Users face many risks while being online, including ones posed by their own actions, such as keeping the same passwords on multiple services. This makes them potential victims of account takeovers, in which a hacker uses stolen credentials to acquire and use accounts for their own benefit. However, few papers have researched how users experience these incidents, and how this affects their trust in the service. To fill this research gap, 4 users that were part of the same account takeover incident were interviewed. Storytelling was used to present and analyse the interviews. One participant experienced the takeover as it happened, while the other three learned about it after it was mitigated. The results show that the role the user took, and how they valued the platform, affected their trust. This paper contributes to research by giving in-depth insights into account takeovers, and what challenges and opportunities the systems face. / Användare står inför många risker när de är online, inklusive de som orsakas av deras egna handlingar, som att behålla samma lösenord på flera tjänster. Detta gör dem till potentiella offer för kontoövertaganden, där en hackare använder stulna inloggningsuppgifter för att ta kontroll över och använda konton till sin egen fördel. Men få studier har undersökt hur användare upplever dessa incidenter och hur detta påverkar deras förtroende för tjänsten. För att bidra med kunskap inom detta område intervjuades 4 användare som ingick i samma incident med kontoövertagelser. Storytelling användes för att presentera och analysera intervjuerna. En deltagare upplevde övertagandet medan det hände, medan de andra tre f ick veta om det efter att det hanterats. Resultaten visar att den roll användaren tog, och hur de värderade plattformen, påverkade deras förtroende. Denna artikel bidrar till forskningen genom att ge ingående insikter om övertaganden och vilka utmaningar och möjligheter systemen står inför.

Šiame darbe, kuris gali būti įvardijamas kaip lyginamasis-teisinis kokybinis tyrimas, nagrinėjamas Jungtinėse Amerikos Valstijose, Europos Sąjungoje ir Lietuvos Respublikoje susiklostęs privalomo akcijų pardavimo teisinis reguliavimas. Darbu siekiama nustatyti privalomo akcijų pardavimo (pirkimo) teisinį reguliavimą bei jį įvertinti akcininko teisių užtikrinimo efektyvumo požiūriu identifikuojant pagrindines praktikoje bei teorijoje kylančias problemas. Darbe pristatomu tyrimu siekiama įvertinti privalomo akcijų pardavimo teisinį reguliavimą ne tik mažumos akcininkų, bet ir didžiojo akcininko teisių užtikrinimo efektyvumo aspektu. Tai daroma analizuojant ne tik privalomo akcijų pardavimo instituto tikslus, bet ir šiam institutui būdingas suderinamumo su nuosavybės teisės apsauga, teisingos kainos užtikrinimo bei kitas problemas. / This work, which could be defined as a comparative-legal qualitative study, analyses legal regulation of squeeze-out existent in United States of America, European Union and the Republic of Lithuania. This research aims at determining legal regulation of squeeze-out (sell-out) and to evaluate it with regard to the effective protection of shareholder’s rights by at the same time identifying main practical and theoretical problems. The research presented in this work is aimed at evaluating legal regulation of squeeze-out not only with regard to the effective protection of minority shareholders’ rights but with regard to the effective protection of majority shareholder’s rights as well. It is done not only by analyzing aims of the squeeze-out institute but also the major problems inherent to this legal institute such as compatibility with the protection of private property, determination of fair squeeze-out compensation etc.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M) option droit des affaires" / Les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières doivent veiller à la protection des investisseurs et à l'efficience des marchés financiers. Pour ce faire, ils ont été investis de larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires leur permettant de contrôler les opérations qui, quoique conformes aux prescriptions légales, sont susceptibles de porter atteinte à l'intérêt public. La notion d'intérêt public étant malléable et difficile à circonscrire, la discrétion conférée à ces organismes est étendue. Son exercice pouvant menacer la sécurité juridique des opérations et être associé à l'arbitraire, elle a été décriée par de nombreux observateurs qui ont demandé qu'elle soit limitée aux cas de transgression de la législation sur les valeurs mobilières. Le texte cherche à déterminer si les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières ont fait preuve de l'ingérence appréhendée par certains en recourant à leur discrétion relative à l'intérêt public. Tout en faisant ressortir la portée large et flexible de cette discrétion, il cherche à cerner les types d'opérations susceptibles d'en entraîner l'exercice. Bien qu'il ne propose pas une refonte du cadre juridique actuel, il soulève des points de réflexion et suggère des avenues qui pourraient être envisagées afin de limiter les risques y étant associés. / Securities regulators must ensure the protection ofinvestors and the ejJiciency of capital markets. With this intention, they have been vested with broad discretionary powers enabling them to control the operations that, although in conformity with legal requirements, are likely to undermine public interest. The public interest notion being malleable and difJicult to circumscribe, the discretion conferred to these organizations has a wide scope. As its exercise can threaten the legal safety of operations and be associated to the arbitrary, it has been disparaged by many observers who required that it be limited to cases in which the securities legislation has been breached. The text seeks to determine if securities regulators have shown the interference dreaded by some by resorting to their public interest discretion. White emphasizing the broad andflexible range ofthis discretion, it seeks to determine the types ofoperations likely to lead to its exercise. Although it does not propose a revision ofthe current legal framework, it provides points for reflection and suggests avenues that could be considered in order to limit the risks being associated to it.

