Risikopolitischer Investitionsschutz nimmt zur Förderung von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (ADI) in Entwicklungsländern eine wichtige Funktion ein. Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert unterschiedliche Investitionsschutzinstrumente im internationalen Kapitalverkehr. Hierbei werden Schwerpunkte auf öffentliche Investitionsgarantien und -versicherungen gelegt, wobei das Instrumentarium der Multilateralen Investitions-Garantie-Agentur (MIGA) als Institution der Weltbankgruppe sowie das der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufgrund ihrer führenden Stellungen als vorrangige Analysegegenstände dienen. Nach einer fundierten Darstellung der Versicherungssysteme werden diese miteinander verglichen. Ferner werden die MIGA und die Investitionsgarantien des Bundes hinsichtlich ihrer Mehrwerte und Grenzen untersucht. Unter Einbeziehung auch kritischer Aspekte zeigt die Arbeit Handlungsperspektive für die Versicherungssysteme auf, um ADI in Entwicklungsländern verstärkt zu fördern.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Nigeria’s ability to play a regional stabilizing role in the Gulf of Guinea is severely thwarted due to unresolved conflict in the Niger Delta. Stemming from agitation by local communities, it evolved from peaceful rallies into an armed insurgency with the youth as the vanguard, and the conflict has subsequently spread into neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Benin. The aim of this study was to analyse the conflict in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria in order to assess its impact on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. Taking the form of a political risk analysis, a means of forecasting potential pitfalls for an investing client to mitigate or manage risk, the study postulated that a country specific risk analysis would not be sufficient to analyse an integrated system like the Gulf of Guinea. Many scholars have suggested that regional analysis has become more important than national. In the context of Africa contagion effects, the spill over, positive as well as negative from one country to another, casts doubt on the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. Taking this phenomenon into account, a regional risk index was created in order to assess the regional implications of the conflict in the Niger Delta. The index consists of six variables chosen from four political risk frameworks, namely the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence, The Brink Model, and finally the International Country Risk Guide. The variables were chosen on their utility for regional political risk analysis and their status as major risk variables, universal risk variables employed by various risk frameworks. In the subsequent political risk analysis, the first four variables were rated as having a high risk while the latter two garnered a medium risk rating. As such the overall rating for the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea was found to be high. This study finds that conventional country specific risk models are still very much the preferred means of analysing risk, but that regional risk analysis would have to take a larger role in political risk analysis in the future. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Nigerië se vermoë om ‘n streeks-stabiliserende rol in die Golf van Guinea te speel, word ernstig gedwarsboom deur die onopgeloste konflik in die Niger Delta. Die oorsprong van die konflik in vreedsame gemeenskaplike protestaksie vir meer regverdige verdeling van olie inkomste het uitgekring na gewapende konflik, beide in die Delta self en in buurlande Kameroen, Ekwatoriale Guinee en Benin. Hierdie studie het gepoog om die konflik in die Nigeriese Delta te bestudeer om die impak van politieke risiko op die Golf van Guinea te assesseer. Die studie het die vorm van ‘n politieke risiko analise aangeneem, ‘n middel van vooruitskatting om potensiële valstrikke aan ‘n kliënt wat wil belê uit te wys om sodoende konflik te verlig of te beheer. Die studie veronderstel dat ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise onvoldoende is om ‘n geïntegreerde sisteem soos die Golf van Guinea te analiseer. Met menige akademici wat voorstel dat streeksanalise belangriker geword het as die nasionale, word daar in die konteks van die gevolge van Afrika-besmetting, die oorloop daarvan van een land na ‘n ander, positief sowel as negatief, ‘n skaduwee gegooi op die waarde van die assessering van slegs ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise. Met hierdie fenomeen in gedagte, is ‘n streek risiko inhoud geskep om die implikasies vir die konflik in die Niger Deltastreek, te assesseer. Die inhoud is saamgestel uit ‘n verskeidenheid van ses variante gekies uit vier politieke risiko raamwerke, nl die ‘Ekonomist Intelligence Unit’, die ‘Business Environment Risk Intelligence’, die ‘Brink Model’ en ook die ‘International Country Risk Guide’. Die variante is gebruik vir hulle waarde vir streekspolitieke risiko analise, asook die belangrikheid van hulle hoof risiko veranderlikheid, ‘n universele Hoof risiko variant wat gebruik word in verskillende risiko raamwerke. In die gevolglike politieke risiko-analise, is die vier variante beskou as ‘n baie hoë risiko, terwyl die laaste twee as medium risiko beskou word. Dus is die algemene taksering vir die politiese risiko in die Golf van Guinea baie hoog. Die studie vind uiteindelik dat lande se spesifieke risiko modelle steeds die verkose manier is om risiko’s te analiseer, alhoewel politieke risiko analise ‘n groter rol sal speel in toekomstige streek risiko analise.

