Les stéréotypes négatifs qu’émettent les Musulmans d’Orient à l’égard des Musulmans Tunisiens causent autant de souffrance aux Tunisiens d’avant la révolution et d'aujourd'hui. L’objectif de ce travail est de connaître jusqu’à quel point les jeunes tunisiens sont influencés par les méta-stéréotypes négatifs dans leurs définition de soi Musulman et comment ils réagissent au fait qu’ils appartiennent à un groupe de musulmans socialement dévalorisé. Nous travaillons sur des associations verbales et leurs valences de 208 étudiants pratiquants et non pratiquants, des deux sexes se prononçant sur l’Islam et le Musulman, d'abord en leur nom propre puis au nom du Musulman d’Orient. Dans cette perspective, quatre études comparatives inter et intra-sujets sont menées afin de repérer les prototypes du Musulman et le degré d'affirmation des jeunes interrogés de leur identité musulmane, les méta-stéréotypes du Musulman Tunisien et leur incidence sur l'identité endogroupe et les stratégies de restauration identitaire. Les résultats sont discutés en référence à la théorie du noyau, au modèle prototypique des catégories et à la fonction explicative des stéréotypes. Dans l'ensemble, ils montrent un grand décalage entre les traits prototypiques du Musulman et les traits les plus typiques du Musulman Tunisien, les jeunes définissent l'endogroupe "croyant" mais le décrivent "mécréant". Au niveau des représentations sociales de l'Islam, des biais de contraste de type faux consensus, fausse unicité et stéréotypie sont identifiés. Pour infirmer les méta-stéréotypes négatifs, les jeunes se représentent l'Islam en leur faveur. Le Musulman d'Orient est discriminé, il n'est plus un référent positif. / The negative stereotypes that the Muslim of East emit towards the Tunisian Muslims cause so much suffering to the Tunisian of front the revolution and today. The objective of this work is to know how much the young Tunisians are influenced by the meta negative stereotypes and how they react to the fact they belong a group of Muslims socially depreciated. We work on verbal associations and their valences of 208 students, practicing and non-practicing of both sexes, pronouncing at first on their proper name then in the name of the Muslim of East on the Islam and the Muslim. In this perspective, four comparative studies inter and intra-subjects are led, the spot the prototypes of the Muslim and the degree of attachment of the young to their Muslim identity, the meta-stereotypes of the Tunisian Muslim and their incidence on the identity endogroup; the cognitive and motivational strategies of identity change. The results are discussed in reference to the theory of the core, to the prototypical model of the categories and to justification function of stereotypes. So, altogether, they show a big gap between the prototypical lines of Muslim and the most typical lines of the Tunisian Muslim. the young people define their endogroup believer but describe him unbeliever. In the social representations of the Islam, biases of contrast of type false consensus, false uniqueness and stereotypy are identified to invalid meta negative stereotypes and differentiate positively and distinctively the Tunisian Islam. Muslim of East is not anymore a positive referent.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:48:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Janoi Joaquim Mamedes.pdf: 1651189 bytes, checksum: af59bda3a8a4993794c94aae88c63260 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-13 / Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie / The research approaches the Mosque of light, the physical space were gathers the beneficent society Muslim of Rio de Janeiro (SBMRJ), movement of Sunni Islam. The Work aims to identify the hatcher of SBMRJ and what contributed to the formation of their identity. Part of the historical about renaissance of Islam, the main schisms, mystique, holy book, five pillars: The testimony, daily prayers, alms, fasting during the Ramadan s month and pilgrimage to Mecca. Islam and the six faith s pillars: Faith in just one God, faith in angels, faith in holy books, faith in predestination, faith in resurrection and in dooms day. The arrival of Islam to Brazil, highlighting the African Islam that arrived with slaves brought from Africa and the Islam of immigrants originating from the Middle East. This research also approaches the Rio de Janeiro s Muslim Beneficent Society history, the Mosque abandoned of Jacarepaguá and its change to current address. Also approaches the construction of identify from groups identified