My thesis concerns how architecture can actively participate in processes of community-formation without reducing its creative processes to the oppositional tensions, prejudices and instrumentality of conventional left/right or bottom-up/top-down politics, “two poles of the same governmental machine.” By elaborating the architect as craftsman-author, my thesis explores Community and processes of political and poetic Representation. It is critical towards the biopolitics of governance. Theorisation is drawn principally from the political philosophy of critical theory, phenomenology and hermeneutics. My thesis promotes the architecture of “unavowable community.” Rather than forming communities by grouping likenesses together, and architecture forming their limits to either secure self-sufficiency or protect against insufficiency, architecture is tasked with finding methodologies for delimiting community-formation based on affirmative views of incompleteness and insufficiency. It is arranged in three Sections: Section I sets out the political and representational ground from which the investigation into community begins – it is a brief investigation into historical processes of forming community; Section II sets out possibilities for rethinking community – it is an investigation that shifts questions of craftsmanship, authorship, politics and representation from the search for appropriate community form to processes for becoming community; Section III is an investigation into the processes of craftsmanship and authorship directed towards the unpredictable but nonetheless “coming community” – it sets out a methodology for how an architect might go about proposing community.

O poder constituinte, tal como entendido pela teoria constitucionalista clássica, é definido como poder bruto, original, ilimitado e incondicionado, a partir do qual nasce o Estado e, por consequência, a ordem jurídica. Esse poder, definido como supraestatal, não encontra limites no direito e, nas concepções democráticas, é titularizado pelo povo soberano. Essa concepção teórica passa por uma releitura no trabalho, a fim de se definir o poder constituinte como poder comunicativo criador da norma constitucional, de aparição episódica, por meio do qual é possível filtrar os argumentos morais, ético-políticos e estratégicos expostos pelos cidadãos na esfera pública democrática, representativos de um modo de vida compartilhado que se impõe politicamente. De acordo com a releitura apresentada, os postulados da ilimitação material e da incondicionalidade do poder constituinte não se sustentam em face do paradigma da racionalidade comunicativa e dialogal. Na qualidade de momento de fundação e fundamentação da ordem constitucional, o poder constituinte precisa respeitar direitos pressupostos, garantidores da autonomia individual, e institucionalizar os procedimentos discursivos que viabilizam a reprodução do direito legítimo. Entendido como processo extraordinário, no qual os interesses e os valores permanecem latentes na sociedade, o exercício do poder constituinte representa um momento único para análise do discurso de fundamentação normativa, objeto central da tese. Associando-se fundamentação normativa com legitimidade política, nos termos da teoria democrática exposta por Jürgen Habermas, conclui-se que o cerne da legitimidade das ordens estatais organizadas democraticamente é a institucionalização de uma ordem jurídica fundamentada discursivamente por intermédio de um procedimento de deliberação pública, no qual todos os potenciais atingidos pela norma possam exprimir o seu assentimento. O poder constituinte, ao estruturar o estado, garante que o processo de formação da vontade e da opinião pública se estabilize e o consenso seja alcançado. / Constituent power, based on classical constitutional theory, is defined as raw, original, limitless and unconditional power, from which the state and, consequently, legal order are born. Such power, defined as supranational, knows no boundaries in the law and according to democratic notions it is held by the sovereign people. This thesis reexamines that theoretical conception in order to define constituent power as a communicative power which creates constitutional norm; it appears occasionally and it allows for a selection of moral, ethical-political and strategic arguments introduced by citizens in the public democratic sphere which represent a shared way of life that imposes itself politically. According to this reexamination, postulates of constituent powers material illimitation and unconditionality cannot resist to the paradigm of communicative and dialogical rationality. As the founding moment and grounds of constitutional order, constituent power must respect presupposed rights which guarantee individual autonomy and institutionalize discursive procedures which enable the reproduction of legitimate law. Understood as an extraordinary process in which interests and values remain latent in society, exercise of constituent power represents a unique moment to analyze the normative grounds discourse, the core issue of this thesis. Combining normative grounds and political legitimacy, in the terms of the democratic theory introduced by Jürgen Habermas, the conclusion is that the essence of legitimacy of democratically-organized state orders is the institutionalization of a legal order based discursively through a process of public deliberation, where all individuals potentially affected by the norm may express their consent. By structuring the state, constituting power ensures that the public will and opinion formation process will become stable and consensus will be reached.

