The purpose of this reserch is to understand the Kuomintang had been through repeatedly long-term being in power in Taiwan since 1949. Nevertheless, it degenerated into the opposition party in 2000 and suffers from losing two presidential elections. After such defeated impacts, its policy and politics have been changed. The thesis discussing the Kuomintang's system and its reforming related variables are used in historical research way and historical methodology and the literature analytic method. The historical methodology is used in the material collection, analyzing the Kuomintang's political programs, in power in 1949 and its vicissitude and the practice situation in 2000. The framework that the literature analytic method used is to analyze the Kuomintang's reformation on the principle and the present system. This research focuses on Kuomintang's principles¡Bpolitical programs' changes¡Bthe Kuomintang's in ruling the influence since May 20 2000, and the comparison between domestic and the international circumstances, impacting on the vicissitude of Kuomintang. The research discovered that, the Kuomintang's policy changes its main axle along with different time, different leader, different space background, and with different definition of " One China". Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Jing-Guo persisted in "Resist Communist party in One China", namely opposed the Communist Party to be the "One China", and insisted on "One China" is the Republic of China. However, in the Chiang Jing-Guo old age, he began to launch the democratic reform. When the democratic reform started and shook "One China"'s framework and rationality. The Lee Teng-Hui time, followed Chiang Jing-Guo's democratic reform and completed the reformation, for impelling the democracy, he had no choice but to revise "One China" the framework. Thus, no longer regards the Communist Party in China as the rebellion association, the national localization also from "One China"¡B"One China, self representation"¡B"Republic of China in Taiwan" transformed into "the special nation and nation's relationship". After Lien Chan had taken over the party president, he lost two times of presidential election. Recently, he launched "the third Kuomintang and Communist Party Commercial Conference". In short, Kuomintang's political policy "One China" the political view, has often been changed along with time's vicissitude and the external factors' pressure.

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Chez les eucaryotes, l’expression des gènes dépend en partie du degré de compaction de la chromatine. La structure chromatinienne est régulée par des marques dites épigénétiques,telles que les modifications post-traductionnelles des protéines structurelles de la chromatine, les histones. Ainsi, la méthylation de la lysine 9 de l’histone H3 (H3K9) sur le promoteur des gènes est essentiellement associée à la répression de la transcription. H3K9 est méthylée par différentes enzymes appelées lysine méthyltransférases (KMTs). L’objectif principal de mon projet de thèse a été de mieux comprendre le rôle de principales KMTs de H3K9, que sontG9a, GLP, Suv39h1 et SETDB1, dans la régulation de l’équilibre entre prolifération et différenciation terminale. Pour cela, j’ai utilisé le modèle de différenciation terminale de cellules du muscle squelettique. En effet, durant la différenciation terminale, les myoblastes arrêtent de proliférer et fusionnent entre eux pour former de longues cellules multi nucléées que sont les myotubes. Ce processus implique, d’une part, l’expression des gènes de différenciation musculaire et, d’autre part, la répression irréversible des gènes associés à la prolifération cellulaire. L’introduction bibliographique de ce travail de thèse est séparée en trois chapitres. Le premier chapitre porte sur la chromatine et ses modifications post-traductionnelles. Le second s’attache à décrire les rôles de la méthylation de H3K9 et, en particulier, des quatre KMTs sur lesquelles j’ai travaillé durant ma thèse : G9a, GLP, SETDB1 et Suv39h1. Dans le troisième chapitre, je présente le modèle de la différenciation terminale du muscle squelettique. Dans la partie "Résultats", je décris deux des principales études que j’ai menées durant ma thèse. La première porte sur les rôles antagonistes de G9a et GLP. La seconde porte sur le rôle de SETDB1 durant la différenciation musculaire. Les résultats que j’ai obtenus sont discutés dans cette partie. Je conclus ce manuscrit en discutant mes résultats de manière plus générale et en proposant des perspectives à long terme. Enfin, une annexe présentera les autres articles de recherche auxquels j’ai participé pendant ma thèse. / In eukaryotes, gene expression partly relies on chromatin compaction degree. Chromatin status is controlled by epigenetic marks, such as histones (chromatin structural proteins) posttranslational modifications. As an example, histone H3 lysine 9 (H3K9) methylation on gene promoters is mainly associated with transcriptional repression. H3K9 is methylated by several enzymes called lysine methyltransferases (KMTs). The aim of my thesis project was to understand the role of the H3K9 KMTs, G9a, GLP, Suv39h1 and SETDB1 in regulating the balance between proliferation and terminal differentiation. For this purpose, I used skeletal muscle terminal differentiation as model. Upon muscle terminal differentiation, myoblasts exit, in an irreversible way, from the cell cycle and under go differentiation where cells fusion and form myotubes. During this process, cell cycle genes are permanently silenced and muscle specific genes are activated. Thesis introduction is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on chromatin and post-translational modifications. The second chapter describes H3K9 methylation characteristics and the role of the four KMTs that I studied during my thesis project: G9a,GLP, Suv39h1 and SETDB1. In the third chapter, the skeletal muscle terminal differentiation model is described in details. Results section reports my two major studies outcomes and their discussion. The first concerns the antagonistic roles of G9a and GLP regarding the muscle terminal differentiation and the second focuses on the role of SETDB1 during muscle differentiation. Finally, I conclude this manuscript by a plainer discussion followed by long term perspectives and an appendix presents other research articles, in which I collaborated during my PhD.

