This thesis deals with takeovers in the Czech environment according to the Insolvency Act No. 182/2006 Coll., which passed an amendment to the 1. 1. 2008. There are methods of resolving insolvency of the debtor and principles of insolvency proceedings which should be followed during the insolvency process. Work distinguishes friendly and hostile takeover. The theoretical part provides an overview of possible ways of takeover, the reasons that motivate new owners to think about a possible takeover and globally applicable defense strategies. Another theoretical starting point is consideration of the reorganization of the company, which may be conducted by both the debtor and of the creditor(s). The practical part describes the hostile takeover of SAZKA from its history, through description of the key moments of crisis to insolvency proceedings which resulted in the bankruptcy of the debtor. Subsequent hostile takeover was directed by PPF and KKCG, which bought up commitment wagers and therefore became important creditors (controlling the betting and lottery activities) and later winner of the tender for the sale of the entire company. This case is a textbook example of takeover of the company, which had fallen into financial distress. The battle for the largest lottery company in the country was very hard, long and eventually resulted in a very profitable business, which fell into the arms of a single owner.

股東權益與意見在公司治理中屬重要一環，否則少數公司決策者（例如董事會或公司的CEO）會過度左右企業資源的分配，甚至發生浪費、貪污等代理問題，進而損及小股東權益，甚至勞工權益。本論文以公司治理的基本概念及架構為基礎，並以惡意併購的個案作為案例，探討並說明股東行動主義的經濟與法律意涵。其中，主要就「金融控股公司依金融控股公司法申請轉投資審核原則」法規設計，選擇具代表性個案，探討個案公司於股東治理的基礎規範與相關運作程序，包括非合意併購、委託書爭奪戰等相關法律問題。若根據目前台灣上市/櫃公司，其公司治理的實施狀況，許多法律學者均認為職業股東屬必要之罪，委託書是在目前公司所有權與經營權不分下，可能的外部監督力量。目前台灣委託書的相關規定過於保護大股東、公司派，導致小股東的權益受到一定程度的損害。若能自由化委託書收購，並且讓委託書可以在自由市場買賣，如此所創造的市場機制，據委託書的價格及外部市場機制，對於台灣過度依賴大股東或管理階層的公司治理結構會產生顯著改善效果，有效提升公司治理。本論文所選擇的個案公司，可以充分顯現上述這些方面的法律與經濟意涵。另外一個好的金融控股公司合併政策有賴一個健全之法律制度加以配套。針對金控公司是否得以所謂非合意併購達成合併之目的，金管會僅以行政命令「金融控股公司依金融控股公司法申請轉投資審核原則」與「公開收購公開發行公司有價證券管理辦法」作為主要法源，在法律上之位階上似乎有將行政命令之位階提高至法律位階之必要，本文以個案公司為例探討其相關法律問題。 關鍵字：公司治理、委託書、非合意併購、代理理論、價購委託書 / Shareholder’s interests play an important role in corporate governance. Otherwise, few decision-makers (ex. Board members, directors, etc) might misuse corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions in which interests of minority shareholders and employees will be jeopardized. This thesis will explore synergies of shareholder’s activism based on basic concepts and framework of corporate governance. In particular, case studies will focus on related regulations and practicable mechanisms of corporate governance in which certain legal issues, such as hostile takeover and proxy battle, will be elaborated based on ‘Principles of supervising investment application from financial holding companies’. Related regulations of proxy rights in Taiwan tend to protect interests of major shareholders and result in negative impacts of minority shareholders. If purchase offers of proxy could be freely traded in public, marketing mechanisms will balance the distortion of major shareholders and enhance the essence of corporate governance effectively. Case studies in this thesis therefore will reflect the above-mentioned legal and business implications. In addition, merge policies of financial conglomerate need supplementally sound regulations. In Taiwan, legal sources in financial holding companies are based on “Principles of supervising investment application from financial holding companies “ and “Regulations Governing Tender Offers for Purchase of the Securities of a Public Company “ issued by Financial Supervisory Committee of Executive Yuan. Positions of legal sources, in which case studies will be reviewed, seemingly need to be upgraded from administrative to legal level. Key word: Corporate Governance, Proxy,Hostile takeover,Agency Theory, Proxy Buying

This DPhil thesis analyses the Takeover Bid Directive in the light of EU Law and examines the extent to which this Directive facilitates the exercise of the fundamental freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital in the internal market. Since the Directive is based on the EC Treaty chapter on freedom of establishment (Articles 43 and 44(2)(g) EC Treaty), it should in principle contribute to cross frontier corporate mobility in the internal market through takeover bids; this was the aim of the Commission in its various proposals. Takeover bids and the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment are closely related. The Directive forms part of the EU company law harmonization programme whose weaknesses and limits are also explored. However, the Takeover Bid Directive is an EU company law instrument with strong links to EU capital market law. The initial aims of the EU legislature were to establish an internal market for companies and to achieve market integration in the field of EU company law. However, the Takeover Bid Directive is a compromise and watered down version of a proposal which the Commission envisaged would lead to a more effective pan-European takeover regime than that which actually proved possible. The need for compromise was the result of the very different legal and policy approaches of the Member States in the field of takeover regulation. Some provisions of the Directive are obligatory for all Member States. These provisions