Orientador: Márcio Augusto Damin Custódio / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T11:32:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_MatheusBarretoPazosde_M.pdf: 952011 bytes, checksum: e54788366ad16d580c88882bc959ac5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A presente dissertação tem por escopo analisar a noção de bem na metafísica de Tomás de Aquino. Para tanto, investigar-se-á como Tomás apresenta essa noção a partir de uma dupla caracterização, qual seja: o bem entendido como uma das noções gerais do ente, isto é, uma propriedade transcendental, e o bem entendido como um dos atributos divinos próprios, isto é, uma propriedade transcendente. Nesse sentido, analisar-se-á, por um lado, as características gerais dos transcendentais e o modo segundo o qual Tomás determina que o bem, sendo convertível ao ente, pode ser entendido como um transcendental. Por outro lado, analisar-se-á como Tomás determina que esta noção pode ser dita transcendente, entendendo, nesse ponto, que o bem é uma das perfeições divinas. Contudo, tal caracterização do bem, aparentemente, gera uma contradição: como essa noção pode ser dita um transcendental e, simultaneamente, ser transcendente? Para investigar essa aparente contradição na caracterização do bem, faz-se necessário explicitar como Tomás salvaguarda este duplo aspecto utilizando-se do modelo de predicação por participação. Assim, a presente dissertação visa explicitar a justificativa encontrada por Tomás para estabelecer a relação entre uma propriedade transcendental e uma propriedade transcendente na utilização de um modelo específico de predicação por participação que, nesse contexto, é mobilizado como fundamento metafísico à dupla caracterização da noção de bem. Nessa medida, para Tomás, as criaturas são ditas boas porque participam da bondade divina. Ao mobilizar, portanto, as noções de predicação e participação, mostrar-se-á como a doutrina dos transcendentais constitui-se como um modelo peculiar de análise de um problema filosófico que recebeu, da parte de Tomás, um tratamento distinto da tradição que o precedera e que não se restringe à mera recepção das fontes que ele tinha acesso / Abstract: This dissertation aims to analyze the notion of good in Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics. In order to do so, it will be inquired how Aquinas introduces this notion through a double characterization: good understood as one of the general notions of the being, i.e., a transcendental property, and good regarded as one of the proper divine attributes, i.e., a transcendent property. In this sense, it shall be analyzed, first, the general characteristics of the transcendentals and the way Aquinas asserts that the good, once it is convertible to the being, may be regarded as a transcendental. Secondly, it will be analyzed how Aquinas states that this notion may be said to be transcendent, provided that the good is one of the divine perfections. However, such a characterization of the good apparently brings out a contradiction: How can this notion be said to be a transcendental and, simultaneously, to be transcendent? In order to inquire this apparent contradiction in the characterization of the good, it is necessary to make explicit the way Aquinas preserves this double aspect by using the model of predication by participation. Thus, this dissertation aims to highlight the justification found by Aquinas to establish the relation between a transcendental property and transcendent one by making use of a specific model of predication by participation which, in this context, is taken as a metaphysical foundation to the double characterization of the notion of good. According to Aquinas, creatures are said to be good because they participate in divine goodness. As this study deals with the notions of predication and participation, it will be presented how the doctrine of transcendentals constitutes a peculiar model of philosophical analysis which has received, from Aquinas, a distinct treatment from the tradition before him and is not only the reception of the sources available to him / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

Taking into account an indigenous pre-colonial, a European colonial and a hybrid postcolonial history, in addition to cruel post-independence authoritarian regimes, postcolonial literatures reflect very often the difficult experiences of nations who struggle to find their identities. This is the case of Equatorial Guinea, whose writers, many of them in exile, use their works to raise both national and international awareness about the miserable conditions of a people suffering the consequences of colonialism and two dictatorships. One of these writers is Juan Tomás Ávila Laurel (1966), the subject of this thesis. This dissertation explores how Ávila Laurel’s writings dialogue with Western literary tradition to represent a postcolonial society still in the process of nation-building. In the second chapter, we study Avión de ricos, ladrón de cerdos (2008) as a picaresque novel, and in the third, Arde el monte de noche (2009) as a Bildungsroman. After presenting an overview of the main characteristics of these genres, we demonstrate the similarities of Ávila Laurel’s narratives with the canonical texts, and at the same time, how their rewriting in a postcolonial context leads to fundamental revisions. The final chapter is devoted to Ávila Laurel’s blog Malabo that he has been publishing in the digital journal FronteraD since 2009. We understand his blog as the author’s effort to write political essay, a genre with a longstanding tradition, benefitting from the advantages the new media and communication tools provide. As we argue in this thesis, the author uses Western literary genres that also surfaced in times of deep social and political crisis, to protest against poverty, corruption and abuse of authority, and to denounce hypocrisy and the persistence of colonial and neocolonial structures in Equatorial Guinea. Writing from a hybrid “third space,” Ávila Laurel’s works are, above all, a desire to tell a collective story and create an archive for generations to come.

