Philosophers who show interest in authenticity tend to narrowly focus on its capacity to help people evade conformity and affirm individuality, a simplistic reduction that neglects authenticity’s moral potential and gives credence to the many critics who dismiss it as a euphemism for excessive individualism. Yet when conceived ethically, authenticity can also allow for worthy human flourishing without falling prey to conformity’s opposite extreme—egoism. This thesis proposes a relational conception of authenticity that can help prevent the often destructive excess of egoism while also offsetting the undesirable deficiency of heteronomy, concertedly moving agents towards socially responsible living. It demonstrates how authenticity necessarily has ethical dimensions when rooted in existentialist and dialogical frameworks. It also defines egoism as a form of self-deception rooted in flawed logic that cannot be considered “authentic” by relational standards. Relational authenticity recognizes the interpersonal relationships and social engagements that imbue meaning into agents’ lives, fostering a balance between personal ambitions and social obligations, and enabling more consistently moral lifestyles.

Philip Pettit claims his neorepublican theory of freedom as non-domination is preferable to the liberal ideal of non-interference, and he is right. But the reasons why he is right run deeper than is apparent if we attend solely to his arguments defending non-domination in negative terms. In fact, embedded in the three benefits that Pettit claims non-domination can offer (which non-interference cannot) lie significant resonances with a positive idea of freedom concerned with a person’s sense of agency. We find such an idea in Charles Taylor, where freedom as self-realization is intricately linked with his “significance view” of human agency. By adopting this Taylorian lens and assessing Pettit’s non-domination, I show that non-domination does have much to offer those of us who think of freedom primarily in positive terms and, more generally, to all those of us who believe that freedom and agency are inextricably linked and must be treated as such.

Christian theology (whether biblical or liturgical) generally affirms that God is somehow present in the setting of gathered worship. However, it is often the case that many worshippers themselves (and even ministers) might not perceive that God is present to the church in any discernible way, leading to worship practices that may functionally ignore God's presence, or that may attempt to conjure up some feeling that something transcendent is happening in worship. This thesis attempts to use Charles Taylor's concept of 'the immanent frame' to explain why believers and unbelievers alike might misinterpret worship. In doing so, this thesis applies Taylor's phenomenological methodology to several casual, popular-level accounts relating to perception of God's presence or absence in worship, revealing that the imminent frame does indeed come to bear on the ways in which people understand and experience worship, and suggesting that practitioners must learn to reinterpret worship.

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Ce mémoire engage une réflexion sur la plénitude dans la pensée de Charles Taylor, et plus particulièrement dans son maître ouvrage L’âge séculier. L’idée de plénitude y est intimement liée à celles de modernité, de croyance et d’incroyance. C’est que, pour Taylor, comprendre la modernité implique de saisir le changement qui nous a permis de passer d’un contexte dans lequel il était impensable de ne pas croire en Dieu à un contexte dans lequel la croyance n’est qu’une option. Ce changement tourne essentiellement autour d’une modification de notre représentation de la plénitude. Qu’est-ce que la plénitude pour notre auteur ? Elle est la condition à laquelle tend tout homme et implique une réponse, tacite ou pas, à la question du sens de la vie. Mon principal objectif sera de saisir la nature de la plénitude telle que la conçoit Taylor. Je montrerai que la double définition de la plénitude dans L’âge séculier génère une certaine tension entre la plénitude conçue comme un événement unique et comme une aspiration constante vers le sens (qui correspond aussi au bien). Je proposerai une résolution de cette tension à travers une compréhension de la plénitude qui vise à en restituer l’unité fondamentale, l’idée étant de saisir la plénitude comme événement unique et comme aspiration constante au sens, non pas séparément, mais dans leur relation. Ce modèle d’interprétation, fourni par l’idée d’éternité, que l’on retrouve aussi dans L’âge séculier, me conduira à établir une coïncidence entre la poursuite de la plénitude et le désir d’éternité. Tous deux ont le même but fondamental : à travers l’inscription de moments qualitativement privilégiés et uniques, constitutifs de la vie, dans la totalité de cette vie, ils visent à en dévoiler le sens et à lui conférer une certaine pérennité. À plus forte raison, ce que j’entends montrer à travers la coïncidence entre plénitude et éternité, c’est que la quête de plénitude n’engage pas nécessairement la perspective religieuse déployée dans L’âge séculier, mais plutôt une forme de transcendance que l’on pourrait qualifier de « temporelle ». / This M.A. thesis unfolds a reflexion upon the concept of fullness as developed by Charles Taylor, especially in his book A Secular Age, in which the idea of fullness is intrinsically connected with modernity, belief and unbelief. For Taylor, the understanding of modernity implies a grasping of the change that allowed the transition from a context where unbelief in God was considered inconceivable to a context where belief remains only an option. That change consists essentially in a modification of our very representation of fullness. What is fullness for Charles Taylor? It is the condition to which any human being tends towards, and which implies an answer, unspoken or not, to the question of the meaning of life. My main goal will be the understanding of the nature of fullness as conceived by Charles Taylor. I shall show that the twofold definition of fullness in A Secular Age generates a tension between fullness conceived as a unique event, and fullness conceived as a constant aspiration towards meaning (which identifies with goodness). I shall suggest a resolution of this tension through an understanding of fullness which aims to restore its fundamental unity – the idea being to grasp the notion of fullness as a unique event and as the constant aspiration to meaning not separately, but in their relationship with one other. This interpretation model, provided by the idea of eternity, which is also present in A Secular Age, will allow me to establish a coincidence between the pursuit of fullness and the desire of eternity. Both of them share the same fundamental aim: through the inscription of qualitatively privileged and unique moments, constituents of life, in the very totality of this life, they aim to reveal its meaning and to bestow permanence to it. Moreover, I will argue from this coincidence between fullness and eternity that the quest for fullness doesn’t necessarily imply a religious perspective as unfolded in A Secular Age, but can lead rather to a form of transcendence that one can qualify as « temporal ».

