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[pt] Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a liberdade religiosa e a liberdade de expressão ambos como normas fundamentais, cláusulas pétreas do Estado Constitucional Democrático de Direito, em face da também constitucional laicização do Estado moderno, analisando os limites desta se suas respectivas efetividades partindo do princípio da liberdade religiosa, tendo em vista que tal relacionamento entre ambas é composta de colisões. A pesquisa mostrará a dimensão da experiência religiosa do homem como fundamento material e a função da religião como sistema social, um breve panorama histórico da relação entre Estado e religião no início da era cristã até o processo de laicização do Estado Moderno, liberdade religiosa e a liberdade de expressão na Constituinte de 1988, até onde pode ir um discurso de um líder religioso de matriz cristã revestido pela liberdade religiosa e da liberdade de expressão e também algumas propostas para estas situações problemáticas da prática jurídica contemporânea, refletindo sobre possíveis encaminhamentos no sentido da efetivação da liberdade religiosa em consonância com a laicização do Estado Democrático de Direito. / [en] This dissertation aims to analyze religious freedom and freedom of expression, both as fundamental norms, essential clauses of the Democratic Constitutional State of Law, in the face of the also constitutional secularization of the modern State, analyzing the limits of this and their respective effectiveness based on the principle of religious freedom, considering that such a relationship between the two is composed of collisions. The research will show the dimension of man s religious experience as a material foundation and the function of religion as a social system, a brief historical overview of the relationship between State and religion from the beginning of the Christian era to the secularization process of the Modern State, religious freedom and the freedom of expression in the 1988 Constituent Assembly, how far can a speech by a religious leader of a Christian matrix go, covered by religious freedom and freedom of expression and also some proposals for these problematic situations of contemporary legal practice, reflecting on possible referrals towards the realization of religious freedom in line with the secularization of the Democratic State of Law.

Copyright is conventionally justified as an incentive to produce and disseminate works of authorship. We can justify and theorise copyright more richly, not least because empirical evidence does not support the incentive narrative. Rather than focussing on quantitative matters such as the number of works incentivised and produced, we should consider copyright's qualitative influence on culture. A threshold objection to such an approach is the risk of cultural paternalism. This objection can be overcome. Rather than specifying paternalistic standards of merit for works, we can target the conditions under which their creation and consumption takes place. I argue, firstly, that we should adopt the following high-level principles: (i) that the conditions of creation and consumption of works should be conducive to democratic deliberation (democracy) and (ii) that they should facilitate the development of human capabilities (autonomy). Secondly, I propose that we pursue three mid-level objectives, which are helpful indicia of democracy and autonomy: - a fair and wide distribution of communicative and cultural power (inclusiveness); - diversity in the content and perspectives available to the public (diversity); and - conditions that permit authors and users of works to engage rigorously with the conventions of the media in which they operate (rigour). It is often said that copyright obstructs important qualitative objectives, like freedom of expression, and that we could better pursue these goals by weakening copyright and relying on non-proprietary alternatives. My approach produces a more optimistic, but also more complicated, view of copyright. While copyright's qualitative influence is not optimal, reductions in the strength and scope of copyright sometimes produces conditions and incentive structures that are worse for inclusiveness, diversity and rigour than stronger copyright. For example, both attention and wealth are highly concentrated in networked information economies driven by free sharing of content, and this is bad for diversity or inclusiveness. Online business models, based on surveillance of users' consumption of free works, are corrosive of autonomy and democracy. Merely removing copyright-based restrictions on the sharing of works is not a panacea for copyright's ills. A qualitative theory such as mine equips us to better understand and calibrate more richly the trade-offs involved in copyright policy decisions, and encourages us to treat copyright as part of a broader, qualitatively-oriented information and cultural policy.

