In this thesis I address the question of sympathetic action - action by one group of workers designed to aid another group of workers in their struggle with an employer, manifested most obviously through refusals by workers to cross a picket line - through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As the law currently stands in Canada, undertaking sympathetic action collectively is invariably illegal as it is considered an illegal "strike" under Canadian labour legislation. Further, workers who undertake sympathetic action - whether collectively or individually - can be subject to discipline or discharge by their employer. I argue that workers who undertake sympathetic action can have numerous motivations, ranging from economic self-interest to deeply-held political or moral beliefs (the latter manifested through the concept of "solidarity"), and that when those motivations include expressive or conscientious interests, sympathetic action should be entitled to protection by the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression, and association found in section 2 of the Charter. I further argue that a each of these freedoms represents a different aspect of the inherent dignity and worth of an individual, and that a right to sympathetic action promotes both those freedoms and Charter values. Finally, I argue that a constitutional right to sympathetic action is a free-standing right that can exist even in the absence of a constitutional right to strike. This thesis reviews the current and historical state of Canadian law (in both the statutory labour relations regimes and in common law) regarding sympathetic action, the potential application of the Charter freedoms of conscience, expression, and association to sympathetic action, and finally options for reform that reduce or eliminate restrictions on sympathetic action and therefore make our labour relations system more in keeping with Charter values.

Text in German / The present thesis undertakes a comprehensive survey and criticak analysis of the concept of duty and its significance in the prose of Siegfried Lenz (born in 1926). It concentrates on those novels and narratives in which duty is the main motif; these are Schwierige Trauer (1960), Das Feuerschiff (1960), Deutschstunde (1968) and Ein Kriegsende (1984). After an introduction which outlines the development and the influence of the concept of duty in Germany, the thesis deals with Lenz's prose in chronological order. Siegfried Lenz's main motif is the significance of the concept of duty within the moral code of the individual, the specific meaning and influence of which has been developed in Germany. Lenz does not deny that duty is a necessary element of the process of socialization. But he rejects the unreflected and uncritical acceptance of a dubious morality based on a sense of duty, at the expense of individuality and responsibility for oneself. It is a deformed understanding of duty which Lenz exposes and criticizes in his work: a characteristic mark of submissiveness and slavish obedience ("Untertanengeist und Kadavergehorsam"). These distortions are determined by political-historical events, theological dogmas, philosophical theses and an authoritarian upbringing. The reasons for the attitudes and behaviour of Lenz's fictitious characters have their roots in those factors. Lenz always insists on reflection. He refuses the uncritical acceptance of a morality based on duty, which allows a person to avoid his or her responsibility. However, Siegfried Lenz neither attempts to construct a social background nor does he offer recipes for a new social order. Rather he restricts himself to the sceptical questioning of norms and values, which are maintained by authority. The author creates a conflict in a hermetic environment, for example a ship or a small village, in which his fictitious characters have to prove themselves. By confronting his readers with such an extreme situation and the protagonists' questionable decisions, Lenz forces his public to reconsider their own position. The author's aim is to make his readers realize that right and wrong cannot always be distinguished in a clear-cut manner / Linguistics and Modern Languages / D.Litt. et Phil. (German)

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé. / Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal traditions, also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the collectivity in society. Our study will analyse the Canadian, American and European constitutional models of freedom of religion and conscience. In a first chapter, we will examine the theoretical conceptions of religion in the social sciences as well as from the perspectives of legal approaches in order to discern the manner in which religion is conceived and to better understand its various influences. In this way, we hope to enhance our understanding of both identity and to a greater extent, culture, both in and out of law. In the second and third chapters, we will attempt to characterise the relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, as well as identify unresolved issues. In the final chapter, we will observe how freedom of conscience has been interpreted in the American legal setting as well as in the European Union, by way of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We hypothesise that a better understanding of the relationship between the freedoms of conscience and religion can be arrived at by clarifying the theoretical conceptions of religion and conscience in comparative constitutional law.

