Multi-national military exercises have been recognised to have both military utility and political effects, however these mechanisms have been mainly studied from of major states. The purpose of the study is to determine what motivations Small states have to participate in multi-national military exercises and how they are used as a political tool, in order to further develop a analytical framework for analysing Small states behaviour in military exercise. The study was conducted via a single case study on Sweden through a deductive thematic analysis with themes developed on the basis of existing theory on a military exercise and Small state theory. Press releases and annual reports were scrutinised and relevant codes were identified. Results show that all themes outlined were represented in the material. What can be gathered from the investigation is how Small states highly value factors such as increasing military capacity and interoperability. The major find of the investigation was how Small states use multi-national military exercises is order to enhance deterrence, strengthen relationships, and to increase prestige and relevance, all in the pursuit of security. The investigation showed that Small states are indeed different from that of Great states in how they use multi-national military exercises. Recommendation were then made on further studies, such as quantitative or comparative efforts.

The thesis researches whether in the Visegrad Group there is growing importance and securitization of energy security and military security leading to further cooperation based on recent crises. The thesis also researches whether Russia is perceived as a threat. This is done through content analysis of national security strategies, energy security strategies and military or defence strategies, as well as discourse analysis of official statements presented by ministries and governments of the Visegrad Group states. In the text, also materials published by the Visegrad Group as a whole are analysed. The discourse analysis in case of the states is focused on moments of crises. In energy security field, three crises were chosen: gas crises of 2006 and 2009, as well as oil crisis of 2008. In the chapter about military security, two events were chosen- conflict in Georgia in 2008 and military exercises in 2009. As it is presented, cooperation in energy security is already taking place and cooperation in military affairs in form of battlegroup is planned. Especially in energy security, a link between recent crises, their securitization and cooperation might be seen based on the research.

[pt] O Exército Brasileiro publicou em maio de 2021 o Manual de Campanha de Assuntos Civis, em substituição ao Manual de Campanha de Cooperação Civil Militar (2017) e ao Manual de Assuntos de Governo (1981). Baseado na recente modificação doutrinária ocorrida através da publicação do manual em questão, este estudo tem o objetivo de analisar como se deu o processo de produção da Doutrina de Assuntos Civis do Exército Brasileiro e como ela se traduz e se desenvolve a partir de um conjunto de práticas e experiências que visa a melhor coordenação entre civis e militares em operações militares. O estudo utiliza a revisão de bibliografia especializada e a condução de entrevistas como métodos de análise qualitativa. Argumenta-se que o processo de produção da Doutrina de Assuntos Civis se baseia largamente na experiência dos militares do Exército na condução de atividades de assuntos civis em operações de paz, operações humanitárias e operações de apoio aos órgãos governamentais, na realização de experimentações doutrinárias e no contato de militares brasileiros com doutrinas estrangeiras através de cursos realizados no exterior, resultando na utilização de conhecimentos doutrinários de países parceiros e organizações internacionais. Dessa maneira, constata-se que a produção doutrinária atravessa campos de experiências que conjugam o engajamento militar externo e interno. Adicionalmente, conclui-se que o Manual de Assuntos Civis visa consolidar uma doutrina que informe mais objetivamente a missão do Exército Brasileiro na sua relação com atores civis. / [en] The Brazilian Army published the Civil Affairs Field Manual in May 2021, replacing the Civil Military Cooperation Field Manual (2017) and the Government Affairs Manual (1981). Based on the recent doctrinal modification that occurred through the publication of the referenced manual, this study aims to analyze how the process of producing the Brazilian Army s Civil Affairs doctrine took place and how it translates and develops from a set of practices and experiences aimed at improving coordination between civilians and the military in military operations. The study uses a review of specialized literature and the conduct of interviews as methods of qualitative analysis. It is argued that the process of producing civil affairs doctrine is largely based on the experience of the Army military personnel in conducting civil affairs activities in peace operations, humanitarian operations, operations supporting government agencies, in conducting doctrinal experimentation and in the contact of Brazilian military personnel with foreign doctrines through courses conducted abroad, resulting in the use of doctrinal knowledge from partner countries and international organizations. In this way, it can be argued that doctrinal production crosses fields of experiences that combine external and internal military engagement. Additionally, one can conclude that the Manual of Civil Affairs aims to consolidate a doctrine that more objectively informs the Brazilian Army s mission in its relationship with civilian actors.

