In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

In this project, I develop Nietzsche’s account of truth based on the two perspectives of nihilism and health and conclude that his varied analyses and comments from the early and late periods of his writing are compatible. Nietzsche’s discussions of truth are divided into two parts. First, the discussion of the concept of truth. Second, he analyzes modern culture that considers the highest type the one that seeks truth. His discussion of the concept of truth involves a critique of the thing-in-itself and Correspondence Theory. The subtle point to get is that Nietzsche never denies the existence of a real world in which we live. However, his critique is of human’s ability to arrive at this truth. I argue that his attack on the concept of the thing-in-itself in the late notebooks is aimed at showing the metaphysical incoherence of the concepts of thinghood and self-identity and not on the concept of an unknown grounding existence. As for the second discussion, I argue that Nietzsche condemns truth-seeking insofar as it is held as the highest ideal in a culture. When this occurs, the will to truth in cultures and individuals becomes tyrannical and stems the growth of the person as a complete self, with varied drives and impulses. Finally, I conclude that Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by breaking the tyranny that has taken over society which is governed by a will to nothingness, which depreciates the value of life. He understands the immensity of the task of overcoming this will, and understands that he can only be part of a larger context of combating nihilism. Accordingly, he sees his role as reintroducing man to his body and his physiology and to bring back the experimentation and playful seriousness in the art of living life as opposed to the life-sacrificing and life-denying type that thinks of the pursuit of truth as a relinquishment of life.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / A presente dissertaÃÃo objetiva fornecer uma interpretaÃÃo acerca do conjunto de reflexÃes desenvolvidas pelo filÃsofo alemÃo Friedrich Nietzsche em torno da noÃÃo de verdade. Tal reflexÃo à realizada a partir dos diferentes pontos de vista presentes em sua obra, procurando observar como se articulam as ideias de verdade e de vida, tendo como fio condutor a noÃÃo de âvontade de verdadeâ. Procuro, por um lado, articular os momentos em que o filÃsofo empreende crÃticas à noÃÃo de verdade, direcionadas primeiramente Ãs verdades da metafÃsica, mas que apontam e investigam, ao mesmo tempo, para a noÃÃo de veracidade, na medida em que esta passa a ser entendida como a provÃvel origem daquela. Em seguida, intento entender, na esteira da reflexÃo sobre a veracidade, como Nietzsche desenvolve esta crÃtica e dà a ela um novo direcionamento com um sentido existencial e normativo (uma vez que elege um critÃrio a partir do qual à possÃvel avaliar o valor dos valores morais), a partir da elaboraÃÃo do seu procedimento genealÃgico. O resultado de tais reflexÃes sÃo essenciais para a compreensÃo da ideia de vontade de verdade e, igualmente, de um sentido possÃvel da noÃÃo verdade para o filÃsofo. / This dissertation aims to provide an interpretation about the set of reflections developed by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche around the notion of truth. Such reflection is carried out from different points of view present in his work, trying to observe how articulate the ideas of truth and life, with the thread of the notion of "will to truth". I seek, on the one hand, articulate the moments in which the philosopher undertakes criticism of the notion of truth, first directed to the metaphysical truths, but pointing and investigating at the same time, to the notion of veracity, as it passes the it is understood as the likely source of that. Then attempt to understand, in the wake of reflection on the veracity, how Nietzsche develops this critical and gives it a new direction with an existential and normative sense (since elects a criterion from which to assess the value of moral values), from the preparation of its genealogical procedure. The result of such reflections are essential to understanding the âwill to truthâ idea and also a possible sense of the truth to the philosopher.

With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) so-called ‘immoralism’. When he calls himself an ‘immoralist’ and even ‘the first immoralist’ (EH Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ which he insists ought to be possible (BGE 202). I shall interpret Nietzsche’s explicit claim of ‘immoralism’ and his ‘campaign against morality’ as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality ‘that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself’ (EH Destiny 4). His ‘immoralism’ does not reject the idea of an ethical life. Nietzsche favours a ‘supra-moral’ version of life (GM II 2&BGE 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a ‘negative’ (‘destructive’) and a ‘positive’ (‘productive’) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the ‘negative’ side, which involves Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality. In his Genealogy, Nietzsche criticizes the man of ressentiment, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world’, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (GM III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his ‘positive’ ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the Übermensch, and the paradox of the Übermenschas ‘the annihilator of morality’ (EH Books 1) and as ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). By proclaiming a process of ‘self-overcoming of morality’ (BGE 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (BGE 216), and ‘mere symptomatology’ (TI ‘Improvers’ of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (A 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (GS 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the Übermensch. His idea of the Übermensch implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment. There are affinities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsche’s process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsche’s philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Philosophy / unrestricted