Thesis (MDF (Development Finance))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Mozambique managed to attract a lot of foreign direct investment despite it being one of the poorest countries in the world and after it has been through a devastating 17 year civil war. GOP per capita in 1995 was about US$ 144 which was one of the lowest in the world. The country was faced with enormous challenges and risks in terms of both country and political risk. Major risks were associated with investment in that country because of prolonged civil war with no record of macro-economic stability. Despite these huge challenges, Mozambique managed to attract a lot of investment with Mozal 1 being the first big project post civil war. This paper analyses and quantifies where Mozambique was before and after mega projects. This is done by looking at where Mozambique was before Mozal 1 being the first mega project in the country post civil war. The analysis is in terms of political risk as it relates to cross border transactions with specific reference to a number of political risk indicators as suggested by Brink (2004) that prevailed and how the projects were structured to minimize risk. A political risk rating is developed for 1995 and 2005 using the Brink model to check if the project did improve the country's economic health. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Mosambiek het daarin geslaag om grootskaalse direkte buitelandse investering te lok ten spyte van sy status as een van die wereld se armste lande en die verwoestende burgeroorlog wat 17 jaar geduur het. Die BBP per capita was ongeveer US$ 144 in 1995, wat dit een van die laagstes in die wereld gemaak het. Die land het enorme uitdagings en risiko's in die gesig gestaar in terme van die land en die politiek. Die hoofrisiko's het met investering verband gehou vanwee die langdurige burgeroorlog en geen makro-ekonomiese stabiliteit in die land se verlede nie. Ondanks hierdie reuse uitdagings het Mosambiek daarin geslaag om baie investering te lok, waarvan Mozal 1 die eerste megaprojek na die burgeroorlog was. Hierdie tesis analiseer en kwantifiseer Mosambiek se posisie voor en na megaprojekte. Dit is gedoen deur te kyk na hoe Mosambiek daar uitgesien het voor Mozal 1. Die analise is in terme van die verband tussen politieke risiko en oorgrenstransaksies gedoen. Daar word spesifiek verwys na 'n aantal aanwysers van politieke risiko, soos voorgestel deur Brink (2004), wat geheers het en hoe projekte gestruktureer is om risiko te verminder. 'n Gradering van politieke risiko is vir 1995 en 2005 aan die hand van Brink se model ontwikkel om te kontroleer of die projek die land se ekonomiese gesondheid verbeter het.

Research object – Risk of international settlements. The aim of this work is to analyze the process of the management of international settlements risk and foresee the opportunities of risk management in Lithuania. The set tasks for achieving the aim of this research: to introduce the understanding of international settlements risk; to set the kinds of international settlements risk; to set the process of the management of international settlements risk; to set the international settlements risk management means; to set the usage opportunities of these means in Lithuania. There are four kinds of international settlements risk described in this work: political, liquidity, currency rate range and economical risk. There are introduced means of risk management for every kind of risk in this work. There you can also find opportunities of usage of international settlements risk management in Lithuania. Research methods: analysis and synthesis of literature, logical analysis and synthesis, statistics analysis.

