<p>Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. </p><p>Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. </p><p>Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.</p>

Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.

This thesis provides more precise characterisation of patterns, causes and consequences of takeover activity in Australia over three decades spanning from 1972 to 2004. The first contribution of the thesis is to characterise the time series behaviour of takeover activity. It is found that linear models do not adequately capture the structure of merger activity; a non-linear two-state Markov switching model works better. A key contribution of the thesis is, therefore, to propose an approach of combining a State-Space model with the Markov switching regime model in describing takeover activity. Experimental results based on our approach show an improvement over other existing approaches. We find four waves, one in the 1980s, two in the 1990s, and one in the 2000s, with an expected duration of each wave state of approximately two years. The second contribution is an investigation of the extent to which financial and macro-economic factors predict takeover activity after controlling for the probability of takeover waves. A main finding is that while stock market boom periods are empirically associated with takeover waves, the underlying driver is interest rate level. A low interest rate environment is associated with higher aggregate takeover activity. This relationship is consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992)'s liquidity argument that takeover waves are symptoms of lower cost of capital. Replicating the analysis to the biggest takeover market in the world, the US, reveals a remarkable consistency of results. In short, the Australian findings are not idiosyncratic. Finally, the implications for target and bidder firm shareholders are explored via investigation of takeover bid premiums and long-term abnormal returns separately between the wave and non-wave periods. This represents the third contribution to the literature of takeover waves. Findings reveal that target shareholders earn abnormally positive returns in takeover bids and bid premiums are slightly lower in the wave periods. Analysis of the returns to bidding firm shareholders suggests that the lower premiums earned by target shareholders in the wave periods may simply reflect lower total economic gains, at the margin, to takeovers made in the wave periods. It is found that bidding firms earn normal post-takeover returns (relative to a portfolio of firms matched in size and survival) if their bids are made in the non-wave periods. However, bidders who announce their takeover bids during the wave periods exhibit significant under-performance. For mergers that took place within waves, there is no difference in bid premiums and nor is there a difference in the long-run returns of bidders involved in the first half and second half of the waves. We find that none of theories of merger waves (managerial, mis-valuation and neoclassical) can fully account for the Australian takeover waves and their effects. Instead, our results suggest that a combination of these theories may provide better explanation. Given that normal returns are observed for acquiring firms, taken as a whole, we are more likely to uphold the neoclassical argument for merger activity. However, the evidence is not entirely consistent with neo-classical rational models, the under-performance effect during the wave states is consistent with the herding behaviour by firms.

The subject of the Thesis titled “Mergers of Daughter Companies” is a suggestion of a method of merger of daughter companies of agricultural division of existing corporate group – AGROFERT HOLDING, a.s. The first part introduces the mother company and the daughter companies which were suggested for the mergers, and furthermore specifies other options of corporate transformations permitted by Commercial Code. The second part includes analysis of feasibility of mergers and possible options thereof. It also includes an explanation of legal rules on the chosen method of corporate transformation – an equity takeover. The last part contains a project of merger of daughter companies, including a timeline thereof, contract on equity takeover and related documents.

The stock market has proven to offer satisfactory means of raising capital for public companies. One behaviour that rather frequently can be observed is that companies on the stock market are becoming the subject of so-called takeover-offers. Immediately upon the commencement of a takeover-process the board of directors of a target-company is responsible for certain obligations stipulated in the legal framework for the stock market. An obligation of quite substantial significance for the shareholders in the target-company is the board of directors’ duty to make a statement on the takeover-offer. Since the said statement is of such significance for the shareholders, the question arises whether the board of directors can be held liable for irresponsible statements with regards to an imminent takeover-offer. This thesis aims to answer this question whilst examining closely related questions such as which obligations the board of directors has when making a statement on a takeover-offer as well as what basis of liability is applicable to the board of directors. Due to the nature of the Swedish capital market regulation the thesis also aims to illustrate and problematize the relationship between legislation and what is commonly referred to as self-regulation. By the means of a legal dogmatic method the thesis concludes that the boards of directors in some cases are liable for their statements on a takeover-offer. The conditions for which a basis of liability is applicable differs depending upon which ground of liability is chosen to establish said liability, this circumstance turns out to be of critical importance in a procedural sense. Although the basis of liability differs from one another the thesis displays that legitimate reasons speak for basing a claim for damages on the rule regarding tortious liability that the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) has developed. In addition to how the board of directors can be held liable the research has also demonstrated the importance of the statements the board of directors make on a takeover-offer. This provides support to the belief that the board of directors should be able to be held responsible for careless statements with regards to an impending takeover-offer. Furthermore, the research shows that a lack of distinct conjunction between self-regulation and legislation could generate an inconsistent construction of what the content of the current law is at any given time.

