la respuesta legal a una realidad financiera que proviene de la economía del mercado. Los negocios pueden fracasar. Cuando las compañías y personas fallan en el cumplimiento de sus obligaciones de deuda y sus activos no son suficientes para cubrir sus créditos caen en insolvencia y quiebran. Para regular las demandas de los acreedores y resolver el dilema de los acreedores como grupo la Ley concursal se convierte en un método ordenado para maximizar los activos del deudor y proteger a determinados grupos de interés. El propósito de esta disertación ha sido la de contribuir al conocimiento del problema concursal. Su objetivo es identificar factores claves para medir la eficiencia a través de los costos de transacción utilizando directos e indirectos, ex ante y ex post, a si como los costos de información, coordinación y ejecución y luego comparar estos contra otro sistema en este caso el Régimen colombiano, creando una metodología para medir la eficiencia.La disertación también cubre racionalidad. La racionalidad concursal es maximizar el valor de los activos del deudor a fin de pagar sus deudas. Es también mantener en el mercado compañías viables considerando en este caso que el valor de la empresa insolvente como una unidad operativa vale más que liquidada y retirar del mercado aquellos negocios que no pueden mantenerse como empresas en marcha. El principal propósito de cualquier sistema concursal es proteger el crédito y proveer un foro para los acreedores a fin que coordinen acciones y de este modo reduzcan costos de transacción. La racionalidad básica del sistema es que estos acuerdos benefician a todos los acreedores y se respeten las preferencias dadas por ley para ciertas clases de acreedores. Un sistema concursal eficiente evitará el error tipo 1 y el error tipo 2, es decir, mantener empresas inviables o liquidar empresas viables.La disertación trata sobre la eficiencia y racionalidad a través de medios empíricos. Una revisión extensa de la literatura se llevo a cabo en áreas como reflotamiento empresarial, costos de transacción, racionalidad limitada, teoría de juegos y Ley concursal a fin de seleccionar variables y formular hipótesis.La investigación cubre 15 años (1992-2007) de historia peruana bajo cuatro diferentes regímenes concursales, utilizando metodología cualitativa y cuantitativa.En la etapa cualitativa se entrevisto a 70 expertos. Ellos son jugadores claves en el mundo académico Indecopi, bancos, compañías administradoras, interventores, las entrevistas generaron ocho categorías útiles para comprender porque los diferentes grupos de interés se comportan como lo hacen. Se tuvo cuidado en seleccionar códigos claves para luego probar estos en la etapa cuantitativa.Las entrevistas semiestructuradas a los expertos proveen un marco conceptual para comprender la conducta que corresponde a industrias reguladas como la banca. A fin de probar las hipótesis se estudiaron 359 compañías. El estudio cubre una extensa documentación retrospectiva en los archivos centrales del Indecopi. La muestra fue incrementada a 3 386 empresas para efectos de la minería datos. La data de las empresas se tomo de los expedientes oficiales que se guardan en Indecopi. SPSS se utilizo para probar las hipótesis y CLEMENTINE para minería de datos. Todas las compañías fueron clasificadas por sector económico es decir, industrias extractivas o primarias (minería, pesquería, agricultura, gas y petróleo) industrias secundarias - manufactureras (textileras, fabricantes de autos, acerías) comercio (tiendas por departamento, venta de carros, mercados, supermercados) servicios (transporte, servicios públicos) los resultados muestran que el sistema concursal peruano es ineficiente, irracional, impredecible e inconsistente. También muestra que no existe correlación positiva entre el sistema concursal y el costo del crédito. El sistema esta diseñado para incentivar el comportamiento estratégico de acreedores privilegiados.El estudio muestra que la decisión final de liquidar o salvar una compañía depende del sector económico y no de la viabilidad de la empresa, más en línea con los intereses de acreedores específicos.La etapa final del estudio proporciona premisas empresariales útiles para los dueños y gerentes de pequeñas y medianas empresas frente a sus acreedores. El estudio trae la racionalidad limitada al marco del derecho económico que fue utilizado para privatizar el proceso concursal en el Perú limitando la acción y alcance de Indecopi.El estudio remarca la necesidad de coordinar las diferentes regulaciones legales que afectan a los grupos de interés principalmente bancos quienes actúan más en respuesta a sus accionistas y depositantes. Considerando que todo comportamiento es el resultado de un análisis costo beneficio la falta de superprivilegio para la deuda post concursal, craw down y otras medidas de reconstitución de capital de trabajo llevaran a mayores liquidaciones. Se propone un conjunto de normas legislativas con un análisis costo beneficio, entre estas reducir el porcentaje del quórum para reestructurar la firma y la modificación del orden de prelación, derogar la liquidación automática por situación de balance, crear la figura jurídica del Promotor y permitir la difusión del procedimiento vía página web.A nivel de procedimientos:Otorgar competencias y facultades a las Salas Superiores en lo Comercial en los procedimientos concursales. En lo que respecta a la Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros rebajar el nivel de provisión bancaria al considerar los créditos reestructurados en la categoría normal.Proponer cambios en el reglamento de Valores de Empresas en Concurso privilegiando la libre negociabilidad de estos créditos y con la finalidad de apoyar a empresas viables crear un Fondo de Reactivación Económica para incentivar la refinanciación.El presente estudio es útil para la formulación de políticas gubernamentales así como para las políticas de empresas en dificultades.Limitaciones de este estudio son el uso indirecto de las medidas de recuperación así como el gran número de compañías con data