於1980年代的後半幾年中國大陸對台灣的選舉影響開始演變。中國仍然秉持一個中國的原則，而且中國為了統一台灣不排除使用軍力。但是中國這幾年開始用跟之前不同的手段影響台灣的選舉。中國最近開始用經濟發展與自由貿易來試圖影響台灣的選舉。反過來說台灣的兩個政黨對中共的新手段亦有不同的立場。藍影認為中國對台灣來說是個機會，綠影則認為中國對台灣的民主是一個威脅。 / Beginning with Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s China’s influence over Taiwan has begun to evolve. China, although still maintaining the right to use military force, has transition to a more economic way of dealing with Taiwan. China attempts to influence Taiwanese voting behavior by offering economic incentives for closer relations with the Mainland. This change has resulted in both of Taiwan’s main political parties evolving their positions on China. The Kuomintang (KMT) views China as an opportunity and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views China as a threat. Keywords: China, Taiwan, Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

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本文的研究主旨在於探討，威權轉型期我國獨立選民的一些特性。就獨立選民的淵源來說，獨立選民是美國政治文化下的特有產物，並且被賦於理想的公民、優秀的公民及理想的民主人等稱號。然而，美國的獨立選民是否如規範論所言，是一理想公民呢？而更重要的是，我國獨立選民的情形是如何呢？這是本文所要探討的主要研究課題。 　　透過此一研究焦點，本文的研究架構如下： 　　第一章：導論的部份，旨在說明研究問題與動機，以及本文所使用選舉調查資料的來源（政大選舉研究中心，民國七十八年三項公職人員選舉），並對這些資料進行檢定。 　　第二章：獨立選民的意義及測量。這一章，首先探討的是獨立選民的意義，其次是探究獨立選民的測量法或研究法，再次是討論與獨立選民息息相關的政黨認同，以及政黨認同所引起的一些問題。最後，我們將對政黨認同、獨立選民在我國的適用性提出討論，並說明本文政黨認同和獨立選民的測量方式。 　　第三章：我國獨立選民的組成及其社會背景分析。這一章，我們將先討論我國政黨認同的分佈以及穩定性，並與其他民主國家做一比較。而此章的第二部份，主要在探討獨立選民的社會背景，而這些社會背景包括有教育、省籍、職業、年齡、主觀社會階層和性別。獨立選民的社會背景分析，除了單一變項的分析外，我們亦以多變項再做深入的探討。 　　第四章：獨立選民的政治涉入。如前述所言，假如獨立選民是一理想公民，則他們的政治涉入應是高的。本章旨在分析我國獨立選民是否比一般選民（政黨認同者）為高，或是如政黨認同理論所說，獨立選民的政治涉入是所有選民中最低者。 　　第五章：獨立選民的政治態度。本章旨在討論獨立選民的政治態度是否比政黨認同者還中立，或者從另外一個角度來說，是否比政黨認同者少有黨派色彩呢？抑或他們對政治態度的反應，是呈現另外一種風貌？假如，獨立選民是一理想公民，則他們的政治態度應是中立或是少黨派的，並且能積極地將他們的態度表現出來。 　　第六章：結論部份。本文的結論，分為二個部份。在第一部份中，我們將對前述的研究做一總結，並據此對我國獨立選民的特性做一簡單的描述。此外，由於本文所用的調查資料距今已有五年了，而我國的政治（政黨）在這其間經歷了相當大的變化，因此本文的最後將討論七十八年後獨立選民的新發展，並論及獨立選民與「新黨」的關係和可能的發展。

The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system was mainly used for Taiwan¡¦s electoral system after several reforms. However, most democratic countries already don¡¦t adopt any more the SNTV system which is not appropriate. In order to combat the abuses in electoral system and implement democracy, the single-member district and two-vote system is definitely needed. By using this system, the voters can elect the capable People¡¦s Representatives and the parliamentary quality and efficiency will be enhanced. Taiwan started to use this single-member district and two-vote system from the 7th Legislative Yuan Election. In this study, we¡¦ll observe how the legislative seats of the Kuomintang (KMT) Party have been changed in Ping-tung County. The electoral reform usually affects the results. Therefore, the KMT Party desired to extend their territory by this reform and used different strategies for the three political districts respectively: non-nomination, negotiation and recruitment. In Ping-tung County, the KMT Party¡¦s territory has been always inferior to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)¡¦s. In the past, the KMT Party was just one third of the seats of the DPP in the Legislative Yuan Election. Consequently, the KMT Party expected to break through the awkward situation after the 7th Legislative Yuan Election. Nevertheless, the KMT didn¡¦t succeed. Thus it is evident that if the KMT Party longs for victory, they will not only rely on the reform of electoral system, but also need to improve themselves in many perspectives.

