The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between evangelicalism and modernity with the Swedish holiness preacher Emil Gustafson (1862–1900) as a case. This is achieved by comparing Gustafson’s spirituality with Charles Taylor’s characterization of modernity. The investigation identifies five central themes in Gustafson’s spirituality: conversion, calling, suffering, sanctification, and spiritual experience. With regard to these themes paral-lels with modernity are noted. For example, the analysis shows that modern individualism influenced Gustafson’s view of conversion, and that instrumental rationality informed his evaluations of his own work as a preacher. But there are also instances where he distanced himself from modernity. He did not embrace a modern optimistic anthropology, or the view of suffering as purely negative. It is concluded that Gustafson is neither anti-modern, nor identical to Taylor’s depiction of modernity. He represents one kind of modernity. One that is theocentric rather than anthropo-centric. In order to uphold this theocentric character Gustafson’s opposition to the basic struc-ture of modernity had to be grounded in social practices. For instance, his negative anthropol-ogy was grounded in the revival-meeting where outsiders were called to repent and rely on God rather than themselves. Based on the results from this study it is suggested that evangelicalism should be inter-preted as neither in conflict with modernity, nor in continuity with it, but rather as a kind of modernity. There are multiple modernities, and evangelicalism is one of them.

Taking Saba Mahmood's question 'Can secularism be other-wise?' (2010) as the starting point for a critical-historical investigation of the 'secular body' (Asad 2003; Hirschkind 2011), my thesis develops in two stages. In the first, I argue that current works of secular theory - particularly A Secular Age (Taylor 2007) - tend to rely on an excessively rationalistic conception of Enlightenment thought for the construction of their central conceptual categories (e.g. the 'immanent frame', 'buffered self', or 'modern exclusive humanism'), thus reinforcing a double-binary linking rationality to Euro-American secularity, and emotion to subaltern 'religion'. Against Taylor and others, I emphasise the contradictory, 'assembled' nature of Enlightenment discourse, and point to alternative, more body-centred strands of thought in key figures of the seventeenth-eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, such as Descartes, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Helvétius, and Holbach. Against common perceptions, and drawing on a range of philosophical works, institutional reports, and stage plays in French and in translation, I suggest these figures in some ways reinstated emotion and the body against the rationalistic tendencies of the past. Insofar as 'the secular' was shaped by the Enlightenment, it emerged out of a conscious project of nationalist cultivation, based fundamentally on manipulating the body and emotions. In the second stage, I consider the way Orientalist representations of non-Western religions meshed with prevalent theories of political manipulation to generate an affective system of anti-Catholic propaganda geared towards the national good. Though existing critiques of Taylor tend to focus on the importance of religious (i.e. Christian) constructions of Oriental religions for the genealogy of secularity (e.g. Mahmood 2010), I suggest a distinctively secular form of Orientalism emerged in the eighteenth century, in which anti-religion, racism, and nationalism merged into a powerful weapon of republican discourse, congruent with ambient theories of emotion. The aesthetic manipulation of racist and Orientalist tropes in Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes (1721) and Voltaire's Le Fanatisme (1741), for example, can be read as a practical response to existing theory on the power of images to regulate people's passions in the national interest.

In modern times of globalisation, most countries no longer consist of a homogeneous population. People from different backgrounds, with different stories, religion and culture live together in the same community. Unfortunately, this creates challenges and a modern state needs to have a plan for integration so that all these groups and individuals may live together peacefully, which is important in aspects of universal human rights and human dignity, but also for the function of a society. In this Master's thesis in Human Rights, questions about integration are discussed in a European context through four ideal-typical integration policy options from a model by Karin Borevi; together with perspectives from Seyla Benhabib, Abdelmalek Sayad and Charles Taylor. The four ideal-typical options for integration that are used in this thesis are: 1: Assimilaion to an ethnic community 2: Politics for ethnic exclusion 3: Assimilation to a civil community 4: Multicultural politics. Integration in Sweden, Great Britain and France during the 90's are used as illustrative examples of integration in order to be able to discuss the ideal-typical policy options in relation to real examples for demonstrating which political ideas and values that are built into different models of integration. In the end a normative discussion results in a solution of which values that should be prioritised and which strategy that is the best to accomplish these values. I conclude amongst other things that different forms of integration value culture, groups or individuals differently and that many different types of strategies and politics can be put into the same ideal-typical option for integration. People tend to treat cultures as unchangeable and well-defined units, even though they in reality seem to be of a changeable nature. The modern state should in my opinion work more with the principles around which type of society that would be the best for all its citizens and not so much how we should preserve what cannot be preserved in the first place, like cultures. We should create societies where cultures can mix and change. The global world is here to stay and so is the heterogeneous society, the state should focus on creating a society built on this fact, where society and people as individuals may grow.

