Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.

In the present article, the autor seeks to explain us the juridical nature of mining concession, thus by explaining the concessional technique and the juridical effects that come along with it. For this purpose, a doctrinaire and legal analysis of mining concession and the legal institution is done. / En el presente artículo el autor busca explicar la naturaleza jurídica de la concesión minera, a través de la explicación de la técnica concesional y los efectos jurídicos que derivan de esta. Para ello, se hace un repaso doctrinario y normativo de la concesión minera y las instituciones jurídicas relacionadas.

La notion de liberté de création est difficile à appréhender. L’étendue même de cette liberté ne fait pas l’objet d’un consensus. Elle est le plus souvent considérée comme un sous-ensemble de la liberté d’expression - restreinte alors à la liberté de création artistique, voire comme un aspect de la liberté d’entreprendre. La liberté de création présente néanmoins des spécificités et est autonome. Elle peut dès lors être protégée en tant que telle par les juges, en amont de la création, comme c’est le cas pour les contrats de commande entre peintres et marchands de tableaux. Dans ce cas, elle est envisagée préalablement à l’octroi de droits. La liberté de création ne peut cependant être considérée sous ce seul angle. En effet, la liberté de création doit être protégée aux différents stades de la création et ses contours sont alors dessinés par la protection accordée à la création elle-même et aux acteurs de la création. Dès lors, la liberté de création est liée aux droits de propriété intellectuelle si l’on considère que ces droits protègent la création. La liberté de création est garantie par l’équilibre entre protection et liberté au sein de ces droits. Au-delà de cet équilibre, la liberté de création peut être confrontée à d’autres libertés et droits fondamentaux. L’ordre public et les bonnes mœurs, la liberté de religion, la vie privée peuvent ainsi limiter la liberté de création. Recourir à la notion de liberté de création peut alors permettre de faire prévaloir l’intérêt du créateur. / The freedom of creation concept is difficult to understand. There is no consensus on the scope of this freedom. It is widely considered as a freedom of expression subset - restricted to the freedom of artistic creation, or even for one of the aspects of freedom of trade and industry. Freedom of creation possesses specific features and is autonomous. Therefore it can be protected, as such, by the judges, before the creation, this is the case for the contracts concluded between painters and art dealers. In this case, this is considered prior to the grant of rights. The freedom of creation cannot be considered only from this perspective. Indeed, freedom of creation needs to be protected at the different stages of creation and the delineation of such freedom are sought in the protection given to the creation and the stakeholders. Therefore, freedom of creation is closely related to intellectual property rights, if one considers that this rights protect creation. Freedom of creation is guaranteed by balance between protection and freedom in this rights. Beyond this balance, freedom of creation may have to be confronted with other fundamental rights and freedoms. Public policy or morality, freedom of religion, right to privacy may thereby limit the freedom of creation. Using the freedom of creation concept can contribute to give precedence to interest of the creator.

InhaltsangabeNutzung der zentralen Rechentechnik Mainframe IBM 4381 Ausbildungs- und Beratungszentrum Softwareangebot des PS/2-ABZ Public Domain Software

L’eau, ressource au cœur des préoccupations économiques, techniques, politiques, culturelles, etc., inquiète le monde juridique, y compris l’histoire du droit. Le droit colonial français se rapportant à l’eau constitue un domaine d’investigation qui suscite l’intérêt compte tenu de la portée de cette problématique au sein du continent africain depuis le XIXe siècle. À cette époque, ce territoire subit d’importantes transformations à la fois juridiques, politiques et sociales. Si les grandes artères fluviales favorisent la pénétration française en Afrique, les eaux douces dans leur globalité s’avèrent être le véhicule majeur de la colonisation. Protection, distribution équitable, exploitation, mise en valeur, etc., constituent des besoins conduisant à un encadrement juridique de cette ressource. S’appropriant les eaux dès le départ, le colonisateur français élabore, au cours des XIXe et XXe siècles, un droit suis generis organisant la gestion des eaux dans les territoires conquis. Ce « droit colonial de l’eau », marqué par une « domanialisation »globale de la ressource, s’établit de façon progressive. La législation, ponctuelle dans un premier temps, devient systématique à partir des années 1920, dans un contexte de prélèvement accru de la ressource. Une approche historique de la gestion de l’eau en Afrique présente un double intérêt : illustrer la circulation du principe de la domanialité publique entre la métropole et les colonies et mettre en évidence la réception de ce principe dans les colonies, en tant qu’il bouleverse les pratiques traditionnelles, déforme la logique locale et finit par se greffer aux législations des nouveaux États africains. / Water, an essential ressource, has préoccupied the juridical world and occupies an important place in the history of law. French colonial law concerning water constitutes a vital field of historical research, given its importance in the African continent since the nineteenth century. In this period, the region underwent important juridical, political and social transformations. It was via the great rivers that France entered Africa, and colonial settlements centered around the major bodies of fresh water. The need to protect, to distribute equitably, to manage and to develop fresh water ressources led to the development of a specific juridical framework concerning it. Since the early stage of the colonization, French rule appropriates water and develops during the 19th and 20th centuries a law of exception organizing water management in conquered territories. This "colonial water law", marked by a global "domanialization" of the resource, is gradually established. Legislation, ad hoc at first, becomes systematic from the 1920s, in a context of incraesed resource extraction. A historical approach to water management in Africa is of twofold interest: it illustrates the circulation of the principle of state ownership between the European countries and their colonies and it highlights the reception of this principle in the colonies, insofar as it disrupts traditional practices, deforms local logic and ends up grafting on to the legislations of the new African states.

