Depuis 2004 et la résolution 1559 appelant au retrait syrien, le Liban est l’objet d’une action internationale extrêmement intense. En effet, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU), face à la nouvelle configuration libanaise et levantine, a déployé des mécanismes issus de la sécurité collective afin de renforcer les attributs régaliens de l’État libanais. Le maintien de la paix, à travers le renforcement de la Force intérimaire des Nations unies au Liban (Finul), et la justice internationale, à travers la création du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban (TSL), sont les deux principaux outils visant à maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales par le prisme libanais. Dans les deux cas, la France, que ce soit militairement ou diplomatiquement, a été singulièrement active.Partant de ce constat, notre thèse vise, dans un premier temps, à déconstruire les mécanismes onusiens mis en oeuvre dans le cas libanais. Il s’agira, plus précisément,d’appréhender les différentes logiques qui sont constitutives de l’action du CSNU au Liban.Que ce soit en matière de maintien de la paix ou de justice internationale, les résolutions onusiennes et les organes qui en découlent font face à la souveraineté nationale et reflètent ainsi l’éternelle opposition entre les chapitres VI et VII de la Charte des Nations unies. Or,nous verrons que dans le cas libanais, le CSNU met en oeuvre une action hybride oscillant entre une logique coercitive et une logique consensuelle.Dans un second temps, notre thèse analysera la tension permanente de l’État libanais,qualifié de quasi-État, entre des dynamiques supra-étatiques traduites par les résolutions onusiennes et des dynamiques infra-étatiques incarnées par des acteurs communautaires et confessionnels, parfois transfrontaliers, et propres au système consociatif libanais. Nous tenterons alors de mesurer le degré de consolidation de deux des attributs régaliens du quasi-État libanais : la défense et la justice. Plus largement, il s’agira de s’interroger sur la possibilité pour l’action internationale, héritière du système westphalien, de remplir ses objectifs dans un environnement national et régional qui questionne plus que jamais la possibilité de maintenir et de conforter des États-nations.À l’aune de la régionalisation des conflits depuis 2004, et particulièrement depuis2011 au Levant, nous conclurons à la difficulté pour le CSNU de faire face à des États déliquescents ainsi qu’à des conflictualités d’interface qui non seulement sont en plein essor,mais qui sont par ailleurs de plus en plus liées les unes aux autres. / Since 2004 and Resolution 1559 demanding Syrian withdrawal, Lebanon has been subjected to an exceptionally intense international action. Facing a new configuration both in Lebanon and the Levant, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has indeed implemented mechanisms of collective security aimed at strengthening national sovereignty.Peace-keeping through United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) enhancement and international justice through the creation of the Special tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are the main tools for maintaining international peace and security in a Lebanese perspective. In both cases, France has been particularly active, be it militarily or diplomatically. Setting out from this premise, our thesis, to begin with, will aim at deconstructing the UN mechanisms implemented in the Lebanese case. More precisely, we shall try to apprehend the constitutive logics of the Security Council’s action in Lebanon. Whether in peace-keeping or in international justice, UN resolutions and the bodies created by them are faced with national sovereignty and, therefore, reflect the eternal opposition between chapters VI andVII of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it will be shown that, in the Lebanese case,the UNSC has developed a hybrid action, fluctuating between coercion and consensus.Then, our thesis will show how the Lebanese State, which we will describe as a “quasi-State”, has to face an ongoing tension between supra-State dynamics expressed by UN resolutions and sub-State dynamics embodied by communitarian and religious representatives, sometimes cross-border, which are specific to the Lebanese consociationalist system. We shall later determine the extent to which two of the Lebanese quasi-State’s attributes, defense and security, have been consolidated by international action. More broadly, we will wonder whether international action, as an heir to the Westphalian system,can achieve its goal in a national and regional environment that challenges, today more than ever, the possibility to maintain and support nation-States. In a context of regionalization of conflicts since 2004, and especially since 2011 in the Levant, we shall come to the conclusion that the Security Council still has problems indealing with deliquescent States and with what we will call “interface conflicts”, which not only are booming, but also are more and more inextricably connected to one another.