Sous l’effet de la mondialisation qui a accéléré le rapprochement des cultures, la notion d’identité a pris de l’importance dans la conscience contemporaine. L’émergence du multiculturalisme et de l’idéal de la reconnaissance est liée à ce phénomène. Elle est fondée sur un rejet de l’identité essentielle jugée comme fictive et assimilationniste, au profit d’une valorisation de l’identité sociale réelle. Cette investigation porte sur les enjeux de l’identité, à savoir, sa formation, les conditions de possibilité de son épanouissement, sa reconnaissance dans l’espace public, et surtout son intégration dans la gestion des affaires de l’État. Ces enjeux soulèvent les passions, jusqu’à constituer dans certains cas des menaces pour la cohésion sociale et l’unité de l’État. À travers une analyse conceptuelle et une discussion des problèmes moraux et politiques touchant l’actualité des sociétés contemporaines, Taylor démontre que l’harmonie sociale et l’épanouissement individuel et collectif passent nécessairement par une gestion harmonieuse de l’identité et de la différence. Quant à Honneth, il développe une théorie de l’intersubjectivité, en soulignant que l’identité des individus ne peut se former et s’épanouir que dans des rapports de reconnaissance. Les deux penseurs se rejoignent sur l’idée qu’au fond de l’exigence de la reconnaissance se trouve l’idéal de justice sociale et d’équité. Au-delà de l’estime mutuelle, le partage équitable des richesses (matérielles ou symboliques), les compromis, les accords ou accommodements raisonnables, deviennent le pilier d’un vivre-ensemble harmonieux. / Under the influence of globalization, which has brought different cultures closer, the notion of identity has taken center stage in contemporary consciousness. The emergence of multiculturalism and the recognition of the ideal are connected to this phenomenon. They are based on the rejection of the essential identity, which is judged as fictitious, for the benefit of a real social one. This research accounts for the stakes in identity: its formation, the conditions of possibility of its self-fulfillment, its recognition in the public area, and especially its integration in the management of the affairs of the state. Such requirements sometimes raise passions and may be considered as threats to social cohesion and the compactness of the state. Through an abstract quest and a discussion of the moral and political problems affecting contemporary societies, Taylor demonstrates that social harmony and individual and collective self-fulfillment is inevitably interwoven with a harmonious management of identity and some difference. As for Honneth, he develops an idea based on intersubjectivation, and underscores the fact that the identity of the individual can formed and allow to blossom in the presence of requirements for the recognition of the ideals of social justice and equity. Beyond mutual respect, the equal distribution of wealth (material or symbolic), compromises, agreements or reasonable settlements, are the pillars of harmonious societies.

