Opérations particulièrement complexes, les offres publiques d'acquisition ne cessent de faire parler d'elles, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société visée. De nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Ces dernières ont par ailleurs développé un certain nombre de mécanismes de défense anti-OPA particulièrement efficaces, mais se révélant le plus souvent insuffisants face à l'ingéniosité dont peut faire preuve l'initiateur. Le droit positif montre ainsi ses limites face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. L'analyse prospective du droit anti-OPA permet d'observer les nouvelles mutations que subit le droit positif au regard des nouveaux enjeux économiques. Elle permet également d'envisager de nouveaux modes d'appréhension des OPA hostiles. Il est ainsi possible d'observer que le gouvernement d'entreprise prend une place considérable dans la vie des sociétés cotées. De même, la montée en puissance de la régulation et l'interventionnisme de l’État sont de plus en plus marqués ; et les salariés s'impliquent de plus en plus dans la gestion de l'entreprise. L'ensemble de ces paramètres marquent un glissement progressif vers une réorganisation du mode de fonctionnement des sociétés, ce qui a amené au développement du soft law, un droit à la frontière du droit positif et des pratiques des sociétés. Le soft law constitue à ce titre une approche inédite des OPA hostiles, dont l'analyse permet de cerner les apports liés à la mutation du droit positif et d'envisager l'émergence de nouveaux moyens de défense. Celui-ci doit toutefois demeurer complémentaire au cadre législatif et réglementaire existant. / No abstract

Le présent mémoire dresse un portrait des règles entourant la mise en vigueur et l'entrée en application de régimes de droits de souscription d'actions. À cet effet, l'auteur résume les règles entourant les offres publiques d'achat, examine les principes touchés par la mise en place d'un régime de droits de souscription d'actions, ainsi que les effets d'un tel régime sur la valeur des actions. Dans un deuxième temps, l'auteur se penche sur la légalité des régimes de droits de souscription d'actions en effectuant une revue du principe de l'égalité des actionnaires et des droits et obligations des administrateurs en matière de défense à une offre publique d'achat. L'auteur termine en effectuant une revue des divers recours qui s'ouvrent aux divers intervenants. / The present thesis tries to review the main rules regarding the creation and the application of a shareholders rights plan. The author reviews also the sections of the Securities Act pertaining to the Take-Over bid. The author also explains the main principles of the corporation law domain and how a shareholders rights plan may be implemented. Second, the author reviews the legality of the implementation of the shareholders rights plan with regards to the shareholders rights given by the Law, and to the obligations and duties of the directors of the Corporation. At the end of the present thesis, the author presents a review of the main recourses opened to the Shareholders, the corporation and the bidder.