No description available.

Tomás Segovia and Angelina Muñiz Huberman belong to a group of writers known as «Hispanomexicanos». Most approaches to this generation have been towards the role that exile plays in their early work, paying almost no attention to its role after that initial stage. These approaches have been limited to the first years of their work, in the belief that those writers subsequently moved on to deal with issues which are different from those in which their experience of exile is clearly the central topic. However, through an analysis of the poetry of Muñiz and Segovia, this thesis aims to show that exile continues to play a central role beyond that first stage. It argues that their exile is transformed into a series of symbols that come to constitute a shared style and, more importantly, it proposes that their experience of exile is transformed into a feeling of existential displacement which impels a search for meaning and belonging to the world. Consequently, the conclusion presented in this thesis is that exile plays a central role in their poetry, in the sense that it expresses the ways in which these two writers search and transmit meaning and attempt to feel part of the world. Ultimately, this thesis aims to set an example of approach which could be productively taken to study the work of other writers from this generation.

This dissertation explores the social relations of indebtedness. In this project I read Latinx and Latin American texts not often placed in conversation—Tomás Rivera’s …y no se lo tragó la tierra, Carlos Fuentes’ La Frontera de Cristal, Rosario Ferré’s Maldito Amor, and Angie Cruz’s Let It Rain Coffee—and explore their thematic and formal engagements with debt. I consider the problem of the visibility, representation, and understanding of indebtedness and argue that, to engage with the invisible logic of debt requires engaging the formal logic—the temporal, narratological, and rhetorical features—of the text. Each chapter treats each of these texts as a case study, and analyzes a different historical context and a different form and scale of debt—from the individual and informal in Rivera’s text to the sovereign and neocolonial in Ferré’s. Unlike other scholars who read for representations of high finance, the stock market, and debt relations, I read texts where questions of credit, finance, and the market are represented in subtle ways, attending to how the ideologies that precede debt are negotiated in the intimate spaces of the home and the family. I ask questions like what kind of ideas about the American Dream, family sacrifice, and national progress prop up debt regimes or what ideas about national progress justify sovereign debt to understand the generation and maintenance of an indebted subjectivity, not merely on an institutional and abstract level, but from below. Reading for debt’s logic is not an attempt to expose the latent ideology of the text or how it mimetically reflects reality but rather to show how the text’s critical engagement of related ideologies—those of progress, development, and liberalism—also encode questions related to credit, debt, risk, and loss. The texts I bring together offer a certain comparative, theoretical, and historical value in foregrounding narrative’s ability to generate relationships of debt and expose the literary techniques deployed to conceal debt’s logic. I show how attending to debt in these texts reframe struggles that tend to be thought of in spatial terms—displacement, migration, expropriation, extraction—and help us see them in temporal ones. Unlike engagements of finance and indebtedness that focus on its asocial and alienating qualities, I show how these texts render visible the deeply intimate nature of indebtedness and how debt mechanisms both produce and are produced by social relationships. Throughout the project, I argue that the relations of intimacy—the stories told that produce closeness, the care from which value is extracted for the production of profit, and the relations created between the debtor and the creditor—are the necessary conditions for contemporary debt and finance across the Americas.

