I denna uppsats undersöker jag hur två olika tolkningar av den sokratiska frivillighetsparadoxen ingen gör fel frivilligt påverkar möjligheten att förstå Platons dialog Staten. Min hypotes är att de två tolkningarna av frivillighetsparadoxen kastar ljus över diskussionen i Staten, och att det är nödvändigt att förstå frivillighetsparadoxens roll för att förstå vad som står på spel i Staten. I uppsatsen ämnar jag visa att ett möjligt sätt att läsa Staten är att tolka Sokrates och de övriga samtalsdeltagarnas uttalanden baserat på kontexten, eftersom vissa uttalanden är polemiska i sin karaktär, medan andra är traditionella. Jag argumenterar för att såväl den traditionella synen på Sokrates som den polemiska dito är korrekta analyser av Sokrates filosofiska gärning, men inte heltäckande sådana, eftersom Sokrates ibland är polemisk – mot de som kvickt måste nedkämpas – och ibland är instruerande på traditionellt manér, mot de som kan förbättras genom det filosofiska samtalet. Detta sätt att läsa Staten skiljer sig från andra genom att läsaren bör avstå a priori-uppfattningar om Sokrates, Thrasymakos eller Glaukons och Adeimantos ståndpunkter till förmån för att tolka beteenden hos samtalsdeltagarna samt deras uppfattningar, vilka förmedlas av texten.

The aim of this study is to examine and analyse how the Alexandrian prefect Orestes of late antiquity and his management of the events of 414-415 were depicted in the ancient sources: Socrates Scholasticus, John of Nikiu and Damascius. By applying S. Brownes rhetoric analysis to remove the authors “filters” in their depiction and then applying French & Ravens bases of power to analyse how prefect Orestes power were depicted. Th analyses also applies the bases of power on bishop Cyril and philosopher Hypatia as the study found it difficult to analyses the prefect without them. The result of the analysis and discussion mainly found that the depiction of the prefect Orestes is affected by the rhetoric “filterers” of the three ancient authors. The study also found that the depiction of prefect Orestes and how he managed the events between 414-415 is always dependent on the office of prefectures authority and power. This what French & Raven call legitimate power. Prefect Orestes actions were based on the office of prefecture authority and power, in accordance to the social structure and cultural rules. He was always depicted as the prefect not the person Orestes.

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The study of the phenomenon of religion is a field that has many challenges regarding what its object of study is and how to observe and interpret the different religious phenomenon in a way that reflects both its origin and how its practiced. The study is carried out through a philosophical approach. In this essay Lua Nazerian intends to address the four different theoretical perspectives: Critical Religion Theory, Cognitive Sciences of Religion, Positive Psychology and Platonic Idealism. The two former ones are well established theoretical frameworks in the study of religion, while the two latter ones are lend from the field of psychology and philosophy to test whether they could be used as analytical tools in the study of religion. Moreover the perspectives different view on the human nature in particular are further examined through the lens of the subcategories: Materialism, Conceptualism and Realism. Furthermore, by adding the two subcategories of 1) a virtuous life 2) transcendence, the essay examines whether the perspectives touches on these topics which seems to be central concepts in the majority of religious doctrine. Finally, some possible conclusions of the perspectives inherent premises impacting the understanding of religion are carefully examined and presented. Suggested further studies to be done cross-disciplines, such as religious studies, positive psychology and philosophy. Also by a combination of descriptive and prescriptive approach within religious studies.