include the mandatory bid rule, the squeeze-out right, and the sell-out right. All these obligatory provisions of the Directive are in their present form open to criticism. The two key provisions of the Directive have been made optional for Member States. These are the non-frustration rule, requiring the board to obtain the prior authorization of the general meeting of shareholders before taking any action which could result in the frustration of the bid; and the breakthrough rule, requiring that any restrictions on the transfer of securities or voting rights provided for in the articles of association of the offeree company or in contractual agreements between the offeree company and the holders of its securities or in contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company’s securities shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid. Nevertheless, Member States, which opt out, are obliged to allow individual companies to opt in. Moreover, a reciprocity rule was also adopted, which allows Member States to permit those companies, which apply these provisions, to opt out again if they are the target of a bidder, which does not itself apply the same takeover provisions. Additionally, the non-frustration and the breakthrough rule are not fully comprehensive and even when a company applies them, it might still be able to evade their application since some corporate and financial structures remain outside the Directive’s scope. Finally, this thesis discusses the extent to which obstacles to cross border takeovers addressed by the Directive, or indeed left intact by the Directive, are to be regarded as restrictions on the right of establishment stricto sensu, or simply as obstacles in practice to making a successful takeover bid. More specifically, it scrutinizes the horizontal direct effect of the EC fundamental freedoms and seeks to analyze the extent to which conduct of the board and articles in the corporate constitution might be said to constitute restrictions on the freedom of establishment and on the free movement of capital.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LLM en droit" / Le présent mémoire analyse le phénomène des prises de contrôle inversée (PCI). Cette technique permet à une société privée de se faire acquérir par une société publique coté en Bourse. Elle obtient de cette dernière, en contrepartie, un nombre si important de ses actions qu'à la suite de la transaction, la société privée contrôle la société publique qui vient légalement de l'acheter. D'où la prise de contrôle dite inversée. Le but de l'opération consiste pour la société privée à devenir publique rapidement, et ce, à coûts moindres, comparativement à un appel public traditionnel. La société privée profite ainsi de son nouveau statut pour se financer par un appel public à l'épargne publique par le biais de la Bourse. La piètre réputation associée à ce genre de transactions est due à la cupidité de quelques entrepreneurs peu scrupuleux qui ont comme objectif d'empocher un profit rapide au détriment du public investisseur. Avec comme résultat que ce type de transaction suscite, à juste titre, la méfiance des autorités réglementaires. Le dilemme peut donc être posé en ces termes: compte tenu de l'importance économique des PME en termes de création de richesse au pays, doit-on restreindre l'usage de la PCI au nom du principe de la protection des épargnants? En somme, la liberté commerciale doit-elle céder le pas à des craintes de nature réglementaire? Nous concluons que malgré ces craintes très réelles, la PCI, majoritairement utilisée par la PME, doit être maintenue et qu'en termes de politique réglementaire, les autorités devraient favoriser l'emploi par ces jeunes sociétés du programme de financement « Société de Capital de Démarrage» (SCD) mis en place par la Bourse de Croissance rsx. Malgré ses défauts évidents, ce programme doit être amélioré afin de promouvoir une PCI plus efficace, et ce, à l'intérieur du programme Sco. À cet égard, la SCD pourrait bénéficier de la crédibilité ainsi que de l'expertise indéniable de la Bourse de Croissance en matière de financement de jeunes entreprises. Idéalement, la SCD serait améliorée au point où elle rendrait la PCI, hors ce programme, inutile. En ce sens, la liberté commerciale de faire des PCI serait préservée, tout en assurant la protection du public investisseur. / This thesis endeavours to analyse the phenomenon of the reverse takeover (RTO). This technique allows a private company to be acquired by a public entity whose stock is listed on an exchange. The former obtains from the latter such an important part of its stock that following the completion of the transaction, the private company controls the public company which has just acquired it. The takeover is therefore deemed reversed. The purpose of the transaction from the private entity perspective is to gain the status and privilege associated with being a publicly listed company faster and at a fraction of the cost that would otherwise be the case with a traditional public offering. Thereafter the private company uses its newly acquired public status to tap the capital markets via the stock exchange. The poor reputation generally associated with this kind of transaction is in a large measure due to the greed of a few scam artists whose main motive is a quick profit at the expense