Market Liquidity, Active Investment, and Markets for Information. This paper studies a financial market in which investors choose among investment strategies that exploit information about different fundamentals. On the one hand, the presence of other informed investors generates illiquidity. On the other hand, investors who use different strategies can serve as quasi-noise traders for each other, thereby also supplying each other with liquidity. Thus, investment strategies can be substitutes or complements. Such externalities in information acquisition have effects on investor herding, comovement in prices and liquidity across assets, trade volume, and the informational role of prices. They further affect the relationship between financial markets and information markets. Information market competition fosters investor diversity, whereas monopoly power promotes investor herding. Also, in order to benefit from quasi-noise trading, a financial institution may engage in both proprietary trading and information sales. Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening. This paper shows that non-voting shares can promote takeovers. When the bidder has private information, shareholders may refuse to tender because they suspect to sell at an ex-post unfavourable price. The ensuing friction in the sale of cash flow rights can prevent an efficient sale of control. Separating cash flow and voting rights mitigates this externality, thereby facilitating takeovers. In fact, the fraction of non-voting shares can be used to discriminate between efficient and inefficient bidders. The optimal fraction decreases with managerial ability, implying an inverse relationship between firm value and non-voting shares. As non-voting shares increase control contestability, share reunification programs entrench managers of widely held firms, whereas dual-class recapitalizations can increase shareholder wealth. Signaling in Tender Offer Games. This paper examines whether a bidder can use the terms of the tender offer to signal the post-takeover security benefits to the shareholders of a widely held target firm. As atomistic shareholders extract all the gains in security benefits, signaling equilibria are subject to a constraint that is absent from bilateral trade models. The buyer (bidder) must enjoy gains from trade that are excluded from bargaining (private benefits), but can nonetheless be relinquished and enable shareholders to draw inference about the security benefits. Restricted bids and cash-equity offers do not satisfy these requirements. Dilution, debt financing, probabilistic takeover outcomes and toeholds are all viable signals because they make bidder gains depend on the security benefits in a predictable manner. In all the signaling equilibria, lower-valued types must forgo a larger fraction of their private benefits and these signaling costs prevent some takeovers. When the bidder has additional private information about the private benefits as in the case of two-dimensional bidder types, fully revealing equilibria cease to exist. This does not hold once bidders can offer not only cash or equity but also (more) elaborate contingent claims. Offers which include options avoid inefficiencies and implement the symmetric information outcome. Goldrush Dynamics of Private Equity. This paper presents a simple dynamic model of entry and exit in a private equity market with heterogeneous private equity firms, a depletable stock of target companies, and rational learning about investment profitability. The predictions of the model match a number of stylized facts: Aggregate fund activity follows waves with endogenous transitions from boom to bust. Supply and demand in the private equity market are inelastic, and the supply comoves with investment valuations. High industry performance precedes high entry, which in turn precedes low industry performance. There are persistent differences in fund performance across private equity firms, first-time funds underperform the industry, and first-time funds raised in booms are unlikely to be succeeded by a follow-on fund. Fund performance and fund size are positively correlated across firms, but negatively correlated across consecutive funds of a private equity firm. Finally, booms can make ”too much capital chase too few deals.” Reputable Friends as Watchdogs: Social Ties and Governance. To examine how governance is affected when a designated supervisor befriends the person to be supervised, this paper embeds a delegated monitoring problem in a social structure: the supervisor and the agent are friends, and the supervisor desires to be socially recognized for having integrity. Strengthening the friendship weakens the supervisor’s monitoring incentives, forging an alliance against the principal (bonding). But the agent also grows more reluctant to put the supervisor’s perceived integrity at risk, thus becoming more aligned with the principal (bridging). If the supervisor’s desire for social recognition is strong, the principal’s preferences regarding the supervisor-agent friendship are bipolar. Weak friendship makes the supervisor monitor intensively to save face. Strong friendship leads the supervisor to abandon monitoring but the agent to behave well in order to protect the supervisor from losing face. The strength of friendship necessary for the latter outcome decreases in the supervisor’s desire for esteem; that is, image concerns leverage the bridging effect of friendship. This suggests that overlapping personal and professional ties can enhance delegated governance in cultures or contexts where social recognition is important, and provides a novel perspective on issues related to crony capitalism, corporate governance, and organizational culture. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2009 Sammanfattning jämte 5 uppsatser

Emerging markets such as India have witnessed waves of domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This historical analysis, which consists of two parts, tests central tenets of resource dependence theory. The first part entails an analysis of the transition in public policy governing corporations between 1991 and 2005. The second part tests hypotheses derived from resource dependence theory relating to a firm’s decision to acquire. The analysis explores the factors that explain why firms engage in mergers and acquisitions by examining three specific policy periods (i.e., 1991-1996, 1997-2001 and 2002-2005). The findings from the historical analysis suggest that firms did not merely react to the conditions (i.e., constraints on capital) in their environment by undertaking merger and acquisition activity, but attempted to alter them as resource dependence theory suggests. Findings from the event history logit model also support resource dependence theory. Overall, the study shows that merger and acquisition activity increased during a period of intense deregulation (i.e., 1991-2005) brought about by the adoption of neo-liberal reforms, change to the multilayer subsidiary form, deregulation of the banking and financial sectors’ and reforms in foreign direct investment and equity markets. During this period of uncertainty, firms controlling more resources in terms of earnings, efficiency and number of subsidiaries were more likely to undertake acquisition activity as they have leverage in organization-environment relationships. The effect of number of subsidiaries on acquisition activity was the most consistent across policy periods’. This dissertation is organized in the following manner: Following the introductory chapter, Chapter II is a historical examination of the three policy periods and includes an analysis of the effect of the political-legal environment on mergers and acquisitions between 1991 and 2005. Chapter III reviews the propositions of resource dependence theory that pertain to organizational change and presents research hypotheses related to mergers and acquisitions. Chapter IV describes the data, measurement and methodology employed in the quantitative analysis. Chapter V presents the findings from the quantitative analysis and discusses the results. The concluding chapter (Chapter VI) includes a presentation of the theoretical findings and discussion of the limitations and scope of the study.

