L’économie a toujours fait partie des productions artistiques. En effet, que ce soit par les commandes des mécènes, par les coûts des matériaux utilisés ou encore par la mise en vente des œuvres, l’art et l’argent sont deux entités inséparables. Toutefois, les artistes qui représentent et qui s’entretiennent de l’argent et de l’économie dans leurs œuvres se font plus rares. Des représentations du commerce adviennent avant le modernisme. Toutefois, ce n’est que récemment que les artistes se sont mis à s’intéresser aux manifestations de l’économie en les intégrant dans leur pratique. Existe-t-il actuellement une place dans le monde de l’art pour ce type particulier de production conceptuelle qui réfléchit à des questions économiques ? Notre recherche tourne autour de cette réflexion et explore la vente des productions artistiques à caractère économique sur le marché. C’est sous les termes d’économies imaginaires que nous retrouverons ces productions tout au long de ce mémoire. Nous nous pencherons plus spécifiquement sur la définition de cette pratique particulière, ainsi que sur sa vente dans les galeries et maisons de vente aux enchères. / Economy has always been a part of artistic productions. Indeed, whether it be through patronage or by the cost and worth of the materials employed, or even by the selling of the artworks, art and money have always been two inseparable entities. However, artists who represent and deal with money and economy in their work are still quite scarce. We are able to find some representations of trading in ancient artworks, but it is only recently that the artists began to address the various expressions of economy by integrating them into their practice. Is there currently a place in the art world for this particular type of conceptual production that reflects on economic issues? Our research is guided by this topic and explores the sales of this type of artistic productions on the markets. This type of production will be referred to as “imaginary economics” throughout this master’s thesis. We will explore its definition as well as its sales in galleries and auction houses.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Artikeln in dem Forschungsfeld der Informationsökonomik. Ein wiederkehrendes Motiv in allen drei Artikeln ist die ambivalente Rolle von privater Information. In Kontrast zur klassischen Entscheidungstheorie, in der mehr Informationen Individuen niemals schlechter stellt, analysiere ich drei verschiedene Umgebungen, in denen mehr Konsumenteninformation die Konsumentenrente verringern kann. / This dissertation comprises three independent chapters in the field of information economics. The recurrent theme of all three chapters is the ambiguous role of information: While in standard decision theory additional information enables individuals to weakly increase utility through making better choices, I analyze three di erent environments in which more information to consumers may actually be detrimental to consumer utility.

[pt] O objetivo desta tese é desenvolver uma metodologia para estratégia de oferta de geradoras em leilões de contratos de energia elétrica, que determine a quantidade ótima que deve ser ofertada de cada contrato para cada ní­vel de preço de leilão, levando em conta os perfis de risco de cada agente e os riscos associados à  contratação. Em particular a incerteza quanto ao montante de energia produzida e ao seu preço no mercado de curto prazo (preço spot), também conhecida como incerteza de quantidade e preço. Desta forma, são realizadas aplicações desta metodologia para dois tipos de leilões de energia existente, mono e multi-produto. Neste segundo caso (multi-produto) é realizado um estudo de caso para o Leilão de Transição que ocorrerá em dezembro de 2004, onde serão leiloados 75% da eletricidade disponí­vel hoje no país (55 mil MW), segundo as diretrizes do novo modelo do setor elétrico brasileiro. / [en] The objective of this work is to develop a methodology for bidding strategies in multi-unit auctions for long-term electricity power purchase agreements (PPA). Considering a descending price auction design, the objective of a generating agent is to determine the optimal amount of energy to be offered in each contract for the actual auction prices at each round that maximizes the revenues of the agent given their risk profiles and the contract risks involved. The main risk treated in this work is the so-called price- quantity risk, related to the negative correlation between energy produced and the short term prices (spot price). The modeling of the risk profile for each agent is done using utility functions. This methodology is then applied on two types of auctions: singleproduct (only one contract being auctioned) and multi-product (more than one product is simultaneously auctioned). Case studies are presented with data from the Brazilian system. In particular, on the second type (multivariated auction) the case study is realized for the transition auction that will occur on December 2004, where 75% of the generation market of the whole country (about 55GW) will be negotiated under the guidelines of the new Brazilian electrical sector model.