[pt] Em fins de 2016 o conceituado Dicionário Oxford elegeu e divulgou que pós-verdade seria sua palavra do ano. A escolha teria se baseado no singular aumento de uso da palavra e seria relativa ao agitado panorama macropolítico que havia dominado a discussão pública, nos contextos aos quais se refere o dicionário, naquele ano. Sua definição remeteria a uma perspectiva na qual a emoção seria mais importante ao apelo público que referências aos fatos, tal como uma crescente desvalorização da verdade. A palavra, então, passou a ser bastante tematizada e discutida publicamente nesta chave. Partindo deste contexto, o presente trabalho chega à seguinte pergunta: por que se preteriria e defenderia, axiologicamente falando, uma afirmação enquanto verdadeira mesmo que epistemologicamente tais afirmações procedam ou não? A partir do debate acerca desta questão, o trabalho desloca seu olhar de uma vontade de verdade para uma vontade de identidade, pensando os processos pelos quais indivíduos ou grupos criam identificações acerca de certas verdades, em seu sentido axiológico. Assim, passa a indagar os mecanismos da identidade e consolidação de tais verdades; para isto, recorre aos postulados filosóficos de Friedrich Nietzsche e Jacques Derrida e estabelece uma narrativa, a partir da pergunta sobre a noção de pós verdade e seus limites, que se segue da vontade de verdade de acordo com o postulado por Nietzsche para as discussões acerca de identidades e identificações nos postulados de Derrida. Pergunta-se então, se em sentido axiológico se poderia falar de uma hipertrofia da verdade. / [en] At the end of 2016 the prestigious Oxford Dictionary has elected and announced that post-thuth was his word of the year. The choice was based on the significantly increase of the use of the word and it would be related to the main politics landscape that had been on the spots of the public discussion that year, about the contexts referred by the dictionary. His definition (of post-truth) would refer to a perspective where emotion was more important to the public appeal than references to facts, just as a growing devaluation of truth too. The word, then, got more themed and publicly discussed in this key. From this context, this text comes to the following question: why it would be preferred, pointed and defended, axiologically speaking, a statement as true even if epistemologically these statements proceed or not? From this debate, this text turns his view from a will to truth to a will to identity, thinking the processes in witch individuals or groups creates identifications about certain truths in their axiological sense. Thus, it begins to inquire the mechanisms of identity and the consolidation of those truths; in this purpose it resorts to the philosophical postulates of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida and establishes a narrative starting from the question about the notion of post-truth, its limits, which follows from the will to truth according to postulates of Nietzsche to the discussions about identities and identifications on Derrida s postulates. So, it s possible to outline the possibilities, in an axiological sense, of a discuss about a hypertrophy of truth.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2017-07-31T11:57:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 928533 bytes, checksum: 50c7a01860e44bc1dcc59f2057924f81 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-31T11:57:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 928533 bytes, checksum: 50c7a01860e44bc1dcc59f2057924f81 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-12 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The constitution of the subject in all societies is closely linked to power relations established in a given historical moment. These relationships pervade the social practices and grounded in a set of knowledge, develop real desires that are incorporated by the subjects as "truths" absolute, unique and unquestionable. With regard specifically to the constitution of the subject Iranian woman, the development of their identity is tied to a particularized power system by a strong association between State and Religion, which has, over time, inferiorized the identity of the individual woman , seen as the other child before marriage to the father and then the celebration of the marriage agreement, the husband. Having as theoretical support the contributions from the Discourse Analysis, Foucault's research and cultural studies, this research we aim to analyze the constitution of the subject Iranian woman immersed in power relations in circulation in the course of the twentieth century, marked by profound changes political, social and historical. From this goal, we adopted as of this research investigation object the autobiographical novel What I did not tell, the Iranian author Azar Nafisi, whose first edition was translated into Portuguese in 2009, a year after its publication in the original Things I’ve been silent about. After our reflections, we found that the novel, narrated in first person, can be understood as an intimate writing, since the author, in addition to the first-person narrative from the title makes it clear that it is a vision particular about their country, attempting to resist the "male tyranny," breaking the silence for a long time the subject woman. / A constituição do sujeito em todas as sociedades está intimamente atrelada às relações de poder instituídas em determinado momento histórico. Essas relações perpassam as práticas sociais e, alicerçadas em um conjunto de saberes, elaboram vontades de verdade que são incorporadas pelos sujeitos como “verdades” absolutas, únicas e inquestionáveis. No que diz respeito, especificamente, à constituição do sujeito mulher iraniana, a elaboração de sua identidade está atrelada a um sistema de poder particularizado por uma intensa associação entre Estado e Religião, que tem, ao longo do tempo, inferiorizado a identidade do sujeito mulher, visto como o outro subordinado, antes do casamento ao pai e depois, da celebração do acordo matrimonial, ao esposo. Tendo como suporte teórico as contribuições advindas da Análise do Discurso, das pesquisas foucaultianas e dos Estudos culturais, nesta pesquisa temos como objetivo analisar a constituição do sujeito mulher iraniana imersa nas relações de poder em circulação, no transcorrer do século XX, marcado por profundas mudanças políticas, sociais e históricas. A partir desse objetivo, adotamos como objeto de investigação dessa pesquisa o romance autobiográfico O que eu não contei, da autora iraniana Azar Nafisi, cuja primeira edição foi traduzida para o português no ano de 2009, um ano após a sua publicação no original Things I’ve been silent about.Após as nossas reflexões, constatamos que o romance, narrado em primeira pessoa, pode ser entendido como uma escrita íntima, uma vez que a autora, além de fazer a narrativa em primeira pessoa, desde o título, deixa claro que se trata de uma visão particular sobre o seu país, intentando resistir à “tirania masculina”, quebrando o silêncio imposto por um longo período ao sujeito mulher.

