Contributing to the contentious debate on the relationship between sovereign debt and economic growth, I examine the role of theory-driven (non-)sustainable debt-ratios in combination with debt-ratio thresholds on economic growth. Based on both dynamic and non-dynamic panel data analyses in the euro area (EA) 12 countries over the period 1970-2013, I find that non-sustainable debt-ratios above and below the 60% threshold, have a detrimental effect on short-run economic growth, while sustainable debt-ratios below the 90% threshold exert a positive influence on short-run economic growth. In the long-run, both non-sustainable and sustainable debt-ratios above the 90% threshold, as well as non-sustainable debt-ratios below the 60% compromise economic growth. Robustness analysis supports these findings, and provides additional evidence of a positive effect of sustainable debt-ratios below the 60% threshold, as predicated by the Maastricht Treaty criterion, on (short- and long-run) economic growth. Overall, these results suggest that debt sustainability in addition to debt non-linearities should be considered simultaneously in the debt-growth nexus. In addition, the results indicate the importance of a timely reaction of fiscal policy in countries with non-sustainable debts, as implied by fiscal rules, in an attempt to ensure fiscal sustainability and, ultimately, promote long-run economic growth. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper examines the extent to which thin markets in conjunction with tax induced kinks in the budget constraint cause consumer demand to be skewed. To illustrate the principles I focus on the demand for owner-occupied housing. Housing units are indivisible and heterogeneous while tastes for housing are at least partly idiosyncratic, causing housing markets to be thin. In addition, prior to 1998, capital gains tax provisions introduced a sharp kink in the budget constraint of existing owner-occupiers in search of a new home: previous homeowners under age 55 paid no capital gains tax if they bought up, but were subject to capital gains tax if they bought down. I first characterize the economic conditions under which households err on the up or down side when choosing a home in the presence of a thin market and a kinked budget constraint. I then specify an empirical model that takes such effects into account. Results based on Monte Carlo experiments indicate that failing to allow for skewness in the demand for housing leads to biased estimates of the elasticities of demand when such skewness is actually present. In addition, estimates based on American Housing Survey data suggest that such bias is substantial: controlling for skewness reduces the price elasticity of demand among previous owner-occupiers from 1.6 to 0.3. Moreover, 58% of previous homeowners err on the up while only 42% err on the down side. Thus, housing demand is skewed. / Ph. D.

當俄羅斯正經歷著政治結構與經濟體系同時轉變的考驗時，連年下降的國有企業生產力與總產量並未隨著改革工作的進展而有所提升，即使改革措施因為先前政策的成效不彰而有所調整，但俄羅斯的總體經濟表現依然不理想。為了探究 1992 年年初到 1994 年年中這段期間俄羅斯國有企業政策的內容、實施的成效，以及政策取向變化的原因，本文先從財產權途徑與市場結構途徑著手，分析決策過程中不同的部門對國有企業的預算約制、協調機制與市場結構的看法，然後歸納出兩種不同的政策取向：保護取向與效率取向。保護取向者以國有企業員工及立法機構的成員為主，主張維持現有制度與就業水準，避免失業引發社會問題，並增加對國有企業資源的投入以提高企業產量。效率取向者以新興的經濟學家及部份的內閣成員為主，希望建立新的機制以減少資源投入的數量，但賦予國有企業提高生產效率的誘因，使其提高產量，如此一來便可以減輕政府的財政負擔，並達到穩定金融及控制通貨膨脹的目的。1992年年初俄羅斯行政機構中的效率取向者取得了優勢的決策地位，並且開始採取穩定化與價格自由化等改革措施，但緊縮資源投入的改革方式卻造成國有企業員工的恐慌，從系統論的觀點來看，民主化之後的俄羅斯因為政策承受者的反饋機制開始強化，因此效率取向者的改革措施便遭到立法機構中保護取向者的修正，而開始向擴張支出的政策方向傾斜。雖然效率取向者試圖以憑證私有化政策換取民眾對改革的信心，甚至以發動流血政變、重新制定憲法等方式變更制度設計以重新取得優勢的決策地位，但因為其緊縮政策忽略了市場結構因素，難以提升企業產量，又引發企業員工對失業的恐懼，因此保護取向者便又在 1994 年年初佔領了優勢的決策地位，主導了政策的走向。總括 1992 年年初到 1994 年年中俄羅斯國有企業改革政策的走向，便可以得出政策取向在保護取向與效率取向之間連續擺盪，但結果卻受保護取向影響較深的局面。 / When people in Russia suffered from the transformation of the political structure and the economic system, the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Russia did not improve , either. In order to find out the options of reform strategy and the cause of failure, this research applies the property rights approach and the market structure approach to analyze the budget constraint, coordination mechanism, and market structure problems of SOEs. Combing those problems with the decision making process founded on systems model, we made a conclusion that there were two policy orientations in solving the SOE problems: one is the protection-orientated policy, and the other is the efficiency-oriented one. Most employees of SOEs and legislators preferred the protection-oriented policy because they were afraid of unemployment and bankruptcy of their enterprises by privatization. On the contrary, the efficiency-oriented government placed its emphasis on the rampant inflation and preferred to cut the government expense by reducing the investment in SOEs. At the beginning of 1992, the efficiency-oriented stabilization policy and the liberalization of price became the focuses of reform. Those retrenchment policies limited the spending of SOEs and reduced the government's popularity, too. In order to keep the enterprises operating, employees of SOEs and legislators expected more investment from the government. With the feedback function performed by legislators, the protection-oriented policy substituted the efficiency-oriented one from the mid of 1992. To dominate the reform strategy again. President Yeltsin dismissed the congress in September 1993 and called for the referendum of new constitution and the election of new congress in December 1993. Although the efficiency-oriented government tried to recover the public confidence of reform by controlling the inflation, but the employees, living in the fear of unemployment, did not place their trust in government. After the election, the protection-oriented deputies still occupied the majority seats and turned the direction of reform strategy again. In sum, the orientation of reform policy of SOEs in Russia swung all the time since 1992 to 1994, but the protection-oriented policy had more influence on it in general.