冷戰時期，蘇哈托所統治的印尼雖然標榜著不結盟運動，試圖在東西兩強的夾擊下另闢蹊徑。但是在同樣反對共產主義的主張下，印尼在這段時期，和美國建立起了相當友好的關係，包括軍事和經濟上的援助。在一個近年來已解密的文件中更顯示，福特總統以及季辛吉更曾經和蘇哈托有過正式及非正式的接觸，被認為是美國希望以對印尼軍政府的支持，換取其在反共同盟上的支持。 九十年代之後，印尼政府在人權問題上的處理失當，多次導致美國政府的不滿，進而暫停或取消對印尼的援助。在此事件上，美國國會更採取強硬的立場，要求美國政府必須更仔細而審慎的評估，對印尼的人權表現，是否有明顯的改善。 2001年的九一一事件，代表著美國政府外交政策的巨大改變，在對印尼的外交政策上也出現了明顯的變化。印尼為世界上最大的回教國家，其本身對美國較溫和的立場，使得美國政府在宣揚其反恐理念上，需要印尼的協助。而印尼本身與日俱增的戰略地位，如控制麻六甲海峽，龐大資源，以及在東南亞國協中的大國地位等，使美國政府不得不重新審視其對印尼的外交政策。 本論文主要在探討布希政府在九一一事變後，對印尼外交政策的特點，以及是否和過去出現不同之處。論文組織分為三個主要部分，分別為反恐、人權以及軍事合作。在理論架構方面，本論文借助Steven M. Walt(沃爾特)的同盟理論，希望能釐清兩國在反恐合作方面，是否已具備了同盟的性質。而其他同盟理論的重要內涵，如威脅平衡、意識型態、援助、滲透等，皆會被用來加強本文的論述。 研究發現，在沃爾特的同盟理論架構下，美國和印尼在反恐合作上，的確出現了有如同盟的密切關係。雖然彼此間不存在約束的同盟條約，然而，就同盟的實質而言，恢復的軍事關係和密切的反恐合作等，皆是同盟的重要指標。研究並發現，威脅平衡理論的確較合理的詮釋了美印兩國因反恐而強化的關係。而意識型態、援助和滲透等，對同盟的組成皆有一定程度的影響，但非強大的因素。 / During the Cold War, Indonesia was noted for its leadership in the Non-Alignment Movement, which distinguished itself from the two-polar world. However, the Suharto government had in fact built an amicable relationship with the U.S. under the flag of anti-communism. In the 1990s, due to the notorious human rights records, the U.S. had moved to cancel or suspend military and economic aid to Indonesia. The Congress and Senate of the U.S. took a hard-line stance in dealing with these problems. The 9/11 event marked a significant change in the U.S. foreign policy. As the biggest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia’s comparably moderate nature gains its importance for America in promoting anti-terror in Muslim world. Also, the growing strategic status, like the location in the Malacca Straits, vast resources and key status in ASEAN, necessitates the U.S. to reconsider its policy toward Indonesia. The thesis is primarily dedicated to analyze the Bush Administration’s foreign policy toward Indonesia after the 9/11 event. There are three main pillars in the thesis—anti-terror, human rights and military cooperation. Steven M. Walt’s famous Alliance Theory contributes the analytic framework to this thesis. Also, some other arguments of alliance theory like balance of threat, ideology, foreign aid and penetration will be utilized to deepen the analysis of this thesis. Under Walt’s alliance theory, in spite of the fact that there is no concrete alliance binding between these two countries, the resumed military relationship, and close anti-terror cooperation are all noted indicators that shows the U.S. and Indonesia act as alliance partners. This thesis also demonstrates that the balance of threat theory is a better analytic framework to explain the relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia. Ideology, foreign aid and penetration in this case surely affects the formation of alliance, however, they are not causes of it as Walt concludes.

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

COMMON ENDS OR COMMON MEANS? The Cold War is over and Sweden and Finland are starting to deal with the new security enviroment that has emerged. Grand Strategy in both countries is changing to meet the new Europe and surroundings. Both Sweden and Finland consider the risk of a direct attack in the near future to be highly unlikely and this has effects on the respective countries grand strategy. A broadened approach to security is applied and the military instrument is no longer the primary concern in the strategy. Both Sweden and Finland become members of the European Union in 1995 but neither is a member of NATO, the countries both consider themselves as military non-aligned, the only two countries with a coastline to the Baltic Sea with that stance. This makes for a logic choice to cooperate for the common security and a cooperation is formed to cover security policies to be relevant in peace, crisis and war. Even though the countries are existing in and interpret the new security enviroment in similar ways they approach the challanges in differing ways. This creates the differences that we identify and describe in this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to identify and describe the differences between Sweden's and Finland's grand strategy, how this difference has changed from 1996 to 2018 and if these differences can have consequences for the cooperation between the two countries, mainly military and at the highest strategic level. The thesis is focused on the elements of the grand strategy that involves the armed forces of the respective countries. This comparative text analysis compares political policy documents within the grand strategy field from both Sweden and Finland. We will compare the period from 1996-2018. The comparison will be made by examining three occasions in the period, year 1996, Year 2004 and year 2018. The documents used have relevance against these years and are analyzed by applying Jacob Westberg's model; ends, means, ways and environment. The differences and the consequences that are the conclusions of this thesis are that cooperation are not always formed because it is the best possible option but sometimest the only possible options. Sweden and Finland's history differ in some parts and this has affected the respective country's security strategies. Finland has a history of coping for itself and has thus a national focus with focus on a stable national defense while Sweden has a history without war in modern times and a constant glance at military international engagement and the political benefits that can be achieved on the international scene.