Les sociétés modernes sont de plus en plus souvent confrontées aux enjeux de la diversité. Le multiculturalisme tente d’y apporter une réponse à travers un modèle de société basé sur une politique de la reconnaissance. Selon moi, l’argumentation des multiculturalistes repose sur leur conception de l’identité. C’est pourquoi, pour apporter une critique nouvelle de ce courant de pensée, j’analyse les écrits de ses principaux défenseurs, Will Kymlicka et Charles Taylor, en concentrant mon analyse sur ce qu’ils entendent par identité. Je soutiens que leur conception ne laisse pas assez de place au potentiel d’évolution et ne considère pas suffisamment l’importance et le pouvoir de la volonté individuelle dans la construction de l’identité. En m’appuyant sur l’étude d’autres auteurs, je souligne la nécessité de considérer les frontières entre le semblable et l’autre de manière plus souple et de reconnaître que la violence peut s’exercer par la création de différences entre les personnes. J’ai choisi la figure radicale de « l’homme sans qualités » de Robert Musil pour montrer comment un individu peut devenir autonome à travers un acte de destruction créatrice. Enfin, je conclus que l’État devrait favoriser ce processus, et permettre au sujet, qui est selon moi dénué d’une nature authentique, de penser son existence comme une expérience du possible. / Modern societies are increasingly confronted with the challenge of diversity. Defenders of multiculturalism responded with a model of society based on a politics of recognition. This model can be connected to a particular conception of identity. In order to make a new contribution to the critique of this approach, this work presents an analysis of the writings of two of the main proponents: Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor. It does so by focusing on their conception of identity and argues that it does not leave enough room for change and fails to fully recognise the importance and the impact of personal will. The works of other authors are analysed in order to emphasize the need to view the boundaries between sameness and otherness in a more flexible fashion and to acknowledge that violence can attend the creation of differences between people. The figure of the “man without qualifies” portrayed by the novelist Robert Musil is offered as emblematic of how an individual can become autonomous through an act of creative destruction. Finally, it is concluded that the state should facilitate the creation of difference and this requires allowing citizens to conceive of their lives as an experience of the possible.

Ce mémoire traite de la critique communautarienne du libéralisme et se donne deux projets. D’abord, il s’agit de formuler une position de synthèse à partir des travaux des philosophes Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre et Michael Walzer. Cette synthèse s’articule autour de trois axes, soit ontologique, sociale et méthodologique. Le deuxième projet est d’évaluer cette position pour statuer sur son rapport au libéralisme, et, plus précisément, pour déterminer si elle est seulement une critique, une alternative, ou encore une variante à l’intérieur du libéralisme. Il est conclu que le communautarisme est réconciliable avec une certaine forme de libéralisme et que sa critique permet même de l’améliorer. / In this essay about the communitarian critique of liberalism I seek to reach two goals. First, it is to form a synthesis from the works of philosophers Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. This synthesis is articulated through three axes: ontologicial, social and methodological. Building on this, my second objective is to assess its relation to liberalism. More specifically, I seek to determine whether communitarianism is merely a critique, an alternative or a variant of liberalism. My conclusion is that communitarianism is reconciliable with a certain form of liberalism and that its critique allows to improve it.

<p>“What characterizes an acceptable theory of self-realization?” The thrust of the present dissertation is towards seeking an answer to this central problem, which stems from the fundamental human experience that life involves change, and that in a modern society such change is often expected to be towards a realization of potentials and the good life for the individual. </p><p>The dissertation has a three-fold purpose. The first is to clarify the content of five modern theories of self-realization from three academic fields. The theories are those of the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, the philosophers Charles Taylor and Alan Gewirth, and the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Bernard Lonergan. These are methodologically studied by the help of seven analytical questions. The second purpose is to perform a lengthwise comparatative analysis of the five theories, the results of which lead to the third; namely to critically discuss several elements of the reality of human life which have proven to be missing or supressed in much of the material.</p><p>The theoretical framework for the dissertation runs along two axes: one concerns what is developed as a distinction between internalism and relationalism, and the other is to cast a critical light on the lack of attention paid by the the theories of self-realization to experiences which run counter to optimistic ideas of individual development, such as death, loss and dependence. </p><p>The dissertation concludes with an outline for a constructive position based on the necessity of a theory’s closeness to experience, and on the need for reconcilitation of what may seem to be unabridgeble in human life. A theory of self-realization must do more than formulate positive conditions for change. It must also take into consideration conditions that are not directly related to, and sometimes even run contrary to, realization of the self.</p>