This thesis applies Søren Kierkegaard's understanding of irony as outlined in his master's thesis, The Concept of Irony, to the literary works of Fernando Pessoa. Recently Kierkegaardian scholarship has opened possibilities for non-traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard's dissertation and pseudonymous "aesthetic" texts by reading them in the ironic tone in which they were written. This paper offers a similar re-reading of the poetic and prose works Pessoa attributes to his heteronyms. Kierkegaard's presentation of Socrates as irony serves as a model for how Pessoa sustains the heteronymic project by balancing the use of rhetorical irony within the works of the heteronyms with simultaneous use of "Socratic" irony relating to both the heteronyms and their literary contributions. Pessoa "controls" irony by bringing his heteronyms into his historical reality whereby he posits subjectivities for them. The necessary element of eros as it is identified with Socrates and thereby with irony is defined negatively as the desire for that which one is lacking and is sustained by the distance inherent in desire. Irony-eros as desire is present in the works of each of Pessoa's poetic heteronyms, gains for them corporeality, and characterizes the relationship the reader has with those works. Pessoa, like Socrates, is unable to extend controlled irony to his personal life and remains in the negativity of desire. Bernardo Soares and O Livro do Desassossego challenge traditional notions of reality since Soares feels with equal intensity the reality of his actuality and that of his imagination. Kierkegaard holds that the imagination provides the thinker with various possibilities or ideals. The thinker must then actualize the ideal. Kierkegaard's pseudonyms offer possible life-views as do Pessoa's heteronyms. The distance of irony is essential, for in reflecting on the life-views, the reader must not be able to see the author in that reflection. Unlike Kierkegaard, Pessoa successfully distanced himself from his heteronyms by multiplying and deferring his identity. Adept in Socratic midwifery Pessoa establishes the subjectivity of other "Pessoas" through whom he offers his readers possibilities. Pessoa's ironic existence proves the self is indefinable and unassimilable to any System.

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Le présent mémoire entend étudier le concept de l’anhypothétique dans l’oeuvre de Platon et d’Aristote. Plus exactement, nous examinons le Bien intelligible chez Platon ainsi que le principe de non-contradiction chez Aristote. Bien que ce sont des principes qui adoptent la même conceptualisation, ils ont chacun un contexte et des facteurs qui leur sont spécifiques. Cela s’explique notamment par le fait que les philosophes ont des divergences doctrinales par rapport à l’être, la théorie des formes, la dialectique, et cetera. Un tour d’horizon des philosophies respectives ainsi qu’une comparaison systématique des principes nous aideront à y voir plus clair. De plus, nous examinerons en quoi Aristote est redevable à Platon pour l’adoption du principe de non-contradiction. Cela dit, les deux principes à l’étude ont comme caractéristique fondamentale de ne pas être des hypothèses, c’est-à-dire qu’ils ne peuvent souffrir du statut de contingence qui est typique de l’hypothèse. En effet, l’anhypothétique cherche à neutraliser son alternative afin de s’ériger en tant que nécessité catégorique. Les raisons d’une telle nécessité s’expliquent entre autres parce que l’anhypothétique est condition de possibilité pour la connaissance des êtres. La potentialité de sa négation est donc nettement problématique sur le plan scientifique et ontologique, d’où son statut particulièrement éminent pour les philosophes. / This dissertation examines the concept of the anhypothetical in the works of Plato and Aristotle. More precisely, we examine the Intelligible Good in Plato and the principle of non-contradiction in Aristotle. Although these principles adopt the same conceptualization, they each have their own specific context and factors. This is because the philosophers have doctrinal differences with regard to being, the theory of forms, dialectics, etcetera. An overview of the respective philosophies, together with a systematic comparison of principles, will help us to get a clearer picture. We'll also examine how Aristotle is indebted to Plato for the adoption of the principle of non-contradiction. That said, the two principles under consideration have the fundamental characteristic of not being hypotheses, i.e. they cannot suffer from the status of contingency that is typical of hypothesis. Indeed, the anhypothetical seeks to neutralize its alternative in order to set itself up as a categorical necessity. The reasons for such a necessity include the fact that the anhypothetic is a condition of possibility for the knowledge of beings. The potentiality of its negation is therefore clearly problematic on a scientific and ontological level, hence its particularly eminent status for philosophers.

