Esta dissertação é fruto de uma pesquisa realizada com o objetivo de examinar enunciados produzidos por professoras dos Anos Iniciais do Ensino Fundamental sobre uma escola bilíngue para alunos surdos e o ensino de matemática. Os aportes teóricos que sustentam a investigação são as teorizações de Michel Foucault e Ludwig Wittgenstein, principalmente aqueles presentes em na obra Investigações Filosóficas. Além disso, foram utilizados conceitos do campo dos Estudos Surdos, conforme descrito por Carlos Skliar, Maura Corcini Lopes e Adriana Thoma. O material de pesquisa examinado consiste em: narrativas de quatro professoras dos Anos Iniciais do Ensino Fundamental da escola investigada, geradas em entrevistas, documentos oficiais e Registros de Chamada da instituição. A estratégia analítica utilizada para examinar esse material orientou-se pela análise do discurso, na perspectiva de Michel Foucault. O exercício analítico realizado a partir do uso das ferramentas teóricas selecionadas mostrou que a escola de ouvintes e a escola de surdos têm fortes semelhanças de família, responsáveis pela disciplinarização dos corpos e dos saberes e condução das condutas dos alunos. Também foi possível identificar que tanto a escola de surdos como a de ouvintes se ocupam da produção de sujeitos disciplinados, normalizados a partir de um modelo a ser seguido, contudo, no caso dessa primeira, com um referencial de normalidade pautado em saberes provenientes da comunidade surda. Na disciplina de Matemática, especificamente, foi identificado que as semelhanças de família entre o ensino de surdos e ouvintes é ainda mais forte, visto que este campo de conhecimento, segundo os dados empíricos, pode ser trabalhado visualmente. Percebeu-se que a imperatividade do uso dos materiais concretos nas aulas de Matemática também está presente, porém com uma outra justificativa: a de que o aluno surdo é um sujeito visual. Assim, pode-se pensar que os jogos de linguagem que constituem a Matemática Escolar seguem predominantes, mesmo nas escolas de surdos, com sua gramática pautada por formalismo, ordem e assepsia. / This dissertation is the result of a research carried out with the objective of examining statements made by elementary school teachers about a bilingual school for deaf students and the teaching of mathematics. The theoretical contributions that support the investigation are the theories of Michel Foucault and Ludwig Wittgenstein, mainly those present in the work Philosophical Investigations. In addition, concepts from the field of Deaf Studies were used, as described by Carlos Skliar, Maura Corcini Lopes and Adriana Thoma. The research material examined consists of: narratives of four Elementary School teachers of the school investigated, generated in interviews, official documents and some observation records from the institution. The analytical strategy used to examine this material was guided by discourse analysis, from Michel Foucault's perspective. The analytical exercise based on the use of the selected theoretical tools showed that the school of hearers and the school of the deaf have strong family resemblances, responsible for disciplining the bodies and the knowledge and conducting the students' behaviors. It was also possible to identify that both the school of deaf and the hearers are concerned with the production of disciplined subjects, normalized from a model to be followed, however, in the case of this first, with a referential of normality based on knowledge from the deaf community. In the discipline of Mathematics, specifically, it was identified that the family similarities between the teaching of deaf and hearers are even stronger, since this field of knowledge, according to the empirical data, can be worked visually. It was noticed that the imperative use of concrete materials in Mathematics classes is also present, but with another justification: that the deaf student is a visual subject. Thus, one may think that the language games that make up School Mathematics remain predominant, even in schools of the deaf, with its grammar marked by formalism, order and asepsis.