like Arabs and its descendants, African, and Brazilian reversed. The dynamic of Mosque is show highlighting the main activities like prayers on Friday, department education, female department and the institution s social department. The work conducts to the following conclusion: The SBMRJ contributes to the creation of a National Islam, with a Koranic Orthodoxy and a Brazilian Orthopraxis. / A presente pesquisa aborda a Mesquita da Luz, o espaço físico onde se reúne a Sociedade Beneficente Muçulmana do Rio de Janeiro (SBMRJ) movimento do Islã Sunita. O trabalho tem como objetivo identificar o nascedouro da SBMRJ e o que contribuiu para formação de sua identidade. Parte do histórico sobre o nascimento do Islamismo, os principais cismas, a mística, o livro sagrado, os cinco pilares: O testemunho, as orações diárias, as esmolas, o jejum durante o mês de Ramadan e a peregrinação à Meca. O Islã e os seis pilares da fé: fé em um Deus único, fé nos anjos, fé nos livros sagrados, fé nos profetas e mensageiros de Deus, fé na predestinação e a fé na ressurreição e no Juízo Final. A chegada do Islã ao Brasil, destacando o Islã afro que chegou com os escravos trazidos da África e o Islã dos imigrantes originários do Oriente Médio. A presente pesquisa aborda também a história da Sociedade Beneficente Muçulmana do Rio de Janeiro, a Mesquita abandonada de Jacarepaguá e a mudança para o atual endereço. Aborda também a construção da identidade a partir de grupos identificados como árabes e descendentes, os africanos e os brasileiros revertidos. A dinâmica da mesquita é apresentada destacando as principais atividades como as orações de sexta-feira, o departamento educacional, o departamento feminino e o departamento social da instituição. Chegando a conclusão de que a SBMRJ contribui para a criação de um Islã nacional, com uma ortodoxia corânica e uma ortopraxia brasileira e carioca.

Jerusalem - the third holiest city in Islam - is home to some 300,000 Muslims. But due to Israel’s occupation, they live difficult and disrupted lives. What might it mean for Muslims to practice their faith - on the ground, day by day - in such a conflicted place? One way religion becomes a meaningful category in people’s lives is through ritual. Scholars of Muslim religious practice have been attuned to this insight and observed it in various contexts. But their analyses have often been predicated on an implicit and unquestioned assumption - that people who desire to perform rituals have the means to act on their intention in regular and routine ways. Scholars have also shown that when societies are in rapid transition - be they weakened or threatened - their rituals often evolve with them. In this project, therefore, I ask: what happens in Jerusalem when Muslims live under the existential threat of occupation and their ability to routinely perform religious rituals cannot be assumed? I argue that when rituals are disrupted, Muslims are forced to improvise. Religious rituals - like the performances of skilled jazz musicians - are spontaneous and dynamic but also practiced and deliberate. Rituals are spontaneous in that they respond to the occupation’s disruptions, making physical and discursive adjustments. They are practiced in that Muslims draw from an established repertoire of themes that includes Islam and sacred space, nationalism and resistance, local culture and geography. I term the coalescence of these dynamics the “improvisation thesis” and explore three case studies where specific improvisations have different levels of resonance. The Naqshbandi improvise rituals to make peace, but they are discordant with other established themes; Ramadan rituals have resonance that define specific moments; and the improvisations of the Murabitat are deeply resonant, influencing Muslim rituals throughout the city.

Excerpt: For a mere Muslim mortal, Allah’s granting of martyrdom (Shahada) is the pinnacle of spiritual achievement. The martyr (Shahid) is granted unique privileges among which are the right to bypass the moral interrogation meted out to determine after death whether one is spiritually fit; the complete freedom from all anguish, pain, and suffering caused by one’s wounds as one immediately traverses into the highest of seven heavens; the right to intercede and request divine favors on behalf of seventy of one’s loved one’s; the enjoyment of exclusive sexual privileges with seventy-two virgins; and finally, the right to exist within the proximity of the All Mighty Allah and an eternity spent in enjoyment of the sumptuous delights of a blessed paradise.

