Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao DANIEL FRANCA OLIVEIRA.pdf: 930759 bytes, checksum: f4dd04daadd3161679331d37899dd5de (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-02-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The recent Brazilian to a United Nations Security Council permanent seat is the expression of a historical desire in having a place among the great powers. The path followed by the so-called Great Power Foreign Policy begins in the political tentative in being elected to a permanent seat in the League of Nations Council. It also passes through a process of diplomatic negotiation with the United States to occupy a permanent seat in the Security Council during the establishing process of United Nations and goes through the nuclear parallel policy project in the Geisel period. Its recent manifestation begins when President Sarney takes the initiative to release Brazilian candidacy to a permanent seat in the Security Council, in 1989. Since then, the other government periods have given distinct diplomatic treatment and emphasis during the debate process of the Council expansion. For instance, in the beginning of the 90´s, president Collor promotes an exploration diplomacy that corresponds to the immature atmosphere of first debates about the Council s reform. Recently, President Lula, emphasizing a policy willing for leadership, gives an intense treatment to the Brazilian campaign in the Council s expansion. Even if, having a diplomacy accurately constructed to get a great power status to Brazil in the Council _ which the most important alliance is the G-4, a group formed by Brazil, Germany, Japan and India to propose a unified resolution to the Council s reform _ Lula has not been successful in getting Brazil a permanent seat. The present study is an analysis of the main reasons that have taken Brazil s proposal to an unsuccessful stage. It is based in three main possibilities: the Brazilian lack of power projection capacity in the international relations, the non-regional consensus on Brazilian proposal, and the political rivalry between Japan and China, showing a misperception in Brazil diplomacy view, having joined the G-4. With this specific purpose, an analysis is executed based on the Great Power Foreign Policy historical fundaments and on how the foreign policy since president Sarney to Lula contributed to this unwished result / A atual candidatura brasileira para um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas é a expressão de um antigo desejo brasileiro de ocupar um lugar no concerto das grandes nações. O trajeto percorrido pela chamada política externa de grande potência, nesse sentido, inicia na tentativa de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no Conselho da Liga das Nações, passa pela negociação com os EUA por um lugar permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas durante sua criação, assim como também tem passagem na política nuclear paralela do governo Geisel, e culmina na iniciativa do presidente Sarney quem lançou a candidatura atual brasileira, em 1989, e a qual sobrevive até os dias atuais, no governo Lula. Desde o governo Sarney, a participação brasileira nos debates acerca da ampliação do CS têm tido diferentes ênfases e graus de importância nos governos subseqüentes: desde a diplomacia de desbravamento de Collor no início dos debates sobre a reforma até a política para uma busca de liderança explícita de Lula, promovendo uma campanha intensa para eleger o Brasil ao Conselho. Mesmo com uma diplomacia arquitetada para lograr a vontade brasileira de obter status de potência mundial, cuja aliança mais importante é o G-4 (grupo formado por Alemanha, Brasil, Japão e Índia que propõe uma única resolução para a reforma do Conselho), Lula não elege o Brasil para o Conselho. Esse estudo é uma análise de como os resultados até o momento atual não favoreceram o pleito brasileiro no Conselho, tendo os EUA e a China vetado a proposta de reforma do G-4. Nos baseamos em três principais possibilidades que possam ter culminado nesse resultado: a ausência de capacidade do Brasil de projetar poder nas relações internacionais, o não consenso regional para com o pleito brasileiro, e a rivalidade sino-japonesa, mostrando um misperception da diplomacia brasileira ao aderir o G-4. Para tanto, ao longo do estudo, analisamos desde o histórico da política externa de grande potência até a construção de um mapa político desde o governo Sarney até Lula para verificar essas possibilidades

The occurrence of internal armed conflict in Africa has increased over the last two decades. As such, Africa continues to be viewed by many as a troubled continent. In an attempt to avoid further conflict in Africa, organisations such as the United Nations have implemented comprehensive tools and strategies to prevent further conflicts from occurring. However, the genocide in Rwanda and the on-going unrest in Sudan have shown that there is still a lot of work to be done. In both these cases, the conflicts took place or escalated even with UN presence on ground. This paper will thus examine the UN's legal role in the prevention of internal armed conflict and establish the type of lessons that could be learnt from Rwanda and Sudan. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LL.M.