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka den svenska utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken i skenet av ett allt mer spänt omvärldsläge. Vi vill undersöka de bakomliggande faktorerna till den svenska alliansfria hållningen i perioden 2008-2017, där Sverige ingår militära samarbeten och gör tydliga solidaritetsförklaringar men samtidigt stint håller fast vid alliansfriheten. Vilket ger två forskningsfrågor. Hur har svensk syn på militära samarbeten och allianser i utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken utvecklats i perioden 2008-2017? och Hur förklaras å ena sidan Sveriges officiella och strikta militära alliansfrihet samt å andra sidan Sveriges ökade militära samarbeten? För att finna svar på forskningsfrågorna har vi genomfört en enfallsstudie där fallet utgörs av allianspolitik och analysenheten är Sverige. Undersökning är gjord i två steg med beskrivande analys av det empiriska underlaget och en förklarande analys som är hypotesprövande. De hypoteser som prövas är två realistiska hypoteser ur teorier kring makt- och hotbalansering samt en socialpsykologisk hypotes ur teori kring perceptioner. Undersökningsmaterielat är avgränsat till utrikesdeklarationer samt debattartiklar, tal, uttalanden och pressmedelande från sittande regerings stats- utrikes- och försvarsminister i perioden 2008-2017. I undersökningen har vi kommit fram till att farhågan att tappa sin handlingsfrihet och sin oberoende röst i världen gör att Sverige gärna ingår militära samarbeten, men fortsätter kalla sig alliansfria. / The purpose of this essay is to analyze the Swedish foreign and security policy in the light of an increasingly tense regional situation. We want to analyze the underlying factors for the Swedish alliance-free stance in the period 2008-2017, where Sweden is part of military cooperation and makes clear statements of solidarity, while at the same time maintaining the freedom of alliance. Which gives two research questions. How has Swedish view of military cooperation and alliances in foreign and security policy developed in the period 2008-2017? and How is Sweden's official and strict military alliance freedom and Sweden's increased military cooperation, on the one hand, explained? To answer the research questions we have conducted a single case study where the case is alliance policy and the analysis unit is Sweden. Analysis is divided in two steps with descriptive analysis of the empirical basis and an explanatory analysis that is hypothesis testing. The hypotheses being tested are two realistic hypotheses from theories of power and threat balancing, as well as a social psychological hypothesis from the theory of perceptions. Investigation material is limited to foreign declarations, as well as debate articles, speeches, statements and press releases from the seat minister of state, foreign affairs and defense in the period 2008-2017.In the study we have come to the conclusion that daring to lose its freedom of action and its independent voice in the world makes Sweden happy to join military cooperation, but continues to call itself alliance free.