O poder constituinte, tal como entendido pela teoria constitucionalista clássica, é definido como poder bruto, original, ilimitado e incondicionado, a partir do qual nasce o Estado e, por consequência, a ordem jurídica. Esse poder, definido como supraestatal, não encontra limites no direito e, nas concepções democráticas, é titularizado pelo povo soberano. Essa concepção teórica passa por uma releitura no trabalho, a fim de se definir o poder constituinte como poder comunicativo criador da norma constitucional, de aparição episódica, por meio do qual é possível filtrar os argumentos morais, ético-políticos e estratégicos expostos pelos cidadãos na esfera pública democrática, representativos de um modo de vida compartilhado que se impõe politicamente. De acordo com a releitura apresentada, os postulados da ilimitação material e da incondicionalidade do poder constituinte não se sustentam em face do paradigma da racionalidade comunicativa e dialogal. Na qualidade de momento de fundação e fundamentação da ordem constitucional, o poder constituinte precisa respeitar direitos pressupostos, garantidores da autonomia individual, e institucionalizar os procedimentos discursivos que viabilizam a reprodução do direito legítimo. Entendido como processo extraordinário, no qual os interesses e os valores permanecem latentes na sociedade, o exercício do poder constituinte representa um momento único para análise do discurso de fundamentação normativa, objeto central da tese. Associando-se fundamentação normativa com legitimidade política, nos termos da teoria democrática exposta por Jürgen Habermas, conclui-se que o cerne da legitimidade das ordens estatais organizadas democraticamente é a institucionalização de uma ordem jurídica fundamentada discursivamente por intermédio de um procedimento de deliberação pública, no qual todos os potenciais atingidos pela norma possam exprimir o seu assentimento. O poder constituinte, ao estruturar o estado, garante que o processo de formação da vontade e da opinião pública se estabilize e o consenso seja alcançado. / Constituent power, based on classical constitutional theory, is defined as raw, original, limitless and unconditional power, from which the state and, consequently, legal order are born. Such power, defined as supranational, knows no boundaries in the law and according to democratic notions it is held by the sovereign people. This thesis reexamines that theoretical conception in order to define constituent power as a communicative power which creates constitutional norm; it appears occasionally and it allows for a selection of moral, ethical-political and strategic arguments introduced by citizens in the public democratic sphere which represent a shared way of life that imposes itself politically. According to this reexamination, postulates of constituent powers material illimitation and unconditionality cannot resist to the paradigm of communicative and dialogical rationality. As the founding moment and grounds of constitutional order, constituent power must respect presupposed rights which guarantee individual autonomy and institutionalize discursive procedures which enable the reproduction of legitimate law. Understood as an extraordinary process in which interests and values remain latent in society, exercise of constituent power represents a unique moment to analyze the normative grounds discourse, the core issue of this thesis. Combining normative grounds and political legitimacy, in the terms of the democratic theory introduced by Jürgen Habermas, the conclusion is that the essence of legitimacy of democratically-organized state orders is the institutionalization of a legal order based discursively through a process of public deliberation, where all individuals potentially affected by the norm may express their consent. By structuring the state, constituting power ensures that the public will and opinion formation process will become stable and consensus will be reached.