Le présent mémoire dresse un portrait des règles entourant la mise en vigueur et l'entrée en application de régimes de droits de souscription d'actions. À cet effet, l'auteur résume les règles entourant les offres publiques d'achat, examine les principes touchés par la mise en place d'un régime de droits de souscription d'actions, ainsi que les effets d'un tel régime sur la valeur des actions. Dans un deuxième temps, l'auteur se penche sur la légalité des régimes de droits de souscription d'actions en effectuant une revue du principe de l'égalité des actionnaires et des droits et obligations des administrateurs en matière de défense à une offre publique d'achat. L'auteur termine en effectuant une revue des divers recours qui s'ouvrent aux divers intervenants. / The present thesis tries to review the main rules regarding the creation and the application of a shareholders rights plan. The author reviews also the sections of the Securities Act pertaining to the Take-Over bid. The author also explains the main principles of the corporation law domain and how a shareholders rights plan may be implemented. Second, the author reviews the legality of the implementation of the shareholders rights plan with regards to the shareholders rights given by the Law, and to the obligations and duties of the directors of the Corporation. At the end of the present thesis, the author presents a review of the main recourses opened to the Shareholders, the corporation and the bidder.

2016年全球半導體產值約 3,270 億美元，台灣半導體產值佔全球的23%，繼續蟬聯全球第二大半導體產業大國，排行僅次於美國。此外，台灣以出口為導向，根據我國財政部統計，2017上半年積體電路出口金額占整體出口總值的27.6%，是我國最主要的出口產品，可見半導體產業對台灣的影響力不言而喻。 近年來半導體併購浪潮興起，台灣廠商也無法置身事外，最受矚目非日月光與矽品的非合意併購案莫屬。一般學術論文對於非合意併購案的探討，著重於併購前的動機與併購後的綜效，鮮少討論雙方在併購過程中的攻防。故本研究欲以動態競爭觀點，並考量政府對併購成敗的影響，來找出矽品最後同意日月光共組控股公司之提案的原因，並分析此合併案對全球封測產業所造成的影響。 本研究發現雙方在合併前，應用產品及地區的市場共同性，分別呈現上升及下降趨勢，透過收購矽品，日月光不僅能追趕其主要競爭對手在車用電子的領先地位，更可以降低營收過度集中於北美的風險。另外，雙方在台灣及中國的專利申請數量有下降趨勢，但在美國專利的申請數有明顯增加且資源相似性也呈上升趨勢，故推論日月光收購矽品可鞏固其在北美市場的領導地位。總而言之，雖然日矽合併案被外界視為雙贏結果，但客戶轉單、中國商務部的限制條件及收購溢價偏高可能使得此合併綜效有限。在面對中國封測產商崛起、封測產業的市場集中度上升及半導體產業中下游界限越來越不明確的情況下，雙方合併為必然之勢。 / The worldwide semiconductor market grew 1.1% in 2016 to $338.9 billion USD, in which Taiwan accounts for 23% of the total output. Taiwan continues to rank as the world's second largest semiconductor industry, with the first being America. Taiwan is export oriented, and from the statistical data provided by the Ministry of Finance, the shipment of integrated circuit exports accounted for 27.6% of gross export value in the first two quarters of 2017. This indicates that integrated circuit is an important export product and that the semiconductor industry is of great importance to Taiwan. The recent and unprecedented M&A waves in the semiconductor industry caused major changes and created impact on Taiwanese semiconductor firm. The recent case that drew most attention is the M&A between ASE (Advanced Semiconductor Engineering, Inc.) and SPIL (Siliconware Precision Industries Co., Ltd). While most academic theses focus on the acquiring firm’s motive and post-M&A synergy, the offense and defense strategies during the M&A process are rarely explored. This research aims to focus on reasons why SPIL agreed on ASE’s proposal to form a joint venture holding company and the impact on the global OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) industry after this M&A. This thesis utilized the dynamic competitive perspective and identifies government’s impact on M&A. The study finds that before the merger, the commonality of product shows an upward trend while the commonality of region market presents a downward direction. This merger not only assists ASE to catch up with its leading competitors in the automotive electronics sectors, but also reduce the revenue concentration risk, given that its major sales is in North America. In addition, the number of patents filed by both companies in Taiwan and China has declined, but the number in the United States has increased significantly along with an escalating resource similarity. Therefore, the research concludes that the acquisition of SPIL can consolidate ASE’s leading position in the North American market. To sum up, the merger of ASE and SPIL is regarded as win-win outcome. However, the M&A has risks, such as customer attrition, restriction from The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) and merger overpayment. Such uncertainties may reduce synergy. Nevertheless, in the face of the rise of China's OSAT business, the market concentration of OSAT industry, and the increasingly unclear boundary between the middle and downstream firms, the merger of the two firms is inevitable.