Nous nous proposons dans la présente thèse d’examiner quelques conséquences de l´indétermination de l’œuvre musicale telle qu’elle a été proposée par John Cage dans ses propres œuvres. Nous discutons, dans le chapitre 1, plusieurs manières d'aborder l'ontologie de l'œuvre d'art dans la philosophie analytique. On constate une pression intrinsèque à l'exercice philosophique dans la direction d'une purification de la catégorie investiguée, menant à son tour à une hypostasie des catégories esthétiques historiques comme constituant l'œuvre d'art en général. L´oeuvre de Cage fonctionne comme un court-circuit dans la pratique préthéorique de composition et de manutention des œuvres en tant qu'identités reconnaissables, contrariant toute tentative d'ontologie qui présuppose ces identités pour la compréhension et la définition de l'œuvre. Dans les chapitres II e III nous tentons d'expliciter cette duplicité de l'œuvre de Cage - d'un coté, elle rompt radicalement avec les compréhensions philosophiques et pré-philosophiques des œuvres ; de l'autre, elle utilise la propre normativité de l'action présente dans la pratique sociale des concerts pour la constitution de cette rupture- à partir des apports d´une morphologie musicale inspirée de la philosophie de Wittgenstein. Enfin, nous offrons quelques réflexions sur la notion de nominalisme esthétique qui se dessine tout au long de la thèse. Ce nominalisme propose que chaque oeuvre soit responsable de ses propres conditions d´identification- ce qui pourrait ouvir la voie à une compréhension de l´indétermination comme une forme de composition critique. Cette hypothése est examinée par rapport à quelques idées d´Adorno. / We propose in the present thesis to identify some consequences of indeterminacy in musical works as it appears in the works of John Cage. The first chapter discusses various approaches to musical ontology in analytic philosophy. We detect a pressure that is intrinsic to the philosophical endeavor in the sense of a greater purification of concepts pertaining to the concerned category, which in turn lead to a hypostasis of historical aesthetic categories as constituents of the musical work as such. The work of Cage functions here as a short circuit in the common practice of maintaining recognizable identities in individual works, defying every model of ontology that presupposes these stable identities for the understanding and the definition of a work. In the chapters II and III we try to make clear this duplicity of the work of Cage- on one side, it breaks radically with pre- and philosophical concepts of the work of art; on the other side, it uses the normativity of action that is present in the social practices characterizing concert music in order to constitute itself as a rupture- through our engagement with a musical morphology inspired by the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In the end, we strive to offer some reflections on an aesthetic nominalism that is being outlined throughout the thesis. This nominalism proposes basically that each work is responsible for its own conditions of identification- an hypothesis that holds a possibility for the understanding of indeterminacy as a form of critical composition. This idea is then examined in relation to some ideas by Theodor Adorno.

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Submitted by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2012-08-08T14:13:34Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao_AprendizadoRegrasMatematicas.pdf: 1384071 bytes, checksum: ca353fc473bbd034af8f6a07aa629725 (MD5) license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva(arosa@ufpa.br) on 2012-08-08T14:14:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao_AprendizadoRegrasMatematicas.pdf: 1384071 bytes, checksum: ca353fc473bbd034af8f6a07aa629725 (MD5) license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-08-08T14:14:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao_AprendizadoRegrasMatematicas.pdf: 1384071 bytes, checksum: ca353fc473bbd034af8f6a07aa629725 (MD5) license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / CNPq - Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Neste trabalho, investigamos o aprendizado de regras matemáticas no contexto da sala de aula, com ênfase, principalmente, nas discussões sobre a linguagem. Nosso objetivo principal foi pesquisar as dificuldades de ordem lingüística, enfrentadas pelos alunos no decurso do aprendizado das regras matemáticas, em especial, o conceito/algoritmo da divisão. Para tanto, discutimos, entre outras coisas, o tema “seguir regras”, proposto pelo filósofo austríaco Ludwig Wittgenstein em sua obra Investigações Filosóficas. Nosso trabalho e nossas análises foram fundamentadas, principalmente, na filosofia deste autor, que discute, entre outros temas, a linguagem e sua significação e os fundamentos da matemática, bem como nas reflexões do filósofo Gilles-Gaston Granger que analisa as linguagens formais. Realizamos uma pesquisa de campo que foi desenvolvida na Escola de Aplicação da Universidade Federal do Pará, em uma turma da quarta série do ensino fundamental. As aulas ministradas pela professora da turma foram observadas e, posteriormente, foi solicitado aos alunos que resolvessem problemas de divisão verbais e não-verbais, seguido de uma breve entrevista, na qual indagamos, entre outras questões, como os alunos resolveram os problemas envolvendo a divisão. Em nossas análises destacamos algumas dificuldades dos alunos, percebidas nas observações e em seus registros escritos ou orais: alguns alunos, em suas estratégias de resolução, inventam novas “regras matemáticas”. Há ainda aqueles que “confundem” os contextos na resolução de problemas matemáticos verbais, bem como a dificuldade de compreensão de problemas que trazem informações implícitas. / In this study, we investigated the learning of mathematical rules in the context of the classroom, emphasizing, primarily, the discussions about language. Our main goal was to investigate the linguistic difficulties, faced by students during the learning of mathematical rules, in particular, the concept / division algorithm. To this end, we discuss, among other things, the theme "following rules" proposed by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. Our work and our analysis were based primarily on this author, who discusses, among other themes, language and their meaning and foundations of mathematics, as well as the reflections of philosopher Gilles-Gaston Granger who analyzes the formal languages. We conducted a field survey that was developed at the “school of pedagogical application” of the Federal University of Pará, in a class of fourth grade. The lessons taught by the classroom teacher was observed and later the students were asked to solve division problems, verbal and nonverbal, followed by a brief interview in which we ask, among other issues, how students solve problems involving the division. In our analysis we highlight some students' difficulties, perceived in observations and in their written records or oral: some students, in its resolution strategies, invent new “mathematical rules". There are still those who "confuse" the contexts in solving verbal mathematical problems as well as the difficulty of understanding the problems that bring implicit information.