Ce mémoire engage une réflexion sur la plénitude dans la pensée de Charles Taylor, et plus particulièrement dans son maître ouvrage L’âge séculier. L’idée de plénitude y est intimement liée à celles de modernité, de croyance et d’incroyance. C’est que, pour Taylor, comprendre la modernité implique de saisir le changement qui nous a permis de passer d’un contexte dans lequel il était impensable de ne pas croire en Dieu à un contexte dans lequel la croyance n’est qu’une option. Ce changement tourne essentiellement autour d’une modification de notre représentation de la plénitude. Qu’est-ce que la plénitude pour notre auteur ? Elle est la condition à laquelle tend tout homme et implique une réponse, tacite ou pas, à la question du sens de la vie. Mon principal objectif sera de saisir la nature de la plénitude telle que la conçoit Taylor. Je montrerai que la double définition de la plénitude dans L’âge séculier génère une certaine tension entre la plénitude conçue comme un événement unique et comme une aspiration constante vers le sens (qui correspond aussi au bien). Je proposerai une résolution de cette tension à travers une compréhension de la plénitude qui vise à en restituer l’unité fondamentale, l’idée étant de saisir la plénitude comme événement unique et comme aspiration constante au sens, non pas séparément, mais dans leur relation. Ce modèle d’interprétation, fourni par l’idée d’éternité, que l’on retrouve aussi dans L’âge séculier, me conduira à établir une coïncidence entre la poursuite de la plénitude et le désir d’éternité. Tous deux ont le même but fondamental : à travers l’inscription de moments qualitativement privilégiés et uniques, constitutifs de la vie, dans la totalité de cette vie, ils visent à en dévoiler le sens et à lui conférer une certaine pérennité. À plus forte raison, ce que j’entends montrer à travers la coïncidence entre plénitude et éternité, c’est que la quête de plénitude n’engage pas nécessairement la perspective religieuse déployée dans L’âge séculier, mais plutôt une forme de transcendance que l’on pourrait qualifier de « temporelle ». / This M.A. thesis unfolds a reflexion upon the concept of fullness as developed by Charles Taylor, especially in his book A Secular Age, in which the idea of fullness is intrinsically connected with modernity, belief and unbelief. For Taylor, the understanding of modernity implies a grasping of the change that allowed the transition from a context where unbelief in God was considered inconceivable to a context where belief remains only an option. That change consists essentially in a modification of our very representation of fullness. What is fullness for Charles Taylor? It is the condition to which any human being tends towards, and which implies an answer, unspoken or not, to the question of the meaning of life. My main goal will be the understanding of the nature of fullness as conceived by Charles Taylor. I shall show that the twofold definition of fullness in A Secular Age generates a tension between fullness conceived as a unique event, and fullness conceived as a constant aspiration towards meaning (which identifies with goodness). I shall suggest a resolution of this tension through an understanding of fullness which aims to restore its fundamental unity – the idea being to grasp the notion of fullness as a unique event and as the constant aspiration to meaning not separately, but in their relationship with one other. This interpretation model, provided by the idea of eternity, which is also present in A Secular Age, will allow me to establish a coincidence between the pursuit of fullness and the desire of eternity. Both of them share the same fundamental aim: through the inscription of qualitatively privileged and unique moments, constituents of life, in the very totality of this life, they aim to reveal its meaning and to bestow permanence to it. Moreover, I will argue from this coincidence between fullness and eternity that the quest for fullness doesn’t necessarily imply a religious perspective as unfolded in A Secular Age, but can lead rather to a form of transcendence that one can qualify as « temporal ».