Ett offentligt uppköpserbjudande innebär att ett aktiebolag, budgivaren, lämnar ett erbjudande ställt på generella villkor till aktieägarna i ett annat aktiebolag, målbolaget, i syfte att förvärva aktierna i det sistnämnda bolaget. Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden är vanligt förekommande på den svenska värdepappersmarknaden och eftersom transaktioner av detta slag är väldigt komplexa är det av stor vikt att förtroendet för marknaden upprätthålls under sådana förfaranden.  En viktig faktor för att upprätthålla förtroendet för aktiemarknaden på ett effektivt sätt är att självreglering föreligger. För Sveriges del utgörs självregleringen av-seende offentliga uppköpserbjudaden av de s.k. Takeover-reglerna (TO-reglerna). Den senaste revideringen av TO-reglerna skedde den 1 februari år 2015 och med-förde ett förbud mot s.k. budrelaterade arrangemang, även kallat break-up fees. Break-up fees är ett avtal som ingås mellan budgivare och målbolag i syfte att målbolaget ska vara skyldigt att utge en ersättning till budgivaren ifall förvärvet inte fullföljs. Break-up fees skapades under 1980-talet i USA och används flitigt än i dag på den amerikanska aktiemarknaden i syfte att främst åstadkomma en ”försäkringsfunktion” för budgivaren vid takeovers. För budgivaren är offentliga uppköpserbjudanden nämligen ofta förenade med stora kostnader till följd av omfattande förberedelser. Genom denna ”försäkring” uppnås en kostnadstäckningsfunktion och minskar således den ekonomiska risken som är förenad med takeovers. Den senaste revideringen har sin grund i de ändringar som tidigare hade skett i den brittiska motsvarigheten till TO-reglerna. I Storbritannien ansågs det vara nödvändigt att införa ett förbud mot break-up fees eftersom denna typ av avtal ansågs begränsa målbolaget vid takeover-förfaranden. Break-up fees ansågs således resultera i en otillbörlig fördel för budgivaren. Liknande resonemang anfördes under arbetet med de svenska reglerna vilket resulterade i ett svenskt förbud mot break-up fees. Förbudet är emellertid inte absolut utan Aktiemarknadsnämnden (AMN) har möjlighet att lämna dispens från förbudet.  Även om break-up fees är vanligt förekommande i USA har avtal av detta slag endast förekommit i mycket ringa omfattning i Sverige. Till följd av detta väcker förbudet mot break-up fees en stor osäkerhet beträffande de konsekvenser som förbudet kommer resultera i och huruvida förbudet borde ha införts i svensk rätt. Den amerikanska forskningen visar att break-up fees resulterar bl.a. i att målbolag försätts i en god förhandlingsposition, uppnår riskminimering till följd av ovannämnda kostnadstäckning, skapar förtroende för aktiemarknaden i allmänhet och transaktionen i synnerhet. Forskningen visar även att fler takeovers fullföljs ifall en break-up fee har ingåtts mellan parterna.  I detta arbete förs resonemang beträffande anledningen till att de svenska TO-reglerna har följt utvecklingen av de motsvarande brittiska reglerna och således införandet av förbud mot break-up fees. Det diskuteras även huruvida målbolagsstyrelsen är förhindrad att p.g.a. det aktuella förbudet fullgöra sina skyldigheter enligt gällande rätt. Vidare diskuteras hur aktieägarskyddet vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden är uppbyggt i svensk rätt mot bakgrund av brittisk och amerikansk rätt samt huruvida förbudet mot break-up fees kan anses resultera i att målbolagsstyrelsens roll försvagas och aktieägarskyddet försvagas. Därtill kommer att en de lege ferenda-diskussion förs vari fenomenet break-up fees jämförs med gällande rätt rörande försvarsåtgärder. I syfte att belysa de konsekvenser som förbudet kan medföra problematiseras även förbudet mot break-up fees mot bakgrund av bestämmelsen avseende insiderbrott och break-up fees praktiska funktioner i olika rättssystem. Undertecknad kommer i detta arbete fram till att förbudet mot break-up fees torde bl.a. resultera i att budgivare och målbolag kommer hädanefter att söka sig till att uppnå andra deal protection-avtal. Vidare torde förbudet varken resultera i att målbolagets roll stärks eller i ett ökat skydd för målbolagets aktieägare. Därtill anses förbudet resultera i en maktobalans mellan AMN och målbolagsstyrelsen, vilket är negativ ur ett företagsekonomiskt perspektiv. Mot bakgrund av detta och ett antal andra skäl kommer undertecknad fram till slutsatsen att ett förbud mot break-up fees borde ej ha införts i svensk rätt.