of the investing public. The result of this situation is that the RTO is viewed with considerable scepticism by the regulatory authorities. The dilemma may therefore be set in the following terms: taking into consideration the economic importance of the small and medium business (SME) as a creator of wealth in the economy, should the competent authorities limit the use of the RTO in the name of investor protection. In other words, should the commercial freedom to use the RTO in order to finance SME take a back seat to regulatory concerns. We conclude that although the serious concerns levelled by the regulators are very real, the RTO which is used primarily by SME should be maintained. It is further argued that regulatory authorities should promote as a matter of policy the RTO sponsored by the Capital Pool Company (CPC) program provided for by TSX Venture. We find that this program should be upgraded to allow for a more efficient RTO under the rules of the CPC. In this regard, the program would gain from the credibility and the undeniable expertise of the TSX Venture in the realm of financing young and emerging companies. Therefore, ideally, this program would be improved to the point where it would render the RTO pursued out of the program useless. If this were the case, we conclude that commercial freedom would be preserved, while concurrently maintaining protection for investors and upholding the integrity of capital markets.

O presente trabalho cuida das técnicas comumente referidas como cláusula de proteção à dispersão acionária, empregadas pelas companhias brasileiras. Tais técnicas foram apelidadas pela comunidade jurídica nacional de poison pills (pílulas de veneno). A expressão já é utilizada na experiência norte-americana para se referir a um conjunto de medidas defensivas contra a tomada de controle hostil, com as quais a poison pill à brasileira guarda pouca semelhança. O tema insere-se no contexto mais amplo da tomada de controle da companhia aberta (takeover) e as técnicas de defesa usualmente empregadas para impedi-la ou dificultá-la, quando indesejada. Tais técnicas são principalmente empregadas por companhias com capital disperso no mercado mobiliário e cujo poder de controle é exercido com a detenção de parcela reduzida do capital social. A busca pela maior dispersão acionária, bem como a presença apenas de ações votantes, fez com que a pílula brasileira se tornasse especialmente comum nas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&F-Bovespa S.A. Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros. A análise proposta circunscreve-se a tais companhias e à defesa por elas adotada. Dessa forma, parte-se da análise da disciplina jurídica das ofertas públicas voluntárias (artigo 257 da Lei das Sociedades por Ações), principal instrumento para a tomada de controle da companhia aberta, passa-se pelos dois principais sistemas de regulação da tomada de controle, com destaque para os modelos norte-americanos e inglês/europeu, para enfim chegar à apreciação da medida defensiva denominada poison pill tanto como originalmente concebida, na prática forense norte-americana, quanto em sua versão brasileira. É tema recente na literatura jurídica brasileira, ainda pouco explorado, mas bastante conhecido, estudado e vivenciado pela doutrina e experiência estrangeira, com apoio na qual o presente trabalho foi desenvolvido / Il presente lavoro si occupa delle tecniche comunemente citate come clausola di protezione alla dispersione azionaria, usate dalle società brasiliane. Dette tecniche sono state soprannominate dalla comunità giuridica nazionale di poison pills (pillole di veleno). Lespressione già è utilizzata nellesperienza nordamericana per riferirsi a un insieme di misure difensive contro la scalata ostile, con la quale la poison pill alla brasiliana si somiglia molto poco. Il tema si inserisce nel contesto più ampio della scalata della società cotata (takeover) e le tecniche di difesa usualmente impiegate per impedirla o tornarla più difficile, quando non desiderata. Tali tecniche sono principalmente usate da società con capitale disperso sul mercato mobiliare e il cui potere di controllo è praticato con il controllo di porzione ridotta del capitale sociale. La ricerca per una maggiore dispersione azionaria, così come la presenza solamente di azioni votanti, ha fatto con che la pillola brasiliana si tornassi specialmente comune nelle società elencate nel Nuovo Mercato della BM&F-Bovespa S.A. Borsa Valori, Borsa Merce e Mercato a termine. Lanalisi proposta è circoscritta a dette società e alla difesa da loro adottate. In questo modo, si parte dallanalisi della disciplina giuridica delle offerte pubbliche volontarie (articolo 257 della Legge di Società per Azioni), principale strumento per la scalata del controllo di società cotata, passiamo per i due principali sistemi di regolazione della scalata, con distacco ai modelli nordamericani e inglese/europeo, per infine arrivare alla valutazione della misura difensiva denominata poison pill tanto come originalmente concepita, nella pratica forense nordamericana, quanto nella sua versione brasiliana. È tema recente nella letteratura giuridica brasiliana, ancora poco investigata, ma abbastanza conosciuta, studiata e vissuta dalla dottrina ed esperienza straniera, con base nella quale il presente lavoro è stato sviluppato.