Segundo Tomás de Aquino, a forma é o que instancia a substância em determinada natureza; sem ela, a substância não seria o que é. Saliente-se que definir o que é (quid est) algo não é o mesmo que afirmar que ele é, pois, neste caso, o que é afirmado é sua existência, não sua natureza. Isso indica que a existência não é posta pela forma da substância, mas por algo outro, que, em sua Exposição aos Ebdomadibus de Boécio, Tomás chama de ato de ser (actus essendi). Imiscuído na substância que é seu sujeito , o ato de ser concede-lhe existência, tornando-a um ente, o qual possui um vínculo com o próprio ser (ipsum esse), que é deus. O aquinatense chama esse vínculo de participação, donde o ente participa do ser tal como o efeito de sua causa. O problema é instaurado quando se passa do plano ontológico ao gnosiológico, isto é, quando o intelecto busca inteligir a participação do ente no ser. Nessa intelecção, a limitação do intelecto humano se evidencia: a participação do ente no ser é entendida não como tal, mas como a do concreto no abstrato. O ente é significado em concreto, pois nele o ato de ser se encontra concretizado; a dificuldade, contudo, apresenta-se quando o intelecto tenta abstrair o ato de ser do ente: nessa abstração, o ato de ser não é inteligido enquanto tal, mas enquanto abstrato. Diante disso, torna-se inevitável levantar as seguintes questões: qual o modo de abstração que tenta obter o ato de ser do ente? Por que o intelecto não é capaz de inteligir o ser enquanto ser, mas apenas enquanto abstrato? O ato de ser, inconcebível pelo intelecto humano, é de fato superior à forma substancial? A participação do concreto no abstrato corresponde à do ente no ser? São estas as principais questões que, neste estudo, buscaremos responder. / According to Thomas of Aquinas, form is that which instantiates substance in a determinate nature; without it, substance would not be what it is. It should be emphasized that defining what something is (its quid est) is not not the same as to assert that it is, for in this case what is asserted is its existence, not its nature. That indicates that existence is not given by the form of the substance, but by something else, which in his Exposition to the Boethius\'s Ebdomadibus, Thomas calls act of being (actus essendi). Mingling in the substance its subject , the act of being gives it its existence, turning it into an entity, which is vinculated to being itself (ipsum esse), or God. The Aquinate calls this nexus participation, whence the entity participates in being as the effect of its cause. The problem is set when one traverses the ontological level to the gnoseological, that is, when the intellect tries to grasp the participation of the entity in being. In this intellection, the limits of the human intellect become clear: the participation of entity in being is understood not as such, but as the concrete in relation to the abstract. The entity is signified in concrete, for in it the act of being is found concretized; the difficulty, however, reveals itself when the intellect tries to abstract the act of being from the entity: in this abstraction, the act of being is not grasped as such, but as abstract. Thus it becomes inevitable to formulate the following questions: which is the mode of abstraction which tries to obtain the act of being of the entity? Why is the intellect not able to grasp being as being, but only as abstract? Is the act of being, inconceivable to the human intellect, in fact superior to the substantial form? And does participation of the concrete in the abstract correspond to that of the entity in being? These are the main questions that this study aims to answer.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-05-19T15:21:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 fe_razao.pdf: 608760 bytes, checksum: 1d986a346585d2023d5a07faac9f7ba6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-19T15:21:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 fe_razao.pdf: 608760 bytes, checksum: 1d986a346585d2023d5a07faac9f7ba6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-12-20 / Nenhuma / Analisa-se a relação entre a razão e a fé, e como a filosofia poderia auxiliar algumas disposições religiosas. Buscam-se os limites da ação do religioso e as condições mínimas para a sua atuação como civil, isto é, a defesa da fé como certa razoabilidade nas relações éticas. Inicialmente, investiga-se a abertura da filosofia a um