This dissertation consists of three essays examining the relation between corporate governance and firm performance. The theme of this study is that the widely documented long-term underperformance in equity carve-outs can be partly explained by weak corporate governance. The first essay presented in Chapter 2 explores the effect of shareholder-rights protection on the performance of a sample of firms that initiated a carve-out during the period 1983-2004. Using the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) entrenchment index, as proxies for the quality of shareholder-rights protection, I provide evidence that firms with better shareholder rights protection outperform those with weaker rights protection. Results indicate that the weaker the rights protection, the greater the degree of underperformance. Overall, the results are robust to measures of firm performance and to model specification. The second essay presented in Chapter 3 examines the relation between firm performance and board structure. In particular, I study how board size, board independence, and CEO duality influence firm performance. I find that board size for non-financial firms is negatively related to firm performance but positively associated with performance for financial firms. Board independence is positively related to firm performance and CEO duality is negatively associated with performance for both financial and non-financial firms. These results are robust to various measures of firm performance. The conflicting evidence on board size, between financials and non-financials, seems to suggest that the scope and complexity of a firm.s operations drives board size. The third essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates corporate ownership and firm performance. I focus on insider ownership, outside blockholder ownership, and ownership concentration. Results show that insider ownership is negatively related to firm performance even at low levels of insider ownership levels. It is plausible that the combination of parent ownership and management ownership in the subsidiary exacerbate the entrenchment effect thus overwhelming the incentive alignment effects that theory posits. I document a positive relation between outside blockholder ownership and firm performance. And finally, I show that the level of ownership concentration increases (decreases) in anticipation of positive (negative) changes in firm performance.

A financially secure public school district can provide children with an educational foundation that will eventually transition them into self-sufficient employed adults. These adults will become tax-paying citizens who will contribute to their local economies. The problem with one midwestern public school district is that a history of financial insecurity has affected the district's ability to provide students with all of the programs to which they are entitled. Using Baumgartner and Jones' conceptualization of punctuated equilibrium as the theoretical foundation, the purpose of this quantitative study was to determine the relationship between aspects of the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act (LFSCA) in 1 state and the educational policy outcomes in 1 affected city. The educational policy outcome variables were student retention, graduation rates, college readiness, student assessments, and the annual budget balance. Secondary data were collected from the Michigan School Data website. Data included the entire school district from the periods of Fiscal Year 2007 through Fiscal Year 2016. Data were analyzed using the non-parametric chi-square test of association. The findings indicated that LFSCA legislation has a statistical association with the graduation rate increasing, student assessment scores decreasing, and college readiness rates decreasing. The effect of the LFSCA legislation was found inconclusive for the student count and the annual budget balance. The implications for positive social change include for legislators to use the findings to create performance outcome measures that provide feedback on public school districts or public institutions.