incompleta. Futuras líneas de investigación deben abarcar estudios comparativos en otras latitudes sudamericanas utilizando sistemas judiciales y administrativos y luego comparar países desarrollados y no desarrollados utilizando las mismas variables y métodos para probar la metodología. / Bankruptcy law is the legal response to a financial reality which arises from the market economy. Business can fail. When companies and persons fail to comply with their debt obligations and assets are not enough to cover credits they go under in insolvency. To regulate creditor's demands and solve creditor's pool dilemma bankruptcy law becomes an orderly method to maximize debtor assets and protect qualified stakeholders. The purpose of this dissertation has been to make a contribution to the knowledge of the bankruptcy problem. Its aim is to identify key factors to measure efficiency through transactional cost using direct and indirect ones, ex ante and ex post as well as information, coordination and execution ones and then compare those against another system, in this case the Colombian one, creating a methodology to measure efficiency.The dissertation also covers rationality. Bankruptcy rationality is to maximize the debtor asset value in order to pay his debts. It is also to maintain in the market viable companies considering in this case that the value of the insolvent company as an operating unit is worth more than liquidated and also to take out of the market those businesses which are not on going concerns.The main purpose of any bankruptcy system is to protect credit and provide a forum for creditors to coordinate actions and in doing so reduce transactional costs. The basic rationality of the system is that these agreements with benefits all creditors and respect preferences given by law to certain creditors classes.An efficient bankruptcy system will avoid error type one and error type two, namely, maintain unviable companies or liquidate viable companies.The dissertation addresses efficiency and rationality by empirical means. An extensive review of the literature was carried out in subjects as turnaround, transactional cost, bankruptcy legislation, bounded rationality, game theory and bankruptcy law in order to select variables and to formulate hypothesis.The research covers fifteen years (1992-2007) of Peruvian history under four different legal bankruptcy regimes, using qualitative and quantitative methodology.In the qualitative stage seventy experts were interviewed. They are key players in academics, Indecopi, banks; administrative companies, Trustees, interviews provided eight categories all useful to understand why different stake holders behave as they do.Great care was taken to select key codes to later test in quantitative stage. Semi structured interviews to experts provide a framework to understand behavior which respond to regulate industries as banking. In order to test hypothesis 359 companies were studied. The study covers an extensive retrospective documentary research in Indecopi Central Archives. The sample was increased to 3386 companies for data mining purposes.Data from companies was taken from official files kept in Indecopi. SPSS was used to test hypothesis and Clementine for data mining. All companies were classified by economic sector, namely, Primary or Extractive Industries (Mining, fishing, agriculture, oil and gas) Secondary Industries -manufacturing (textiles, car making, steel mills), Commerce (Department stores, car dealers, super markets), Services (transport, utilities).Results show that the Peruvian bankruptcy system is inefficient, irrational, unpredictable and inconsistent. It also shows no positive correlation between the bankruptcy system and credit cost. The system as designed encourage strategy behavior of privilege creditors. The study shows that final decision to liquidate or save a company depend on the economic sector and not the viability of the company, more in line with the interest of specific creditors. The final stage of the study provides useful business premises to owners and managers of small and medium size companies before creditors. The study brings bounded rationality into law and economic framework which was used to privatize the bankruptcy process in Peru limiting Indecopi actions and scope.The study point out the need to coordinate different legal regulations affecting stakeholders, mainly banks which act more in response to shareholders and savers. Considering that all behavior is the result of cost and benefit analysis lack of super privilege for post bankruptcy debt, cram down and others measures to reinstate working capital will lead to increase liquidations.The study presents a group legislative proposals based on the empirical findings of the present research, proposals which are formulated with a cost - benefit analysis.Among others the reduction of the voting percentage needed to restructuring a company.The change of the preference order of certain credits, the abrogation of the automatic business liquidation in regard of balance sheet situation.The creation of the promoter figure and the diffusion of the procedure through web pages.With regard to competences award the Commercial Superior Courts the power to act in bankruptcy procedures. With regard to the SBS to reduce banking provisions considering restructured credits as normal ones.The study also proposes changes in the regulation of bankruptcy company credits, giving priority to free negotiability of these credits.Also the creation of a reactivation fund to support viable companies and to promote refinancing.The present study is usefully for government policies formulation as well as business policy for companies in distress.Limitations of this study are the indirect measure of recovering as well as the large number of companies with incomplete data. Future research should cover comparative studies in other South American latitudes using administrative and Court systems, and then compare under develop and develop countries using same variables and methods in order to test methodology.