Depuis le début des années 1990, les gouvernements britanniques et français ont encouragé la création d’organisations musulmanes. Cependant, près de vingt ans après la création en 1997 du Conseil musulman de Grande-Bretagne (MCB) du rôle de plus proche allié musulman du gouvernement et de porte-parole des communautés, la question de la représentation musulmane n’est toujours pas réglée. En France, le parcours du Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) créé par le gouvernement en 2003 offre certains parallèles avec l’histoire du MCB: affaibli par les luttes intestines de ses membres, celui-ci a finalement échoué à réaliser l'unité organisationnelle. Dans ma thèse, je compare ces deux histoires singulières et j’étudie les facteurs qui ont entraîné le déclin de ces conseils nationaux. Je démontre en m’appuyant sur des rapports gouvernementaux, des déclarations officielles, des articles de presse et le témoignage des principaux acteurs de la création de ces organismes, qu'ils ont parfois pu jouer un rôle clé dans certaines étapes de l’histoire des mobilisations des musulmans dans les deux pays. Cependant, la légitimité des organisations cultuelles et leur capacité à répondre aux besoins des musulmans ont été remis en question dans le contexte de l’après 11 septembre 2001. Les conseils nationaux ont ainsi cédé la place à de nouveaux types de mobilisation politique. Une multitude d'organisations musulmanes « progressistes » mettant l'accent sur la cohésion sociale, le dialogue interreligieux ou la participation civique a ainsi vu le jour. Ces nouveaux acteurs locaux, en se fixant de nouveaux objectifs plus généraux et ouverts que les besoins particuliers des seuls musulmans aident à la construction de nouvelles identités musulmanes. Ils s'efforcent de transformer l'image de “communautés” repliées sur elles-mêmes en un groupe de citoyens dynamiques tournés vers les autres. / Successive British and French governments have encouraged the formation of bodies claiming to speak for Muslims since the early 1990s. However, nearly two decades after the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was created in 1997, the issue of Muslim representation is still pending. In France, the trajectory of the government-backed the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) created in 2003 is parallel in some respects: weakened by the members’ infighting, it finally failed to achieve organisational unity.In my dissertation, I draw parallels between the two cases and consider the reasons which led to the decline of these national ‘representative’ bodies. Using government reports, official statements, press articles and personal accounts of the individuals involved in their inception, I argue that they played a significant role in the early stages of Muslim mobilisation. However, once their legitimacy and ability to cater for Muslim communities in the new post-9/11 context was called into question, the national councils gave way to new types of Muslim political mobilisation.As a result, a multitude of “progressive” Muslim organisations focusing on social cohesion, interfaith outreach, civic participation and social welfare emerged. By shifting their objectives from accommodating the needs of the Muslim communities to social cohesion as a whole, these new local actors not only help build new Muslim identities but also strive to transform the image of Muslims from an inward-looking community to outward-looking dynamic citizens.

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis militent en faveur de l’intégration de la Turquie à l’UE et deviennent, sous la présidence Clinton, les plus ardents défenseurs de la cause turque, avant même Ankara. Comment expliquer ce positionnement de la superpuissance mondiale, elle qui n’appartient pourtant pas au continent européen et ne dispose pas d’un pouvoir décisionnel dans l’UE ? Cet activisme s’explique par la mutation des enjeux et des défis au XXIe siècle : résurgence éventuelle de la Russie, influence iranienne dans le monde musulman, montée de la menace djihadiste ou « choc des civilisations » prédit par Huntington. Pour y faire face, Washington regarde l’alliance de l’UE chrétienne à la Turquie musulmane comme une stratégie préventive : l’adhésion d’Ankara, outre son aspect symbolique qui permettrait de contrer la rhétorique des djihadistes tout en signalant aux musulmans vivant en Europe qu’ils ne sont pas étrangers au continent, ferait de la Turquie un modèle pour l’ensemble de son voisinage et une force de projection occidentale dans le monde musulman. L’UE, grâce à son pouvoir normatif, est indispensable à cette fin : sans elle, la démocratie ainsi que le libéralisme politique et économique pourraient-ils s’implanter en terre d’Islam ? Sans elle, la Turquie restera-t-elle un Etat laïc ancré à l’Occident ? Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 propulsent cette stratégie au sommet des priorités des administrations Bush : elle s’intègre désormais dans leur Freedom agenda. Si la survenue des printemps arabes en 2011 aurait dû rendre indispensable l’ancrage de la Turquie à l’UE afin de s’assurer qu’elle puisse influencer les événements en propageant les valeurs occidentales auprès de ces populations en quête de démocratie, l’Amérique cesse pourtant progressivement son militantisme envers une adhésion qui devient chimérique. Au lieu de souder l’alliance entre les Etats-Unis, la Turquie et l’UE, les printemps arabes auront fissuré les fondations déjà écornées de ce partenariat, si bien qu’à la fin du mandat d’Obama, la relation triangulaire est déliquescente. / In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has asserted a strong lobbying in favor of Turkey’s accession to the EU, and became the first