conhecimento comum, que atinge uma elevada sistematização em Aristóteles, o que permite um diálogo, como um discurso comunicativo, sob aspectos estritamente humanos, na consideração de mundos possíveis. Nesta parte, se estabelece a máxima potência do intelecto, o que possibilita a abertura do mito e da religião como objetos. Em seguida, estuda-se o primeiro pensador que estabeleceu uma conexão entre o pensamento grego e o religioso: Filo de Alexandria; e a experiência cultural desta visão: o helenismo cristão. Sem Filo, não seria possível a concepção teórica de união entre as visões de razão e fé; e, no helenismo cristão, encontramos a vivência, a experiência da concepção filoniano aplicada no início do cristianismo. Depois, procura-se destacar o elemento da fé, sob o ponto de vista racional, enquanto proposições não contraditórias, destacando certo aspecto da visão de Tomás de Aquino. Aqui, utiliza-se Tomás como pensador de síntese entra a razão e a fé, que estabelece as bases racionais para uma adesão razoável à religião. Por fim, analisam-se dois estudos de caso: o apelo racional de Justino ao imperador Tito; e uma comparação entre Abraão e Ájax da peça de Sófocles. Ambos são exemplos de casos em que a filosofia pode auxiliar a relação do religioso com a política. No primeiro, em função do discurso platônico de Justino, em defesa dos cristãos. E no segundo, para que haja certo ceticismo em algumas disposições religiosas. Conclui-se que as ações do religioso devem ser justificadas na lógica do discurso, para que não se estenda a uma posição além do bem e do mal, mas antes, considere os princípios éticos, sem negar a sua religião, antes, como um complemento de auxílio e reciprocidade. / The first matter of analysis is the relation between reason and faith, and how can philosophy serve to some religious dispositions. The limits of the religious person?s doings and the minimal conditions for his/her civil role are outlined, that is, the defense of faith as an element of reasonability within ethical relations. First, an investigation is made regarding the openness of philosophy to a common knowledge which reaches an elevated systematization in Aristotle, which allows a dialogue as a communicative discourse under strictly human aspects, considering possible worlds. In this part, the maximum potence of the intellect is established, enabling the interpretation of myth and religion as objects. Next, a study is developed on the matter of the first thinker to establish the link between the Greek and the religious lines of thought: Philo of Alexandria; and the cultural experience of such view: Christian helenism. But for Philo, it would not be possible to theoretically conceive the union between the views of reason and faith; and, within Christian helenism, the experience of the Philonian conception applied at the start of Christianism can be found. Then, an attempt is made to highlight the element of faith under a rational point of view, considering non-contradictory propositions, stressing a particular aspect of Thomas Aquinas view. Here, Thomas is taken up as a thinker of synthesis between reason and faith, which sets up the rational basis for a reasonable adhesion to religion. Lastly, two case studies are presented: the rational appeal of Justin to Emperor Titus; and a comparison between Abraham and Ajax, from Sophocles play. Both are examples of cases in which philosophy can be of help to the relation of the religious person to politics. In the first one, due to Justins platonic discourse, in defense of the Christians. And in the second, in order to a certain skepticism in some religious dispositions to exist. The conclusion is reached by infering that the actions of the religions individual must be justified in the logic of discourse, so that the matter does not extends itself to stances beyond good and evil. Instead, it must take into account the ethical principles without denying its religion; as a complement of assistance and reciprocity.