En cette ère que plusieurs surnomment le « Web 2.0 », les usagers se sont emparés avec enthousiasme des fonctions liées aux communications et au partage sur Internet, ce médium devenant ainsi une nouvelle plate-forme pour les enjeux liés à la vie privée et à la réputation. La diffamation constitue justement un des problèmes prédominants constatés en lien avec ce contenu électronique, plus particulièrement lorsqu’il est question de contenu généré par les utilisateurs. Face à cet outil permettant une diffusion et une intéractivité sans précédent, comment devons-nous aborder Internet au regard des règles de droit applicables au Canada en matière de diffamation? L’analyse juridique traditionnelle sied-elle aux nouvelles réalités introduites par ce médium? Le bijuridisme canadien nous impose d’étudier parallèlement les régimes de droit civil et de common law et ce, dans une optique comparative afin de comprendre les concepts et le fonctionnement propres à chacune des approches juridiques cohabitant au pays. Cette analyse nous permettra de mettre en lumière les particularités du médium électronique qui se révèlent pertinentes lorsqu’il est question de diffamation et qui font la spécificité des situations et des acteurs en ligne, distinguant ainsi Internet des modes de communications traditionnels que le droit connaît. Cette approche comparative permet de poser un regard critique sur chacun des régimes de droit en vigueur au Canada, considérant la réalité propre à Internet et au contenu généré par les utilisateurs, mais surtout, vise à promouvoir le développement de méthodes d’analyse véritablement ancrées dans le fonctionnement du médium en cause et susceptibles d’évoluer avec celui-ci. / In this era often called « Web 2.0 », users have jumped with enthousiasm on the functions of communications and sharing on the Internet, this medium becoming a new platform for issues relating to privacy and reputation. Defamation is one of the main concerns about electronic content, more specificially regarding user generated content (UGC). Dealing with this tool which enables an unprecedented dissemination and interactivity in communications, how should we treat Internet with regards to the legal rules applicable in matters of defamation in Canada? Does the traditionnal legal analysis fit the new reality introduced by this medium? Because of Canada’s bijuralism, we will study separately the civil law and common law regimes with a comparative method in order to understand the concepts and the functionning specific to each of the legal approaches cohabiting in Canada. It will allow us to identify the special features of the electronic media which stand out when confronted with matters of defamation and which caracterize the specificity of the online context and users, therefore distinguishing it from the traditionnal means of communication known by the law. This comparative analysis aims to take a citical look at each of the law regimes in effect in Canada, considering the reality of Internet and its user generated content. Mainly, this study aims to foster the development of analytical methods truly entrenched in the functionning of the medium concerned and likely to evolve therewith.

Le présent mémoire se penche sur la constitutionnalité des articles 517 et 539 C.cr., qui prévoient des ordonnances de non-publication à l'enquête sur mise en liberté provisoire ainsi qu'à l'enquête préliminaire. L'auteur présente d'abord les modalités d'application de chacune de ces ordonnances. Suit ensuite un portrait de la jurisprudence sur la constitutionnalité de ces deux dispositions. L'auteur applique par la suite aux dispositions le test élaboré dans l'arrêt Oakes. Il conclut que l'objectif des dispositions, qui consiste à assurer un procès équitable à l'accusé, est urgent et réel. L'auteur constate ensuite que le critère du lien rationnel n'est pas satisfait puisque, ordonnance ou pas, les informations préjudiciables pour un accusé seront de toute façon dispersées dans le public, notamment grâce aux nouvelles technologies de l'information. À défaut de profiter d'informations fiables retransmises par les médias, le public devra se concentrer sur les rumeurs non vérifiables propagées par le Web. Le critère de l'atteinte minimale est également examiné. L'auteur estime que ni les récusations motivées, ni le changement de venue, ni les directives aux jurés ne sont en mesure de remplacer des ordonnances de non-publication. Enfin, l'auteur estime que les articles 517 et 539 C.cr. échouent le critère de proportionnalité entre les effets préjudiciables et les effets bénéfiques. En conclusion, comme alternative aux interdits de publication, l'auteur propose une réforme du processus de récusations motivées. / This thesis examines the constitutionality of sections 517 et 539 of the Criminal Code, which permits the judge presiding over a bail hearing or a preliminary inquiry to impose a publication ban. The author explains the way these bans are applied. He then reviews the existing case law regarding the constitutionality of these sections of the Criminal Code. In the second part of his thesis, the author applies the Oakes test to both sections. He first deals with the contextual factors to be considered in the analysis. He then examines the objective of the sections, which is to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial. He concludes that this objective is pressing and substantial. On the other hand, the rational connection test is not satisfied, because even with a ban, the prejudicial information will still be transmitted to the public through new technologies such as the Internet. If no information is allowed to be published by the journalists, the public will have to rely solely on rumours and possibly false news circulating on the Web. The minimal impairment test is also examined. Neither challenge for cause, nor change of venue or judicial instructions can replace effectively publication bans. Applying the last part of the Oakes test, the author fails to find that the deleterious effects of publication bans are proportionate to their salutary effects. In conclusion, the author briefly proposes a reform of the challenge for cause process.