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:19:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre Laizo Clapis.pdf: 2525677 bytes, checksum: 20816b6035d54337908241e5629d9294 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-27 / The purpose of this work is to review general issues related to a type of security, the fiduciary ownership of real estate (propriedade fiduciária imobiliária) associated with practical aspects of its registration. The fiduciary ownership was introduced in the Brazilian legal system by Federal Law No. 9,514/1997, although it has been being used to secure the financing of durable goods for a long time. After the issuance of such law, within the scope of the Brazilian Real Estate Financing System SFI, the fiduciary ownership of real estate emerged as an alternative to the weakened Brazilian Housing System SFH. The Brazilian real estate market benefited from the introduction of a new type of fiduciary security. In particular because the mechanisms available to the creditor to recover its credit were expedited and improved with the sale of the property at extrajudicial public auctions, this is to say, with the possibility of the fiduciary/trustee (fiduciário) to recover the amount financed with no need to file a judicial execution proceeding that is knowingly more time consuming and involves higher costs. To understand the current features of the Brazilian fiduciary ownership of real estate, one must return to the origin of the institute, particularly to the fidúcia (trust) of Roman Law and the one that has appeared in Germanic Law because one has served itself from the failure of the other in an attempt to improve its structure and introduce, in the German fiduciary relationship, the resolvable condition resulting from the law rather than from the fiduciary s will, as it happened in Roman Law. However, in any of those origins, it is possible to notice that the special attractive of this type of security is the transfer of the title to the fiduciary, so that the security is created on a creditor s asset. Because of the increasing use of this type of security, Brazilian courts have already had the opportunity to pronounce on fundamental aspects such as the constitutionality of the extrajudicial enforcement of the security consisting of the fiduciary ownership of real estate in other words, the mandatory public auctions, in case of default of the fiduciary agent (fiduciante) does not violate constitutional commandments of access to courts and full defense and, similarly, the structure of reimbursement of the fiduciary and the fiduciary agent, in case there is any balance after the sale at an extrajudicial public auction does not violate Article 53 of the Brazilian Consumers Defense Code / Neste trabalho são analisados os temas gerais relacionados a um tipo de garantia real, a da propriedade fiduciária imobiliária, aliados aos aspectos práticos registrários. Essa propriedade foi introduzida em nosso sistema jurídico pela Lei Federal nº 9.514/1997, mas nosso ordenamento há muito já se serve de tal modalidade de garantia real para financiamento de coisas móveis de consumo durável. A propriedade fiduciária imobiliária, com a edição da referida lei, no âmbito do Sistema de Financiamento Imobiliário SFI , surgiu como alternativa para o enfraquecido Sistema Financeiro Habitacional SFH. O mercado imobiliário brasileiro foi favorecido pela introdução da nova modalidade de garantia real fiduciária. Especialmente pelo fato de que os mecanismos de recuperação do crédito pelo credor foram agilizados e melhorados com a alienação da coisa por meio dos leilões públicos extrajudiciais, ou seja, com a possibilidade de o fiduciário recobrar o valor financiado sem que seja necessário buscar a execução judicial que, sabidamente, é morosa e de custo elevado. Para compreender os atuais contornos da propriedade fiduciária imobiliária brasileira deve-se retornar às origens do instituto, especialmente à fidúcia do Direito Romano e à fidúcia que surgiu no Direito Germânico, pois uma serviu-se da causa do fracasso da outra para tentar aprimorar sua estrutura e introduzir, na relação fiduciária alemã, a condição resolúvel decorrente da lei e não da vontade do fiduciário, como era para os romanos. Contudo, em qualquer das origens é possível notar que o especial atrativo dessa modalidade de garantia é a transferência da propriedade para o fiduciário, de forma que a garantia é constituída sob coisa do credor. Pela crescente utilização dessa modalide de garantia real imobiliária, os tribunais brasileiros já tiveram oportunidade de se manifestar sobre aspectos fundamentais, como a constitucionalidade da execução extrajudicial da garantia fiduciária imobiliária ou seja, os leilões públicos obrigatórios, em caso de inadimplemento do fiduciante, não ferem os preceitos constitucionais de acesso à justiça e de ampla defesa, e, da mesma forma, a estrutura de ressarcimento do fiduciário e do fiduciante, caso haja saldo após a alienação em público leilão estrajudicial, não afronta o art. 53 do Código de Defesa do Consumidor