The work first introduces the area of public licenses as a space between the copyright law and public domain. After that, consecutively for proprietary software, free and open source software, open hardware and open content, it maps particular types of public licenses and the accompanying social and cultural movements, puts them in mutual as well as historical context, examines their characteristics and compares them to each other, shows how the public licenses are defined by various accompanying movements, and also analyses which obstacles to the usage of public licenses are put by the Czech law. Keywords Copyright, licenses, open source, creative commons, public domain, software, design.

La présente recherche vise à cerner et définir le concept de valorisation appliqué aux biens publics en s’appuyant sur son double fondement, le droit de propriété et le bon usage des deniers publics. Ce concept repose sur deux composantes, l’exploitation et la cession, qui permettent de mettre en lumière les multiples formes de la valorisation : économique, sociale, environnementale. Ces manifestations de la valorisation renouvellent l’analyse afin de mieux comprendre l’enjeu de la réforme du droit des biens publics, la manière dont la valorisation a influencé ce droit et les évolutions à venir. Ainsi, le rapprochement des régimes domaniaux a permis d’assouplir et de moderniser les outils de valorisation et les principes juridiques régissant le domaine public. Ce rapprochement devrait aboutir à une unification de la compétence juridictionnelle au profit du juge administratif. Par ailleurs, sous l’impulsion de la valorisation, de nouvelles obligations s’imposent aux propriétaires publics : mise en concurrence des occupations domaniales, inventaire des biens, valorisation d’avenir. / This research aims to identify and define the concept of valorization applied to public properties based on its double foundation, the right to property and the proper use of public funds. This concept is based on two components, exploitation and disposal, which highlight the multiple forms of valorization : economic, social, environmental. These valorisation events renew the analysis in order to better understand the stake of the reform of the law of the public properties, the way in which the valorization has influenced this right and the evolutions to come. Thus, the approximation of state regimes has made it possible to soften and modernize valorization tools and the legal principles governing the public domain. This rapprochement should lead to a unification of jurisdiction for the benefit of the administrative judge. In addition, under the impetus of the valorization, new obligations are imposed on the public owners : competition of the public occupations, inventory of the properties, valorization of the future.

相較於過去認為政策導向產業園區開發成效優於市場導向產業園區的研究，本論文從產業群聚的觀點重新檢視兩種園區，則並未發現上述的現象，內科與土城頂埔的發展成就，也突顯了市場導向產業園區對於產業群聚的調適性要快於政策導向的產業園區。制度架構的完整性是形成上述狀況的主要原因，也就是第二章理論與文獻中所提到的「公共領域」是否充足的問題。臺北新竹地區一直是世界知名的電子產業群聚地點，甚至有亞洲矽谷的美稱(Mathews, 1997)，這裡不僅匯集了臺積電、鴻海與廣達等知名企業，也有像是新竹科學園區、南港軟體園區、頂埔科技園區以及內湖科技園區等具有高新聞性的產業園區。 / 在竹科與南軟的個案中，政府都透過政策直接規範廠商規模與產業結構，單就園區開發與招商而言，明確的制度規範固然有助於降低開發招商過程的不確定性與交易成本，但就強調廠商間彼此互動而衍生出綜效 (synergy) 的產業群聚而言，完善的制度規範與政策引導反而限縮了廠商的互動機會，讓非交易性依賴的形成遭遇困境。反觀幾乎沒有制度規範的內科與土城頂埔園區，由市場自行決定進駐廠商規模與產業結構，則提供了廠商非交易依賴的形成基礎。由上可知，廠商 (市場) 而非政府政策才是產業園區創造產業群聚效應的主要形成原因。