Corporate Governance hat einen radikalen Wandel in Europa seit den 1990er Jahren durchgemacht. Der Wandel ist konsolidiert und ist nun Teil des Rechts der modernen Aktiengesellschaften. Brasilianisches Recht wird immer durch die europäische Gesetzgebung inspiriert. Unsere Studie fragt, aus einer vergleichenden Sicht, ob sich das brasilianische Unternehmensrecht auf die europäische Corporate Governance bezieht. Wir konzentrieren uns in Europa auf das deutsche Recht, das englische Recht, das französische Recht und das europäische Recht. Unsere Analyse geht über die Herzen der Unternehmensführung und umfasst Teile, die dem Kapitalmarkt- und dem Umweltrecht angehören, da sie selbstverständlich auch eine Verbindung mit der Corporate Governance und dem Aktienrecht haben. Das Verständnis des Kerns der Unternehmensführung, welcher die Organisation der Verwaltungsorgane der börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaft ist, hängt von der Analyse der rechtlichen Behandlung von Neben-Themen, die aber verwandt sind, ab, wie die Regeln über die Haftung. / Corporate governance has undergone a radical change in Europe since the 1990s. Change has now consolidated and is part of the company law. Brazilian law has always been inspired by European legislation. Our study asks, from a comparative perspective, if the Brazilian corporate law relates to the European corporate governance. In Europe, we focus on German law, English law, French law and Community law. Our analysis goes beyond the heart of corporate governance and includes parts of capital markets law and environmental law, because they obviously also have a connection with corporate governance and company law. The understanding of the core of corporate governance, which is the organization of administrative bodies of the listed company on a regulated market, depends on the analysis of the legal treatment of incidental subjects, but related, as the regime of liability.

La présente étude a pour objet de montrer que les moyens de la protection des actionnaires minoritaires en droit chinois et en droit français ne sont pas soumis à des critères fondamentalement différents. Dans les sociétés anonymes, les règles juridiques visent à trouver un équilibre des rapports entre les actionnaires majoritaires et minoritaires, ainsi qu’entre les actionnaires et la société ou le groupe de sociétés.C’est l’intérêt social et le principe d’égalité qui guident le législateur et le juge de proposer des solutions convenables.Il importe de noter qu’en droit français, les dispositions sur les responsabilités et les moyens de recours pour les minoritaires sont d’applications faciles qu’en droit chinois. D’ailleurs, la recherche de l’acquisition des sociétés cotées chinoises sous l’angle de la protection des minoritaires, tout à fait différent à l’offre publique en droit français, présente les particularités du marché réglementé chinois et mérite que les investisseurs étrangers découvrent davantage. / The dissertation aimed to point out that the methods of the protection of minority shareholders in Chinese law and in French law are not subject to the different criteria. In company limited by shares, the legal provisions intend to find a balance of relation between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and between the shareholders and the company or group of company. It is corporate profits and the principal of equality that direct legislators and judges to suggest applicable solutions.It is important to notify that in French law, legal provisions about the responsibility of majority shareholders or company leaders and the ways of resort of minority shareholders provide reference for improvement of Chinese law. Besides, the study of acquisition of chinese listed companies, looked from the angle of the protection of minority shareholders, very different from tender offer in French law, demonstrate the characteristics of Chinese stock market and deserve foreign investors’ enough attention.