In 1948 the international community in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust sought to eradicate genocide forever by creating the 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'. This Convention criminalised the preparation and act of genocide by international law, making all individuals accountable irrelevant of status or sovereignty. But the Convention has not been enough to deter the act of genocide from occurring again, and again, and again. Worst, the international community has been slow to react to cases of genocide. The problem with preventing and punishing genocide is hindered by the power and right of veto held by permanent members of the UNSC. The UNSC has been given the responsibility to maintain international peace and security and is the only entity that can mandate an intervention that overrides the principle of non-intervention. The aim of this thesis is to show that the veto has been a crucial factor in stopping the prevention of genocide, thus it is imperative that the veto change. This study argues that to effectively prevent and punish genocide the veto needs to be barred from use in cases of genocide. It looks at different cases since the Armenian genocide during WWI through to the Darfur genocide which is still in process. The case of Armenia is significant because for the first time, members of the international community were prepared to hold leaders of another state accountable for their treatment of their own citizens. However the collective will to bring justice to those accountable waned coming to an abrupt end in 1923. The holocaust followed in WWII; six million Jews died, and numerous other groups were targeted under the Nazi's serial genocide. The shock of the holocaust led to the Genocide Convention. But thirty years later during the Cold War, Cambodia became embroiled in a genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge. The international community silently stood by. The USSR, China, and the US all had their reasons to stay out of Cambodia, from supporting a regime with a likeminded political ideology to war weariness from Vietnam. In the 1990s, genocides in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo) followed. The former was neglected by the US's unwillingness to be involved in another peacekeeping disaster. The two genocides in the former Yugoslavia were affected by Russia and China's reluctance to use military force even after the clear failure of serial negotiations. Finally, in 2003 Darfur became the latest tragedy of genocide. Again, Russia and China have been timid of calling the conflict genocide thus avoiding any affirmative action to stop it. These cases all show that where one state is unwilling to be involved in stopping genocide, their right and power to the veto stops or delays the international community from preventing and punishing genocide, regardless of whether the veto is used or merely seen as a threat. Therefore, for future prevention of genocide, the veto needs to be changed to prevent its use in times of genocide.

<p>It is an unfortunate and cruel reality that both government and armed groups used child soldiers during armed conflict. Child soldiers have become an integral part of government forces as well as insurgent groups in Africa and elsewhere. Most of them are being exploited as combatants, while others perform functions, such as porters, spies who are able to enter small spaces, cooks, messengers, lookouts, and even suicide bombers. Some of the most disturbing aspects of child soldiering are that some of them are being forced to kill or are themselves killed, sexually abused and are exposed to drugs. The use of child soldiers in conflicts is not a recent phenomenon and has indeed become a common practice that characterises modern conflicts. Recruitment is usually carried out forcefully or voluntarily by both government and rebel forces. The difference between these two types of recruitment is not always clear since their decision to join is always influenced by external factors. Examples of such reasons for voluntary recruitment include the desire to revenge, adventure, peer pressure, and need for belonging and survival. Concerning the reason for survival, some argue that, the children do not actually choose freely to become combatants, but are rather forced by circumstances. There are numerous reasons for the continuous targeting of children by armed forces and armed groups. These include shortage of combatants, the fact that children are easy to train physically and psychologically, and also that children are obedient and are readily available. The recruited children are compelled to take part in brutal induction ceremonies, where they are threatened and forced to kill or witness the killing of someone they know.</p>

Le crime d'agression se veut etre un des quatre crimes internationaux sous la juridiction de la CPI. Lorsque les delegues a la Conference de Rome n'eurent point atteint de consensus sur une definition du crime, celui-ci resta, depuis, indefini en droit. En consequence, la CPI n'aura juridiction pour entendre des causes portant sur le crime d'agression qu'une fois la definition sera adoptee par l'Assemblee des Etats Parties au plus tot en 2009. Ce memoire traite trois problematiques liees au crime d'agression : la question de la responsabilite penale individuelle, le role du Conseil de securite de l'ONU, et les parametres du crime en tant que tel. La responsabilite penale individuelle est analysee, inter alia, du point de vue du principe des sources du droit international. Quant al'eventuelle implication du Conseil de securite dans le champ de competence de la CPI sur le crime d'agression, l'auteure soutient tel que suit: Si le Conseil de securite se voit accorde un pouvoir plus large que celui dont il est presentement dote en vertu des articles 13(b) et 16 du Statut de Rome, chaque membre permanent aura un veto sur toute situation d'agression qui serait autrement portee devant la Cour. Ceci aura pour consequence de politiser la CPI en ce qui a trait au crime et rendra hypothethique toute definition eventuelle. Si la definition est bien con9ue et redigee, on fait valoir, qu'il n' est point necessaire de limiter davantage la competence de la CPI. Les parametres de la definition du crime proposes par l'auteure sont etablis selon les conclusions d'une analyse des notions composantes de l'agression. L'essentiel du concept se veut un recours illegal et non-necessaire qui constitue une rupture ala paix. Amoins qu'il ne soit exerce en « legitime defence» ou en vertu d'un mandat du Chapitre VII, Ie recours ala force constitue prima facie une agression et s'il est suffisamment grave, il s'agira d'un crime d'agression. Ce memoire termine avec un projet de definition du crime d'agression en vue d'avancer Ie discours vers un consensus sur ces problematiques majeures. Non seulement est-il possible d'arriver aun consensus sur la definition, croit l'auteure, mais nous sommes plus que jamais al'aube d'y parvenir. / The crime of aggression is one of the four international crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. When delegates at the Rome Conference were unable to agree on the content of a definition, the crime was left undefined. As a result, the ICC can only begin prosecuting individuals for the crime of aggression once a definition is adopted by the Assembly of States Parties in 2009, at the earliest. This thesis examines three issues associated with the crime of aggression: the question of individual criminal responsibility, the role of the UN Security Council and the general scope of the definition of the crime of aggression itself Individual criminal liability is reviewed, inter alia, from the perspective of international sources doctrine. Regarding the role of the Security Council in relation to the crime of aggression, the author concludes: if the Security Council is vested with more powers than it already has under Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute, each permanent member will have a veto over any situation of aggression that might otherwise be brought before the Court. This would result in a complete politicization of the ICC and render moot any future definition of the crime of aggression. If a definition for the crime of aggression is properly conceived and constructed, it is argued, there is no need to further limit the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. The author proposes general parameters for the scope ofthe definition based on conclusions reached in the analysis of the conceptual components of aggression. At its essence, the act of aggression is the unnecessary, unlawful use of force which constitutes a breach ofthe peace. Unless employed in "self-defence" or under a Chapter VII mandate, the use offorce constitutes prima facie an act of aggression, and if it is sufficiently grave, a crime ofaggression. This thesis concludes with a working definition ofthe crime of aggression to promote dialogue and ultimately a consensus on these core issues. Not only is a definition is within reach, the author believes, we are closer to it than we ever have been before. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des Études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en Maîtrise en droit Option recherche"