<p>This dissertation deals with the encounter between Lutheran orthodoxy and conservative pietism 1720–1730. The aim has been to compare their views on society and man. </p><p>In the pietistic conflict, orthodoxy gave rise to attitudes which proved to be key to its view on society and man. It was a deeply rooted traditionalism, patriarchal order of society, demand for confessional uniformity and a corporativistic view on society. The above mentioned contained a specific view on the relationship between the church, state and individual. By using the Organism Metaphor, i.e. society depicted as a body, orthodoxy made visible the church’s collective unity. This body was also identical to the Swedish kingdom. If uniformity in faith and ceremonies was to be dissolved, it implied a disintegration of the social body and breaking of the bonds which held together both church and country. Uniformity was upheld through confessionalism and the partiarchal order of the church. The priests’ monopoly on official functions, and the legal calling created a barrier protecting this relationship to power. Where the views on society and man intersected, one specific theme can be identified – conscience. This spiritual function connected man to law, society’s patriarchal order and God. </p><p>I have emphasised five distinct traits of pietism: its polarizing tendencies, strong emotionalism, its reformist attitude towards church and social life, its egalitarianism and religious individualism. All of these traits collided with orthodoxy’s view on society and man. Pietism can be described as a massive christianization project, which included moral and ethic education of the people on an individual and collective level. Where pietism and religious individualism coincided with egalitarianism, a new discourse for conscience was established, where conscience became both an internal court of law – with God acting as judge – and a spiritual authority whose integrity grew in proportion to authority and church.</p>

This dissertation deals with the encounter between Lutheran orthodoxy and conservative pietism 1720–1730. The aim has been to compare their views on society and man. In the pietistic conflict, orthodoxy gave rise to attitudes which proved to be key to its view on society and man. It was a deeply rooted traditionalism, patriarchal order of society, demand for confessional uniformity and a corporativistic view on society. The above mentioned contained a specific view on the relationship between the church, state and individual. By using the Organism Metaphor, i.e. society depicted as a body, orthodoxy made visible the church’s collective unity. This body was also identical to the Swedish kingdom. If uniformity in faith and ceremonies was to be dissolved, it implied a disintegration of the social body and breaking of the bonds which held together both church and country. Uniformity was upheld through confessionalism and the partiarchal order of the church. The priests’ monopoly on official functions, and the legal calling created a barrier protecting this relationship to power. Where the views on society and man intersected, one specific theme can be identified – conscience. This spiritual function connected man to law, society’s patriarchal order and God. I have emphasised five distinct traits of pietism: its polarizing tendencies, strong emotionalism, its reformist attitude towards church and social life, its egalitarianism and religious individualism. All of these traits collided with orthodoxy’s view on society and man. Pietism can be described as a massive christianization project, which included moral and ethic education of the people on an individual and collective level. Where pietism and religious individualism coincided with egalitarianism, a new discourse for conscience was established, where conscience became both an internal court of law – with God acting as judge – and a spiritual authority whose integrity grew in proportion to authority and church.