Submitted by Maria Aparecida (cidazen@gmail.com) on 2017-04-03T15:12:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Nilson Sa.pdf: 782333 bytes, checksum: d519ab26cc38c2ed5e980a8bfd2aa254 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-03T15:12:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nilson Sa.pdf: 782333 bytes, checksum: d519ab26cc38c2ed5e980a8bfd2aa254 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-23 / CAPES / The various changes that have happened in the electricity markets around the world have introduced competition among the participants in this sector. Thus, the generation agents that participate on electrical energy auctions may prefer to build optimal strategies to maximize their profits. Mathematical models based on game theory have been used in the analysis of electric energy markets and especially in electricity auctions. In this sense, this theory optimizes the decision-making process for setting prices offered by the generators to the system operator in a power auction. This research discusses a comparative analysis of individual strategies of each generating unit, using a non-cooperative game theory approach and incomplete information on various types of auctions. A modified IEEE 57- bus test system is used to illustrate the main features of the auction models used. / As diversas mudanças que ocorreram nos mercados de eletricidade em todo o mundo têm introduzido a competição entre os participantes neste setor. Assim, os agentes de geração que participam de leilões de energia elétrica podem construir estratégias ótimas para maximizar seus lucros. Modelos matemáticos baseados na teoria dos jogos têm sido utilizados na análise de mercados de energia elétrica e, especialmente, em leilões de eletricidade. Nesse sentido, esta teoria otimiza o processo de tomada de decisão para fixar os preços oferecidos pelos geradores ao operador do sistema em um leilão de energia. Este trabalho discute uma análise comparativa das estratégias individuais de cada unidade geradora, usando uma abordagem de teoria dos jogos não-cooperativa e informações incompletas sobre vários tipos de leilões. Um sistema de teste IEEE 57-bus modificado é usado para ilustrar as principais características dos modelos de leilão utilizados.

A função de pregoeiro surgiu com a edição da Lei 10.520/00, com o advento da modalidade de pregão. Com a adesão cada vez maior a essa modalidade, buscou-se trazer maior eficiência e transparência às compras governamentais, o que culminou em uma maior responsabilidade atribuída ao pregoeiro, o principal agente de licitações no pregão. Com procedimentos rígidos previstos na legislação, a atividade exige que o pregoeiro seja diligente em relação a todos os atos que compõe o processo, bem como receba treinamento adequado e atualização constante em relação à legislação. Diante das atividades de compras públicas e das responsabilidades do pregoeiro, buscou-se investigar quais são as percepções do pregoeiro sobre o seu trabalho na condução dos processos licitatórios de um Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia. A metodologia aplicada na pesquisa consistiu de revisão bibliográfica, observação participante e aplicação de um questionário eletrônico junto a uma amostra dos pregoeiros daquela Instituição. A pesquisa constatou que a Instituição estudada possui 114 pregoeiros designados e que realizou em 2016 mais de 700 de pregões eletrônicos. Outro dado levantado pela pesquisa foi que os pregoeiros consideram não ter o suporte institucional necessário para o desempenho da função (treinamento, suporte operacional e jurídico e incentivo financeiro), que eles permanecem na função em média três anos, sugerindo assim, uma evasão da função pelos servidores mais antigos. Como proposta de intervenção, foi elaborado um perfil ideal para o servidor que desempenha a função de pregoeiro bem como a concentração da quantidade do número de pregões. Essas medidas possibilitam uma racionalização do número de pregões, gerando economia de escala, poder de negociação e competição dos fornecedores, e com um menor número de pregoeiros designados é possível direcionar a função para os servidores com maior afinidade com a área e aderência ao perfil desejado, e também liberar os outros servidores anteriormente designados para o desempenho de outras funções administrativas. / The profession “Auctioneers” has rise for Law nº 10.520/00, afterward of range of business auction in govern companies. The popularity of this profession becoming too much more known, and efforts to accurate to efficiently and transparence in auctions on government companies were necessary, to add much more responsibility and increase the role of Auctioneers in supply chain on their auctions on companies. The mainly process