This thesis examines the policies, positions, and perspectives of developing countries on the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, focusing on the period between 1991 and 2001. In doing so, it questions the role of opposition that conventional wisdom has allotted to them as parochial defenders of sovereignty. Instead, the thesis reveals variation and complexity, which militates against defining the South, or the issues that humanitarian intervention raises, in simplistic either-or terms. Part I draws on insights about ‘sovereignty as what states make of it’ to break the classic pluralism-solidarism impasse that has otherwise stymied the conversation on humanitarian intervention and confined the South as a whole to a ‘black box’ labelled rejectionism. It reconstructs the empirical record of developing countries at large on six cases of military intervention (northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor), revealing variation that defies easy categorization. It also charts a cumulative and dynamic trend within the South towards a grey area between pluralism and solidarism that shows how these were not diametrically opposed positions. Following from that, Part II looks in-depth at India and Argentina. Whereas Argentina accepted the idea of humanitarian intervention, India remained reluctant to countenance it and persistently objected to the development of a new rule in its favour. Part II argues that the level of congruence between the emerging norm and the two countries’ prevailing values, aspirations, and historically constructed ways of thinking played a key role in determining the different levels of acceptance that the idea found with them. Part III delves deeper into the substance of their views. It shows how neither country constructed mutually exclusive choices between pluralism and solidarism, sovereignty and human rights, and intervention and non-intervention. Rather, both exhibited an acute awareness of the dilemmas of protecting human rights in a society of states, and a wariness of yes-no answers. Cumulatively, this thesis thus points away from thinking about the South itself as a given category with clear, shared or pre-determined ideas, and towards a more nuanced and inclusive conversation on humanitarian intervention.

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

Le Conseil de sécurité est l’organe principal du système onusien chargé du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. Face à une situation illégale, il ne peut donc l’ignorer et s’en désintéresser. Cependant, la perpétration d’un acte à la légalité controversée par l’un ou plusieurs de ses membres permanents peut nous laisser entendre que l’organe politique onusien aura des difficultés à remplir son rôle. Les membres permanents vont tenter d’instrumentaliser le Conseil de sécurité afin de diminuer l’illégalité de la situation. Ceci pose avec acuité le problème du contrôle de son activité en matière de maintien de la paix. L’accomplissement d’un acte illégal par un ou plusieurs membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité nécessite alors de réfléchir à des moyens d’ordre juridique pour limiter son pouvoir. Cette réflexion s’avère particulièrement pressante lorsque le Conseil est confronté à une occupation de guerre impliquant ses membres permanents ou, lorsqu’il crée ou autorise des opérations de paix de grandes envergures suite à un conflit armé impliquant ses membres permanents. Afin de limiter les prérogatives du Conseil de sécurité, le régime juridique de l’occupation tel qu’énoncé par le Règlement de La Haye (IV) de 1907 et la IVe Convention de Genève de 1949 devrait être appliquer par l’organe politique onusien lorsqu’il intervient dans une situation d’occupation de guerre impliquant ses membres permanents. L’objectif est d’éviter qu’il n’attribue aux puissances occupantes des missions qui dépassent le cadre juridique imposé par le droit des conflits armés. L’autorisation, par le Conseil de sécurité d’opérations de paix, telles qu’une administration civile transitoire ou une force multinationale avec un mandat de la paix avec recours à la force armée, suite à un conflit armé impliquant ses propres membres permanents, ouvre le débat sur leur réglementation. Alors, il sera proposé une interprétation progressiste de la définition de l’occupation telle qu’énoncée par le Règlement de La Haye (IV) de 1907 et la IVe Convention de Genève de 1949 afin d’y intégrer ces nouvelles formes d’occupations pacifiques, présentant de grandes similitudes avec les occupations de guerre. Ainsi, le régime juridique de l’occupation pourra leur être appliqué. / The Security Council is the primary body of the UN system responsible for peacekeeping and international security. In cases of violations of international law, the Security Council cannot turn a blind eye. Nevertheless, in cases when Security Council members are themselves perpetrators of international law violations one could conclude that this political body has difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. The danger exists that Security Council members in violation of international law will implicate the Security Council in justifying illegal decisions. This therefore raises the question of Security Council accountability. The violation of international law by a Security Council member therefore requires a legal mechanism to limit the powers of this body. This is particularly relevant for cases of occupation involving its permanent members, or, when the Security Council creates or authorizes large-scale peace-keeping operations following an armed conflict involving its own members. In order to limit the powers of the Security Council, this study proposes to impose a legal regime of administration as stipulated by the IV (1907) Hague and the 4th 1949 Geneva Convention, according to which the Security Council intervenes when a territory is administered by one of its permanent members. The goal is to avoid that the Security Council gives too much freedom to an administrative power during interventions which go beyond the legal framework defined by the law on administrated territories. The authorization by the Security Council of peace-keeping operations, such as transitional civil administration or multinational peace-keeping force mandated to use force, following an armed conflict involving its own members, opens the debate of their regulation. Consequently a progressive interpretation of occupation as defined by the IV (1907) Hague and the 4th 1949 Geneva Convention is proposed in order to encompass new forms of peaceful occupations which contain clear similarities with military occupations. Thus, they will fall under the legal mechanism of the latter.