La liberté de religion, souvent reconnue comme étant la « première liberté » dans de nombreuses traditions juridiques, reflète également les différentes conceptions de la place de l’individu et de la communauté dans la société. Notre étude analysera les modèles constitutionnels canadien, américain et européen de liberté de religion et conscience. Dans un premier chapitre, nous examinerons les conceptions théoriques de la religion dans les sciences sociales ainsi les approches juridiques afin de mieux cerner comment la religion est conçue et de plus, comprendre les diverses influences sur sa conceptualisation. Dans un second et troisième chapitre, nous tenterons d’une part, de qualifier la relation entre la liberté de conscience et la liberté de religion au Canada en nous livrant à une analyse approfondie des deux libertés et d’autre part, d’identifier les questions qui demeurent irrésolues. Dans le chapitre final, nous observerons comment la liberté de conscience a été interprétée dans les contextes américain et dans l’Union Européenne, par le biais de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’Homme. Notre hypothèse est que l’on peut arriver à une meilleure compréhension de la relation entre les libertés de conscience et religion en clarifiant les conceptions théoriques de la religion et de la conscience en droit constitutionnel comparé. / Freedom of religion, often recognised as “first freedom” in numerous legal traditions, also reflects the different conceptions of the place of the individual and the collectivity in society. Our study will analyse the Canadian, American and European constitutional models of freedom of religion and conscience. In a first chapter, we will examine the theoretical conceptions of religion in the social sciences as well as from the perspectives of legal approaches in order to discern the manner in which religion is conceived and to better understand its various influences. In this way, we hope to enhance our understanding of both identity and to a greater extent, culture, both in and out of law. In the second and third chapters, we will attempt to characterise the relationship between freedom of conscience and freedom of religion in Canada, as well as identify unresolved issues. In the final chapter, we will observe how freedom of conscience has been interpreted in the American legal setting as well as in the European Union, by way of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). We hypothesise that a better understanding of the relationship between the freedoms of conscience and religion can be arrived at by clarifying the theoretical conceptions of religion and conscience in comparative constitutional law.

[pt] Existe um conflito de direitos entre homossexuais e indivíduos que seguem religiões que pregam que a homossexualidade é contrária às leis divinas e que o casamento é uma união sagrada entre um homem e uma mulher. Esse conflito foi potencializado a partir da legalização do casamento homoafetivo. Por um lado, indivíduos homossexuais têm o direito à igualdade, o que significa que não devem ser discriminados por causa de sua orientação sexual; por outro lado, indivíduos religiosos têm a liberdade de crer em determinada religião e adotar condutas que estejam de acordo com suas crenças. Dentre as situações que podem gerar conflito, três são analisadas neste trabalho: a recusa de um indivíduo religioso a celebrar ou contribuir para uma cerimônia de casamento homoafetivo, com base na perspectiva religiosa sobre o conceito de casamento; a recusa por parte de um psicólogo a atender um paciente homossexual ou casal homoafetivo, sob o fundamento de que suas crenças religiosas o impedem de manifestar aprovação em relação à homossexualidade ou auxiliar uma união homoafetiva durante o atendimento; a recusa religiosamente motivada a fornecer produtos que manifestam apoio ao casamento homoafetivo ou alguma causa LGBT. Além do estudo de doutrina estrangeira sobre o tema, são examinadas dez decisões judiciais referentes a casos concretos ocorridos nos Estados Unidos, Reino Unido e Canadá, com o objetivo de auxiliar na elucidação de parâmetros claros para a melhor resolução da controvérsia em questão, ante a razoável expectativa de que, em breve, conflitos semelhantes surgirão no Brasil. / [en] There is a conflict of rights between homosexuals and individuals who follow religions that preach that homosexuality is contrary to the laws of God and marriage is a sacred union between one man and one woman. This conflict was intensified after the legalization of same-sex marriage. On the one hand, homosexual individuals have the right to equality, which means they must not be discriminated on basis of sexual orientation; on the other hand, religious individuals have the right to believe in a religion and act according to their beliefs. This paper will examine three situations that might cause conflict: the refusal to celebrate or contribute to a same-sex wedding, because of one s religious views on marriage; the refusal to assist a homosexual patient or a same-sex couple, by a psychologist or counselor whose religious beliefs prevent them from affirming homosexuality or assisting a same-sex union; the religiously motivated refusal to print materials that promote same-sex marriage or other LGBT interests. This dissertation will look at foreign studies on the matter, and will examine ten judicial decisions on cases that occurred in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, in order to help create clear parameters to resolve the controversy, which is likely to soon arise in Brazil.