At the outset of the Phaedrus, Plato tells us that Socrates’ knows himself (228a). This statement is then followed up by Socrates’ claim that he is not able to obey the Delphic imperative and know himself (229e-230b). This apparent contradiction has given rise to an interesting debate concerning what kind of knowledge we are dealing with here. While the debate is complex a few main positions can be identified. One group of scholars, hereafter referred to as the practitioners, argue that the self-knowledge Socrates here talks about is a life-guiding term. The practitioners argue that when striving toward what is true about oneself and acknowledging one’s limits, one turns away from chaos towards a well structured life. Another group of scholars, referred to as the mystics, argue that self-knowledge is something Socrates’ possesses when contemplating over his own epistemic limits as well as his soul and its connection to the Forms. Finally, the unitarian view explains the content of self-knowledge, namely that it includes dispositional and cognitive knowledge of oneself. Even if these views are helpful to explain the different parts of self-knowledge, they fail to explain Socrates’ apparently contradictory answers regarding self-knowledge. What is lacking, and what this thesis will try to provide, is an account of how Socrates both can say that he knows and does not know himself. The thesis will help explain how Socrates can be said to have self-knowledge. However, Socrates does not yet have absolute self-knowledge and acknowledges, with his denial of self-knowledge, that a deepened self-knowledge can be gained gradually. On the view that this thesis will test and defend, Socratic self-knowledge is a continuum, that is to say, a coherent yet dynamic knowledge. This can help to explain how Socrates can claim to both know and not yet know himself.

This dissertation is generally concerned with Plato's conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic' dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy' does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity. A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic' (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato's science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher. In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.

Cette étude propose un commentaire thématique des Mémorables de Xénophon prenant comme fil conducteur la conciliation ergon-logos. En relevant les manifestations nombreuses et variées de ce thème, en les regroupant thématiquement et en les analysant, on peut apprécier dans quelle mesure la conciliation ergon-logos est centrale dans la philosophie socratique de Xénophon. Le premier chapitre considère la place de la conciliation ergon-logos dans l’intention globale des Mémorables – qui est fixée sur le motif apologétique de l’utilité de Socrate –, tout en soulevant un enjeu philosophique de taille concernant les limites du logos, enjeu qui permet de renforcer d’autant plus l’intérêt et l’importance philosophique de la conciliation ergon-logos. Le second chapitre examine à quel point la conciliation ergon-logos est impliquée dans la morale socratique de Xénophon, non seulement parce que Socrate lui-même incarne de façon exemplaire les principales vertus en acte et en parole, mais aussi parce que la conception morale de Xénophon est à la fois intellectualiste et ascétique, impliquant, d’un côté, l’apprentissage et la connaissance, et de l’autre, la maîtrise de soi, l’exercice, la fréquentation d’un maître et la vertu de l’exemple. Le troisième chapitre explore le rôle de la conciliation ergon-logos à titre de condition de l’amitié, d’une part en tant qu’exigence éthique, d’autre part en tant que moyen pour se faire des amis. Enfin, le dernier chapitre montre au moyen de la notion d’imposture que les principes de la morale socratique de Xénophon s’étendent aussi au domaine technique. / This thesis offers a thematic commentary of Xenophon’s Memorabilia following the ergon-logos conciliation. Surveying, regrouping and analyzing the many and varied occurrences of this theme reveals the extent to which it is deeply rooted in Xenophon’s Socratic philosophy. The first chapter considers the role Xenophon ascribes to this theme in the general intention that governs the Memorabilia – which focuses on Socrates’ usefulness as an apologetic device –, and reveals a greater philosophical question about the limits of logos, which in reality reinforces the philosophical interest and importance of the ergon-logos conciliation. The second chapter examines just how significant the ergon-logos conciliation is in Xenophon’s Socratic morality, not only because Socrates himself is, in word and deed, the ideal incarnation of virtue, but also because Xenophon’s moral conception is both intellectualistic and ascetic, which advocates learning and knowledge, as well as self-control, exercise, mentorship, and the virtue of example. The third chapter investigates the role the ergon-logos conciliation plays as a condition to friendship, in turn as its ethical foundation and as a means to acquire friends. Finally, the fourth and last chapter uses the notion of imposture to illustrate that Xenophon’s Socratic morality also stretches to the technical field.