Le différend entre la France et les Etats-Unis sur le règlement de la question irakienne a provoqué une crise diplomatique majeure entre les deux pays, jugée par certains comme la plus sérieuse dans l’histoire des relations bilatérales. Le dossier irakien a cristallisé les positions diplomatiques des deux alliés et mis en lumière deux lectures d’une grande question internationale. Pour la France, il a été l’occasion de défendre des principes, de faire entendre sa voix et de partager sa vision d’un monde multipolaire fondé sur la quête d’un règlement pacifique des différends. Pour les Etats-Unis, cette question relevait d’un enjeu de sécurité nationale, dans une Amérique profondément traumatisée par les attentats de septembre 2001. La rupture franco-américaine a résulté de facteurs structurels anciens : la concurrence entre deux modèles politiques et diplomatiques qui se veulent universels et le déséquilibre entre une puissance française, déclinante, qui aspire à préserver ses sphères d’influence sur la scène internationale, et une puissance américaine, ascendante, devenue, depuis l’effondrement du bloc soviétique, l’unique superpuissance à la tête d’un monde unipolaire. L’affrontement bilatéral du printemps 2003 a ainsi révélé les caractères intrinsèques qui opposent la diplomatie française et la diplomatie américaine et dévoilé leur conception très éloignée qu’elles se faisaient du nouvel ordre mondial et de la place qu’elles aspirent à occuper sur l’échiquier international / The disagreement between France and the US over the Iraqi issue led to a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries, considered by many analysts as the most serious one in the history of bilateral relations. The Iraqi case crystallized the diplomatic positions of both allies and revealed two different reads of this major international issue. For France, this case was the opportunity to defend its principles, to get itself heard by the rest of the world and to share its vision of a multipolar world, where disputes would be peacefully settled through international organizations. For the US, that issue fell under a matter of national security, in a country deeply traumatized by ‘9/11’. The split between thetwo countries resulted from historical structural causes : (i) the competition between two political and diplomatic models that present themselves as universal, and (ii) the imbalance between France’s declining power aspiring to preserve its spheres of influence over the world and America’s ascending power that has become, since the end of the Cold War, the only superpower. The bilateral confrontation of 2003 revealed the distinctive patterns of both French and American foreign policies and exposed their different views and models of the new world order, as well as their ambitions on the international scene

During the UN World Summit 2005 all Member States of the United Nations unanimously accepted the Responsibility to protect- principle (R2P- principle), that each member state shall protect its own population from ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the set-up of the United Nations and the Security Council’s veto system in the San Francisco Conference 1945, the five permanent members of the Security Council promised that their right to veto would be used “sparingly” and in the “interest” of the world organization, to safeguard “the International peace and security”. Despite the united acceptance of the R2P- principle to avoid mass atrocities since 2005, China have been detaining up to one million Uyghur, including Kazakhs in detainment camps, in former East Turkestan since the beginning of 2018. Since the passage to invoke the R2P- principle is by the Security Council, the question arises if- the veto would serve as a deadlock on the R2P- principle if China could veto such decision. The purpose of the thesis have therefore been to analyze if the R2P- principle is inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system, by targeting China’s opportunity of vetoing the R2P- principle. The conclusion have been that the R2P- principle is inefficient against the Security Council’s veto system. This is because a permanent member can block the R2P- principle by either vetoing or double vetoing a draft resolution, which have been demonstrated by illustrating how China could veto the R2P- principle. Since the decisions of the Security Council cannot be appealed or dissent in terms of the veto card and UN Charter, it leaves the R2P- principle inefficient with a weak operational legitimacy against the Security Council’s powerful veto system, on the cost of human lives.

La lutte contre le terrorisme, ainsi que ses conséquences sur la sphère des droits de l'Homme, n'est pas un thème nouveau en Europe. Cependant, depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 perpétrés sur le sol des Etats-Unis, «confirmés» par ceux de Madrid en 2004 et Londres en 2005, elle n'a jamais incarné une telle priorité. La majeure partie des mesures prises par l'Union européenne tombe sous le titre de la coopération en matière pénale, c’est-à-dire sousl’ex-troisième Pilier, parmi lesquelles la décision-cadre sur la lutte contre le terrorisme, la décision-cadre sur le mandat d'arrêt européen et les accords entre l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique sur l'extradition et l'assistance juridique mutuelle. Sur base des mesures européennes, certains Etats, historiquement non concernés par ce phénomène, ont été pressés à adopter des mesures anti-terroristes alors que d’autres y ont vu une légitimation pour renforcer leur corpus juridique déjà existant. Quel est l'impact des mesures européennes et de celles prises par les Etats sur le délicat équilibre entre la sécurité et la liberté ? En d'autres termes, quel est le rôle de l'Etat de droit : une limitation à ces mesures ou, un principe visant au renforcement du combat contre le terrorisme? / The fight against terrorism, as well as its consequences in the field of Human Rights, is not a new theme for Europe. However, since the terrorist attacks of September the 11th 2001 in the United States of America, “confirmed” by the ones of Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, it has never embodied such a priority. The larger part of the measures taken by the European Union falls under the heading of cooperation in criminal matters, i.e. within the scope of the former Third Pillar, among which the framework decision on combating terrorism, the framework decision on the European arrest warrant and the agreements between the European Union and the United States of America on extradition and mutual legal assistance. On basis of the European measures, some States, not historically concerned by terrorism, have been compelled to carry out counter-terrorism measures whereas, others have seen a legitimation to reinforce their existing body of law. What is the impact of the European measures and the ones taken by States on the delicate balance between security and liberty? In other words, what is the role of the Rule of Law: a limitation to those measures or, a principle aiming to the strengthening of the fight against terrorism?