“What characterizes an acceptable theory of self-realization?” The thrust of the present dissertation is towards seeking an answer to this central problem, which stems from the fundamental human experience that life involves change, and that in a modern society such change is often expected to be towards a realization of potentials and the good life for the individual. The dissertation has a three-fold purpose. The first is to clarify the content of five modern theories of self-realization from three academic fields. The theories are those of the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, the philosophers Charles Taylor and Alan Gewirth, and the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Bernard Lonergan. These are methodologically studied by the help of seven analytical questions. The second purpose is to perform a lengthwise comparatative analysis of the five theories, the results of which lead to the third; namely to critically discuss several elements of the reality of human life which have proven to be missing or supressed in much of the material. The theoretical framework for the dissertation runs along two axes: one concerns what is developed as a distinction between internalism and relationalism, and the other is to cast a critical light on the lack of attention paid by the the theories of self-realization to experiences which run counter to optimistic ideas of individual development, such as death, loss and dependence. The dissertation concludes with an outline for a constructive position based on the necessity of a theory’s closeness to experience, and on the need for reconcilitation of what may seem to be unabridgeble in human life. A theory of self-realization must do more than formulate positive conditions for change. It must also take into consideration conditions that are not directly related to, and sometimes even run contrary to, realization of the self.

According to the National Rites of Passage Institute (NROPI), African Americans have lost their authentic identity, which has led to inauthentic, broken individuals and communities. In order to reverse these trends, according to NROPI, African Americans must rediscover their authentic identity through a rites of passage program that plucks them from a Eurocentric narrative and places them into an Afrocentric one. This thesis explores how NROPI is a religious response to adversity that takes on a decidedly American form of contemporary religiosity. I argue that by analyzing NROPI and other contemporary rites of passage programs through the lens of religious studies, scholars can gain a deeper understanding of how these programs fit into the broader American religious landscape, and provide commentary on the changing nature of that religiosity, and how their language and rituals can be used as rhetorical strategies for social cohesion and control.

This thesis argues that pluralism and diversity pose a more fundamental challenge to liberal constitutionalism than is sometimes recognised by liberal political theorists. While the challenges presented by moral pluralism at the philosophical level, and by cultural diversity at the socio-cultural level, have received a great deal of attention in recent political thought, the background within which these themes become salient has not always been fully acknowledged. What is new in the modern world is not so much diversity of lifestyles, but the disintegration of frameworks that traditionally provided an unproblematic basis for political authority. What this modern challenge forces us to confront then, is the idea that ‘the people’ who are subject to law, are also, as citizens, the ultimate source of political authority. I consider in detail the work of two contemporary political theorists who have provided among the most sustained and far-reaching attempts to respond to this challenge, Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas. Both make a significant contribution to responding to the contemporary situation of pluralism by taking on board the ‘dialogical’ nature of identity, and the role of the ‘people’ as the ultimate source of political power. However each places a heavy reliance on a privileged standpoint that may shield political judgement from the full implications of modern pluralism: Habermas, by appealing to ‘post-conventional morality’ and Taylor, by appealing to an incipient teleology.

This dissertation evaluates the recent academic consensus on liberal multiculturalism. I argue that this apparent consensus, by subsuming religious experience under the general category of culture, has rested upon undefended and contestable conceptions of modern religious life. In the liberal multicultural literature, cultures are primarily identified as sharing certain ethnic, linguistic, or geographic attributes, which is to say morally arbitrary particulars that can be defended without raising the possibility of conflict over metaphysical beliefs. In such theories, the possibility of conflict due to diverse religious principles or claims to the transcendent is either steadfastly ignored or, more typically, explained away as the expression of perverted religious faith. I argue that this conception of the relation between culture and religion fails to provide an account of liberal multiculturalism that is persuasive to religious believers on their own terms. To illustrate this failing, I begin with an examination of the Canadian policy of official multiculturalism and the constitutional design of Pierre Trudeau. I argue that the resistance of Québécois nationalists to liberal multiculturalism, as well as the conflict between the Québécois and minority religious groups within Quebec, has been animated by religious and quasi-religious claims to the transcendent. I maintain that to truly confront this basic problem of religious difference, one must articulate and defend the substantive visions of religious life that are implicit in liberal multicultural theory. To this end, I contrast the portrait of religious life and secularization that is implicit in Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights with the recent account of modern religious life presented by Charles Taylor. I conclude by suggesting that Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s contrasting conceptions of religious difference—which are fundamentally at odds regarding the relation of the right to the good, and the diversity and nature of genuine religious belief—underline the extent to which liberal multicultural theory has reached an academic consensus only by ignoring the reality of religious diversity. / text