Peter Carey has been discussed in academia since the 1980s. And since then these discussions revolve around postmodernism, postcolonial studies or, indeed, both at once. So, either Peter Carey has been writing the same old novel for nearly thirty years by now, or there are whole worlds in his writings that have yet to be uncovered. Since I claim the latter is the case, this thesis sets out to chart at least a few areas of these vast forgotten territories, to use a consciously colonial metaphor. The theoretical ‘vehicle’ with which the new areas are entered is agency. Which means that the thesis investigates how individual characters manage to become successful actors, or fail to do so. The thesis first provides an overview of Carey's writing (Chapter 2), then traces three typical 'Carey themes' through his entire oeuvre and shows how they are relevant for agency (Chapter 3), before discussing the concept of agency itself at some length in Chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are close readings of My Life as a Fake, Illywhacker and Tristan Smith and investigate the novels' main characters' development in depth. The appendix contains research that would be relevant for a biographical approach to Carey's works. It explains the climate of Australian literature production in the 1970s in which Carey emerges as an author and that is relevant for his writing up to his latest works Amnesia and a Long Way from Home. It also relates a few biographical notes that are relevant for many of his works.:1. Introduction 4 2. Literary Overview of Carey’s Writing 18 3. Agency in Carey’s Writing: Three ‘Carey Themes’ 29 4. Agency 49 4.1. Important Terminology 49 4.2. Agency: A New Phenomenon? 53 4.3. The Ancient Sources of Agency 62 4.4. The Agency Game: The Sociological Concept of Agency 67 4.5. Agency, Nature, and Metaphysics 76 4.6. The Problem of Normativity 84 4.7. Getting the Moral Framework Back into the Picture 89 4.8. Getting Intrinsic Capacity Back into the Picture 95 4.9. The Whole Picture 100 5. My Life as a Fake 109 5.1. The Story 109 5.2. The Central Conflict: Apollo and Dionysus Caught in a ‘Deathlock’ 112 5.3. My Life as a Fake and the Struggle for Authenticity 125 5.4. Chubb and McCorkle Revisited: Authenticity and the Social Arena 132 5.5. Conclusion 138 6. Illywhacker 141 6.1. Lies and control 148 6.1.1. Book I 149 6.1.2. Book II 156 6.1.3. Book III 164 6.2. Compulsive Visions and Compelled Selves 171 6.2.1. The McGraths: Molly and Jack 185 6.2.2. The Young Compulsive Mistresses 190 6.3. Peter Carey’s Entrapped Dreamers 199 6.4. From the Aircraft Factory to the Museum: Baudrillard in Australia 204 6.4.1. The Three-Tiered Advance of Australia Fair 205 6.4.2. Agency in the Hyperreal Condition 214 6.4.3. Illywhacker and the Western World: Anti-Depressants 217 6.5. Final Remarks on Illywhacker 221 7. Tristan Smith 224 7.1. Tristan as Narrative Voice and as Character inside his Story 228 7.2. Tristan’s Bildung: A Study in two Mirror Phases 231 7.2.1. Initial Conceit 232 7.2.2. The Gaze of the Other 236 7.2.3. The First Mirror Stage 241 7.2.4. Interlude 246 7.2.5. The Voyage 249 7.2.6. The Second Mirror Stage 252 7.3. Tristan’s Subversiveness: “Bodies […] out of Control” 258 7.3.1. Postcolonial Approaches and External Reality 259 7.3.2. Cultural Simulation: Ghostdorps and Ghost Lights 264 7.3.3. Confronting Simulations: Tristan and Peggy 270 7.3.4. Not Escaping the Now: Felicity 275 7.3.5. Jacqui: From Self-Realisation to Escapism and Back to the Now 280 7.4. The Radical’s Conceit: Peter Carey’s Political Activists 287 8. Conclusion 292 9. Bibliography 303 10. Appendix 314 10.1. Publishing Carey: The Emergence of an Author 314 10.2. Peter Carey and the New Nationalism 320 10.3. Biographical Notes on Peter Carey’s Writing 330

This essay studies the implicit and explicit perspectives of Bruce Lincoln, Jürgen Habermas, Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Charles Taylor, José Casanova and their approach to secularism as a phenomenon. This is done by categorizing them into three categories. The categories,enlightenment-centered theorists, critical theorists and implicit-theological theorists, all have explicit accounts and implicit forms of reasoning that shape and contextualize their respective approach. The Enlightenment-centered theorists tend to regard secularism as a neutral and peace-keeping statecraft. This approach implicitly contains the idea of a clear division between secular and religious. This implicit form of reasoning I argue is problematically non-reflexive to the theorist’s own standpoint and risks becoming a form of secular ideology. The theorists categorized as critical theorists view secularism more as a type of discourse where what is seen as religious and the secular is inherently fluid. This is then analyzed by them as a special strategy for Western sovereignty. The perspective of the implicit-theological theorists is similar both to the Enlightenment-centered and the criticaltheorists' perspective in that secularism is primarily peace-keeping and that the categories are often fluid. I show that their approach contains theological assumptions that religion responds to a realm which challenges the immanent world. In the last chapter of the essay, I give a normative evaluation of the three approaches to secularism where I argue that while the enlightenment-centered theorists have useful explanatory models, the critical and to a lesser extent implicit-theological approach to secularism are more fruitful for religious studies. They allow for more flexibility in studying the relationship between secular and religious groups as they do not determine the categories in advance. The essay also contains a concluding discussion on the type of problems for philosophy of science and religious studies that arise when secularism and what is seen as the secular is deconstructed.