supporter of this integration, before Ankara itself. How could we explain the US involvement since it doesn’t belong to the European continent? The new world order brought new challenges for the 21st century. Therefore, such an integration was perceived as a preventive strategy by Washington to deter upcoming threats facing the West, such as Russian resurgence, Iranian influence in the Muslim world, jihadism, or the « clash of civilizations ». Indeed, it would help bridging the growing gap between the West and the Muslim world by uniting under the same roof Christian countries within the EU, and the former Caliphate. It would also enable Turkey to be a Western projection force in its neighborhood — stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East — by becoming a model. To do so, Turkey has to become more liberal politically and economically. However, would it be possible without European prospects? From a US perspective, the normative power of the EU is necessary to see Turkey succeeding in proving that Islam, secularism and democracy are compatible and to spread Western values in its neighborhood while anchoring Ankara firmly in the West. 9/11 reinforced the significance of this strategy, which got integrated into the Freedom agenda and the global war on terror. Therefore, supporting Ankara’s accession became a top priority of Bush administrations. Barack Obama maintained this policy, even though the US lobbying slowed down, since it appeared this integration might never occur. The Arab awakening could have been the perfect occasion to bring closer together Turkey and the EU so that Ankara could become the model Arabs were calling for. However, instead of strengthening the US-Turkey-EU relations, those events damaged their alliance, which was already strained. At the end of Obama’s presidency, this triangular relation seemed on the verge to collapse.

The values and beliefs involved in Islam maintain that religion is embedded in everyday life. Students from countries which subscribe to the tenets of Islam may have a difficult time adjusting to the secular society of the U.S. This study is concerned with the interrelationships among events perceived as stressful, the ways of coping with stress that are reported as most often used, and the reported level of satisfaction with living in the U.S. for the Muslim Arab international students in this study. A four page survey questionnaire was used as the instrument. The questionnaire was filled out by 102 Muslim Arab international students regarding the areas of stressors, coping strategies, satisfaction with living in the U.S., and individual descriptors. None of the hypotheses were supported with statistically significant results. Of the subjects, 83% reported that they did not receive any intercultural pre-sojourn training. Presently, pre-sojourn intercultural training does not aid in reducing the stressful situations experienced by these subjects (Hypothesis 1). The frequency of emotion-focused coping does not decrease when the perceived effectiveness of presojourn intercultural training increases (Hypothesis 2). Limited knowledge and standardized research in this area may contribute to the lack of success of intercultural training. Additional time spent living in the U.S. does not reduce the communication-related stressors Muslim Arab students experience (Hypothesis 3). Although research indicates the longer people live in a foreign culture, the more they learn the rules and norms and therefore become acculturated (Samovar and Porter, 1988), the additional considerations a Muslim Arab international student may have to deal with could override the positive effects of time. The frequency of emotion-focused coping does not substantially decrease the longer amount of time a student has lived in the U.S. (Hypothesis 4). stress is a part of any student's life. For Muslim Arab international students living in the U.S., the basic value system provided by the belief in Islam appears to be related to coping with stressful situations (Hypothesis 5). However, the results were not significant. As the variety of coping strategies increases, the variety of stressors does not decrease (Hypothesis 6). Rather, as the variety of stressors increases, so too does the variety of coping strategies. It appears that students who experience more stressors respond by using more coping strategies. Satisfaction was correlated with neither coping strategies nor stressors. One would expect satisfaction to be positively related to coping strategies (Hypothesis 7), but there was no relationship. One would also expect satisfaction to be inversely related to stressors (Hypothesis 8), but there is no relationship. Satisfaction was measured by the extent to which subjects would want to remain in the U.S., and if they would recommend a loved one to study in the U.S. Based on the highly obligatory social structure that exists in many Middle Eastern countries, contemplating remaining away from one's family and friends may not have been acceptable. Difficulties associated with living in the U.S. as an international student may have also led subjects to report they would not recommend a loved one to study in the U.S. In conclusion, there are three important results that can be drawn from this study. First, with respect, at least, to the Muslim Arab international students in this study, there is no way to empirically discriminate between different categories of stressors or different categories of coping strategies. Second, denial and wishful thinking are not effective coping strategies. Third, direct problem solving is clearly the most effective way for the Muslim Arab international students in this study to cope with stressors while living in the U.S.