The purpose of this thesis is the analysis of the anticipated agreement proposal, in its substantive and procedural aspects, through its consistency with the purposes assigned. It is an institution without precedents in the Spanish Bankruptcy Law, which has unique characteristics that distinguish it from the ordinary agreement proposal and that serve to achieve specific purposes, designed to configure a less costly and time-consuming procedure and ultimately contribute to maximize the satisfaction of the creditors of the debtor with financial difficulties. The originality of the anticipated agreement proposal lies in its processing, in which activities that traditionally take place during the bankruptcy procedure, such as negotiations between the debtor and its creditors, held outside of it, achieving this way less judicial intervention until the confirmation of the agreement by the court and therefore achieving a less expensive procedure. / L’objecte d’aquesta tesi doctoral és l’anàlisi del règim jurídic de la proposta anticipada de conveni, en la seva vessant substantiva i processal, a través de la consistència d’aquest règim amb les finalitats que el legislador li atribueix. Es tracta d’un instrument sense precedents en el Dret concursal anterior a la reforma operada per la Llei 22/2003, de 9 de juliol, Concursal, que presenta unes característiques pròpies que la distingeixen de la proposta ordinària i que serveixen per aconseguir una sèrie de finalitats específiques, tendents a configurar un procediment concursal poc costós i àgil i en última instància a contribuir a maximitzar la satisfacció dels creditors del deutor insolvent. L’originalitat de la proposta anticipada de conveni radica en una tramitació en què actuacions que tradicionalment tenen lloc durant el concurs es celebren fora del mateix, assolint-se d’aquesta manera un concurs més desjudicialitzat i en conseqüència menys costós.

Problem: Konkurser drar med sig höga kostnader på olika sätt, och genom åren har många försök gjorts att finna modeller som kan förutse konkurser och därigenom undvika dem. Några av de mest beprövade modellerna är Altmans olika Z-scoremodeller, som genom åren visat olika resultat. Allt fler företag blir också verksamma inom tjänstesektorn, och forskningen menar att dessa företag skiljer sig från tillverkande företag när det gäller dess nyckeltal, vilket alltså borde påverka möjligheterna att förutse konkurser enligt de modeller som idag finns. Syfte: Kontrollera huruvida Altmans Z´´-scoremodell fungerar på små- och medelstora tjänsteföretag i Sverige, men även om korrelation mellan ett företags kreditbetyg och dess Z´´-score föreligger. Metod: Uppsatsen är skriven utifrån ett positivistiskt synsätt med deduktiv ansats, och bygger på kvantitativ sekundärdata. Analyser görs genom hypotesprövning. Slutsats: Altmans Z´´-scoremodell fungerar dåligt på tjänsteföretag inom segmentet små- och medelstora företag i Sverige. Resultatet blir detsamma, även om modellen tillämpas på    tillverkande företag och handelsföretag. Däremot går det se skillnad på nyckeltal i företag försatta i konkurs och friska företag, bland annat genom att konkursföretag har sämre lönsamhet, balanslikviditet och skuldsättningsgrad. Fortsatt forskning: Forskningen går isär när det gäller möjligheterna att förutse konkurser, och det finns fortfarande många aspekter att pröva. Förslag på fortsatt forskning är därför att undersöka hur nyckeltalen verkligen skiljer sig åt, och om det därigenom är möjligt att undvika konkurser. Ytterligare alternativ kan vara att undersöka variablerna i Z´´-scoremodellen, och eventuellt justera dessa för bättre utfall. / Problem: Bankruptcy is associated with a high cost in different ways, and over the years, many attempts have been made to find models that can predict failures and thru that avoid them. Some of the most proven models are Altmans Z-score in various forms, which over the years have shown different results. More and more companies work with services, and research says that these companies differ from manufacturing companies when it comes to its economic ratios, which should affect the possibilities in predicting bankruptcy according to today available models. Purpose: Check whether the