本篇論文所探討的重心為公司接管策略之賽局應用，首先解釋公司接管時可採行的方法有那些，之後再將賽局理論導入不同的接管方法中，我們試著從賽局的理論模型中得到一些關於公司接管策略較強的結果。 公司接管之可採行方式有自集中市場買進股權、公開收購、委託書收購，資產收購、策略聯盟 …等，而這些策略所面對的參賽者是有所不同的，譬如股權收購為目標公司股東，資產收購和策略聯盟為目標公司管理當局。因此我們可運用不同的賽局理論模型來解釋這些策略的進行過程及其結果如何。因此本論文擬應用的賽局模型有：訊號賽局、出價賽局、Kalyan C. & Larry S. (1988)談判賽局及Rubinstein (1985)談判賽局。 更進一步，我們希望能獲得關於接管者的管理能力大小是如何影響公司接管的策略？於是本論文最後結論證明結果為：當接管者的管理能力（綜效水準）很強時，建議他採股權收購；當接管者的管理能力綜效水準）很弱時，建議採取委託書收購；然而當接管者的管理能力不強不弱時，則採策略聯盟。

<p>Takeover is a business activity which really started in the beginning of the eighties and which still takes a strong part in the business and financial area all over the world. According to our studies as the desire for further acknowledgements and the desire of building a career around financial activities, this study has been naturally conducted in the banking area.</p><p>Regarding the steady use of acquisition like a powerful process with some positive and negative sides, we decided to implement a comparison of different mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry in the United States and Europe. This comparison has been supported and based on the third main topic of our study: performance.</p><p>These large and complex subjects combined together lead to the following hypotheses:</p><p>Hypothesis 1: Performance is not improved after takeover in the banking industry.</p><p>Hypothesis 2: The level of post takeover performance is the same in the U.S. as in the European bank acquisitions.</p><p>Based on the historical data and knowledge, the United States was the pioneer in the development of such gathers in the banking sector. Considering the United States as a reference, a first purpose was to compare them with the bank mergers and acquisitions in Europe. Stating on some possible differences as increasing our own knowledge have been some others purposes which have supported our work.</p><p>A first large part of our work was focused, through a large literature review, on the enhancement of our knowledge as the statements of the basis and support for the analysis.</p><p>To illustrate and to try to answer our research question, we have conducted our study based on a sample of 20 acquisitions which were achieved in the banking industry between March 1998 and May 2004. 10 of these acquisitions had been achieved in the United States as the 10 remaining acquisitions had been executed in Europe.</p><p>The analysis has been achieved by collecting data in Thomson Datastream Advance.</p><p>Based on a quantitative method, we applied two financial models: The Market Model (MM) and the Market-Adjusted Returns Model (MAR) supported by the Cumulative Abnormal Returns Method (CARs).</p><p>The post-takeover study has been delimited on a period of 42 months after the public announcement.</p><p>The study and the comparison between the United States and Europe have shown some differences between the two areas. Nevertheless it seems that negative abnormal returns are usually the case after such takeovers on the whole period studied. Some positive abnormal returns have been recorded at different points in the time into the studying period.</p><p>According to the models we applied, the US banks results seem to be better than the ones of European banks: the differences range from 5,58 to 16,65 points under the MM, and from 1,66 to 18,08 points under the MAR model.</p>

Taking a sociological perspective on the market for corporate control this thesis calls into question financial capitalism with its preference for clear shareholder-value governance of the corporation. The institutional setting chosen to show this is Sweden, with its particularly shareholder friendly governance regime and its very active takeover market. To this is added three longitudinal case studies of cross-border hostile takeover processes during the sixth takeover wave in Europe. These reveal that the success of cross-border hostile bids has little to do with the theory of the market for corporate control, as a market where contests enable “good managers” to win over “bad managers”, with the overarching goal of enhancing wealth creation for society at large. Instead the most successful actors on a market for corporate control are those who best understand that market’s power dynamics – including the use of regulatory and moral arbitrage between different national frameworks and the leveraging of short-termism of institutional investors. The case studies are then analyzed in relation to the revised Swedish takeover rules of 2009. This shows that the revision did not address the problems detected, focusing instead on enhancing deal making and further limiting the board’s ability to work for long term value creation. As a whole this thesis calls for a development of a theory of a market for corporate control that in a more sustainable way will enable board of directors to focus on the corporation as value accretive entity. Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall has conducted her PhD work at the Stockholm School of Economics and is today a researcher
at the Center for Management and Organization at the Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research (SIR). She has a background as a prize winning financial journalist for over 20 years and has co-authored three books about delicate issues in large Swedish corporations. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2012</p>