This thesis asks how manifestation of religious belief by religious individuals can best be protected in English law. It is particularly concerned with the protection available to religious individuals in the public sphere. This thesis assesses the current state of protection under religious freedom and religious discrimination models, before considering the potential for increasing protection by reconceptualising the right to manifest religious belief as an aspect of freedom of expression. This thesis asks whether the practical and conceptual limitations of a religious freedom model, and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in particular, can be overcome by reliance on alternative modes of protection, namely religious discrimination protections in domestic, Convention, and EU law, or through litigating religious manifestation claims as freedom of expression cases under Article 10 of the ECHR. The difficulty of communicating the harm in being denied the ability to manifest religious beliefs publicly is a key limitation of both religious freedom and religious discrimination models. Similarly, this thesis highlights the difficulty in assessing what weight should be attributed to such religious harm within a proportionality exercise balancing the rights of religious individuals with the rights and interests of other parties. The analysis in this thesis draws primarily upon the sources of law which shape domestic English law in this area, namely the ECHR and European Union law. However, this thesis also considers foreign precedent and case law from the United States in particular. This thesis contends that no one model can address the range of cases where manifestation of religious beliefs arise, and that litigants should be able to draw from religious freedom, religious discrimination, and freedom of expression protections depending on the nature of their case.

The thesis presents a contribution to the topic of critical examination of various ways to evaluate and compare the level of press (media) freedom in countries throughout the world. It analyses the process of presentation the conclusions of press freedom indices to the public. The analysis is guided on two levels. First, the form in which the press freedom indices are published is investigated. And second, the media reflection of these publications is examined. The starting-point of this analysis focuses on theoretical view on various definitions of press freedom. First part of the thesis therefore provides the summary of important fields that should not be forgotten by any conceptualization of press freedom. Second chapter deals with the problems connected to evaluations and comparisons of press freedom in general and then in particular concerning the Freedom of the Press index by Freedom House and World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders. In the second part of the thesis, Czech media reflection of the two concerned indices is analyzed. First, the specifics of the Czech media landscape are dealt with. Next, the content analysis is applied that should approach the way Czech media use the data provided by the indices. The thesis then concludes the most serious weaknesses in the process through...

Salariat et liberté d'expression : la contradiction apparaît irréductible. La subordination inhérente à la relation de travail semble en effet exclure l’exercice de cette liberté. Le salarié, parce qu’il demeure citoyen, doit toutefois en jouir de façon effective. Le représentant élu et désigné, parce que le mécanisme de la représentation collective l’exige, doit également le pouvoir. Accorder au salarié une telle liberté peut s’avérer dangereux pour l’autorité de l’employeur ou la survie de l’entreprise. Des notions floues, complexes à circonscrire, telles que l’obligation de confidentialité ou l’abus, peuvent autoriser l’employeur à restreindre l’exercice par le salarié de la liberté d'expression et à le sanctionner. Face au mutisme du législateur et à l’indécision du juge, l’insécurité règne. S’impose alors de dégager une définition plus précise et une articulation plus cohérente des règles légitimant tant l’exercice par le salarié de cette liberté que sa limitation par l’employeur. Bien que périlleuse, cette quête d’équilibre mérite d’être entreprise afin que le caractère nécessaire de cette liberté au monde du travail se révèle. Salariat et liberté d'expression : la contradiction n’apparaîtra qu’apparente. / The employee status and freedom of expression : the contradiction appears to be irreducible. The subordination, which is inherent to the employment relationship, seems indeed to exclude the exercice of such freedom. The employee, because he remains a citizen, must however enjoy it in an effective way. The elected and designated representative, because the collective representation mecanism commands it, must enjoy it as well. Granting the employee with such freedom may prove dangerous for the authority of the employer and the survival of the company. Vague notions, that are hard to define, such as the duty of confidentiality or the abuse of right, authorize the employer to restrict the exercice of this freedom by his employee and to sanction him. Given the legislative mutism and the judge's indecision, insecurity is prevailing. It therefore becomes essential to draw a more precise definition and a more coherent articulation of the rules legitimating the exercise of this freedom by the employee, as well as its limitation by the employer. Althought it is jeopardous, this search for balance deserves to be attempted, so that it is revealed that such freedom is essential to the world of work. The employee status and freedom of expression : the contradiction will eventually reveal to be only apparent.