Altman Z´´-score model works on small- and medium-sized services companies in Sweden, but also check if correlation exist between a company's credit rating and its Z´´-score. Method: The thesis is written with a positivist and deductive approach, based on quantitative secondary data. Analyses are made by hypothesis testing. Conclusion: Altman's Z´´-score does not work on small- and medium-sized service companies in Sweden. The result is the same, even if the model is applied to manufacturing and trading companies. However, it is possible to see differences between bankrupt companies and healthy companies. Some ratios that show differences are profitability, balance sheet liquidity and leverage, which all are lower in bankrupt companies. Continued research: Researchers are divided when it comes to the possibilities to predict bankruptcy, and there are still many aspects to consider. Suggestions for continued researchis to examine how ratios really differ, and if it is thru that is possible to avoid bankruptcy. Another angle might be to examine the variables of the Z´´-score-model, and maybe adjust them for more accurate result.

Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

Dopo una delle peggiori crisi economica e finanziaria mondiale , gli studi sulla previsione delle insolvenze sono diventato uno degli argomenti più dibattuti tra gli studiosi e ricercatori. Al fine di soddisfare le esigenze sia di valutazione interna sia degli investitori professionali , lo studio riscopre il modello "Z - score" di Altman nella sua forma originale , nota per la sua semplicità. Il modello, ancora largamente utilizzato nei mercati statunitensi, è per sua natura poco utilizzato nell’analisi di società europee. La tesi analizza e descrive le caratteristiche dello Z -score, valutandone i risultati come strumento per la previsione di insolvenza nel mercato europeo. Lo studio è condotto su 568 società , prese dagli indici azionari di 7 mercati europei , tra il 2000 e il 2010 . I risultati del test evidenziano una grande variabilità di risultato tra i diversi settori industriali. Il modello risulta semplice ed efficace, ma sostanzialmente incapace di prevedere il rischio di default in Europa, se utilizzato nella sua forma originale . La seconda parte della ricerca studia pertanto come i risultati del modello possano essere valutati da una nuova prospettiva per i mercati europei, concentrandosi su singoli settori industriali. Lo Z score viene testato su un campione di imprese in buona salute ed un altro di aziende insolventi, per 3 gruppi industriali diversi. La ricerca cerca anche di valutare elementi qualitativi accanto a quelli quantitativi, al fine di analizzare in maniera completa il rischio di insolvenza. / After one of the worst world economic and financial crisis, the insolvency prediction has become one of the most debatable topics among scholars. In order to satisfy both the professional investors’ needs and the internal evaluation process, the Thesis rediscovers the original Altman “Z-score” model, known for its convenience. This model is still largely used in the US equity markets but, also for its origin, has hardly been applied to the European equity index. The Thesis investigates and describes the operating characteristics of Altman’s Z-score, evaluating its performance as a tool for insolvency prediction in today's European market. The base model capability is tested examining 568 companies, listed in the main stock indexes of 7 European markets, between 2000 and 2010. A large variability among different industries arises from the analysis conducted. The Thesis results prove that the model is user-friendly but a substantial inability to predict the risk of default in Europe if used in its original form. The second research question try to analyse how could the model be useful for the European markets, testing the Z score over good heath and insolvent firms from 3 industrial groups. The research studies how the model’s results could be evaluated from a new perspective, focusing on individual industrial sectors results. The research also tries to evaluate qualitative elements alongside the quantitative ones, in order to give a harmonized and comprehensive estimation of the insolvency risk.