Cette thèse porte sur les spécificités du secteur public et leurs impacts sur les incitations et la performance. Elle mobilise les outils microéconomiques de la théorie des contrats et l’analyse économétrique. Parmi ces caractéristiques, une attention particulière est portée sur les problématiques de surveillance, de gestion de l’information et de contraintes budgétaires. Le premier chapitre de cette thèse contribue au débat sur la transparence dans le secteur public en considérant l’une de ses caractéristiques majeure : un budget limité. Cette question est étudiée comme un problème de design informationnel et utilise un modèle principal agent sous aléa moral pour montrer que la transparence a plus de chance d’être sélectionnée par le principal lorsque que le budget disponible et la valeur de la tache sont faibles. Le deuxième chapitre s’attache à offrir une nouvelle explication théorique à l’intuition associant un accroissement de la pression bureaucratique à une baisse de la qualité. Dans ce but, l’idée d’«extra-mile» est introduite dans un modèle principal agent classique sous aléa-moral. Le management bureaucratique est caractérisé par l’introduction d’une procédure définie comme l’association d’une codification et d’une vérification. Une telle procédure permet une vérification plus précise de l’action de l’agent mais est source d’inefficience sociale. Le dernier chapitre, dans une démarche théorique et empirique, propose une nouvelle explication de la différence des prix de l’eau en France en se fondant sur des arguments organisationnels. / This thesis focuses on the structural specificities of the public sector and how they impact incentives and performance. It uses the microeconomic tools of contract theory and econometric analysis. Among these characteristics, special attention is paid to monitoring, information management and budget constraints by applying a theoretical lens, that allows to provide new insights into the incentive systems in place in the public sector. The first chapter contributes to the debate on transparency in the public sector by considering one of its major features, i.e. a limited budget. This issue is studied as an information design problem and employ a principal-agent model with moral hazard to show that if the principal has to choose between total transparency and total opacity, then transparency is more likely to be optimal when tasks are least valuable and budgets are lowest. The second chapter aims at capturing a new theoretical explanation for the widespread intuition that more bureaucracy could lead to less effort and quality despite improved control. To that end, the idea of “the extra mile” is introduced in a classic principal-agent model with moral hazard. Bureaucratic management is characterized by the use of procedures, defined as the association of codification and verification. A procedure allows for more accurate verification of the agent’s action, but is socially inefficient. In the third chapter, using both theory and regression analysis, we propose a new explanation for price differences in the French water industry based on organizational arguments.

Cette thèse contient trois études sur le fonctionnement des banques.<p>Le premier Chapitre analyse empiriquement comment la capacité d’offrir des emprunts à long terme est influencée par la dimension des intermédiaires financiers.<p>Le deuxième Chapitre analyse, avec un model théorique caractérisé par la présence de soft-budget constraint, ratchet effect et short-termism, comment la pression compétitive influence la capacité des banque de financer le firmes ayant des projets de bonne qualité.<p>Le troisième Chapitre examine, avec un model théorique du type moral hazard common agency, le conflits d'intérêts des banques universelles.<p><p>Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is considered so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators.<p>Across and within banking sectors it is possible to observe a wide variety of intermediaries. Banks may differ in their size, market power and degree of specialization. This variety raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning banking sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies intending to contribute in this direction.<p>Chapter 1 will empirically study the willingness of smaller and larger lenders to grant long-term loans which, as credit to SME's, constitute an opaque segment of the credit market. Chapter 2 analyzes, with a theoretical model, the effects of competition on the efficiency of the banking sector when this is characterized by dynamic commitment issues which brings to excessive refinancing of bad quality investments (so called soft-budget constraint) or excessive termination of good ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). Chapter 3 presents a model to investigate to what extent the distortions posed by conflicts of interest in universal banks can be addressed through the provision of appropriate incentive schemes by the different categories of clients. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The diploma thesis deals with the analyses of demand using standard tools of engineering mathematics. Mathematical models of demand, both single and multi- factor are investigated. Elasticity of demand is applied for decision making in price policy. Problems of optimization of demand reflecting utility and budget constraints are under consideration. Constructions of demand curve and compensated demand curve are presented. The text is accompanied by illustrative examples aiming at methodical aspects of the work