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

Le Conseil de sécurité est l’organe principal du système onusien chargé du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Face à une situation illégale, il ne peut donc l’ignorer et s’en désintéresser. Cependant, la perpétration d’un acte à la légalité controversée par l’un ou plusieurs de ses membres permanents peut nous laisser entendre que l’organe politique onusien aura des difficultés à remplir son rôle. Les membres permanents vont tenter d’instrumentaliser le Conseil de sécurité afin de diminuer l’illégalité de la situation. Ceci pose avec acuité le problème du contrôle de son activité en matière de maintien de la paix. L’accomplissement d’un acte illégal par un ou plusieurs membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité nécessite alors de réfléchir à des moyens d’ordre juridique pour limiter son pouvoir. Cette réflexion s’avère particulièrement pressante lorsque le Conseil est confronté à une occupation de guerre impliquant ses membres permanents ou, lorsqu’il crée ou autorise des opérations de paix de grandes envergures suite à un conflit armé impliquant ses membres permanents. Afin de limiter les prérogatives du Conseil de sécurité, le régime juridique de l’occupation tel qu’énoncé par le Règlement de La Haye (IV) de 1907 et la IVe Convention de Genève de 1949 devrait être appliquer par l’organe politique onusien lorsqu’il intervient dans une situation d’occupation de guerre impliquant ses membres permanents. L’objectif est d’éviter qu’il n’attribue aux puissances occupantes des missions qui dépassent le cadre juridique imposé par le droit des conflits armés. L’autorisation, par le Conseil de sécurité d’opérations de paix, telles qu’une administration civile transitoire ou une force multinationale avec un mandat de la paix avec recours à la force armée, suite à un conflit armé impliquant ses propres membres permanents, ouvre le débat sur leur réglementation. Alors, il sera proposé une interprétation progressiste de la définition de l’occupation telle qu’énoncée par le Règlement de La Haye (IV) de 1907 et la IVe Convention de Genève de 1949 afin d’y intégrer ces nouvelles formes d’occupations pacifiques, présentant de grandes similitudes avec les occupations de guerre. Ainsi, le régime juridique de l’occupation pourra leur être appliqué. / The Security Council is the primary body of the UN system responsible for peacekeeping and international security. In cases of violations of international law, the Security Council cannot turn a blind eye. Nevertheless, in cases when Security Council members are themselves perpetrators of international law violations one could conclude that this political body has difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. The danger exists that Security Council members in violation of international law will implicate the Security Council in justifying illegal decisions. This therefore raises the question of Security Council accountability. The violation of international law by a Security Council member therefore requires a legal mechanism to limit the powers of this body. This is particularly relevant for cases of occupation involving its permanent members, or, when the Security Council creates or authorizes large-scale peace-keeping operations following an armed conflict involving its own members. In order to limit the powers of the Security Council, this study proposes to impose a legal regime of administration as stipulated by the IV (1907) Hague and the 4th 1949 Geneva Convention, according to which the Security Council intervenes when a territory is administered by one of its permanent members. The goal is to avoid that the Security Council gives too much freedom to an administrative power during interventions which go beyond the legal framework defined by the law on administrated territories. The authorization by the Security Council of peace-keeping operations, such as transitional civil administration or multinational peace-keeping force mandated to use force, following an armed conflict involving its own members, opens the debate of their regulation. Consequently a progressive interpretation of occupation as defined by the IV (1907) Hague and the 4th 1949 Geneva Convention is proposed in order to encompass new forms of peaceful occupations which contain clear similarities with military occupations. Thus, they will fall under the legal mechanism of the latter.