Si Ferdinand Buisson a, du point de vue institutionnel, joué un rôle de premier plan dans l'édification de l'école laïque sous la IIIe République, il fut aussi un remarquable observateur de son temps et un penseur engagé soucieux de faire apparaître toute l'intelligibilité des différentes causes qu'il a embrassées au cours de sa longue carrière d'homme publique, du protestantisme libéral au radical-socialisme. Pour appréhender la cohérence de cet itinéraire intellectuel, la question de l'autorité offre un bon fil directeur: avant d'être envisagée en termes pédagogiques, celle-ci s'est en effet posée à Buisson de manière particulièrement vive dans le contexte théologique et ecclésiologique mouvementé qui était celui de la communauté réformée dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Prenant énergiquement parti pour les "libéraux" dans le débat qui les oppose alors aux "orthodoxes" quant aux statuts respectifs de l'Ecriture et de la conscience dans l'économie de la foi, Buisson esquisse dès les années 1860 une interprétation originale de la tradition protestante qu'il développera bien plus tard dans sa thèse de 1891 sur Sébastien Castellion. A la lumière de ses écrits protestants, sa philosophie de l'éducation laïque apparaît à bien des égards comme l'expression sécularisée d'un geste inaugural et profondément religieux de refus de l'autorité dans ses formes conservatrices et toutes extérieures. Loin de consister cependant en un simple développement d’une essence préexistante, la continuité de cette pensée ne se dessine qu'au gré d'un permanent travail de réécriture commandé par les contextes de discussion abordés, les arguments adverses et les situations historiques que Buisson s'est efforcé d'infléchir avec un sens consommé du kairos. Ce sont ces ajustements et infléchissements successifs de l'idéal buissonien que nous avons tenté d’appréhender depuis les jeunes heures de l'école laïque jusqu'aux premières discussions relatives à sa "démocratisation" à la veille de la première guerre mondiale. / Ferdinand Buisson did not only play a major role, as regards institutions, in the foundation of nondenominational education during the Third Republic, he was also both a talented observer of his time and a committed thinker, concerned with the intelligibility of the various causes he embraced throughout his long career as a public figure , from liberal Protestantism to radical- socialism. The coherence of his intellectual path may be apprehended through a clear issue: The question of authority. As a matter of fact, before considering it from an educational standpoint, Ferdinand Buisson had to face it acutely inthe stormy theological and ecclesiological context of the protestant community during the second half of the 19th century. He stood up vigourously for the”liberals” in their dispute against the “orthodox” concerning respectively, the status of the Scriptures and of conscience in the process of faith. As early as 1860, Ferdinand Buisson outlines an original interpretation of the protestant tradition, which he will later on develop in 1891 in his thesis about Sébastien Castellion. In the light of his protestant works, and in many respects, his philosophy of non-denominational education sounds like the secularized expression of a deeply religious inaugural gesture in refusal of authority, in its external conservative forms. Yet, far from simply expanding on a pre-existent essence, the continuity of this thinking only becomes clear through a continuous work of re-writing, induced from debates, opposing arguments and historical situations which Buisson endeavoured to reorientate with his accomplished sense of Kairos. Indeed, we have tried to apprehend those successive reorientations and realignments of Buisson’s ideal, starting from the very first days of non-denominational education to the first discussions relating to its democratization on the eve of the first World War.

Religious and existential issues by Viktor E. Frankl. Its reception in theological thinking with special regard to Czechoslovak Hussite Church. Marie Jandová (roz. Trtíková) Viktor E. Frankl is considered as one of the most important person of 20th century in the area of medicine, namely in the branch of neurosurgery and psychiatry. He was Professor of Neurology and Psychiatry at the University of Vienna Medical School. He was also the founder of the Third Viennese school of Psychotherapy (after Freud's psychoanalysis and Adler's individual psychology) - the school of logotherapy. Frankl's life and work influenced millions of people all around the world. He published thirty-two books, which have been translated into more than twenty-three languages, including Japanese and Chinese. During my scientific stay in Vienna, I have visited many places, which are connected with Frankl's life. I have also made a lot of pictures. Some of them can be seen in the attachment at the end of this work. The initial part of this thesis describes Frankl's life story from his birth in 1905 to his death in 1997, with main emphasis to experiences which led to his discovery of logotherapy. Frankl's entire family, excepting for his sister, perished during World War II in camps (or were sent to the gas ovens). In the Nazi...