Das übergeordnete Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, ökonomische Gesichtspunkte konsequent in die Diskussion zu den Verhaltenspflichten des Vorstands während öffentlichen Übernahmeverfahren zu integrieren. Aus wohlfahrtstheoretischer Perspektive müssen hierbei die ökonomischen Funktionen des Markts für Unternehmenskontrolle umfassend Berücksichtigung finden. Das Instrumentarium der Ökonomischen Theorie des Rechts dient im Rahmen der Untersuchungen zum einen der positiven Analyse der diskutierten Ansätze zur Regelung der Verhaltenspflichten sowie der bestehenden Regelungen nach der EU-Übernahmerichtlinie (ÜRL) und dem WpÜG. Der normativen Variante der Ökonomischen Theorie des Rechts kommt insbesondere bei der Entwicklung von Regelungsalternativen zu den bestehenden Vorschriften bezüglich der Verhaltenspflichten nach dem WpÜG Bedeutung zu. Vor dem Hintergrund dieses übergeordneten Ziels verfolgt die Arbeit nach der umfassenden Darstellung der, mit der Regulierung des Verhaltens des Vorstands während des Übernahmeverfahrens verbundenen Regelungsprobleme aus juristischer und ökonomischer Perspektive zwei konkrete Ziele: die positive Wirkungsanalyse der bestehenden Regelungen nach der ÜRL und dem WpÜG sowie die Entwicklung einer Regelungsalternative auf nationaler Ebene. / The primary objective of the dissertation is to systematically integrate economic considerations into the discussion about the code of conduct for the board of directors during public takeovers. From a welfare theoretic perspective, the economic functions of the market for corporate control have to be taken into account in their entire scope. In this context the instruments of Law and Economics are used for a positive analysis of different approaches to regulate the code of conduct as well as the existing regulations of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids and the WpÜG. The normative approach of Law and Economics is particularly useful for developing regulatory alternatives to the existing code of conduct under the WpÜG. Based on a survey of the regulatory problems of public takeovers from an economic and legal perspective, the dissertation is perusing two objectives: a positive effect analysis of the impact of the existing rules of the EU Directive on Takeover Bids and the WpÜG as well as the formulation of an alternative concept for the code of conduct on the national level.

Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln. Jedes von ihnen untersucht, wie die Gestaltung von Allokationsregeln das Ergebnis eines Marktes beeinflussen kann. Das erste Kapitel untersucht die Folgen der Beschränkung der Mechanismen, die einem Monopsonisten zur Verfügung stehen, auf Mechanismen, die allen Verkäufern den selben Preis anbietet. Ich zeige, dass dies Beschränkung nicht immer verhindert, dass er Informationen der Verkäufer extrahiert und den Preis damit anpasst. Das zweite Kapitel befasst sich mit der Verteilung von Studentenwohnheimplätzen. Die Studenten dürfen eigene Präferenzen bezüglich eines Wohnheimplatzes sowie zur Zuteilung ihrer Freunde angeben. Ich zeige, dass der random serial dictatorship modifiziert werden kann, um diese neuen Präferenzen zu ermöglichen. Die beiden vorgeschlagenen Lösungen haben schwache Anreizeigenschaften, wenn die Studierenden kooperieren können. Ich zeige jedoch, dass dieses Problem für den ersten Lösungsvorschlag verschwindet, wenn der Markt groß und wettbewerbsfähig ist. Schließlich wird im letzten Kapitel untersucht, wie die Gestaltung von Aufnahmeprüfungen an Universitäten die Zusammensetzung von Gymnasien und Universitäten beeinflussen kann. Das Kapitel vergleicht zwei Aufnahmeprüfungen. In der ersten, werden die besten Schüler jedes Gymnasiums ausgewählt, während in der anderen die insgesamt besten Studenten ausgewählt werden. Wenn der Test verrauscht ist oder wenn die Peer-Effekte für die guten Schüler niedrig sind, schickt der erst Test bessere Studenten in der Universität und fordert Vielfalt in Gymnasien. / The three chapters of this thesis are independent. Each of them investigates how the design of allocation rules may shape the outcome of a market. The first chapter studies the consequences of restricting the mechanisms available to a monopsonist to uniform price posting mechanisms. I show that it doesn't always prevent him to extract meaningful information from the sellers before posting the price. I also show that conditioning this offer on the transaction achieving a minimal quantity facilitates this task. Finally, I address the welfare and the implementation issues and apply the results to takeover operations. The second chapter studies the allocation of houses to students, when students have preferences over the houses they receive and over their friends' allocation. I show that the random serial dictatorship can be modified to accommodate this new set-up. The two solutions proposed have weak incentive properties if students can cooperate. However, I show that this problem disappears for one of them if the market is large and competitive. Finally, the last chapter studies how the design of entrance university exams can be used to influence the composition of high schools and universities. It shows that if the test is noisy or if the peer effects for the good students are low, giving the university's slots to the best students of each high school selects better students than giving them to the best students overall and desegregates high schools.

As medidas defensivas contra tomadas de controle constituem o núcleo de estudo desta dissertação. São instrumentos jurídicos adotados principalmente por companhias abertas com dispersão acionária, visando à proteção contra uma eventual tentativa de tomada de controle. O assunto é de especial interesse no atual momento do mercado de capitais brasileiro, que vem apresentando significativo desenvolvimento nos últimos anos e propiciando meios para a proliferação no Brasil de companhias abertas com dispersão acionária. O estudo do tema é feito concomitantemente à crescente utilização no Brasil de proteções contra tomadas de controle, inclusive por companhias não dotadas de dispersão acionária. Algumas medidas defensivas são inspiradas na experiência prática de outros países e vêm sendo transplantadas para o Brasil sem a adequada harmonização às características do nosso regime jurídico. Este trabalho analisa os efeitos da utilização de medidas defensivas e, na medida do possível, a admissibilidade da adoção de determinadas defesas no Brasil. São também abordados os balizamentos para a postura da administração de companhias diante de tentativas de tomada de controle. São estudados os padrões de tratamento do tema nos principais modelos existentes na experiência internacional, a fim de fornecer subsídios para a criação de uma identidade brasileira no tratamento das defesas contra tentativas de tomada de controle. / The defensive anti-takeover measures constitute the core area of study in this dissertation. These are legal devices adopted mainly by publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion, aiming at protection against an eventual takeover attempt. The subject is of special interest at the current moment of the Brazilian capital markets, which have shown significant development in the recent years, providing means for the proliferation in Brazil of publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion. The study of the issue is done concomitantly with the increase of utilization in Brazil of anti-takeover protections, including by companies without widespread ownership dispersion. Some defensive measures are inspired by the practical experience of other countries, being transplanted to Brazil without the proper harmonization with the characteristics of our own legal system. This work analyzes the effects of the utilization of defensive measures and, to the extent possible, the admissibility of adoption of certain defenses in Brazil. The boundaries for the behavior of the management of companies under takeover attempts are also approached. The patterns for the treatment of this issue in the main existing models in foreign experience are studied, so as to provide subsidies to the creation of a Brazilian identity in the treatment of the defenses against takeover attempts.