Vingt et un an après la création du Tribunal International pour le Rwanda et dix-sept ans après la signature du traité de Rome donnant naissance à la Cour pénale international, la fièvre dénonciatrice que connait cette institution n’est toujours pas apaisée. La CPI est-elle otage des idéaux qui justifient sa création et des forces politiques antagonistes auxquelles elle reste malgré tout liée ? Les africains commettraient-ils davantage de crime passibles de poursuites devant la Cour que les ressortissant d’autres continents ? Si l’étude des procédures judiciaires nées des crimes commis dans des conflits se déroulant sur le continent africain et l’analyse des procédures de mise en cause de certains Chefs d’Etats africains soulignent le très important travail de lutte contre l’impunité que réalise la Cour pénale internationale, le bilan de ce travail met toutefois en évidence la collision des procédures judiciaires avec des impératifs politiques internationaux. Ce travail de recherche montre que si la CPI se veut un prolongement de la sécurité collective, l’efficacité de son action et son universalisme sont aujourd’hui mise en doute, au point de cristalliser les rapports de l’organisme judiciaire international avec le continent africain. / Twenty-one year after the creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and seventeen years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome giving rise to the International Criminal Court, the whistleblower fever that knows this institution is still not appeased. Is the ICC hostage ideals that justified its creation and antagonistic political forces which it nevertheless remains bound? African they commit more crime prosecuted before the Court that the national of other continents? If the study of legal proceedings arising from crimes committed in conflicts taking place on the African continent and in the analysis of the party proceedings of some African Heads of States stress the very important work to fight against impunity that makes the International Criminal Court, the outcome of this work, however, shows the collision of legal proceedings with international political imperatives. This research shows that if the ICC is an expansion of collective security, the effectiveness of its action and universalism are now in doubt, as to crystallize the reports of the international judicial body with the mainland African.

Le génocide des Tutsi du Rwanda est singulier au regard des génocides du XXème siècle. Il l’est par le nombre de ses victimes, par sa rapidité, ses modes d’exécution et surtout par le nombre de ses auteurs. Ce sont plus d’un million de Rwandais (Hutu) qui ont pris part directement aux massacres. La sanction de ces crimes de masse dans une société en quête de reconstruction soulevait d’innombrables difficultés notamment dans l’appréhension d’une criminalité collective en termes de responsabilité individuelle. L’ampleur et le paroxysme atteint dans ce drame a nécessité un traitement spécifique. Trois instances de justice ont été activées de manière concomitante : les juridictions classiques rwandaises (relayées par des juridictions coutumières dites Gacaca), le Tribunal international créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et enfin les juridictions nationales étrangères en application du principe de la compétence universelle. L’intérêt scientifique de notre démarche réside justement dans l’étude de ce traitement juridictionnel multiniveaux. Deux questions se posent : quelle est la pertinence de ce modèle de justice 20 ans après le drame rwandais ?Quel bilan provisoire peut-on tirer de tous les jugements rendus par ces différentes juridictions ? / The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda is singular in consider genocides of the XXth century. It is true by the number of victims, the speed and methods of implementation and, above all the number of the authors. These are more than one million Rwandan (Hutu) who participated directly in the massacres. Punishment of the massive crimes in a society in search of reconstruction, run into problems of group crime and individual responsibility. The scale and the speak of human tragedy needed specific treatment. Rwandan ordinary courts (replace by customary Courts called Gacaca), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (created by United Nations Security Council) and lastly, national foreign jurisdictions are also begin simultaneously in application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The interest of our scientific approach lies in the study of multilevel constitutionalism. This raises two obvious questions: What is the relevance of this justice model twenty years after the Rwandan tragedy? What has been the interim review of all the judgments handed down by the different jurisdictions?