Takeover is a business activity which really started in the beginning of the eighties and which still takes a strong part in the business and financial area all over the world. According to our studies as the desire for further acknowledgements and the desire of building a career around financial activities, this study has been naturally conducted in the banking area. Regarding the steady use of acquisition like a powerful process with some positive and negative sides, we decided to implement a comparison of different mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry in the United States and Europe. This comparison has been supported and based on the third main topic of our study: performance. These large and complex subjects combined together lead to the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1: Performance is not improved after takeover in the banking industry. Hypothesis 2: The level of post takeover performance is the same in the U.S. as in the European bank acquisitions. Based on the historical data and knowledge, the United States was the pioneer in the development of such gathers in the banking sector. Considering the United States as a reference, a first purpose was to compare them with the bank mergers and acquisitions in Europe. Stating on some possible differences as increasing our own knowledge have been some others purposes which have supported our work. A first large part of our work was focused, through a large literature review, on the enhancement of our knowledge as the statements of the basis and support for the analysis. To illustrate and to try to answer our research question, we have conducted our study based on a sample of 20 acquisitions which were achieved in the banking industry between March 1998 and May 2004. 10 of these acquisitions had been achieved in the United States as the 10 remaining acquisitions had been executed in Europe. The analysis has been achieved by collecting data in Thomson Datastream Advance. Based on a quantitative method, we applied two financial models: The Market Model (MM) and the Market-Adjusted Returns Model (MAR) supported by the Cumulative Abnormal Returns Method (CARs). The post-takeover study has been delimited on a period of 42 months after the public announcement. The study and the comparison between the United States and Europe have shown some differences between the two areas. Nevertheless it seems that negative abnormal returns are usually the case after such takeovers on the whole period studied. Some positive abnormal returns have been recorded at different points in the time into the studying period. According to the models we applied, the US banks results seem to be better than the ones of European banks: the differences range from 5,58 to 16,65 points under the MM, and from 1,66 to 18,08 points under the MAR model.

Les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières doivent veiller à la protection des investisseurs et à l'efficience des marchés financiers. Pour ce faire, ils ont été investis de larges pouvoirs discrétionnaires leur permettant de contrôler les opérations qui, quoique conformes aux prescriptions légales, sont susceptibles de porter atteinte à l'intérêt public. La notion d'intérêt public étant malléable et difficile à circonscrire, la discrétion conférée à ces organismes est étendue. Son exercice pouvant menacer la sécurité juridique des opérations et être associé à l'arbitraire, elle a été décriée par de nombreux observateurs qui ont demandé qu'elle soit limitée aux cas de transgression de la législation sur les valeurs mobilières. Le texte cherche à déterminer si les organismes de réglementation des valeurs mobilières ont fait preuve de l'ingérence appréhendée par certains en recourant à leur discrétion relative à l'intérêt public. Tout en faisant ressortir la portée large et flexible de cette discrétion, il cherche à cerner les types d'opérations susceptibles d'en entraîner l'exercice. Bien qu'il ne propose pas une refonte du cadre juridique actuel, il soulève des points de réflexion et suggère des avenues qui pourraient être envisagées afin de limiter les risques y étant associés. / Securities regulators must ensure the protection ofinvestors and the ejJiciency of capital markets. With this intention, they have been vested with broad discretionary powers enabling them to control the operations that, although in conformity with legal requirements, are likely to undermine public interest. The public interest notion being malleable and difJicult to circumscribe, the discretion conferred to these organizations has a wide scope. As its exercise can threaten the legal safety of operations and be associated to the arbitrary, it has been disparaged by many observers who required that it be limited to cases in which the securities legislation has been breached. The text seeks to determine if securities regulators have shown the interference dreaded by some by resorting to their public interest discretion. White emphasizing the broad andflexible range ofthis discretion, it seeks to determine the types ofoperations likely to lead to its exercise. Although it does not propose a revision ofthe current legal framework, it provides points for reflection and suggests avenues that could be considered in order to limit the risks being associated to it. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M) option droit des affaires"