The question of this thesis is whether the individual can resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case. Culture crisis is a historical moment in which our culture leads us to expect a world drastically different from the one in which we find ourselves. This thesis will focus on the experience of Generation Y in the fall-out of the 2008 Recession. It will be argued that we need a Wittgensteinian view of language in order to account for the phenomenon of culture crisis. It will be suggested that our individual has to be a Nietzschean individual in order to resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case. Potential incompatibilities between a Wittgensteinian view of language and the Nietzschean individual will be considered and rejected. It will be concluded that in order to resolve the problem of culture crisis in her own case the individual must change the way she lives.

La tesis analiza dos objeciones corrientes a la interpretación del problema de las reglas por el Wittgenstein de Kripke: el PROBLEMA DE LA OBJETIVIDAD DE LA REGLA, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el PROBLEMA DE LAS RELACIONES INTERNAS entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol de la noción de acuerdo en la misma. La estrategia general de la tesis es examinar las vías de ataque al lenguaje privado (LP) previas a la de Kripke. El contraste con las mismas permite conceptualizar adecuadamente la propuesta de Kripke, para mostrar que las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. En el marco de la tesis, comprendemos por LP a cualquier tesis que sostenga que las condiciones de significatividad del lenguaje pueden ser provistas por estados mentales subjetivos, p.e. creencias, de ahí el solapamiento de la tesis del lenguaje privado con el escepticismo epistemológico y con posiciones solipsistas, y la convicción de que la refutación del LP acarrea la ruina del escepticismo epistemológico. Hay dos versiones clásicas del argumento del LP. Las versiones epistemológicas (Malcom, Fogelin son los representantes que examinamos) derivan la imposibilidad del LP de la imposibilidad de establecer la verdad/corrección de un uso en el contexto de privacidad. La crítica a estas versiones (Ayer, thomson) muestra un círculo justificatorio entre oraciones subjetivas y objetivas. Las versiones semánticas (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) intentan evitar el círculo, elucidando las presuposiciones que le subyacen. Esta respuesta no es satisfactoria ya que o bien regenera el círculo en un nuevo nivel, o bien no logran derrocar al círculo de la justificación. Con Stroud identificamos el fallo común de estas estrategias en el hecho de que en su intento de derrotar al escéptico-privatista, requieren o bien una PREMISA FÁCTICA que indica que conocemos, o bien la especificación del conocimiento como una NOTA DEFINICIONAL de los criterios/condiciones de significatividad que el argumento trascendental elucida en la pregunta del escéptico. Kripke impone un cambio de rumbo en el argumento, al plantear el desafío como una forma de ESCEPTICISMO SEMÁNTICO ONTOLÓGICO, el cual ya no se basa en las limitaciones cognitivas de la privacidad, sino justamente en las presuntas ventajas que presenta. El desafío de Kripke pregunta por las razones que podemos aportar para sostener que no ha ocurrido un cambio en el uso, lo cual equivale a preguntar ¿cómo sabes que tu uso actual CORRESPONDE con tu intención/significado previo? De la imposibilidad de responder a la cuestión clave del realismo clásico (correspondencia) en el caso del significado, Kripke concluye que no puede haber condiciones de verdad para las oraciones semánticas. Esto motiva una paradoja escéptica y una SOLUCIÓN ESCÉPTICA de la paradoja en términos de condiciones de aseverabilidad. Tener en cuenta el abandono de las condiciones de verdad es la clave para responder al problema de la objetividad, mientras que la forma del desafío y el funcionamiento de la concordancia en los juicios como base de atribución, es la clave para la solución del problema de las relaciones internas. / This dissertation analyses two objections currently raised against Kripke's Wittgenstein interpretation of rule-following considerations: The problem of OBJECTIVITY OF THE RULE: Can a single individual be right against communal assent?; and the problem of INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. The general strategy of the thesis is to examine different ways of attacking private language (PL) previous to Kripke's one. through contrast we are able to appreciate clearly the nature of Kripke's proposal, showing that mentioned objections cannot be applied to him. In the framework of this dissertation we understand PL as every theses that claim that conditions of meaning of language can be provided by subjective mental states exclusively, believes for instance, which explains usual association between PL and epistemological scepticism, and conviction that refutation of PL is as