Charles University in Prague Faculty of law Abstract of the dissertation The title of the dissertation: The Role of the Courts of Administrative Justice at the Process of the Unification of the Legal Norm Interpretation of Public Law Supervisor: Doc. JUDr. Vladimír Mikule Author: JUDr. Petra Venclová Prague, March 2012 This dissertation deals with the role of the courts of administrative justice at the process of the unification of the legal norm interpretation in the field of public law. Ambition of this dissertation first lies in the function and meaning of administrative justice in relation of the legal norm interpretation on the level of interpretation practice of administrative body, second in capturing the process of unification of judicial activities of administrative courts in formal position as instrumental presumption for full development of material conception which has axiological content and might offer the answer to the question of legal- philosophical direction of administrative judiciary. This work is divided into three chapters on the basic level. The first chapter explains dualism in law within the meaning of dichotomy between private and public law. The administrative law as a part of public law is defined in the relationship to the private law through the different methods and aims of...

Si tous les juges sont appelés à appliquer la Constitution, le Conseil d'Etat, a une situation particulière. Il a, à apprécier, plus souvent que les autres juges, la conformité à la Constitution de l'action administrative. La soumission des actes administratifs à la Constitution ne doit pas nécessairement passer par une juridiction constitutionnelle. Le Contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes administratifs doit se superposer et même se confondre avec le contrôle de légalité. Le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité introduit en 1990, a privé les juridictions ordinaires de la faculté d'exercer le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois. Le régime du Conseil Constitutionnel offre sans doute moins de garanties du fait que la porte du Conseil Constitutionnel est étroite et demeure interdite aux particuliers, ainsi qu'aux juges ordinaires. Ce régime considère le juge ordinaire comme incompétent pour assurer un contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi. En effet, l'article 18 de la loi 250/93 du 14 juillet 1993 relative à l'institution du Conseil constitutionnel dispose que le Conseil Constitutionnel contrôle la constitutionnalité des lois et textes ayant force de loi. Nonobstant toute disposition contraire, nulle autre autorité judiciaire ne peut exercer ce contrôle par voie d'action ou d'exception d'inconstitutionnalité ou de violation du principe de la hiérarchie des normes et textes. Ainsi, le Conseil constitutionnel ne contrôle pas la constitutionnalité des lois promulguées avant sa création, le juge ordinaire y compris le Conseil d'Etat ne peut exercer un tel contrôle par voie d'action ni par voie d'exception. Le juge ordinaire ne peut donc plus refuser d'appliquer une loi sous prétexte de son inconstitutionnalité et n'est plus autorisé, à quelque titre que ce soit, à opérer un contrôle de constitutionnalité de la loi. L'intervention du juge administratif statuant comme juge constitutionnel peut contribuer à résoudre le problème de déni de justice existant dans le système juridique libanais. Les règles constitutionnelles s'imposent au juge administratif qui doit respecter ses principes dans les décisions qu'il prend. Etant la norme suprême, la Constitution s'impose donc de manière immédiate aux autorités administratives. Pour cela les normes constitutionnelles sont incorporées dans les sources de légalité que le juge administratif se doit de faire respecter. Le Conseil d'Etat est chargé du contrôle de la conformité des actes normatifs par rapport à la Constitution. Cette fonction de contrôle induit la fonction d'interprétation des normes constitutionnelles. Le juge administratif exerce des fonctions similaires : il assure le contrôle de la conformité des actes administratifs par rapport à la Constitution et il est interprète de la Constitution. Le Conseil d'Etat ne peut pas contrôler tous les actes administratifs, puisque certains d'entre eux violent la Constitution du seul fait qu'ils appliquent une loi inconstitutionnelle. Mais selon la théorie de l'écran législatif, la loi fait écran entre la Constitution et l'acte contrôlé. La mission du Conseil d'Etat est-elle, de mettre en cause l'application de cette loi inconstitutionnelle. Cette mission ne peut se concrétiser que si le Conseil d'Etat agit comme juge constitutionnel, c'est-à-dire que s'il est amené à contrôler la constitutionnalité des actes administratifs En France, le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité instauré par la Constitution de 1958 limitait le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois à un contrôle de priori. Tout juge, ne pouvait qu'appliquer la loi, même inconstitutionnelle. Ce problème a été résolu en France en 2008 par la réforme constitutionnelle opérée par la loi constitutionnelle n°2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 qui ajoute un article 61-1 à la Constitution. / If all judges are required to apply the Constitution, the Council of State, has a special status. He has to appreciate more often than the other judges, compliance with the Constitution of the administrative action. Submission of administrative acts to the Constitution need not go through a constitutional court. Control of the constitutionality of administrative acts must overlap and even merge with the judicial review. The system of constitutional review introduced in 1990, has deprived the ordinary courts of the power to exercise control of the constitutionality of laws. The regime of the Constitutional Council has probably less guarantees that the door of the Constitutional Council is narrow and is forbidden to individuals, as well as ordinary judges. This scheme considers the ordinary courts incompetent for a constitutional review of the law. Indeed, Article 18 of the law 250/93 of 14 July 1993 on the establishment of the Constitutional Council provides that the Constitutional Council reviews the constitutionality of laws and instruments having the force of law. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, no other court may exercise this control by action or unconstitutionality or violation of the principle of hierarchy of norms and texts. Thus, the Constitutional Council does not control the constitutionality of laws enacted prior to its creation, the ordinary courts including the State Council may exercise such control by action or by way of exception. The ordinary courts can no longer refuse to enforce a statute on the grounds of its unconstitutionality and is no longer allowed in any capacity whatsoever, to exercise control of the constitutionality of the law. The intervention of the administrative judge acting as a constitutional judge may help solve the problem of denial of justice existing in the Lebanese legal system.Constitutional rules apply to the administrative judge must respect its principles in the decisions it makes. Being the supreme law, the Constitution is therefore required immediate way to administrative authorities. For that constitutional standards are incorporated into the sources of legality that the administrative judge must enforce. The State Council is responsible for monitoring the compliance of normative acts with the Constitution. This control function causes the function of interpretation of constitutional provisions. The administrative judge exercising similar functions: it supervises the compliance of administrative acts with the Constitution and is interpreter of the Constitution. The Council of State cannot control all administrative acts, as some of them violate the Constitution merely because they apply an unconstitutional law. But according to the theory of legislative screen, the law shields between the Constitution and the controlled act. The mission of the State Council is she to question the application of this law unconstitutional. This mission can only be achieved if the Council of State acts as the constitutional court, that is to say, if it is required to review the constitutionality of administrative acts In France, the system of constitutional review introduced by the 1958 Constitution limited the constitutionality of laws to control a priori. Any judge could not apply the law, even unconstitutional. This problem was solved in France in 2008 by the constitutional reform made by the Constitutional Act No. 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 which adds Article 61-1 of the Constitution.