本文主要探討公司治理體系下控制權市場所發揮之功能，內容大致上分為四個部分。第一部分先就公司治理理論以及不同體系加以介紹，從Ronald H. Coase交易成本理論、Berle & Means五種公司類型，以及代理理論說明公司治理的理論基礎，再分別介紹OECD以及World Bank的公司治理架構，而控制權市場則是公司治理體系下，外部治理機制的一項重要工具，最後就美國、日本與我國的公司治理體系加以介紹。 第二部分則是說明企業併購促使控制權市場發揮治理成效之主要活動，因此，分別就美國、日本與我國企業併購之概況加以闡述。美國歷經了五次併購風潮，有其經濟、文化等結構性因素，而日本與我國過去並未發生併購風潮，然而隨著結構性因素的改變，再加上全球化的浪潮，日本與我國併購活動有逐漸加溫之趨勢。 視敵意併購為控制權市場之主要利器，這是因為企業雖然有可能因為善意併購後，改善效率進而增加股東權益，有助於公司治理，但敵意併購活動更兼具威嚇現任經營者之效果，因此，敵意併購活動於公司治理體系上，一方面可汰換不適任經營者，另一方面亦可對現任經營者造成威嚇使其不敢進行有礙於股東權益之情事。而主併者進行敵意併購，主要可行的途徑有二：一為收購股權，另一為委託書徵求。就法制面而言，則見諸公開收購以及委託書管理相關規定。 第三部分開始探討敵意併購法制，本文分別介紹了美國、日本以及我國公開收購制度，目前我國已從事先核准制修正為事先申報制，與美國、日本之申報制相近。但對於公開收購定義則大相逕庭，美國採八項要素判斷，日本與我國則加以明確定義。另外股東平等原則部份，美國、日本與我國同採「比例分配制」，關於禁止變更收購條件的範圍，則是美國最寬鬆因此有利於主併者，而日本最嚴格。至於美國州法下的反併購條款在我國與日本並未出現。而關於我國引進強制公開收購制度，本文分別引述支持與反對者之意見，並基於促進併購活動發生有利於公司治理此一面向，說明強制公開收購制度可能之影響。 第四部份探討美國、日本與我國關於委託書徵求相關制度，就資訊公開的內容而言，美國、日本與我國相關規定大同小異，但徵求人資格限制以及徵求股份總數限制為我國獨有，況且因公司派掌握紀念品的製作權以及發放權，加上相關規定使投信事業必須支持符合持股成數之之公司董事會提出之議案或董事、監察人候選人，且又就使用股東名冊的難易程度而言，我國委託書徵求相關規定實對現任經營者較有利。 而關於委託書價購與否之爭論，本文分別就正反兩方之理由加以介紹，後從公司治理之角度出發，認為收購委託書可能使管理者有更多經濟上誘因進行舞弊，有礙於公司治理，故應禁止之。 最後比較公開收購制度與委託書徵求制度二者，分別從所需資金、成本風險控制、實施之便宜性以及公司治理角度，希冀我國未來公開收購制度能善加運用，發揮公司治理之功效。文末並提出相關建議，以供將來之研究或主管機關作為參考。 / This dissertation mainly discusses the role of control market in the framework of corporate governance. It is composed of four parts. The first part introduces relevant theories of corporate governance, including Ronald H. Coase’s “transaction cost theory”, Berle & Means’ “five types of corporation”, and agency theory. Then the diverse frameworks of corporate governance including OECD, World Bank, in which control market is indicated as a significant external mechanism, are illustrated. At last, the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan's frameworks of corporate governance are introduced respectively. The second part explains that the merges & acquisitions (M&A) is one of the major activities that make control market operate effectively. Then the general situations of the M&A in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Taken as a main mechanism of control market, hostile takeover not only strikes inefficient managers but menaces the incumbent from fraud. Two major feasible approaches of hostile takeover are purchasing stocks and soliciting proxies. The rules of tender offer and proxy contest are relevant. The third part discusses the legal institution of hostile takeover. The rules of tender offer of U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Then the similarities and dissimilarities between the rules from the definitions of tender offer, equal treatment to shareholders, and anti-takeover strategies are detailed. At the end of this part, different points of view about mandatory tender offer and its relation with corporate governance are discussed. The fourth part explores (investigates) the rules of proxy contest of the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. They are similar in the disclosure principle, but only Taiwan set limitations on the qualification of solicitors and the amount of proxies. In addition, the incumbent in Taiwan have the control over the manufacturing and delivery of the tokens for shareholders in annual meetings. What’s more, regulations force the institute-investors to support the incumbent. In conclusion, the proxy rules in Taiwan favor the incumbent. Also, the arguments over proxy purchase and its relation with corporate governance is mentioned. At last, this paper compares tender offer with proxy soliciting in several aspects: the fund needed, risk control, convenience, and corporate governance. In the end, the conclusion provides some suggestions for legislators and future studies.