This thesis aims at critically examining the specific place of the &quot / critical&quot / and &quot / radical&quot / theories within both the theory of public administration and political theory, particularly in terms of the discursive participatory framework they offer. The fundamental question dealt with is whether or not the power and dependence analyses of these approaches (which are treated as &#039 / marginal&#039 / in the field) is convincing for an egalitarian, comprehensive and socially transformative democratic governance. Since a discussion of this sort essentially problematizes the reduction of political equality to a proceduralist and abstract philosophical equality, not to commit a similar fallacy of &quot / apriorism&quot / , the study incorporates the observations on LA-21 Turkey processes as a local governance program, in terms of a concrete contribution to theoretical discussion. In the light of direct observations, interviews and data obtained from secondary resources regarding the participatory practices, the level of organization and current capacity of political representation are inferred to be also decisive on the capacity to participate, owing this decisiveness substantially to the economic and social resources in the real social formation, hence the conditions of production of local knowledge are consequently identified as far from reflecting a democratic environment purified from power relations. Highlighting the risk for the notion of self-governance to gain a hegemonic functionality for bourgeoisie democracy concealing and perpetuating social inequalities, the thesis argues for shifting the inquire for the dominant class, from solely political-administrative sphere to civil society, and the maintainable and reproductive conditions and mechanisms of dominance between these two spheres.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-10-04T14:02:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 José Carlos de Castro Dantas_.pdf: 1311441 bytes, checksum: a765d1fddb4b6e12d592013a80b9106e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-04T14:02:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 José Carlos de Castro Dantas_.pdf: 1311441 bytes, checksum: a765d1fddb4b6e12d592013a80b9106e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-09 / UEMA – Universidade Estadual do Maranhão / A tese básica dessa pesquisa toma a democracia deliberativa pública como paradigma teórico e como recurso político relevante para as democracias moderno-contemporâneas plurais e complexas. É fato histórico que, na heterogênica construção da democracia ocidental estabelecida como regime político mais apropriado, esse modelo deliberativo pode constituir-se atualmente em notável proposição de ethos e práxis democrática e, consequentemente, como objeto de intensos debates. Seus defensores advogam, comumente, que aquilo que é considerado do interesse comum seja resultado dos processos de deliberação coletiva, racional e equitativa entre indivíduos livres e iguais. Além disso, a democracia deliberativa é uma concepção de governo democrático que prioriza a discussão racional na vida política. Princípios associados do liberalismo rawlsiano, tais como o da preservação das liberdades subjetivas, da pluralidade e da razão pública, e do republicanismo pettitiano da liberdade como não dominação positiva fundamentando a democracia, são contributos relevantes considerados à luz racionalidade e dos princípios discursivos habermasianos os quais fundamentam a concepção deliberativo-procedimental no âmbito correlacional do direito e da política. Nesse contexto, o orçamento participativo de Porto Alegre, calcado no histórico associativismo local e na vontade política da Administração Popular entre 1990 e 1996 cujos procedimentos metodológico-discursivos estabeleceram que cidadãos livres e iguais habilitam-se, de cooperações institucionais, a debates, avaliações e decisões em torno dos interesses públicos, foi tomado nessa pesquisa como modelo exemplar de possibilidade deliberação democrática pública. / The basic thesis of this research takes public deliberative democracy as a theoretical paradigm and as a relevant political resource for pluralistic and complex modern contemporary democracies. It is a historical fact that, in the heterogeneous construction of Western democracy established as the most appropriate political regime, this deliberative model can now constitute a remarkable proposition of ethos and democratic praxis and, consequently, as the object of intense debates. Its defenders commonly advocate that aspects considered of common interest have to be a result of processes of rational, equitative and collective deliberation between free and equal individuals. Moreover, deliberative democracy is a conception of democratic government that prioritizes rational discussions in political life. In the Habermasian theory, in particular, contributions such as the Rawlsian liberalism, concerning preservation of subjective freedoms and public reason, and the Pettitian republicanism, related to freedom as positive non-domination, are considered within the context of rationality and discoursive principles, which ground the deliberative-procedural conception on the correlacional scope of law and politics. The context of the Porto Alegre participatory budgeting, based in the historical and local associativism and in the political will of the Popular Administration, whose metodological-discoursive procedures established that free and equal citizens qualify themselves, within the context of institutional cooperations, to debates, evaluations and decisions of public interests, was taken in this research as an exemplary model of possibility of public democratic deliberation.

This paper explores what attributes are important for the creation of environment art tools. The purpose of this is to make sure that when a tool is to be developed, it will be done properly within a given time frame. This is important since the cost of tool development is high in both time and capital spent. Being able to make sure that when those resources are spent, that the resulting tool is of high quality and solving the problem which the development team set out to do. Through interviews, forms and the creation of our own tool I hope to find these attributes and to be able to provide insights into how a studio or team might apply them for their own purposes.