It is a sandwich Thesis. The first and the second essay are joint works with my Supervisor, Dr. Ronald Balvers. The third essay is joint work with Fangxing Liu, a Ph.D. candidate (Finance) at DeGroote School of Business, where we have equally shared the work responsibility. / First essay deals with Productivity shocks. Productivity shocks transmitted from productivity leaders to trailing sectors are systematic sources of risk. Global technology and knowledge diffusion leads to predictable patterns in productivity dynamics across countries and industries. Productivity gaps determine the level of exposure to the systematic leader productivity shocks. Firms in a country-industry with larger productivity gaps relative to the world leader are more dependent on the leader's innovations compared to their own productivity improvements. They thus have higher loadings on the leader productivity shocks and higher average stock returns. For OECD panel data, a country-industry's productivity gap significantly predicts the stock returns of the country-industry: holding the quintile of country- industry portfolios with the largest gaps and shorting the quintile with the smallest gaps generates annual returns of 9.8% (6.7% after risk adjustment with standard factors). A factor associated with the productivity gap explains country-industry portfolio returns substantially better than standard factor models. Loadings on leader-country-productivity shocks are found to have substantial correlation with productivity gaps, and leader productivity shocks are more important for stock returns than idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These findings suggest that the productivity gaps and associated higher average returns are indeed tied to systematic risk. The second essay deals with Technology shocks. Technology shocks from technological frontier economies are a critical determinant of productivity shocks. These shocks spill over, pervading all lagging economies and are true systematic shocks. A country's aggregate technology gap with the frontier determines the potential for the systematic innovation shocks to affect it, but the country's absorption capacity determines its effective sensitivity to these shocks. We find conforming evidence that the technology gap, R&D intensity, and absorption capacity can explain stock returns. For OECD panel data, a one standard deviation increase in the technology gap increases excess stock returns by 0.578 percent per month. A one standard deviation increase in R&D intensity increases the excess return by 0.637 percent per month. An increase in absorption capacity of one standard deviation increases the excess return by 0.275 percent per month. When global FF factors are included, the results are diluted, which suggests that the FF factors may alias for the three variables associated with the systematic risk arising from frontier technology shocks. The third essay deals with Political risk. We find that the differences in Hassan et al. (2019) political Risk proxy derived from text processing of analyst transcripts can price cross-sectional returns after controlling for standard factor risks. A mimicking factor for the political risk measure, when added to the standard Fama French 5 factor model or the Q5 model, explains the test asset returns better than these models. In our limited sample, the changes in PRisk measure captures more information about political risk than the traditional measures from Baker et al. (2016), which suggests that one can start using changes in PRisk characteristic as a political risk proxy. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis emphasizes the role of political risk in international business by analyzing the impact of political events on the valuation of firms. The guiding question is how governments interfere with the business interests of firms located in their own country as well as with the business interests of firms from other nations, as a consequence of the application of international sanctions. Therefore, the focus is on multi-country and multi-sector effects due to the occurrence of specific sanction events. The empirical methodology is the event-study approach, which analyzes stock market reactions to new information. The research objective is to detect abnormal stock returns across multiple markets and sectors, as a consequence of events related to the imposition of or threat of international sanctions. The empirical model of this thesis differentiates between risk-effects for firms located in the sender country (i.e., the origin of sanctions), for firms located in or specifically related to target countries (i.e., the receiver of sanctions) and firms located in third countries (i.e., countries not directly involved). There are three different cases analyzed: E.U. Economic Sanctions against African countries (2002-2005), the U.S. Steel Tariff (2002) and the Iran Sanctions Act (2007). The cases represent sanctions applied on the nationwide, sector- and firm-specific level. The event studies provide empirical evidence for the existence of political risk-effects due to sector-specific sanctions. Risk-effects are detected for firms in target countries and for firms in the sender country itself. The applied political risk framework describes how political risk affects multinational firm value and explains that it varies among firms. The impact of political risk on a firm's value depends on the risk exposure of a firm's individual business interests to it. This contributes a new perspective on political risk that emphasizes multinational and multi-sectoral effects and underlines that a specific political risk can be relevant for a variety of different international business interests. (author's abstract)

The intent of the thesis is to ascertain whether mitigation of political risk to the IT industry in Panama can be of value to the country by improving the economy and standard of living.