Le présent mémoire analyse le phénomène des prises de contrôle inversée (PCI). Cette technique permet à une société privée de se faire acquérir par une société publique coté en Bourse. Elle obtient de cette dernière, en contrepartie, un nombre si important de ses actions qu'à la suite de la transaction, la société privée contrôle la société publique qui vient légalement de l'acheter. D'où la prise de contrôle dite inversée. Le but de l'opération consiste pour la société privée à devenir publique rapidement, et ce, à coûts moindres, comparativement à un appel public traditionnel. La société privée profite ainsi de son nouveau statut pour se financer par un appel public à l'épargne publique par le biais de la Bourse. La piètre réputation associée à ce genre de transactions est due à la cupidité de quelques entrepreneurs peu scrupuleux qui ont comme objectif d'empocher un profit rapide au détriment du public investisseur. Avec comme résultat que ce type de transaction suscite, à juste titre, la méfiance des autorités réglementaires. Le dilemme peut donc être posé en ces termes: compte tenu de l'importance économique des PME en termes de création de richesse au pays, doit-on restreindre l'usage de la PCI au nom du principe de la protection des épargnants? En somme, la liberté commerciale doit-elle céder le pas à des craintes de nature réglementaire? Nous concluons que malgré ces craintes très réelles, la PCI, majoritairement utilisée par la PME, doit être maintenue et qu'en termes de politique réglementaire, les autorités devraient favoriser l'emploi par ces jeunes sociétés du programme de financement « Société de Capital de Démarrage» (SCD) mis en place par la Bourse de Croissance rsx. Malgré ses défauts évidents, ce programme doit être amélioré afin de promouvoir une PCI plus efficace, et ce, à l'intérieur du programme Sco. À cet égard, la SCD pourrait bénéficier de la crédibilité ainsi que de l'expertise indéniable de la Bourse de Croissance en matière de financement de jeunes entreprises. Idéalement, la SCD serait améliorée au point où elle rendrait la PCI, hors ce programme, inutile. En ce sens, la liberté commerciale de faire des PCI serait préservée, tout en assurant la protection du public investisseur. / This thesis endeavours to analyse the phenomenon of the reverse takeover (RTO). This technique allows a private company to be acquired by a public entity whose stock is listed on an exchange. The former obtains from the latter such an important part of its stock that following the completion of the transaction, the private company controls the public company which has just acquired it. The takeover is therefore deemed reversed. The purpose of the transaction from the private entity perspective is to gain the status and privilege associated with being a publicly listed company faster and at a fraction of the cost that would otherwise be the case with a traditional public offering. Thereafter the private company uses its newly acquired public status to tap the capital markets via the stock exchange. The poor reputation generally associated with this kind of transaction is in a large measure due to the greed of a few scam artists whose main motive is a quick profit at the expense of the investing public. The result of this situation is that the RTO is viewed with considerable scepticism by the regulatory authorities. The dilemma may therefore be set in the following terms: taking into consideration the economic importance of the small and medium business (SME) as a creator of wealth in the economy, should the competent authorities limit the use of the RTO in the name of investor protection. In other words, should the commercial freedom to use the RTO in order to finance SME take a back seat to regulatory concerns. We conclude that although the serious concerns levelled by the regulators are very real, the RTO which is used primarily by SME should be maintained. It is further argued that regulatory authorities should promote as a matter of policy the RTO sponsored by the Capital Pool Company (CPC) program provided for by TSX Venture. We find that this program should be upgraded to allow for a more efficient RTO under the rules of the CPC. In this regard, the program would gain from the credibility and the undeniable expertise of the TSX Venture in the realm of financing young and emerging companies. Therefore, ideally, this program would be improved to the point where it would render the RTO pursued out of the program useless. If this were the case, we conclude that commercial freedom would be preserved, while concurrently maintaining protection for investors and upholding the integrity of capital markets. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LLM en droit"