自1980年代各國推行金融自由化後，為穩定金融秩序，建立風險導向金融監理制度更顯重要。一般來說，金融監理工具可分為實地檢查及場外監控兩種，過去以行業別進行之監理，在金融控股公司的發展下，亦發展出對應之監控機制，然而僅止於實地檢查機制，以金融集團為預警對象之場外監控預警系統仍有待建立。 本研究遂在探討如何建立適合我國之以金融集團為預警對象的場外監控預警系統，挑選2003、2004年兩年之本國銀行、票券、證券、壽險、產險公司財務業務比率為樣本，以區別分析法建立預警模型，再以各金融控股公司之子產業公司結果建立各年度金融控股公司之預警模型。 本研究僅嘗試以財務比率建立量化場外監控預警模型，研究結果僅供學術上研究參考，並非運用於真實狀況之評斷，因此，依研究結果提出之結論及建議，僅供參考。此外，(1)模型並未加入質化指標，(2)資料有限的情況下，亦無做樣本外測試，(3)無實際破產金融機構資料，僅能以模擬方法分類，皆是本研究不足之處，仍須修正及改進。

Les risques systémiques des défaillances financières des établissements bancaires bouleversent les limites de compétence des législations nationales. De très grandes disparités entre les systèmes sont de nature à perturber les marchés, nationaux et internationaux, en raison de la spécificité de l’activité bancaire qui est de servir l’intérêt général. Toutefois, les grands systèmes normatifs qu’ils soient chinois, européens ou des Etats-Unis, révèlent des convergences d’ensemble pour prévenir ou résoudre les risques de défaillance des établissements bancaires, au sein d’une « lex argentariae » d’un milieu professionnel homogène. Une analyse comparée de ces législations qui privilégient l’intervention d’autorités administratives montre clairement la prise en considération des nécessités économiques et financières, alors que le juge judiciaire même subsidiairement imposera des solutions ayant autorité erga omnes et conservera ses missions essentielles notamment de protection des droits et des libertés individuels. L’analogie des solutions pose alors une question essentielle, celle de la coordination internationale des interventions administratives et judiciaires, afin de surmonter l’utopie d’une législation mondiale unifiée. Ces réflexions sont confirmées par l'évolution de l'Union bancaire européenne et de l'activité des banques chinoises à l'international. / The systemic risk of the financial failure of the banking institutions has overturned profoundly the limits of the competence of the national legislations. Though the banking activities have the characteristics that serve the general interest, the great disparity between those jurisdictions creates the instability of the national and international markets. However, the major jurisdictions whichever the Europe, the UnitedStates or the China, have revealed overall convergence in preventing or resolving the risk of the bank failure, in a “lex argentariae” of a group of professionals that are homogeneous. The comparative analysis of those legislations that prevails the intervention of the administrative authority has clearly indicated the economic and financial needs, while the judges on bench, though of being subsidiary, continue to impose the solutions that has the authority erga omnes, and maintain their core functions, particularly the protection of the individual rights and freedoms. In order to surmount the utopia of a unified international legislation, the analogy of the solution has raised another important question, which is, the global coordination of the administrative and judicial intervention. These thoughts are confirmed by the evolution of the European Banking Union and of the activities of Chinese banks abroad.