Thèse réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Université de Lausanne / Cette thèse porte sur l’administration des demandes de mort à partir de deux modalités controversées, l’aide médicale à mourir au Québec (Canada) et l’assistance au suicide dans le canton de Vaud (Suisse). Au Québec, l’assistance à mourir est un service public médical, tandis que dans le canton de Vaud, elle est un acte privé toléré par l’État et mis en œuvre par des associations. Selon la façon dont la question de l’assistance à mourir est posée dans les deux contextes, différentes réponses y sont apportées qui reflètent des formes variées de concernement pour cette pratique. Je suggère que ces deux régimes contrastés d’assistance à mourir peuvent être compris dans un même mouvement analytique, malgré les différences qui les séparent. Suivant une perspective comparative et ethnographique, cette thèse explore les façons dont sont mises en œuvre les quatre conditions de possibilité de l’assistance à mourir que j’identifie, et ce à plusieurs échelles, des débats publics aux expériences immédiates des personnes directement concernées. L’enquête repose sur quatre années de recherche, croisant des entretiens, des observations, une revue de presse, ainsi que des analyses de sources documentaires. Cette thèse arrive au constat que les régimes québécois et vaudois d’assistance à mourir se rejoignent autour de maximes morales pratiques employées par les personnes concernées. Ces maximes, qui se matérialisent dans des paroles quotidiennes et des dispositifs institutionnels, encadrent le trouble suscité par l’assistance à mourir et répondent aux quatre conditions de possibilité identifiées. Cette éthique en actes balise l’espace étroit que les personnes concernées doivent naviguer pour rendre l’assistance à mourir possible. J’examine finalement ce qui guette les protagonistes, ainsi que la société, lorsque ces conditions ne sont pas réunies. Plus généralement, la comparaison de l’administration des demandes de mort dans ces deux régimes contrastés ouvre sur une interrogation des frontières de la médecine, du droit et de la vie. L’analyse des conditions de possibilité et des contours du trouble contribue également aux réflexions sur la mise en œuvre des droits, dont celui à la liberté de conscience. / This thesis is about the administration of death requests from two controversial modalities, medical aid in dying in Quebec (Canada) and assisted suicide in the canton of Vaud (Switzerland). In Quebec, assistance in dying is a public medical service, while in the canton of Vaud it is a private act tolerated by the state and implemented by associations. According to how the assistance to dying question is raised in both contexts, different answers are given which reflect different forms of concern for this practice. I suggest that these two contrasting regimes of assistance in dying can be understood in the same analytical movement despite their differences. From a comparative and ethnographic perspective, this thesis explores how the four conditions that enable the possibility of assistance in dying that I identify are put into practice at different scales, from public debates to the experiences of people who are directly involved. The research is based on four years of investigation relying on interviews, observations, a press review, and analyses of documentary sources. This thesis concludes that the assistance in dying regimes of Quebec and Vaud have practical moral maxims used by the people involved in common. These maxims, which emerge in everyday words and institutional arrangements, frame the trouble that arises from the confrontation with assistance in dying and meet the four enabling conditions identified. This ethics in action circumscribes the narrow space that the people involved must navigate to make assistance in dying possible. Finally, I examine what awaits the actors, as well as the society, when these conditions are not met. More generally, comparing the administration of death requests in these two contrasting regimes leads to questioning the boundaries of medicine, law and life itself. Analyzing these enabling conditions and the bounds of the trouble contributes to the reflections on the implementation of rights, including the right to freedom of conscience.