Since 1996, the president of Taiwan's implementation of universal suffrage since 2010 in 14 years, There have been twice to replace the regime of peace, Taiwan's policy toward mainland China in the political division of the two major political parties - the KMT and DDP and also so the identity of the ruling and opposition parties quickly converted twice. Taiwan's political environment has undergone an unprecedented rapid changes. This article by David Easton's system theory as a general theory and approaches, Looks forward to further establishing a political party as the core of the local theory, Analysis of Taiwan's political parties since 1996 in the "internal and external environment ¡÷ demand and input ¡÷ feedback and output ¡÷ re-enter to the internal and external environment" and what role in the political process? As well as how the policies of mainland China affected? ¡@This article has found, political parties in the system theory are not only pressure groups for Political authority, And active in the political system's internal, external and boundary, And can be further repression of political authority, the completion of its own expectations of mainland policy. Political parties, both ruling party or opposition parties or unified government or divided government, the political parties can control congress, congressional paralysis, cooperation with other political system, increased support by social mobilization, the creation of political controversy and use other methods to pressure on the political authority. Finally, this article believes that with the cooperation of the KMT and the China Communist Party platform, the KMT has similar status of political authority in Taiwan's policy toward mainland China.

自孫中山先生領導國民革命建立民國後，中國即入軍閥割據的局面。 北伐的成功，為中國統一與建設帶來弓一線署光，但此時內有中共叛叛， 外有日本侵略，國民黨在「攘外必先安內」的政策考量下，積極剿共，使 得中共在一九三四年放棄江西根據地向西逃竄，瀕臨被剿滅的命運。一九 三五年七月共產國際在莫斯科召開第七次代表大會，史達林有 感於德、 義、日等國對共產主義的威脅日增，及提出了統一戰線的口號，此一政策 與當時中共內求生存與發展的目標相符合，因此積極推行世所週知的「第 二次國共合作」，成立抗日民族統一戰線。經由此，中共在與國民黨邊打 邊談的過程中，逐步奪取了國民黨的政權。中共是如何在剿共後只餘一萬 多兵力擴張到能與國民黨相抗衡，進行奪取其政權，這是一個值得令人深 思的問題。對於這個問題，一般多是以中共軍事實力的擴張或其發展策略 做為討論的重點，本文主要是從國共間的談判著手，來探討當時國共兩黨 為何選擇以和平的方式作為解決雙方權力競爭的手段﹖有那些內外的因素 促使了此一歷史性的國共合作﹖雙方談判的動機為何﹖各階段談判之主要 爭議為何﹖中共力量的消長是否影響其談判方式﹖並歸納出若中共談判之 原則，最後將以國共間從一九三五年起到中共奪取政權的十五年間所締造 的許多正式與非正式的談判為綱，來探討中共如何在與國民黨談判的過程 中，逐步獲得其政權的合法性，終致成功的奪取國民黨所控制的國家機器 。