Submitted by Fernando Mistura (f.mistura@gmail.com) on 2011-10-10T19:43:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 20111010 - ThesisMistura.pdf: 9859237 bytes, checksum: 549c3f8971cac6c47966b93ec2c8debc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-10-10T19:48:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 20111010 - ThesisMistura.pdf: 9859237 bytes, checksum: 549c3f8971cac6c47966b93ec2c8debc (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-10-10T19:48:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 20111010 - ThesisMistura.pdf: 9859237 bytes, checksum: 549c3f8971cac6c47966b93ec2c8debc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-10-11T12:42:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 20111010 - ThesisMistura.pdf: 9859237 bytes, checksum: 549c3f8971cac6c47966b93ec2c8debc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-07 / This dissertation has sought to identify the role of BRIC country governments in the internationalization of their firms. Drawing upon an exploratory comparative analysis of BRIC OFDI trends and policies, it contributes to further an initial understanding of this phenomenon by shedding light on how and why BRIC governments have been promoting their multinationals. For this, it analysed specific OFDI-related policies implemented by BRIC countries as a way of highlighting policy-gaps and the effects of institutional set-ups in the development of internationalized companies. The rapid rise of MNCs from BRIC countries is quite a recent phenomenon. Although they had invested abroad before, only since the early 2000s OFDI by BRIC MNCs has become substantial. BRIC MNCs are becoming major players in many industries, taking-over competitors in both developed and developing countries, and reshaping competition in many industries. In this process, BRIC governments have played an important role. While until the early 1990s, BRIC governments restricted OFDI because of a negative perspective on its effects on home economies (e.g., reduction in investments at home, exports of jobs, and constraints to the balance-of-payments), in the 2000s their perception of OFDI changed. They have become more aware of the importance of OFDI for the competitiveness of their firms and industrial upgrade. While China, and to a lesser extent India, are one step further, having already put in place a comprehensive set of specific OFDI promoting policies, Brazil and Russia have yet to take further steps in order to create an enabling environment for their companies to fully exploit the advantages of global expansion / Esta dissertação procurou identificar o papel dos governos na internacionalização produtiva de empresas dos países BRIC. Por meio de uma análise comparativa do comportamento dos investimentos diretos no exterior (IDE) destes países e dos mecanismos existentes de suporte à internacionalização das empresas, foi possível identificar as diferentes maneiras de envolvimento desses governos na internacionalização produtiva de suas empresas e apontar lacunas de políticas públicas nestes países. Destarte, esta dissertação contribui à compreensão inicial sobre como e por que os governos destes países têm promovido o desenvolvimento de multinacionais. A rápida ascensão das multinacionais dos países BRIC é um fenômeno recente. Apesar de terem investido no exterior anteriormente, apenas a partir do início dos anos 2000 que o IDE de empresas destes países tornou-se significativo. Desde então, as multinacionais dos países BRIC estão se tornando importantes players em diversas indústrias, adquirindo competidores de países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento, e redesenhando a concorrência em muitas indústrias globais. Neste processo, os governos dos países BRIC têm desempenhado um papel importante. Até o início dos anos 1990, o IDE era restringido porque era associado a efeitos negativos sobre as economias domésticas (como por exemplo, à redução de investimentos no país de origem, à exportação de empregos, e a problemas na balança de pagamentos). Desde o início dos anos 2000, entretanto, os governos dos países BRIC mudaram de percepção e passaram a adotar políticas favoráveis à internacionalização produtiva de empresas domésticas. Eles perceberam a importância da internacionalização para a manutenção ou expansão da competitividade das empresas domésticas em um mundo globalizado. A China, e em menor grau a Índia, estão um passo adiante, tendo já posto em prática um conjunto de instrumentos específicos que facilitam a internacionalização de suas empresas. O Brasil e a Rússia ainda têm de tomar novas medidas para criar um ambiente propício para que suas empresas possam mais facilmente explorar as vantagens da expansão global.