well a refutation of epistemological scepticism. There are two main versions of argument against PL. Epistemological versions (Malcolm, Fogelin, are considered) derive impossibility of PL from impossibility to establish corection/truth of a use or application of a given sign. Criticism to this version (Ayer, Thomson) indicates that argument concludes in a justificational circle between subjective and objective sentences. Semantical versions (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) try to avoid this circle elucidating its presuppositions, which are conditions of meaning of language allegedly neglected by privatist. This answer is no satisfactory, beacuse it raises the circle in a new, semantical level, or it doesn't work properly against justificational circle. with Stroud we indentify the common mistake of both strategies as consisting in proposals to beat the sceptic/privatist that requires either a FACTUAL PREMISE of to specify knowledge as part of the meaning of criterion conditions of significance elucidated in the questions of the sceptic or the claims of the privatist. Kripke imposes a change of direction in the argument because he poses a challenge with the form of a ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTICAL SCEPTICISM, which is not based on limitations of privacy but, quite on the contrary, is grounded in the supposed advantages it offers. Kripke's Wittgenstein challenge asks for reasons we can have to be sure that we are not now committing a mistake consisting in a change of use. This is equivalent to ask: how do you now that your actual use CORRESPONDS with your previous intention or intention? From impossibility of answering this question concerning the key question of classical realism (correspondence) in the case of meaning (conceived as a special setting: idealised epistemic conditions) Kripke concludes that there cannot be truth conditions for semantical sentences. This motivates as sceptical paradox and a SCEPTICAL SOLUTION to it, in terms of assertability conditions. I largue that in rejection of truth conditions we have the key to solve the problem the objectivity of the rule, while the special from of the challenge and particular functioning of agreement in judgements in sceptical solution, as ground of attribution, is the key to solve the problem of internal relationships.

This study performs a reading of Wittgenstein’s thought that integrates his sometimes sidelined remarks on aesthetics and belief, and emphasises consideration of language use on the level of practice. It analyses the many ways that Wittgenstein engages with the inexpressible or the limits of expression through comparison with poetry as a practice. The potential of a Wittgensteinian method of literary analysis concentrating on grammatical structures, exemplary forms of expression and quotidian meaning-making is shown by viewing several poets’ work in connection with specific forms of the inexpressible. This thesis consists of three parts. The first chapter surveys previous applications of Wittgenstein to aesthetic appreciation and analysis, and considers common interpretations of his earlier and later work. Incorporating a wide range of Wittgenstein sources allows a new reading to emerge that gives appropriate weight to his hitherto under-researched writings. This reading is tested in Chapters 2-5, in each case studying a poet or poets alongside a philosophical text or topic. Chapter 2 uses the negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius to probe the ineffable; through Cora Diamond’s resolute reading of the Tractatus, Kei Miller’s ‘Church Women’ series and John Burnside’s intimate ineffable of ‘Parousia’, a grammatical understanding of inexpressibility emerges. Chapter 3 compares John McDowell’s minimal realism in Mind and World with Wallace Steven’s Supreme Fiction, demonstrating how Stevens’ – and Wittgenstein’s – rich conception of experience can close off a number of philosophical lacunae. Chapter 4 concentrates on the poetry of Jorie Graham, whose conception of the self is saturated with language. Parallels with Wittgenstein’s methodology are drawn, and some reminders issued to curb the excesses of postmodern accounts of subjectivity. The focus in Chapter 5 moves to the use of cartographical metaphor in Philosophical Investigations and Kei Miller’s poetry. The constraints of specific discourses on our thinking are examined, together with poetry’s potential for laying bare or reinvigorating the pictures by which we navigate. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses a selection of poetic projects completed alongside my research, to extend the reading of Wittgenstein into the area of creative practice. This thesis demonstrates Wittgenstein’s prolonged engagement with the limits of expression and with poetry, as well as the profit of a Wittgensteinian approach to poetry. It thereby questions a number of current responses to Wittgenstein’s work, and displays its own original creative outcomes.