Ce mémoire cherche à porter au jour les présupposés normatifs substantiels de la théorie de la justice comme équité (TJÉ) de John Rawls. Plus précisément, il tente de déduire puis de définir ses présupposés éthiques, c’est-à-dire ce qu’elle tient implicitement pour être des biens constitutifs de la justice. En supposant l’existence d’éléments normatifs se rapportant à la question du bien en amont des normes du juste, cette proposition de recherche contredit en elle-même le trait essentiel du déontologisme procédural rawlsien, soit la primauté du juste (right) sur le bien. Nous suivons en cela Paul Ricœur et réitérons sa thèse du primat de l’éthique, entendue comme visées à propos du bien, sur la morale, comprise comme normes à visées universelles définissant des obligations. Selon cette thèse, toute norme morale s’ancre nécessairement dans un sens éthique qui la précède ou, pour le dire dans les mots de Rawls, dans un sens de la justice. Nous tentons en premier lieu de démontrer que deux présupposés éthiques, en tant qu’idéaux non thématisés, règlent pourtant de bout en bout toute la modélisation théorique de la TJÉ. On pourrait ainsi dire qu’ils sont les points fixes normatifs les plus élémentaires du sens de la justice opérant l’équilibre réfléchi. Il s’agit des présupposés de l’autodétermination des personnes et de la réciprocité symétrique. Ensuite, à l’aide de ce que Ricœur nommait sa « petite éthique », laquelle se trouve en dialogue explicite avec Rawls, nous nous efforçons de préciser les visées originaires à propos du bien donnant force de norme à chacun des deux présupposés éthiques. Une fois la particularité du sens de la justice à l’origine de la TJÉ ainsi exposée et précisée, il sera possible de prendre la mesure des impasses théoriques et pratiques auxquelles se bute forcément une théorie politique dont l’ambition de fonder la légitimité politique sur l’entente mutuelle s’autorise de la prétention à éviter les questions controversées à propos du bien. / This thesis seeks to bring to light the substantial normative presuppositions of the theory of justice as equity (TJE) of John Rawls. More precisely, it tries to deduce and define its ethical presuppositions, that is to say what it implicitly considers to be constitutive goods of justice. In assuming the existence of normative elements that pertain to the question of the good prior to the norms of justice, this research proposal in itself questions the essential feature of Rawlsian procedural deontologism, namely the primacy of the right over the good. In this regard we follow Paul Ricœur, as we reiterate his thesis on the primacy of ethics, understood as ends relatives to the good, on morality, understood as universal norms defining obligations. According to this thesis, any moral norm is necessarily anchored in an ethical aim that precedes it or, to put it in Rawls' words, in a sense of justice. We first attempt to demonstrate that two ethical presuppositions, as non-thematized ideals, nevertheless govern from end to end all the theoretical ordering of the TJE. We could thus say that they are the most elementary normative fixed points of the sense of justice operating the reflective equilibrium. These are the assumptions of self-determination of people and symmetrical reciprocity. Then, using what Ricœur called his "petite éthique", which is in explicit dialogue with Rawls, we attempt to specify the original aims of the good which give normative potency to each of the two ethical presuppositions. Once the particularity of the sense of justice at the origin of the TJE is thus exposed and clarified, it will be possible to recognize the theoretical and practical shortcomings that a political theory that claims to avoid controversial questions about the good in order to justify the possibility of reaching mutual understanding will inevitably encounter.

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In Canada’s recent history, the cases of Kanao Inouye, Omar Khadr, and Maher Arar shed light on the relationship between citizen-rights and sovereign power, a problem which this thesis studies through its three-pronged strategy of analysis. First, it takes a postmetaphysical approach to the problem of exceptionality as it has been explored in the works of Jacques Derrida, Gianni Vattimo, and Reiner Schürmann. Their responses to the problem of exceptionality provide a framework that enables this thesis to capture the relationship between citizen-rights and sovereign power in relative detail. Second, it applies Schürmann’s epochal theory in order to offer a historical periodization of citizen-rights in Canada that highlights the effect of sovereign power on citizen-rights. Lastly, in light of its philosophical and theoretical framework, it interprets the Inouye, Khadr, Arar cases in order to account for the effect of Charter rights on sovereign power. / Graduate / 0626 / tsujikt@gmail.com