Cette étude se donne pour ambition de saisir et de comprendre ce qu’est la motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’État, au demeurant souvent critiquée. Notion fondamentale en droit processuel, la motivation est un discours argumentatif, expression d’une technique juridique, à savoir un discours visant à justifier au plan juridique et factuel la décision à travers un raisonnement afin de persuader l’auditoire. Ainsi faudra-t-il analyser à la fois son architecture et ses fonctions dans une perspective dynamique. En tout état de cause, on constate,depuis au moins le début du XXIe siècle, une certaine évolution de la motivation. Ce phénomène résulte, notamment, de l’européanisation et de la complexité normatives, de la protection renforcée des droits fondamentaux, des exigences de sécurité juridique ou encore de la volonté du Conseil d’État de promouvoir une politique communicationnelle afin de légitimer son action. L’étude implique de revisiter certaines thématiques traditionnelles, en particulier le syllogismejudiciaire, l’argumentation, l’interprétation, le style de la motivation ou encore le pouvoir normatif jurisprudentiel pour constater et mesurer cette évolution. / The aim of this research is to tackle and understand the Conseil d’Etat’s court’s decisions motivation which are often criticised. Fundamental notion in procedural law, motivation is an argumentative discourse expressing a jurisdictional technique but moreover it is specifically a discourse trying trough a legal reasoning to justify a decision in order to convince the audience. Thus we shall have to analyse its architecture and its functions in a dynamic perspective. Either way we can note that since the beginning of the 21st century the court’s motivation has evolved.This phenomenon is the result of the Europeanization and the complexity of the normative production and is also due to enhanced protection of the fundamental rights, legal certainty and the Conseil d’Etat’s wish to promote a communicational policy in order to legitimise its action. This research entails to revisit certain traditional topics such as jurisdictional syllogism, argumentation, interpretation, the motivation’s style or the normative jurisprudential power to both note and measure this evolution.