「上海合作組織」是第一個以中國城市為名的永久性政府間組織，以中文及俄文為正式語言，成員國包括中國、俄羅斯及地處中亞的哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、塔吉克、烏茲別克。而「上海合作組織」的前身是建立於1996年的「上海五國」機制，2001年中，烏茲別克加入「上海五國」機制，同年6月15日，六國元首共同發表「上海合作組織成立宣言」，宣佈在「上海五國」機制基礎上成立「上海合作組織」，當時中共藉著這個機制與俄羅斯及中亞四國開始展開邊境地區信任和裁軍的談判，而這也是「上海合作組織」軍事合作的開端。 本論文以「上海合作組織」軍事合作為研究主題，首先主要探討的目的為從「上海五國」到「上海合作組織」，其軍事合作形成的背景有那些主要因素、其演進的歷程及其內容，其次「上海合作組織」軍事合作的主要內容有那些，接著探討「上海合作組織」軍事合作發展至今，不論外部或內部有那些限制因素影響軍事合作，最後逐一分析「上海合作組織」的軍事合作對全球、區域及台海兩岸的安全情勢未來的發展。 研究發現隨著「上海合作組織」的成立，中共在中亞地區的影響力逐漸加大，中共在中亞日益提昇的力量也形成對俄羅斯的另一種挑戰。2007年6月27日「上海合作組織」六個成員國簽署「上海合作組織成員國關於舉行聯合軍事演習的協定」，使聯合軍演朝向定期化、常態化與制度的趨勢發展，而「上海合作組織」軍事合作發展至今，雖然有許多內外的限制因素，但是其範圍及影響層面卻日漸擴大，對全球、亞太地區或台海兩岸的安全情勢都產生重大的影響，不論兩岸和平談判如何發展，我們都要密切注意「上海合作組織」軍事合作對我軍事、外交等層面所造成的威脅。 / The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the first permanent inter-government organization named by one of the Chinese cities. Its official language is Chinese and Russian, and its members include China, Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan. "Shanghai Five" mechanism, established in 1996, was the forerunner of SCO. In 2001, Republic of Uzbekistan joined the "Shanghai Five" mechanism, and in the same year of June 15, the leaders of the six countries announced a joint statement－"the founding declaration of SCO", which declared SCO was established on the basis of the "Shanghai Five" mechanism . By using this mechanism, China started the negotiation, which is about a mutual trust of boarding area and disarmament issues with Russia and four center Asia countries, and this mechanism started the military cooperation in SCO. This thesis mainly focuses on the military cooperation of SCO. First, it will be discussed that the purpose of the organization from the "Shanghai Five" to SCO, including what are the primary factors of forming the military cooperation and its courses of evolution and contents. Second, we talk about what are the main contents of the military cooperation, and the SCO’s external or internal limitation which may influence the military cooperation. Finally, we analyze its future development of security situation in global, regional, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait areas step by step. The research discovered, with the foundation of SCO, that the China’s influence in center Asia is increasing, which will form another challenge to Russia. On June 27, 2007, the six members of SCO signed “an agreement of holding joint military maneuvers among SCO members” to have them held periodically, normally, and systematically. From now, although there are a lot of limitations, the influence of the military cooperation is increasing and it has played a key role in global, Asia Pacific and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait areas. No matter how the peace negotiation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait areas will go, we must keep a close eye on the fact that the military cooperation could cause Taiwan’s military and diplomacy to be under threat.

La première décennie du XXIème siècle a été particulièrement marquée par le renforcement de la présence de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) en Afrique. En effet, Pékin est devenu un important partenaire du continent dans différents domaines de coopération (économique, commercial, militaire, culturel…). C’est ainsi que l’objet de cette recherche porte essentiellement sur la dimension militaire de la présence chinoise. Celle-ci reste encore peu étudiée contrairement à celle des Etats-Unis, de la France et de l’URSS autrefois. L’étude qui convoque la pensée stratégique chinoise et les théories de relations internationales, tente de cerner les enjeux, les contours et les évolutions de la dimension militaire chinoise dans un contexte de bouleversements et de rivalités stratégiques (1960-2010). Aussi, l’étude s’intéresse aux différents choix stratégiques opérés. Cet effort de compréhension ne porte pas que sur la seule Chine, l’Afrique y est aussi pleinement prise en compte. La réflexion se prolonge avec l’analyse décisionnelle de la politique étrangère de défense, grâce notamment à une approche que nous avons qualifiée d’hybride, une combinaison du modèle rationnel et de l’approche bureaucratique de la décision. Ainsi, dans le cas chinois et africain, la décision en politique étrangère n’est pas le seul fait du Président, bien qu’il en soit un acteur prééminent. De nombreux acteurs participent à son élaboration; ceux-ci disposent de réelles capacités de l’infléchir dans un sens ou dans l’autre. / The reinforcement of China presence in Africa particularly constitutes a remarkable event during the first decade of the twenty-first century. As the matter of fact, China has become an important partner in various domains of cooperation such as trade, military, culture…This is hereby the reason why this study is essentially based on the military dimension of China presence. This aspect is barely analyzed in comparison with those of the USA, France, and the USSR in the past. The study deals with the Chinese strategic Policy and the theories of international relations. It intends to decipher what is at stake, the ins and outs of the Chinese military Policy in a context where upheavals and strategic conflicts are pregnant (1960-2010). Moreover, the study will analyze different strategic choices that have been taken so far. This effort of analysis will not only concern China, but Africa will be fully taken into account as well. The reflection will stretch onto the analysis of decisions inherent to the foreign Policy, notably thanks to an approach that can be qualified as a ‘hybrid approach’, that is, a combination of a rational pattern and the bureaucratic approach of decision. Then, in the Chinese and African cases, the decision in foreign policy is not only the prerogative of the president, although he allegedly seems to be a pre-eminent actor. A lot of actors partake in the foreign Policy elaboration; these ones have real capacities to curb it either way.