為了探討與分析長期以來存在，關於行政院高階政務官、事務官員調動的「普遍說」與「特殊說」爭議，並且探究哪些制度性、組織性因素，對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響。本研究嘗試在制度的代理人理論架構，以及相關理論預設之下，以一九八八年第一季到兩千零一十年第四季，時序橫跨李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統主政期間，包括行政院本部暨所屬三十二個部會的高階政務、事務官員，作為研究對象，進行實證的分析。 在本文的第一到第四章，我們分別說明了研究動機與背景、進行相關文獻回顧、探討研究理論，以及說明研究問題與模型。而在第五章則是分析、探討，台灣於一九九零年代初期，到一九九零年代中期，因為持續進行憲法增修條文的制訂，進而使得總統在憲法本文，以及憲法增修條文，所構成的憲政制度上，獲得了行政院高階行政官員的人事任免權。而且總統在取得了這個制度上的重要權力之後，行政院高階行政官員的任命、調動，就成為總統掌控行政體系的重要制度性工具，同時更是高階行政官員控制的重要手段。 此外，我們更進一步在第六章，分析了台灣從一九八零年代晚期，到兩千零一十年間，分別在不同階段，先後掌權的李登輝、陳水扁、馬英九等三位總統，對行政院高階行政官員，所採取以高階行政官員任命、調動，作為手段的控制模式，並且探討於第四章所提出的假設一、假設二、假設三，分別獲得實證資料支持的情況。至於第七章則是先透過總體資料的分析，探究假設四到假設十一，能否獲得實證資料的支持，同時更以部會為單位的季度別資料，建構縱橫資料的多元迴歸模型，用以分析哪些因素，對於行政院高階行政官員的更替，是有所影響的。 然而，在相關的實證分析之後，我們可以確切的認為，以往關於行政院高階行政官員控制上，所存在的「普遍說」與「特殊說」的爭論，是以普遍說可以獲得理論上，以及實證資料的支持。而就各種可能對於行政院的高階政務、事務官員更替，會有所影響的制度性、組織性因素而言，總統處在什麼樣的政治時機、面對哪些性質的部會，將會是關鍵。當總統必須更為重視行政體系的穩定，以及施政品質時，必然會選擇壓抑行政官員控制的強度。反之，當總統所面對的是，委託代理人難題疑慮的攀升，且有較大的空間容忍行政體系的不穩定時，那麼可以預期的是，大範圍、數量龐大的高階行政官員清洗，將會接踵而至。 最後，透過相關資料的分析，我們也發現了，在一次、二次政黨輪替，於西元兩千年到兩千零八年，相繼的發生，以及相應出現範圍廣泛、人數繁多，全面性高階行政官員清洗，也使台灣社會，在短期間之內，必須付出可觀的政治交易成本。這樣的情況，也使得台灣民眾的民主信念，是有所動搖，同時這也對於台灣的民主政治發展，是一個不容被忽視的隱憂。 / This reasearch offers an analysis of the long-standing discourse on transferal patterns of government officials in Taiwan, with the focus on the much-debated “general theory” vs. “special theory” approach. We will look at the systemic and organizational factors that influence the appointment, replacement, and transferal of both administrative and executive officers in the higher echelons of government. Specifically, this paper examines the time period from 1988 to 2010, employing a systematic agent framework in combination with related theoretical parameters to explore the concrete situation in the Executive Yuan and its 32 ministries, commissions, and other agencies under three consecutive administrations (i.e. presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou). In the first four chapters, we will outline background and motive of this paper, give an overview of past research on this topic, scrutinize relevant theoretical approaches, and illustrate research problems and models. In the fifth chapter, we explore and analyze the period from the early to the mid-1990s, a time that saw repeated amendments and additions to the constitution that gave the president increasingly greater powers of appointment and removal of cabinet members. These powers have become one of the most important political tools the president wields, allowing the nation’s leader to exert highly effective and immediate control over the Executive Yuan, in particular over its highest-ranking officials. In the sixth chapter, we will cover the entire period from the late 1980s to the 2010. During this time, three presidents were successively at the helm (Lee from 1988-2000, Chen from 2000-2008, Ma since 2008), and we will scrutinize the different appointment and transferal modes applied during their terms, in particular as regards their use as a tool of political control. In addition, we will further discuss the first three hypotheses initially proposed in chapter four, and show if and how they are borne out by the data and facts assembled in this research. Chapter seven contains a comprehensive analysis of the entire set of data to facilitate our discussion of hypotheses four to eleven as first proposed in chapter four, and to determine whether or not these are supported by the empirical data. At the same time, we look at the quarterly figures from Executive Yuan ministries and commissions to create a multiple regression model of the cross-section data, which will help us to analyze which specific factors influence the substitution and transferal of high-ranking officials. After a thorough analysis of the empirical data, we will find that of the two theories usually applied to the problem of systemic and political control over the higher echelons of the executive, i.e. the general and the special theory mentioned above, the general theory is in fact better supported by the relevant set of data. As for which particular systemic and organizational factors may influence the replacement or substitution of high-ranking administrative and executive cabinet members, the crucial parameters affecting this question are the larger political climate that the president faces, as well as the type and political weight of the concerned ministries and commissions. At times when administrative stability and quality are the paramount considerations, the president will necessarily deemphasize his control over the executive and refrain from making too many personnel changes, while in times of political crisis, or when there is growing concern over the competence and suitability of his entrusted agents (i.e. leading members of the Executive Yuan’s subdivisions) and thus more tolerance for change, one will almost always see large-scale cabinet reshuffles as the president attempts to flush out unfit or unwanted elements. Finally, an analysis of the overall data also shows that the two transitions of power Taiwan has seen in 2000 and 2008 respectively were—as a matter of course—accompanied by extensive personnel changes as numerous high-ranking government officials were removed from office to make place for new faces. These far-reaching waves of “political purging” and complete reorganization of the cabinet within short periods of time have come at a considerable political cost for Taiwan’s society as a whole. This has somewhat shaken the population’s faith in democracy as a political system, and here lies a significant potential concern for the future development of Taiwan’s democracy.