This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along with the presence or absence of a staggered board of directors, poison pills, and golden parachute agreements. The anti-takeover laws examined are Business Combination, Control Share Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies Statutes. A factor analysis reveals three distinct components of entrenchment: firm- and state-level external entrenchment and firm-level internal entrenchment. External entrenchment is related to market control over management by means of corporate takeovers; internal entrenchment relates to shareholder control over management by means of their voting power. Evidence is found for a positive association between entrenchment at IPO and subsequent CEO cash and total compensation. These relationships are driven by firm-level external entrenchment. Firm-level external entrenchment is also significantly and positively associated with CEO stock-based compensation. The positive effects of entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation appear not to be transitory and remain constant for at least five years post-IPO. Furthermore, entrenchment at IPO is shown to affect CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. On balance, entrenchment reduces the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock returns and returns on assets. The results of this study underscore the crucial importance of insiders' governance decisions made at the time of the IPO. Little support is found for a re-balancing of components of the CEO's compensation contract in response to entrenchment as predicted under the optimal contracting theory of compensation contracts. The findings of this study are almost entirely consistent with the managerial power theory, according to which entrenchment at IPO causes a permanent shift in bargaining power, which enables CEOs to influence compensation contracts in their favor.

abstract: Highly automated vehicles require drivers to remain aware enough to takeover during critical events. Driver distraction is a key factor that prevents drivers from reacting adequately, and thus there is need for an alert to help drivers regain situational awareness and be able to act quickly and successfully should a critical event arise. This study examines two aspects of alerts that could help facilitate driver takeover: mode (auditory and tactile) and direction (towards and away). Auditory alerts appear to be somewhat more effective than tactile alerts, though both modes produce significantly faster reaction times than no alert. Alerts moving towards the driver also appear to be more effective than alerts moving away from the driver. Future research should examine how multimodal alerts differ from single mode, and see if higher fidelity alerts influence takeover times. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Human Systems Engineering 2018

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Hamburg, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 585-679).

我國於2001年通過金融控股公司法（以下簡稱金控法）以來，迄今已逾十年，金融控股公司（以下簡稱金控）之家數已達16家，其中所整合的金融機構型態包含銀行、證券、保險、投信等相關事業等，多達9 0家以上，子公司之總數量高達100家，顯見金控為增加其股東及公司利益、擴展事業體等目的，而對於併購活動日益頻繁。 依據金控發動併購時是否已取得目標金融機構的同意，可區分為合意收購或非合意收購之屬性，然金控是否均適合兩種屬性？本文藉由金控收購的相關法制深入研究本議題。金控收購子公司之法制歷經三次重大修訂，爰將歷次更迭區分為三個階段分別論述，配合實務上真實發生之個案進行研析，論究金控收購子公司之成敗因素，亦即，本文藉由法制演繹、文獻整合、案例分析之研究方法，探究我國金控法收購子公司之法制，並提出結論與建議。