<p>It is an unfortunate and cruel reality that both government and armed groups used child soldiers during armed conflict. Child soldiers have become an integral part of government forces as well as insurgent groups in Africa and elsewhere. Most of them are being exploited as combatants, while others perform functions, such as porters, spies who are able to enter small spaces, cooks, messengers, lookouts, and even suicide bombers. Some of the most disturbing aspects of child soldiering are that some of them are being forced to kill or are themselves killed, sexually abused and are exposed to drugs. The use of child soldiers in conflicts is not a recent phenomenon and has indeed become a common practice that characterises modern conflicts. Recruitment is usually carried out forcefully or voluntarily by both government and rebel forces. The difference between these two types of recruitment is not always clear since their decision to join is always influenced by external factors. Examples of such reasons for voluntary recruitment include the desire to revenge, adventure, peer pressure, and need for belonging and survival. Concerning the reason for survival, some argue that, the children do not actually choose freely to become combatants, but are rather forced by circumstances. There are numerous reasons for the continuous targeting of children by armed forces and armed groups. These include shortage of combatants, the fact that children are easy to train physically and psychologically, and also that children are obedient and are readily available. The recruited children are compelled to take part in brutal induction ceremonies, where they are threatened and forced to kill or witness the killing of someone they know.</p>

Il coordinamento dell’aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo, evocato negli ultimi anni da più parti come la soluzione alla deludente efficacia degli aiuti è in realtà un argomento che nasce quasi contemporaneamente alle prime organizzazioni internazionali dedicate allo sviluppo . La funzione ambivalente delle Nazioni Unite, agente di mediazione diplomatica da un lato (mediazione tra stati e tra gruppi di potere all’interno dello stesso stato), e agente di sviluppo dall’altro, garantisce all’organizzazione un ruolo preminente nel coordinamento degli aiuti nei contesti di guerra e di post-conflitto. E’ questa stessa ambivalenza che impone all’organizzazione un rapporto ufficiale con i territori sottosviluppati, incardinato nella relazione con i governi centrali degli stati. La critica radicale all’aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo individua tutte le distorsioni politiche ed economiche legate all’afflusso dei fondi, sottolineandone le aggravanti possibili laddove esista una discrasia tra gli obiettivi di sviluppo delle Nazioni Unite e quelli dell’élite che occupa le posizioni apicali dello stato. Questa ricerca attraverso un’analisi storica del contesto, mette in luce l’interazione tra il sistema degli aiuti e il sistema-paese in Tajikistan dall’ingresso delle organizzazioni ai giorni nostri. L’analisi dimostra infine che la struttura politico-economica radicata sul territorio, pur conservando i tratti di uno “stato predatorio” (tratti non alleviati bensì aggravati dalle distorsioni legate all’afflusso dei fondi per lo sviluppo), sfugge in realtà alla definizione stessa di “Stato”. Questo dato rivela una debolezza insita nell’approccio metodologico del sistema degli aiuti che si fonda proprio sull’archetipo dello “Stato”. / The Official Development Assistance (ODA) coordination has been recently launched as a genuine mean to increase aid effectiveness. Actually, the “aid coordination” paradigm was born almost contemporaneously to the first international organizations dedicated to “development”. The ambivalent function of the United Nation that acts both as an agent of diplomatic mediation (among states and among different lobbies within the borders of the same state), and as a development agent, guarantees to United Nations a preeminent role in the field of aid coordination in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It’s this real ambivalence that compels the United Nations to deal with development countries through official relations with the central governments. The radical critique to development aid shows different political and economic distortions related to the incidence of foreign funds. At the same time, it underlines that wherever the goals of the official governments diverge from the development goals of the aid community these distortions might be even more burdensome for the country. This research, through an historical analysis, draws attention on the interaction among the development industry and the country-system in Tajikistan from the arrival of the international organizations to our days. The analysis demonstrates that the political and economic structure of the country, while maintaining the features of a “predatory state” (features which are not alleviated but worsened by the distortions brought about by the aid industry), simply do not comply with the definition of a “State”. This result highlights an innate weakness of the aid industry methodological approach that is in fact, fully based on the political archetype of the “State”.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 2006. / Material type: Dissertations. Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-317).

No description available.