La protection de l’environnement est un enjeu capital de la société contemporaine. Suite à la révolution industrielle, la contamination de l’environnement a pris divers chemins pour se retrouver dans notre eau, notre atmosphère et, de manière parfois moins évidente, dans nos sols. Considérant le nombre de sites contaminés répertoriés par le ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement et des Parcs, on peut s’interroger sur l’efficacité des dispositions prévues à la section IV.2.1 de la Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement qui prévoit des pouvoirs d’ordonnance de caractérisation et de réhabilitation pouvant viser de manière rétroactive non seulement le pollueur et celui ayant permis la contamination, mais également, dans certains cas, le gardien, à quelque titre que ce soit, du terrain. En 2003, le cadre réglementaire en matière d’ordonnances de décontamination a fait l’objet d’une réforme majeure, dont les grandes lignes sont rapportées dans la première partie de cette étude. Toutefois, l’application de ces mesures relève d’un pouvoir de nature discrétionnaire pour le ministre, cette discrétion faisant l’objet de développements dans la deuxième partie de notre mémoire. Le nombre d’ordonnances rendues par le ministre en matière de décontamination des sites est si peu élevé qu’on ne peut éviter de traiter, dans la dernière partie de notre étude, de l’éventuelle responsabilité de l’État en lien avec la contamination des sols, considérant les principes de développement durable et surtout, d’équité intergénérationnelle qui, selon nous, devraient se refléter dans l’application des pouvoirs d’ordonnance du ministre de l’Environnement. / The protection of the environment is a vital issue for modern society. Following the Industrial Revolution, the contamination of the environment found many avenues, and now can be found in the water, the atmosphere and, sometimes less obviously, in the soil. Considering the number of contaminated lands indexed by the ministère du Dévoloppement durable, l’Environnement et des Parcs, one might well wonder about the effectiveness of the measures in section IV.2.1 of the Environment Quality Act which include powers of ordering land characterization and rehabilitation retroactively over not only the polluter and whoever allows the contaminants to be emitted, but also in certain cases the one who has or has had the custody of the land, in any capacity. In 2003, the regulatory structure for remediation orders underwent a major reform, whose main features are described in the first part of this essay. However, the application of these measures derives from the minister’s discretionary power. Developments that affect this discretion are described in the second part of our study. The number of orders delivered by the minister is so low that we have to consider, in the third part of our essay, the eventual liability of the State in relation with contaminated grounds, considering the principles of sustainable development and above all of intergenerational equity which, in our view, should be reflected in the application of minister of the environment’s power to order.

Although a child's right to parental care and family life is constitutionally entrenched, many South African children are deprived of this right. Transcultural adoption could serve their need but historically this has been prohibited or discouraged by racist policies. Whether this is in keeping with the now non-racial South African society is questionable. In adoption the best interests of the child is paramount and in determining this, courts should balance children's constitutional rights to their culture of origin against their constitutional rights to non-discrimination. After considering arguments for and against transcultural adoption and the position in the United States and the United Kingdom, the writer suggests that further interdisciplinary research into the question is necessary in South Africa; inter-country adoption should be considered and law reform and governmental policy should facilitate these. / Private Law / LL. M. (Law)