L’ordre public est un concept fuyant. Dans les ordres juridiques nationaux comme dans l’ordre juridique européen, il renvoie à des réalités diverses. Pourtant, il s’agit d’un concept nécessaire. Il est en effet irréductible aux concepts qui lui sont proches : l’indisponibilité, l’illicéité et l’impérativité. Malgré la difficulté que présente sa définition, il peut être identifié dans sa singularité. Des critères d’identification tels que le libellé de la règle et sa sanction sont généralement retenus. Ils sont cependant insuffisants et peuvent être utilement complétés par la détermination de l’intérêt protégé, la prise en compte de la valeur en cause et la contextualisation de la règle. Le concept d’ordre public ainsi délimité présente des atouts indéniables dans une perspective comparatiste ayant pour objet les ordres juridiques nationaux de l’Union européenne. Il est une notion nécessaire à l’harmonisation du droit en général et à celle du droit commercial en particulier. Dès lors, il convient de penser l’harmonisation du droit commercial en fonction des règles d’ordre public. Ces dernières apparaissent comme un élément d’explication des échecs passés. Que les obstacles à l’harmonisation aient été liés à un « ordre public de structure » ou à un « ordre public de fonctionnement », ils peuvent s’expliquer par la diversité des règles d’ordre public. Toutefois, plus qu’un obstacle, les règles d’ordre public constituent un élément d’union entre les différents droits nationaux. La protection de certaines catégories de sujets, la lutte contre l’abus et la fraude, sont en effet des objectifs communs qui trouvent leur meilleure traduction dans des règles d’ordre public. / Public order is an evasive concept. In domestic legal systems as well as in the European legal system, it conveys diverse meanings. Nevertheless, it is a necessary concept. It is indeed irreducible to other similar concepts: unavailability, illegality and mandatory rules. Although it is hard to define, the concept of public order can be identified thanks to its singularity. Identification criteria such as the wording of the rule and its sanction are generally retained. They are however insufficient and can be usefully completed with the determination of the interest of the rule, the taking into account of its value and the putting of the rule into its context. Thus, the scope of public order being defined, this concept has undeniable advantages from a comparative viewpoint, which subject matter is the domestic legal systems of the European Union. It is a necessary notion for the harmonisation of law in general, and of commercial law in particular. Indeed, the harmonisation of commercial law has to abide by the rules of public order. These rules appear then as an element of explanation for past failures. Whether the obstacles to the harmonisation have been linked to a “structural public order” or to a “functional public order”, these obstacles can be explained by the diversity of the rules of public order. However more than an obstacle, the rules of public order constitute an element of union between the various domestic laws. The protection of some categories of individuals, the war against abuse and fraud, are indeed common goals that are better translated into rules of public order.

Motivated by the importance of the risk of bankruptcy in capital structure decisions, this study aims to establish the insolvency risk firm in accordance to the life cycle stages and determine how the stages can explain the change insolvency´s risk. The population under study is companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Buenos Aires, in the period 2004 to 2012. The evidence shows linking life cycle stages with the insolvency´s risk. The firms in the stage maturity have lower risk, relative to the other stages. Moreover, the life cycle stages have a predictive capacity on changing the insolvency´s risk in the next year, the maturity stage has a positive effect and the decline stage a negative effect. The firms that are maintained in the mature stage have a greater opportunity to stay in this stage and firms in growth stages and shake-out have a greater possibility to enter the introduction and decline stages that in the maturity stage. / Motivado por la importancia del riesgo de insolvencia financiera en las decisiones de financiación, este estudio tiene como objetivo establecer el riesgo de crisis financiera en las empresas de acuerdo a las etapas del ciclo de vida y cómo las etapas del ciclo de vida explican el cambio en el riesgo de insolvencia. La población objeto de este estudio son las empresas listadas en la Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires en el período 2004 a 2012. La evidencia muestra la vinculación de las etapas del ciclo de vida con el riesgo de insolvencia, marco en el que las empresas en la etapa de madurez tienen un menor riesgo en relación con las otras etapas. Por otra parte, las etapas del ciclo de vida tienen una capacidad predictiva sobre el cambio del riesgo de insolvencia en el año siguiente: la etapa de madurez tiene un efecto positivo; y la etapa de declinación, un efecto negativo. Las empresas que se mantienen en la etapa de madurez tienen una mayor posibilidad de mantenerse en dicha etapa y las empresas en las etapas de crecimiento, y reestructuración (shake-out) tienen una mayor posibilidad de entrar en las etapas de introducción y declinación que en la etapa de madurez. / Motivado pela importância do risco de insolvência financeira em decisões de financiamento, este estudo pretende estabelecer o risco de crise financeira nas empresas de acordo com as etapas do ciclo de vida e como as etapas do ciclo de vida explicam a mudança em o risco de insolvência. A população que é objeto deste estudo são as empresas listadas na Bolsa de Valores de Buenos Aires, de 2004 a 2012. A evidência mostra o vínculo entre as estágio etapas do ciclo de vida eo risco de insolvência, onde as empresas no estágio de maturidade têm um risco menor, em relação aos outros estágios. Por outro lado, os estágios do ciclo de vida têm uma habilidade preditiva sobre a mudança no risco de insolvência no ano seguinte, o estágio de maturidade tem um efeito positivo e o estágio decrescente tem um efeito negativo. As empresas que permanecem no estágio de maturidade têm maior chance de se manter nesse estágio e as empresas nos estágios de crescimento e reestruturação têm maior possibilidade de entrar nas etapas de introdução e declínio do que na fase de maturidade.