. / Corporate acquisitions are classified as part of “the market for corporate control” in which management teams are facing constant competition from other management teams. If the team that currently controls a company is not maximizing the value of the company’s assets, then an acquisition will likely occur and increase the value of the company by replacing its poor managers with good managers. This dissertation focus on two issues on mergers, the first compares the strategy between mergers and joint ventures. The second investigate how much liquidity should the acquirer preserve and what is the equilibrium price of the acquired firm in considering the merger strategy. Drawing upon the incomplete contract theory, I examine the criterion of the strategic choice between joint ventures (JVs) and mergers when two firms contemplate vertical integration. The model reaches the following conclusions: (1) some ownership provision to the acquired company after the mergers may prove to be more lucrative to the acquirer than 100% takeover; (2) given the same equity share arrangement for JVs and mergers I conclude that these two firms should choose to merge or be merged rather than JVs; (3) I derive the optimal equity share arrangement in both JVs and mergers when ownership provision is considered as a strategic means. In addition, I also compare the welfare and effort of both companies in JVs and mergers under symmetric cost structures, and find that mergers would provide greater social efficiency and welfare than 50-50 JVs when the acquirer’s equity share is between 30% and 65%. Firms are concerned that they may in the future be deprived of the funds that would enable them to take advantage of exciting growth prospects, strengthen existing investments or simply stay alive. I specifically examine a firm’s liquidity need in order to grasp any future opportunity of mergers and acquisitions. However, a firm’s manager (borrower) can shed his interim wrongdoings (misbehavior) under the pretext of further financial need for mergers and acquisitions because he knows that he can easily raise sufficient cash from lenders to cover any adverse shock. My study derives the conditions that when this soft-budget-constraint (SBC) problem will occur. It happens when the interim income is small. Moreover, I analyze how the purchase price of acquisition is affected by this soft-budget-constraint syndrome. If there is SBC problem, the acquisition price will be raised by the investors when the interim income is small. Besides, a firm with severe moral hazard problem will be merely able to offer a smaller purchase price for the acquisition. On the contrast, a firm with a stronger balance sheet will be able to secure a greater credit line and offer a more attractive price for the acquisition. The empirical study of U.S. firms during 1988 to 2006 supports my conclusions.

The financial crisis of 2007/8 has triggered a profound debate about public budget finance sustainability, ever-increasing government expenditures and the efficiency of fiscal policy measures. Given this context, the following dissertation provides four contributions that analyze the long-run growth of government spending throughout economic development, discuss potential effects of fiscal policy measures on output, and provide new insights into the assessment of debt sustainability for a variety of industrialized countries. Since the breakout of the European debt crisis in 2009/2010, there has been a revival of interest in the long-term growth of government expenditures. In this context, the relationship between the size of the public sector and economic growth - often referred to as Wagner's law - has been in the focus of numerous studies, especially with regard to public policy and fiscal sustainability. Using historical data from the mid-19th century, the first chapter analyzes the validity of Wagner's law for five industrialized European countries and links the discussion to different stages of economic development. In line with Wagner's hypothesis, our findings show that the relationship between public spending and economic growth has weakened at an advanced stage of development. Furthermore, all countries under review support the notion that Wagner's law may have lost its economic relevance in recent decades. As a consequence of the 2007/8 financial crisis, there has been an increasing theoretical and empirical debate about the impact of fiscal policy measures on output. Accordingly, the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach to estimating the fiscal multipliers developed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has been applied widely in the literature in recent years. In the second chapter, we point out that the fiscal multipliers derived from this approach include the predicted future path of the policy instruments as well as their dynamic interaction. We analyze a data set from the US and document that these interactions are economically and statistically significant. In a counterfactual simulation, we report fiscal multipliers that abstract from these dynamic responses. Furthermore, we use our estimates to analyze the recent fiscal stimulus of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The third chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature on fiscal multipliers by applying a five-variable SVAR approach to a uniform data set for Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Besides studying the effects of expenditure and tax increases on output, we additionally analyze their dynamic effects on inflation and interest rates as well as the dynamic interaction of both policy instruments. By conducting counterfactual simulations, which abstract from the dynamic response of key macroeconomic variables to the initial fiscal shocks, we study the importance of these channels for the transmission of fiscal policy on output. Overall, the results demonstrate that the effects of fiscal shocks are limited and rather different across countries. Further, it is shown that the inflation and interest rate channel are insignificant for the transmission of fiscal policy. In the field of public finances, governmental budgetary policies are among the most controversial and disputed areas of political and scientific controversy. The sustainability of public debt is often analyzed by testing stationarity conditions of government's budget deficits. The fourth chapter shows that this test can be implemented more effectively by means of an asymmetric unit root test. We argue that this approach increases the power of the test and reduces the likelihood of drawing false inferences. We illustrate this in an application to 14 countries of the European Monetary Union as well as in a Monte Carlo simulation. Distinguishing between positive and negative changes in deficits, we find consistency with the intertemporal budget constraint for more countries, i.e. lower persistence of positive changes in some countries, compared to the earlier literature.