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-11T12:02:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Antônio Ilário Felici.pdf: 1156061 bytes, checksum: 451df83f6d6c1f8d624e46e7f3eb33cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-11T12:02:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antônio Ilário Felici.pdf: 1156061 bytes, checksum: 451df83f6d6c1f8d624e46e7f3eb33cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-30 / The present research of philosophy deals with the presuppositions of social justice in the Summa of Theology of Thomas Aquinas in question 58 about the justice. It begins the reflection by a study of the Summa as contextualization of the subject. The study of the Summa of Theology, even in its form, allows us to understand its content as a manual of catholic doctrine for students of theology, the point of arrival of the author's theological thought, but a starting point for further study, a task assumed by the present study. Thus, it examines the articles of the question, the author's related writings and their sources in other authors as foundations for social justice, especially those that are most inclined to that direction, such as general or legal, distributive and commutative justice. Based on these bases, the research intends to infer what can be said of social justice in Thomas Aquinas / A presente pesquisa de filosofia trata dos pressupostos da justiça social na Suma de Teologia de Tomás de Aquino na questão 58 sobre a justiça. Inicia a reflexão por um estudo da Suma como contextualização do tema. O estudo da Suma de Teologia, mesmo na sua forma, permite entender o seu conteúdo, como manual de doutrina católica para os estudantes de teologia, ponto de chegada do pensamento teológico do autor, mas ponto de partida para ulteriores aprofundamentos, tarefa assumida pelo presente estudo. Assim, examina os artigos da questão, os escritos afins do autor e suas fontes em outros autores como fundamentos para uma justiça social, especialmente os que mais se inclinam para essa direção, a exemplo dos temas como justiça geral ou legal, distributiva e comutativa. Partindo dessas bases, a pesquisa pretende inferir o que se pode afirmar de justiça social em Tomás de Aquino

Orientadora: Márcia Helena Alvim / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ensino, História e Filosofia das Ciências e Matemática, 2013

Comentadores de várias tendências se dividem quanto a como situar o pensamento político do Doutor de Aquino frente à religião. Seria possível fazer uma interpretação naturalista da política em Tomás de Aquino? Ou o seu pensamento político se encontra influenciado por uma esfera superior necessária para que se possa compreender em profundidade o que o autor propõe? No intuito de se posicionar sobre esse antigo debate, pretendemos pesquisar o pensamento de Tomás para buscar entender o conceito de lei, e daí os limites para a lei humana e alguma possível influência do elemento religioso. Para lançar luz sobre o problema, analisaremos as questões sobre o conceito de lei, a lei eterna, a lei natural e a lei humana presentes na Primeira Parte da Segunda Parte da Suma de Teologia, em comparação com outros escritos de Tomás, notadamente a Primeira Parte da Suma de Teologia, a Suma Contra os Gentios e o opúsculo De Regno. Os comentadores divergem a respeito e a pesquisa busca, a partir da releitura das obras de Tomás e dos principais comentadores do século XX e XXI, uma clara tomada de posição clara a respeito, concluindo pela dependência do pensamento político de Tomás de Aquino de uma ordem superior à esfera humana. / Commentators of several trends split themselves as how to situate the political thought of Doctor Aquinas regarding religion. Would it be possible to do a naturalistic interpretation of politics in Thomas Aquinas? Or is his political thought under the influence of a superior sphere necessary to understand in depth what the author proposes? Aiming to set a position about this ancient debate, we attempt to research the thought of Thomas in order to search understanding of the concept of law, and so forth the limits for the human law and any possible influence of the religious element. To bring light on this matter, we will analyse the questions about the concept of law, the eternal law, the natural law and the human law which are enclosed in the First Part of the Second Part of The Summa Theologica, in comparison with the other writings of Thomas, mainly the First Part of the Summa Theologica, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the opuscule De Regno. The commentators disagree in this respect and the research aims, through the carefull reading of the works of Thomas and of the main commentators of the XX and XXI centuries, a clear view in this respect, concluding for the dependency of the political thought of Thomas Aquinas of a superior order above the human sphere.