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11	The architect as collector: Karl Kamrath’s collection of Frank Lloyd Wright Pierce, Kathryn Alisa 2009 August 1900 (has links) Houston modern architect, Karl Kamrath (1911-1988), collected books, periodicals, and archival material that document the career and legacy of Frank Lloyd Wright. Kamrath identified himself as a collector of Wright and a devotee to the principles set forth by the master architect. In this thesis, I present Kamrath’s collection by organizing the materials by subject, considering how Kamrath marked books and journals, and drawing connections between his collecting interests and his architectural work. Kamrath collected and consumed information on Wright and organic architecture and then presented his own articulations of the principles in built form. His interest in organic architecture was evident in his projects that blended into the landscape and satisfied the individual needs of each client. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the story on Karl Kamrath, adding the details of the collection he donated to The University of Texas at Austin. / text Kamrath, Karl MacKie & Kamrath Wright, Frank Lloyd Architecture Organic architecture Collector Collecting Collection Houston, Texas Architecture, Modern-Texas Architecture-20th century-Texas Books Periodicals Archival materials
12	L'éthique et sa place dans la nature Dishaw, Samuel 09 1900 (has links) Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel. / One of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains. Non-naturalisme moral Naturalisme moral Propriétés morales Métaphysique des raisons Argument de la question ouverte G.E. Moore David Enoch Just-too-different intuition Derek Parfit Intuition normative J.L. Mackie Motivation morale Thomas Scanlon Is-ought gap Moral naturalism Moral non-naturalism Moral properties Metaphysics of reasons Open question argument Normative intuition Moral motivation Philosophy / Philosophie (UMI : 0422)
13	The Social Construction of Economic Man: The Genesis, Spread, Impact and Institutionalisation of Economic Ideas Mackinnon, Lauchlan A. K. Unknown Date (has links) The present thesis is concerned with the genesis, diffusion, impact and institutionalisation of economic ideas. Despite Keynes's oft-cited comments to the effect that 'the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood'(Keynes 1936: 383), and the highly visible impact of economic ideas (for example Keynesian economics, Monetarism, or economic ideas regarding deregulation and antitrust issues) on the economic system, economists have done little to systematically explore the spread and impact of economic ideas. In fact, with only a few notable exceptions, the majority of scholarly work concerning the spread and impact of economic ideas has been developed outside of the economics literature, for example in the political institutionalist literature in the social sciences. The present thesis addresses the current lack of attention to the spread and impact of economic ideas by economists by drawing on the political institutionalist, sociological, and psychology of creativity literatures to develop a framework in which the genesis, spread, impact and institutionalisation of economic ideas may be understood. To articulate the dissemination and impact of economic ideas within economics, I consider as a case study the evolution of economists' conception of the economic agent - "homo oeconomicus." I argue that the intellectual milieu or paradigm of economics is 'socially constructed' in a specific sense, namely: (i) economic ideas are created or modified by particular individuals; (ii) economic ideas are disseminated (iii) certain economic ideas are accepted by economists and (iv) economic ideas become institutionalised into the paradigm or milieu of economics. Economic ideas are, of course, disseminated not only within economics to fellow economists, but are also disseminated externally to economic policy makers and business leaders who can - and often do - take economic ideas into account when formulating policy and building economic institutions. Important economic institutions are thereby socially constructed, in the general sense proposed by Berger and Luckmann (1966). But how exactly do economic ideas enter into this process of social construction of economic institutions? Drawing from and building on structure/agency theory (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966; Bourdieu 1977; Bhaskar 1979/1998, 1989; Bourdieu 1990; Lawson 1997, 2003) in the wider social sciences, I provide a framework for understanding how economic ideas enter into the process of social construction of economic institutions. Finally, I take up a methodological question: if economic ideas are disseminated, and if economic ideas have a real and constitutive impact on the economic system being modelled, does 'economic science' then accurately and objectively model an independently existing economic reality, unchanged by economic theory, or does economic theory have an interdependent and 'reflexive' relationship with economic reality, as economic reality co-exists with, is shaped by, and also shapes economic theory? I argue the latter, and consider the implications for evaluating in what sense economic science is, in fact, a science in the classical sense. The thesis makes original contributions to understanding the genesis of economic ideas in the psychological creative work processes of economists; understanding the ontological location of economic ideas in the economic system; articulating the social construction of economic ideas; and highlighting the importance of the spread of economic ideas to economic practice and economic methodology. 410401 Design Theory 349901 Political Economy 370000 Studies in Human Society 340302 History of Economic Thought 349900 Other Economics 410402 Design Innovation 360201 Public Policy 360000 Policy and Political Science 380100 Psychology 360100 Political Science 360200 Policy and Administration 370101 Social Theory 370102 Social Policy and Planning 340100 Economic Theory genesis spread diffusion impact institutionalisation economic ideas idea ideation psychology of creativity Wallas Wertheimer stage model productive thinking creative creativity process economic economics sociology social methodology methodological self-altering self-fulfilling self-denying prophecy belief reflexive reflexivity institution institutionalise institutionalised social construction Berger Luckmann Bhaskar critical realism Lawson Bordieu habitus field spread impact ideation ideational structure social structure action creativity creative economists sociology philosophy of science homo economicus homo oeconomicus economic man economic agent rational economic man man lucas critique Goodhart's law Keynes Marx Mill Hayek Hicks Samuelson Walras Jevons Arrow Debreu Samuelson Merton sociology of economics sociology of scientific knowledge SSK Holton prediction control reflexive prediction reflexivity Whitley Mackie canonization Henshel Grunberg Modigliani Morgenstern Lucas Muth Simon Blyth Hall Sikkink Hira Hood institutionalize institutionalized socialise socialisation internalise internalisation internalization socialization behaviour behavior Thomas theorem expectations stage model productive thinking evolution

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