The Islamist movements operate in all the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region. The mother organization, which is also best-known among the movements, is the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, whose ideas spread quickly into other countries in the region. Although the Islamist movements are ideologically different, they have one similar attribute - focus on various social issues as well as the fact that they originally profiled as charity organizations and they have only recently entered the political scene. The main goal of this diploma thesis is to analyze and compare the activities and achievements of the Muslim Brotherhood (The Freedom and Justice party) and The Movement of Islamic Tendency (The Ennadhda party) within the political systems in Egypt and Tunisia. The thesis also aims at verifying explanatory cleavage of Islamist electorate based on the cleavage theory within Egypt and Tunisia. The biggest success of the Islamist movements so far meant the changes after the Arab Spring. Following this event the Islamist movements won the first free parliamentary election in both countries. However, the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood did not last so long in Egypt - nowadays the movement exists only illegally and it has been in a difficult position. On the contrary, the...

Islamofobi är ett växande problem i Europa som negativt påverkar muslimers förutsättningar och möjligheter i samhället. Samtidigt är religionsfriheten en mänsklig rättighet och en av grundvalarna för ett demokratiskt och pluralistiskt samhälle. Denna uppsats undersöker hur islamofobi påverkar religionsfrihetens implementering i Sverige. Resultatet visar att muslimers rätt att utöva sin religion hotas av islamofobiska praktiker, så som attacker mot moskéer, motstånd mot muslimska organisationer och förbud av slöjan. Studien utforskar även statens förpliktelser och ansvar för att motverka islamofobi och främja muslimers rättigheter och lika möjligheter – för att på så sätt kunna uppnå ett verkligt demokratiskt och pluralistiskt samhälle där utsatta grupper beskyddas. / Islamophobia is an increasing problem in Europe which has a negative effect on Muslims’ conditions and opportunities within the society. At the same time, freedom of religion is a human right and one of the foundations in a democratic and pluralistic society. This thesis examines how islamophobia affects the implementation of freedom of religion in Sweden. The result shows that Muslims’ right to practice their religion is substantially threatened by islamophobic practices, such as attacks against mosques, resistance towards Muslim organizations and banning of the veil. The study also explores the state’s obligations and responsibility to counteract islamophobia and promote Muslims’ rights and equal opportunities – and thus be able to achieve a truly democratic and pluralistic society where vulnerable groups are protected.

Since 1976, Syria has suffered two separate but in nature similar rebellions which was different in terms of spreading, impact and size. The existing literature fails to compare these rebellions and answer the question on how two similar uprising can produce different outcomes. The objective of this study is to answer that question and produce a foundation that is usable when studying future uprisings in the Middle East and Syria. This is a qualitative research that uses multiple case studies that are compared in order to fulfil the objective of this study. The research if a desk study and uses an abductive approach. Two different theoretical concepts have been used in order to understand the dynamics that shaped the two rebellions. These are Frank H. Zimmerman's theory on why insurgencies fail and Frederick D. Miller's model of movement decline. The authors pinpoint different factors that makes a uprising prone to failure or success and these factors has been used as a lens when analysing the findings of this essay. The findings of this essay suggest that key differences that made an impact on the conflicts where the amount of local support, external support and the role of social media. In order to fully understand the dynamics that shapes modern rebellions, further research on the role of globalisation and social media is conflict must be conducted.