Text in Afrikaans, abstract in English / Writer investigates the constitutionality of section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 against the backdrop of the South African common law and the common law of comparative legal systems. In the South Africa law the mother of an illegitimate child has guardianship. The natural father does not have parental power which weakens his legal position. In analysing the judgement of the Constitutional Court, writer criticises the court for stating that in the case of a newborn baby the kind of discrimination which section 18( 4 )( d) authorises against a natural father may be justifiable in the initial period after the child is born. The constitutional position of the natural father in American jurisprudence is discussed at length. Writer concludes that the natural father has to take positive steps to vest a right to be heard in an adoption application. Proposals for legal reform are also made. / Private Law / LL. M. (Law)

D’une manière générale, la fonction administrative contentieuse peut être appréhendée comme l’ensemble des juridictions chargées de connaître des litiges résultant de l’activité des autorités administratives. Elle represente l’activité juridictionnelle en matière administrative. Par conséquent, la fonction administrative contentieuse doit s’appréhender tant sous l’angle d’une juridiction, que sous celle de son juge. L’institution d’une fonction administrative contentieuse en Côte d’Ivoire remonte à l’époque coloniale. Cependant, à l’instar de la plupart des ex-colonies françaises, ce n’est qu’au lendemain de l’indépendance en 1960, que la fonction administrative contentieuse ivoirienne s’est affirmée en tant que fonction juridictionnelle autonome à l’égard du système français. La procédure administrative non contentieuse, comme la procédure administrative contentieuse dont il est question dans l’étude ont connu de grands progrès tant en France que dans les pays francophones d’Afrique pour lesquels le système de juridiction administrative comme le droit qu’il vise à contrôler ont longtemps constitué, selon la belle formule de Jean RIVERO, un bon « produit d’exportation » français. La Côte d’ivoire n’échappe pas à ce constat. Aussi l’étude de la fonction administrative contentieuse en Côte d’Ivoire a pour objet de dessiner la physionomie générale de la justice administrative ivoirienne un demi siècle après son institution afin d’en souligner les éléments de permanence ou de changement. / Generally speaking, the contentious administrative function can be arrested as all the jurisdictions asked to know disputes resulting from the activity of the authorities. She represente the jurisdictional activity in administrative subject. Consequently, the contentious administrative functio has to dread as long under the angle of a jurisdiction, that under that of his judge. The institution of a contentious administrative function (office) in Ivory Coast goes back up to the colonial time. However, following the example of most of the French ex-colonies, it is that after the independence in 1960, that the Ivory Coast contentious administrative function asserted itself as autonomous jurisdictional office towards the French system. The not contentious administrative procedure, as the contentious administrative procedure question of which it is in the study knew big progress both in France and in the French-speaking countries of Africa for which the system of jurisdiction administrative as the right at which it aims at checking constituted for a long time, according to the Jean RIVERO's beautiful formula, a voucher " produced by export " French. Ivory Coast does not escape this report. So, the study of the contentious administrative office in Ivory Coast has for object to draw the general face of the Ivory Coast administrative justice half a century after her institution to underline the elements of durability or change.

1 Summary The public administration itself is bound by applicable laws rules. Therefore, in case of breach of individual rights stemming from the legal system of the Czech Republic, every person is guaranteed a strictly legal procedure with corresponding legal mechanisms, which aim to remedy of status cause by unlawfull action or inaction of the public administration. Moreover, if conditions laid down by European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are met, an individual has a right to apply to the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg) for a revision of a challenged act of public administration, which is considered to be as a final and conclusive from the point of view of national law. The object of this Thesis focuses, in particular, on analysis of individual means of protection of rights in public administration and their mutual relationships between them at level of legal regulation de lege ferenda. Also, it cannot be disregarded the assessment of effect of courts' decisions or doctrine, including stating own knowledge based on the practice particularly in the area of administrative law. The Thesis focuses on the issue of the protection of individual public rights. As a consequence, legal means designed to provide protection of law in objective sense (that is...

La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado. / The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.