對宣稱以「報導真相」為職責的新聞專業而言，一旦新聞報導的「真實」被解構，不再有客觀真實做為新聞是否正確的參照依據，一切報導都是符號建構的結果，此時新聞專業「報導真相」的宣稱是否仍然有效？特別是當前新聞媒體打著「真實」的招牌進行與真實無關的活動，「真實」淪為新聞常規的儀式化象徵，新聞專業的正當性倍受質疑，新聞記者究竟該如何安身立命？難道真的沒有人在乎真實嗎？ 本文從新聞記者的實際個案故事裡，探究新聞專業中的「真實」意謂什麼？除了新聞報導所再現的真實之外，從倫理主體的角度來看，記者更在乎的是新聞採訪報導過程中的真實性（truthfulness），關切的是在追求報導真相的過程中，記者是否盡可能真誠地報導他所知的一切？報導內容是否正確地反映他所掌握的現實？此時，真實不再只是報導的對象，真實做為一種價值，它是主體行事判斷的依據，也是主體追求的德行。記者在實際情境下行使專業判斷時，他所感到的良心不安，便是驅使他成為追求真實性的倫理主體之可能所在。 藉由傅柯晚期的倫理系譜學架構探究當代新聞專業的倫理問題，本文所關注的是記者如何運用自我技術將自己形塑為道德的行動者。因為良心不安的焦慮促使記者重新關心自己，透過真理意志的作用使他突破集體規訓對於個體的束縛，經由長期的自我修練促成個體由內而外的轉變，將自己打造成為追求真實性的倫理主體。如此一來，才使得新聞專業追求報導真實的理想，在不完美的現實情境下仍然有落實的可能。

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriana Padua Borghi.pdf: 855043 bytes, checksum: 8332181e4fd3552f91e7b9cf83e49916 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-15 / This study aims to critically discuss the discourses of two models of judicial practices : the Juvenile Criminal Law and the Restorative Justice . We perform this task in light of the notion of will to truth present in the analyses of Michel Foucault, primarily using Foucault s writings, L ordre du discours and La vérité et les formes juridiques. Due to the problematization of the notion of will to truth , we discuss the two legal models in view of what they propose in regards to the moment of inquiry into the authorship of an offense practiced by adolescents. In Brazil, the Comprehensive Protection Doctrine, formally incorporated in the legislation in respect to the Rights of Children and Adolescents in 1988, guided structural changes around this issue. This adopted doctrine provided the basis which now guides the operations of the Juvenile Justice System provided by the Statute of the Child and Adolescent (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente ECA) in 1990. This system, formed by a set of rules, informs and guides the judiciary to seek the truth about authorship and promote the resulting responsibility of the adolescent involved in an offense. This is the context in which we place the two models of judicial practices related to juvenile responsibility (the Juvenile Criminal Law and the Restorative Justice ). These models emerge in order to implement the Comprehensive Protection Doctrine / O presente trabalho pretende discutir criticamente os discursos de dois modelos de práticas judiciárias : o Direito Penal Juvenil e a Justiça Restaurativa . Realizamos essa tarefa especialmente à luz da noção de vontade de verdade , presente nas análises de Michel Foucault. Para isso, utilizamos principalmente os seus escritos A ordem do discurso e A verdade e as formas jurídicas. Devido à problematização acerca da noção de vontade de verdade , discutimos os dois modelos jurídicos, tendo em vista o que ambos propõem quanto ao momento da apuração da autoria de ato infracional praticado por adolescente(s). No Brasil, a partir de 1988, a doutrina da proteção integral foi incorporada pela legislação no que diz respeito aos Direitos das Crianças e dos Adolescentes, pautando alterações estruturais em torno do tema, em comparação ao que vigorava anteriormente. Essa doutrina adotada conferiu as bases principiológicas que passaram a orientar o funcionamento do sistema de justiça juvenil previsto pelo Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (1990). Esse sistema traduz-se num conjunto de regras para o poder judiciário buscar a verdade sobre a autoria e promover a consequente responsabilização do adolescente envolvido num ato infracional. Esse é o contexto no qual localizamos os dois modelos de práticas judiciárias relacionadas à responsabilização juvenil (o Direito Penal Juvenil e a Justiça Restaurativa ). Tais modelos emergem com o objetivo de implementar a doutrina da proteção integral