is rigid and it has previewed on regiment of laws, which the labor of Auctioneerss must be resilient about every process chains of his work to complete his job. The training and improvements must be done to guarantee quality and keeps the Auctioneers on rules of law enforcement and updated, regarding every changes in legal system and rules about his duties. Considering the activities of public purchase and duties of Auctioneers, research and investigation must were carry on, to check and make surveillance to perceive what should be done on Auctioneers roles, his job and conduct on Auctions process at Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia. The methodology was applied in bibliography research that aftermath to observe the members of work group and insert electronic questionnaire on group of Staff Auctioneerss from the Institute. The research concluded that Institution has 114 Auctioneerss on duty and They have done more than 700 electronic auctions on 2016.Otherwise, the surveillance data, shown that Auctioneerss considering haven´t enough support from their Institution, as well as to help them to do their obligation as a Auctioneers nor on their job, for e.g (Training and courses, Operational and Law support, and finally bonus for his high quality by professionalism to reach the goals of the Government company), and employees usually in duty on their mission (as Auctioneers) stands about three years at least, which suggesting that the profession is abandoned by ancient employees on Institution. Whereas all the fact presented, was offer a proposal to intervention to build a profile about the employees that act as Auctioneers and account the numbers of auctions that have been done on Organization. These surveillance enable to control the numbers of auctions done for employees as well as improving economy, afterward to set free others employees to accept many others missions in administrative branches of the company and organization.

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Cette thèse est composée de trois essais liés à la conception de mécanisme et aux enchères. Dans le premier essai j'étudie la conception de mécanismes bayésiens efficaces dans des environnements où les fonctions d'utilité des agents dépendent de l'alternative choisie même lorsque ceux-ci ne participent pas au mécanisme. En plus d'une règle d'attribution et d'une règle de paiement le planificateur peut proférer des menaces afin d'inciter les agents à participer au mécanisme et de maximiser son propre surplus; Le planificateur peut présumer du type d'un agent qui ne participe pas. Je prouve que la solution du problème de conception peut être trouvée par un choix max-min des types présumés et des menaces. J'applique ceci à la conception d'une enchère multiple efficace lorsque la possession du bien par un acheteur a des externalités négatives sur les autres acheteurs. Le deuxième essai considère la règle du juste retour employée par l'agence spatiale européenne (ESA). Elle assure à chaque état membre un retour proportionnel à sa contribution, sous forme de contrats attribués à des sociétés venant de cet état. La règle du juste retour est en conflit avec le principe de la libre concurrence puisque des contrats ne sont pas nécessairement attribués aux sociétés qui font les offres les plus basses. Ceci a soulevé des discussions sur l'utilisation de cette règle: les grands états ayant des programmes spatiaux nationaux forts, voient sa stricte utilisation comme un obstacle à la compétitivité et à la rentabilité. Apriori cette règle semble plus coûteuse à l'agence que les enchères traditionnelles. Nous prouvons au contraire qu'une implémentation appropriée de la règle du juste retour peut la rendre moins coûteuse que des enchères traditionnelles de libre concurrence. Nous considérons le cas de l'information complète où les niveaux de technologie des firmes sont de notoriété publique, et le cas de l'information incomplète où les sociétés observent en privée leurs coûts de production. Enfin, dans le troisième essai je dérive un mécanisme optimal d'appel d'offre dans un environnement où un acheteur d'articles hétérogènes fait face a de potentiels fournisseurs de différents groupes, et est contraint de choisir une liste de gagnants qui est compatible avec des quotas assignés aux différents groupes. La règle optimale d'attribution consiste à assigner des niveaux de priorité aux fournisseurs sur la base des coûts individuels qu'ils rapportent au décideur. La manière dont ces niveaux de priorité sont déterminés est subjective mais connue de tous avant le déroulement de l'appel d'offre. Les différents coûts rapportés induisent des scores pour chaque liste potentielle de gagnant. Les articles sont alors achetés à la liste ayant les meilleurs scores, s'il n'est pas plus grand que la valeur de l'acheteur. Je montre également qu'en général il n'est pas optimal d'acheter les articles par des enchères séparées. / This thesis is made of three essays related to mechanism design and auctions. In first essay I study Bayesian efficient mechanism design in environments where agents' utility functions depend on the chosen alternative even if they do not participate to the mechanism. In addition to an allocation rule and a payment rule the designer may choose appropriate threats in order to give agents the incentive to participate and maximize his own expected surplus; The planner may presume the type of an agent who does not participate. I show that the solution of the design problem can be found by a max - min choice of the presumed types and threats. I apply this to the design of an efficient multi-unit auction when a buyer in possession of the good causes negative externalities on other buyers.