La conduite de réformes présente un risque élevé pour les décideurs publics : les échecs sont lourds de conséquences pour les politiques publiques visées comme pour les responsables politiques qui les portent. Si le risque politique des réformes est reconnu comme un élément clé dans la prise de décision, sa définition reste floue pour les praticiens. Une revue de littérature en sciences de la décision, science politique et économie politique montre que ce concept est également dans un angle mort théorique. Sur le terrain des réformes, cette recherche vise à définir le risque politique comme la combinaison de facteurs de risque déclenchant des événements perturbateurs conduisant à un degré d'adoption plus ou moins élevé de la réforme projetée. Plus de quarante études de cas ont permis de dégager six facteurs de risque : les caractéristiques intrinsèques de la réforme, l’opinion publique, les parties prenantes, l’environnement politique, le processus de décision et le contexte socio-économique. Le concept de risque politique est ensuite opérationnalisé et testé grâce à des grilles de scores. Il en ressort qu'il existe des relations robustes entre les scores atteints sur les facteurs de risque, les événements perturbateurs et le degré d'adoption des réformes. Cette recherche est une contribution à une meilleure compréhension des interactions entre stratégie et politique dans la prise de décision, améliore la compréhension des ressorts de la prise de décision stratégique dans le secteur public et ouvre la voie à une approche de la conduite des réformes par la gestion des risques. / Carrying out reforms entails a high level of risk for policy makers: reform failure can have far-reaching consequences on both the public policy concerned and the reputation of the political leaders who are pushing for the reform. Policy makers widely acknowledge the role of “political risk” in public decision making. However, its definition remains vague. A literature review in decision sciences, political science and political economy shows that the concept of political risk is a blind spot in academic theory. This research project aims to develop a better understanding of the reasons why some reform initiatives fail while others succeed. It defines political risk as a combination of risk factors which contribute to trigger disruptive events and, in turn, influence the enactment of reforms. Six risk factors are identified on the basis of more than forty reform case studies: intrinsic characteristics of the reform, public opinion, stakeholders, political context and socio-economic context. The concept of political risk is then operationalized and tested using a scorecard approach. The tests show a consistent relation between risk factors, disruptive events and reform enactment. This project contributes to a better understanding of the link between strategy and politics in decision making and the dynamics of strategic decision making in the public sector. It paves the way for a risk based approach to steering public policy reforms.

This thesis brings new evidence on different strands of the literature in macro-finance, international economics and macroeconometrics. The first two chapters combine both theoretical models and empirical techniques to deepen the analysis of important economic phenomena such as the effects of economic policy uncertainty on financial markets, and convergence between emerging market economies and advanced economies on these markets. The third chapter of the thesis, which is co-authored with Hafedh Bouakez, contributes to the literature on the identification of news shocks about future productivity. In the first chapter, I study the effect of monetary and fiscal policy uncertainty on nominal U.S. government bond yields and premiums. I use a New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model featuring recursive preferences, and both real and nominal rigidities. Policy uncertainty in the DSGE model is defined as a mean-preserving spread of the policy shock distributions. My results show that: (i) When the economy is subject to unpredictable shocks to the volatility of policy instruments, the level of the median yield curve is lower, its slope increases and risk premiums decrease relative to an economy with no stochastic volatility. This negative effect on the level of yields and premiums is due to the asymmetric impact of positive versus negative shocks; (ii) A typical policy risk shock increases yields at all maturities. This is because the fall in yields triggered by higher demand for bonds by households, in order to hedge against higher predicted consumption volatility, is outweighed by the increase in yields due to higher inflation risk premiums. Finally, I use several empirical measures economic policy uncertainty in a structural VAR model to show that the above effects of policy risk shocks on yields are consistent empirical evidence. Chapter 2 looks at the market for government bonds in 12 advanced economies and 8 emerging market economies, during the period 1999-2012, and consider the question of whether or not there has been any convergence of risk between emerging market and advanced economies. I distinguish between default risk and other types of risk, such as inflation, liquidity and exchange rate risk. I make the theoretical case that forward risk premium differentials can be used to distinguish default risk and other risks. I then construct forward risk premium differentials and use these to make the empirical case that there has been little convergence associated with the other types of risk. I also show that differences in countries' macroeconomic fundamentals and political risk play an important role in explaining the large "non-default" risk differentials observed between emerging and advanced economies. Chapter 3 proposes a novel strategy to identify anticipated and unanticipated technology