Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-31 / Nenhuma / Esta dissertação é um estudo analítico de duas concepções muito influentes sobre a consciência na filosofia contemporânea da mente. O foco principal desta pesquisa é duplo. Primeiro, ela pretende descrever da forma mais detalhada possível as abordagens de John Searle e de Daniel Dennet sobre a consciência. Além disso, pretende apresentar as críticas de Searle à abordagem funcionalista da Dannett. Ambas as abordagens serão descritas e avaliadas e as diferenças mais relevantes entre esses dois autores serão postas em contraste. Por não fornecer um conceito que inclua a característica qualitativa da consciência, será argumentado que o funcionalismo de Dennett não é capaz de explicar a consciência humana. Sua filosofia da mente também não resolve o problema das outras mentes, uma vez que o conceito de consciência exposto por Dennett não diferencia seres humanos conscientes de zumbis inconscientes. / This dissertation is an analytical study of two very influential conceptions of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind. The main focus of this research is twofold. First, it intends to describe both John Searle's and Daniel Dennett approach on consciousness, and, second, to expose Searle's criticism to Dannett's functionalist approach. Both approaches will be described and evaluated, and the relevant differences between these two authors will be put in contrast. In not providing a concept that includes the qualitative characteristic of consciousness, it will be argued that Dennett's functionalism cannot explain human conscious experiences. His philosophy of mind also cannot solve the problem of other minds, since the concept of consciousness exposed by Dennett does not differentiate conscious human beings from unconscious zombies.

Thesis (M.A. (History of Arts))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

I argue that one cannot hold a Meinongian ontology of fictional characters and have a causal theory of reference for fictional names. The main argument presented refutes Edward Zalta's claim that storytelling should be considered an extended baptism for fictional characters. This amounts to the claim that storytelling fixes the reference of fictional names in the same way that baptism fixes the reference of ordinary names, and this is just a claim about the illocutionary force of these two types of utterance. To evaluate this argument, therefore, we need both a common understanding of the Meinongian ontology and a common taxonomy of speech acts. I briefly sketch the Meinongian ontology as it is laid out by Zalta in order to meet the former condition. Then I present an interpretation of the taxonomy of illocutionary acts given by John Searle in the late 1970s and mid 1980s, within which we can evaluate Zalta's claims. With an ontology of fictional characters and a taxonomy of speech acts in place, I go on to examine the ways in which the Meinongian might argue that storytelling is an extended baptism. None of these arguments are tenable-there is no way for the act of storytelling to serve as an extended baptism. Therefore, the act of storytelling does not constitute a baptism of fictional characters; that is, storytelling fails to ground a causal chain of reference to fictional characters.

My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

La tesi fa un estudi intens i crític de l'obra filosòfica del professor nordamericà John Searle, qui va formalitzar el que es coneix com "teoria dels actes de parla". Es presenta una investigació sobre els temes principals del pensament de Searle: llenguatge, ment i "background" així com les conexions que hi ha entre ells. Aquest estudi suposa una crítica a alguns aspectes poc clars de la concepció del llenguatge de Searle, i, a la vegada, una aposta a possibles solucions a aquestos aspectes.

My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

I argue that one cannot hold a Meinongian ontology of fictional characters and have a causal theory of reference for fictional names. The main argument presented refutes Edward Zalta's claim that storytelling should be considered an extended baptism for fictional characters. This amounts to the claim that storytelling fixes the reference of fictional names in the same way that baptism fixes the reference of ordinary names, and this is just a claim about the illocutionary force of these two types of utterance. To evaluate this argument, therefore, we need both a common understanding of the Meinongian ontology and a common taxonomy of speech acts. I briefly sketch the Meinongian ontology as it is laid out by Zalta in order to meet the former condition. Then I present an interpretation of the taxonomy of illocutionary acts given by John Searle in the late 1970s and mid 1980s, within which we can evaluate Zalta's claims. With an ontology of fictional characters and a taxonomy of speech acts in place, I go on to examine the ways in which the Meinongian might argue that storytelling is an extended baptism. None of these arguments are tenable-there is no way for the act of storytelling to serve as an extended baptism. Therefore, the act of storytelling does not constitute a baptism of fictional characters; that is, storytelling fails to ground a causal chain of reference to fictional characters.

This study focuses on the way in which the conceptual artists Berni Searle and Jan van der Merwe portray their respective memories of the influence of hegemony on their identity formation. Two conceptual installations of each artist, namely Looking back (1999) and Not quite white (2000) of Searle and Wag (2000) and Ontwortel (2009) of Van der Merwe, are interpreted comparatively according to the portrayal of hegemony, identity (including the artists‟ different sexual and race identities) and their memories of the historic and cultural effects of domination. The reading and interpretation of the installations are guided by the key concepts hegemony, identity and memory and are grounded theoretically from a critical post colonial perspective. Searle and Van der Merwe‟s memories of the influence of power relations and ideology on their conception of art and identity formation are addressed by contextualizing the artists within the South African context. Van der Merwe, as a white Afrikaans speaking man, initially formed collectively part of the Western patriarchate identity norm because of his historic background. His identity is in contrast with Searle‟s brown and female identity which is traditionally viewed and portrayed as different and inferior. Van der Merwe‟s memorial art is therefore mainly that of the unjustified benefiting of the white and male agents of power in contrast with Searle‟s memorial art of colonial and patriarchate domination. / Thesis (MA (History of Art))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013

This study focuses on the way in which the conceptual artists Berni Searle and Jan van der Merwe portray their respective memories of the influence of hegemony on their identity formation. Two conceptual installations of each artist, namely Looking back (1999) and Not quite white (2000) of Searle and Wag (2000) and Ontwortel (2009) of Van der Merwe, are interpreted comparatively according to the portrayal of hegemony, identity (including the artists‟ different sexual and race identities) and their memories of the historic and cultural effects of domination. The reading and interpretation of the installations are guided by the key concepts hegemony, identity and memory and are grounded theoretically from a critical post colonial perspective. Searle and Van der Merwe‟s memories of the influence of power relations and ideology on their conception of art and identity formation are addressed by contextualizing the artists within the South African context. Van der Merwe, as a white Afrikaans speaking man, initially formed collectively part of the Western patriarchate identity norm because of his historic background. His identity is in contrast with Searle‟s brown and female identity which is traditionally viewed and portrayed as different and inferior. Van der Merwe‟s memorial art is therefore mainly that of the unjustified benefiting of the white and male agents of power in contrast with Searle‟s memorial art of colonial and patriarchate domination. / Thesis (MA (History of Art))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013

In this dissertation two art works of two female artists, Cindy Sherman and Berni Searle, are analysed comparatively using a method developed in semiotics. The artworks of Sherman that are used in this dissertation forms part of her Untitled Film Stills series and the artworks of Searle that are discussed forms part of her Looking Back series. The artworks and artists are contextualised within the postmodernism and within the realm of performance art. The study focuses on and discusses the way in which these two artists depict identity in their artworks. In Sherman's artworks this identity is linked to a Western, white identity. In contrast with this, the identity that Searle depicts is linked to an African, coloured identity. The study is concluded by a comparative summary of the different identities Sherman and Searle represent in their artworks as well as the way in which they represent these identities. / Thesis (M.A. (History of Arts))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.