The aim of this work is the processing of the technological project for the ,,Skladová hala v Měříně“, which addresses the preparation and organization of construction. Construction technology the project involves the processing of time plans, economic evaluation, design of pumping sources for construction, working procedures, construction site equipment, and design of major machines and mechanisms. Further, it is processed a detailed technological regulation and inspection and test plan for a prefabricated reinforced concrete skeleton. All technological procedures are processed with regard to work safety and environment.

員工持股計畫是由財經律師Louis Kelso所創，在美國已行之多年，廣為美國企業所採。最早的員工持股計畫是一種為了和平地從資本家手中移轉資本給員工、縮減貧富差距的工具。為了使這個計畫可以持續有效地運作下去，立法者將員工持股計畫為退休金計畫的一種，使員工必須長期持有股票，直到退休。然而在實務運作上，員工持股信託經常被運用為防止敵意併購的工具。尤有甚者，某些公司內部人會利用員工持股計畫為自己取得大量資金、移轉投資風險,但仍可保留對於公司的控制力。這些行為都有可能對股東及員工造成不利的影響，但在現行法制下，只能仰賴司法者透過判決保護這些經濟及資訊上的弱勢族群。 在台灣，員工持股計畫雖然已廣為許多企業所採用，但是發展了將近20年，只能成為另一種員工持有股票的工具。員工擁有的股票數量並不足以使其在股東會上贏得一個受公司內部人重視的地位，也不足以倚賴這些股票作為退休金之用。這種規模上的差異是台美員工持股計畫最關鍵的不同點。小規模雖然使員工持股計畫帶來的優勢少了許多，但相對地也減低許多代理成本，至今未有員工持股計畫侵害大量員工利益的事件爆發。然而這不表示員工持股計畫在台灣就是個可以被忽略的問題，若能在未來建立一套有效率的立法制度，使員工持股計畫的規模擴大，員工將可因此享受到更多公司盈餘，並且使其退休生活受到保障。相對地，參考美國員工持股計畫的問題後，也可以預先設想未來可能發生的弊端，未雨綢繆。本文相信，一個有效率的員工持股計畫，可以實現解決貧富不均的理想。 / Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which is created by Louis Kelso is brought to practice for many years. Many enterprises use it as their retirement pension plan. The earliest employee stock ownership plan to transfer the capital frome capitalists to labors and reduce the disparity between the rich and the poor.In order to make the plan work out continueously and effectively, the legislator devise ESOP as a pension fund which makes employee own stock chronically until they retires. However, in practice, ESOP is usually exercised for preventing hostile takeover. Moreover, some company insiders may use ESOP TTO get a great deal of capital and transfer the investment risk, but still own the controlling power to their company. This behaviors will cause some harmful effects to the shareholders and the employees, but in the current legal system,the only one we can depend is the judge who can protect the minority in the economic and the information. ESOP is exercised by many enterprises in Taiwan. But after 20 years, it can only become one of the tools which assist employees to acquire company stocks.The number of shares which employees owns can’t make them have a posi-tion which let the company insiders take account in the shareholder committee and have enough amounts for their retirement pensions.This disparity in scale is the keypoint what is different between Tiwan and the U.S. ESOP. Althoygh small scale makes the adventage of ESOP decrease, it reduce lots of agency costs. To this day, there’re not any events which injure the interests of employees by ESOP. Never-theless, it doesn’t mean that ESOP in Taiwan is a issue which can be neglected. If we can establish an efficient legal system and extend the scale of ESOP, employees can obtain more company interests and have a security of their retirement life.In the opposite, after researching the problem of the U.S. ESOP, we can assume the culpably misconduct which will happen in the future and repair the house before it rains。Ｉ believe that a efficient ESOP can realize the ideal to solve the problem of uneven distribution of the wealth.