\\ The second essay considers the fair return rule used by the European Space Agency (ESA). It ensures each member state of ESA a return proportional to its contribution, in the form of contracts awarded to firms coming from that state. The fair return rule is in conflict with the principle of free competition since contracts are not necessarily awarded to firms with the lowest bids. This has raised debates on the use of this rule: it is well accepted by small states, but larger states with strong national space programs, see its strict use as an obstacle to competitiveness and cost effectiveness. It is easy to believe that this rule is more costly to the agency than traditional auctions. We show on the contrary that an adequate implementation of the fair return rule may cause it to be less expensive to the agency than the traditional auctions of free competition. We consider the case of complete information where firms' technology levels are common knowledge, and the case of incomplete information where firms observe privately their production costs. In both cases we show that adequate implementation of the fair return rule may help take advantage of asymmetries between countries in order to expect a lower cost than with traditional auctions.\\ Finally, in the third essay I derive an optimal procurement mechanism in an environment where a buyer of heterogeneous items faces potential suppliers from different groups, and is constrained to choose a winning list that is consistent with some exogenous quotas assigned to the different groups. The optimal allocation rule consists of assigning priority levels to suppliers on the basis of their cost reports. The way these priority levels are determined is subjective but known to all before the auction. The individual reports induce scores for each potential winning list. The items are then purchased from one of the lists with the best score, provided it is not greater than the buyer's valuation for the items. I also find that it is not optimal to purchase the items through separate auctions, unless the buyer's valuation is sufficiently high or low.

This thesis is a collection of three essays on inflation expectations, forecasting uncertainty, and the role of uncertainty in sequential auctions, all using experimental approach. Chapter 1 studies how individuals forecast inflation in fictitious macroeconomic setup and analyzes the effect of monetary policy rules on their decisions. Results display heterogeneity in inflation forecasting rules and demonstrate the importance of adaptive learning forecasting if model switching is assumed. Chapter 2 extends the analysis from Chapter 1 by analyzing individual inflation forecasting uncertainty. Results show that confidence intervals depend on inflation variance and business cycle phase, have a strong inertia, and are often asymmetric. Finally, Chapter 3 analyzes the role of uncertainty about the number of bidders for the behavior of subjects in a sequential auction experiment. Uncertainty does not aggravate price decline, but it changes individual bidding strategies and auction efficiency. / Esta tesis consta de tres ensayos sobre las expectativas de inflación, la incertidumbre de la predicción, y la importancia de la incertidumbre en subastas secuenciales. Todos ellos utilizan un método experimental. El capítulo 1 estudia cómo los individuos predicen la inflación en la economía ficticia y analiza el efecto de las reglas de política monetaria en sus decisiones. Los resultados revelan la heterogeneidad en las reglas de predicción de la inflación y demuestran la importancia del mecanismo de aprendizaje adaptivo si el cambio entre los modelos se supone. Capítulo 2 continúa el análisis del capítulo 1, analiza la incertidumbre individual de las expectativas de inflación. Los resultados muestran que los intervalos de confianza dependen de varianza de la inflación y la fase del ciclo económico, tienen una fuerte inercia, y son frecuentemente asimétricos. Por último, el capítulo 3 analiza la influencia de la incertidumbre sobre el número de oferentes en el comportamiento de los individuos en un experimento de la subasta secuencial. La incertidumbre no agrava la caída de los precios, pero cambia las estrategias de los oferentes y la eficiencia de la subasta.