shocks, which leads to results that are consistent with the predictions of conventional new-Keynesian models. It shows that the failure of many empirical studies to generate consistent responses to these shocks is due to impurities in the available TFP series, which lead to an incorrect identification of unanticipated technology shocks---whose estimated effects are inconsistent with the interpretation of these disturbances as supply shocks. This, in turn, contaminates the identification of news shocks. My co-author, Hafedh Bouakez, and I propose an agnostic identification strategy that allows TFP to be affected by both technological and non-technological shocks, and identifies unanticipated technology shocks via sign restrictions on the response of inflation. The results show that the effects of both surprise TFP shocks and news shocks are generally consistent with the predictions of standard new-Keynesian models. In particular, the inflation puzzle documented in previous studies vanishes under the novel empirical strategy. / Cette thèse présente de nouveaux résultats sur différentes branches de la littérature en macro-finance, économie internationale et macro-économétrie. Les deux premiers chapitres combinent des modèles théoriques et des techniques empiriques pour approfondir l’étude de phénomènes économiques importants tels que les effets de l’incertitude liée aux politiques économiques sur les marchés financiers et la convergence entre les pays émergents et les pays avancés sur ces marchés. Le troisième chapitre, qui est le fruit d’une collaboration avec Hafedh Bouakez, contribue à la littérature sur l’identification des chocs anticipés sur la productivité future. Dans le premier chapitre, j’étudie l’effet de l’incertitude relative aux politiques monétaire et fiscale sur les rendements et les primes de risque associés aux actifs nominaux du gouvernement des États-Unis. J’utilise un modèle d’équilibre stochastique et dynamique de type néo-Keynesien prenant en compte des préférences récursives des agents et des rigidités réelles et nominales. En utilisant un modèle VAR structurel. L’incertitude relative aux politiques économiques est définie comme étant une expansion de la distribution des chocs de politique, expansion au cours de laquelle la moyenne de la distribution reste inchangée. Mes résultats montrent que : (i) Lorsque l’économie est sujette à des chocs imprévisibles sur la volatilité des instruments de politique, le niveau médian de la courbe des rendements baisse de 8,56 points de base, sa pente s’accroît de 13,5 points de base et les primes de risque baissent en moyenne de 0.21 point de base. Cet effet négatif sur le niveau de rendements et les primes de risque est dû à l’impact asymétrique des chocs de signes opposés mais de même amplitude; (ii) Un choc positif à la volatilité des politiques économiques entraîne une hausse des rendements pour toutes les durées de maturité. Cet effet s’explique par le comportement des ménages qui, à la suite du choc, augmentent leur demande de bons dans le but de se prémunir contre les fortes fluctuations espérées au niveau de la consommation, ce qui entraîne des pressions à la baisse sur les rendements. De façon simultanée, ces ménages requièrent une hausse des taux d’intérêt en raison d’une espérance d’inflation future plus grande. Les analyses montrent que le premier effet est dominant, entraînant donc la hausse des rendements observée. Enfin, j’utilise plusieurs mesures empiriques d’incertitude de politiques économiques et un modèle VAR structurel pour montrer les résultats ci-dessus sont conformes avec les faits empiriques. Le Chapitre 2 explore le marché des bons du gouvernement de 12 pays avancés et 8 pays émergents, pendant la période 1999-2012, et analyses la question de savoir s’il y a eu une quelconque convergence du risque associé à ces actifs entre les deux catégories de pays. Je fais une distinction entre risque de défaut et autres types de risque, comme ceux liés au risque d’inflation, de liquidité ou de change. Je commence par montrer théoriquement que le différentiel au niveau des primes de risque « forward » entre les deux pays peut être utilisé pour faire la distinction entre le risque « forward » et les utilise pour montrer qu’il est difficile de conclure que ces autres types de risque dans les pays émergents ont convergé vers les niveaux différents de risque politique, jouent un rôle important dans l’explication des différences de primes de risque – autres que celles associées au risque de défaut– entre les pays émergents et les pays avancés. Le Chapitre 3 propose une nouvelle stratégie d’identification des chocs technologiques anticipés et non-anticipés, qui conduit à des résultats similaires aux prédictions des modèles néo-Keynésiens conventionnels. Il montre que l’incapacité de plusieurs méthodes empiriques à générer des résultats rejoignant la théorie est due à l’impureté des données existences sur la productivité totale des facteurs (TFP), conduisant à mauvaise identification des chocs technologiques non-anticipés-dont les effets estimés ne concordent pas avec l’interprétation de tels chocs comme des chocs d’offre. Ce problème, à son tour, contamine l’identification des chocs technologiques anticipés. Mon co-auteur, Hafedh Bouakez, et moi proposons une stratégie d’identification agnostique qui permet à la TFP d’être affectée de façon contemporaine par deux chocs surprises (technologique et non technologique), le premier étant identifié en faisant recours aux restrictions de signe sur la réponse de l’inflation. Les résultats montrent que les effets des chocs technologiques anticipés et non-anticipés concordent avec les prédictions des modèles néo-Keynésiens standards. En particulier, le puzzle rencontré dans les travaux précédents concernant les effets d’un choc non-anticipé sur l’inflation disparaît lorsque notre nouvelle stratégie est employée.