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The aim of this Master’s thesis is to achieve philosophical clarity on an interpretative problem I have been struggle with in Euripides’ Medea: That Medea murders her own children, while claimingto love them. Situated within the philosophical and literary tradition of ordinary language philosophy and ordinary language criticism, the thesis draws on ideas, theoretical discussions, and concepts from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Toril Moi, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, and Niklas Forsberg – but also Søren Kierkegaard. The analysis is divided in two parts. The first is anarticulation of the grammar of my problem through Cora Diamond’s conception of the phenomenon “a difficulty of reality”, and an emulation of a hermeneutical strategy to deal with such problems, which I identify in Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. I reach the conclusion that the co-existence of Medea’s murder och love is a paradox, which cannot be thought. The second part of the analysis is an attempt to step out of this paradox. Here, I compare Medea to Stanley Cavell’s readings on the Shakespearean tragedies Othello and King Lear, and Cavell’s ideas on “lived scepticism”, “avoidance of love” and “best case of acknowledgment”. By doing this, I am able to form the hypothesis that Medea’s understanding of “love” has been severely damagedafter Jason’s betrayal, and that she actually fails to sensically mean that she loves her children. In its use of my own confusion as a starting point and in employing Toril Moi’s views on reading, this thesis continuously stresses the individual reader’s responsibility in literary interpretation, as well as the importance of daring to voice or personal struggles, questions, and interests – even (or especially) when reading great classics.

Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Meta-Dimension des Rechts auf Menschenwürde lösen eine Fragestellung aus, die die Grenzen der Disziplin des Rechts übertrifft: wie könnte das Transzendentale als ein Aspekt der Bedeutung von Menschenwürde dargestellt werden? Das Beharren auf der nicht-Bestimmung des Menschenbildes oder auf dem Begriff ‚Gott’ in der Präambel des Deutschen Grundgesetzes, wie es sich in der Deutschen Dogmatik widerspiegelt, gepaart mit dem Bestreben nach einer Fall-zu-Fall ad hoc Konkretisierung dessen, was Menschenwürde bedeutet, inspiriert diese Untersuchung von ‚etwas fehlt’ [‘something missing’]. In postmoderner Art und Weise beschreibt diese Geschichte das Gesetz der Menschenwürde als Trojanisches Pferd und bietet hermeneutische und literarische Grundlagen für eine affirmative Haltung gegenüber einer ''leeren'' Rede im juristischen Diskurs. Die Forschungsfrage erweckt und umkreist die polemisch verbrämten Begriffe von ‚Leere’ und ‚Black Box’: Warum erscheint der Rechtsbegriff der Menschenwürde ‚leer’? Oder wie ist er ‚leer’? Warum und wie ist er eine ‚Black Box’? Wie erscheinen Manifestationen des Konzepts abstrakt wie Universalien, aber im Einzelnen konkret? Die ontologischen, sprachlich-analytischen und phänomenologischen philosophischen Erkenntnisse, vorgestellt im ersten Kapitel, bilden die Linse, durch die fünf maßgebliche Fälle des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes – über Abtreibung, lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe, Transsexualität, staatliche Reaktion auf Terroranschläge und die Gewährleistung eines menschenwürdigen Existenzminimums – im zweiten Kapitel analysiert werden. Die philosophischen Quellen werden nicht als Momente im langen Verlauf der Menschenwürde in der Geschichte der Ideen eingeklammert. / The philosophical underpinnings of what may be called the meta-dimension of the law of human dignity trigger a question that surpasses the boundaries of the discipline of law: how could the transcendental as an aspect of human dignity meaning be portrayed? The insistence on non-determination of the Menschenbild [human image] or ‘God’ in the Preamble to the German Basic Law [Grundgesetz] reflected in German legal doctrine, paired with the commitment to case-by-case ad hoc concretization of what human dignity means inspire this story of ‘something missing’. In postmodern fashion, this story portrays the law of human dignity as a Trojan Horse and provides hermeneutic and literary foundations for an affirmative stance towards ‘emptiness’ talk in legal discourse. The research question rekindles and twists polemically framed ‘emptiness’ and ‘black box’ contentions: Why does the legal concept of human dignity appear ‘empty’? Or, how is it ‘empty’? Why and how is it a ‘black box’? How do manifestations of the concept appear abstract as universals and concrete as particulars? The ontological, linguistic-analytical, and phenomenological philosophical insights presented in Chapter One compose the lens through which five benchmark Bundesverfassungsgericht cases – on abortion, life imprisonment, transsexuals, state response to terrorist attacks, and the guarantee of a dignified subsistence minimum – are analyzed in Chapter Two. The philosophical sources are not bracketed as moments in the long course of human dignity in the history of ideas.