Le droit constitutionnel français a la particularité de laisser une large place au droit administratif. Tandis que le Conseil constitutionnel s’approprie des notions, des techniques et des modes de pensée issus du droit administratif, les normes constitutionnelles font appel à des institutions et des constructions administratives. Parallèlement, le Conseil d’État dispose de compétences formellement et matériellement constitutionnelles. Les conseillers d’État sont omniprésents dans l’élaboration des textes, notamment législatifs, et effectuent un pré-contrôle de constitutionnalité. Enfin, la doctrine de droit constitutionnel, formée en droit administratif, exploite des concepts de contentieux administratif pour analyser la jurisprudence constitutionnelle. Ainsi, poser la question des bases administratives du droit constitutionnel français implique de réfléchir sur l’existence, au sein du droit constitutionnel, d’une culture administrative de la discipline. Cette dernière provient alors, à la fois de l’histoire particulière du droit public français, qui, depuis la Révolution, a nécessité une jurisprudence administrative pléthorique pour pallier la discontinuité du droit constitutionnel, et de la construction particulière de l’État et de la nation, depuis la monarchie absolue. Le droit administratif français apparaît alors, singulièrement, comme la première et principale source d’effectivité du droit constitutionnel jusqu’en 1958. Cette pérennité interroge sur la relation entre État et citoyen, entre libéralisme et démocratie, au sein d’un ordre juridique français singulier. / The distinguishing feature of the French constitutional law is the fact that it uses extensively the administrative law. The Constitutional Council acquire notions, tools and ways of thinking from administrative law, whereas constitutional rules make use of administrative institutions or constructs. Meanwhile, the Council of State has both formal and material constitutional abilities. Councillors of State are ubiquitous in rules redaction, notably about the laws, where they perform a constitutional pre-control. Finally, constitutional authors, instructed in administrative law, study the constitutional rulings with administrative litigation concepts. Thus, inquiring into the administrative foundations of constitutional law involve reflecting on the existence of an administrative culture in this field. This culture comes from the singular history of French public law, which required a strong jurisprudence to compensate the constitutional unsteadiness of the 19th century. Also, it comes from the unusual building of the State and nation since absolute monarchy. French administrative law then appears especially like the first and primary source of constitutional law effectiveness until 1958. This permanence brings up questions about the relation between State and citizen, or liberalism and democracy, in an atypical French legal order.

Si l’on s’en tient à une vision formelle, la participation du Conseil d'Etat à la confection de laloi apparaît marquée par une permanence et une stabilité remarquables depuis sa création enl’An VIII. Un examen plus approfondi montre une vérité plus complexe. Jusqu’à saconstitutionnalisation sous la Vème République, la participation du Conseil d'Etat à laconfection de la loi a été confrontée à la problématique de sa légitimité. C’est à un tout autreenjeu auquel le Conseil d'Etat est aujourd'hui confronté dans l’exercice de sa fonctionlégislative, celui de son expansion au sein des institutions publiques depuis la révisionconstitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008 qui a modifié sa place dans le processus législatif. Dans lecadre de sa participation à la loi, le Conseil d'Etat a par ailleurs à faire face auxtransformations qui traversent l’ordre juridique, et en particulier au phénomène dediversification des sources du droit qui commande une nécessaire adaptation de son cadreorganisationnel, de ses méthodes et de sa grille d’analyse. / If we stick to a formal vision, participation of the Council of State in making the law appearsmalrked by a remarquable permanence and stability since its inception in the year VIII. Acloser examination reveals a more complex truth. Until its constitutionalization in the FifthRepublic, the participation of the Council of State in making the law was faced with theproblem of legitimacy. This is a different issue that the Council of State is currently facing inthe exercise of its legislative function, the one of its expansion in public institutions since theconstitutional revision of the 23th July 2008 which amended its place in the legislativeprocess. As part of its participation in the law, the Council of State has also to deal with thetransformations the legal system has to face today, and in particular the phenomenon ofdiversification of sources of law that controls a necessary adaptation of its organizationalframework, its methods and its analytical framework.

Cette étude se donne pour ambition de saisir et de comprendre ce qu’est la motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’État, au demeurant souvent critiquée. Notion fondamentale en droit processuel, la motivation est un discours argumentatif, expression d’une technique juridique, à savoir un discours visant à justifier au plan juridique et factuel la décision à travers un raisonnement afin de persuader l’auditoire. Ainsi faudra-t-il analyser à la fois son architecture et ses fonctions dans une perspective dynamique. En tout état de cause, on constate,depuis au moins le début du XXIe siècle, une certaine évolution de la motivation. Ce phénomène résulte, notamment, de l’européanisation et de la complexité normatives, de la protection renforcée des droits fondamentaux, des exigences de sécurité juridique ou encore de la volonté du Conseil d’État de promouvoir une politique communicationnelle afin de légitimer son action. L’étude implique de revisiter certaines thématiques traditionnelles, en particulier le syllogismejudiciaire, l’argumentation, l’interprétation, le style de la motivation ou encore le pouvoir normatif jurisprudentiel pour constater et mesurer cette évolution. / The aim of this research is to tackle and understand the Conseil d’Etat’s court’s decisions motivation which are often criticised. Fundamental notion in procedural law, motivation is an argumentative discourse expressing a jurisdictional technique but moreover it is specifically a discourse trying trough a legal reasoning to justify a decision in order to convince the audience. Thus we shall have to analyse its architecture and its functions in a dynamic perspective. Either way we can note that since the beginning of the 21st century the court’s motivation has evolved.This phenomenon is the result of the Europeanization and the complexity of the normative production and is also due to enhanced protection of the fundamental rights, legal certainty and the Conseil d’Etat’s wish to promote a communicational policy in order to legitimise its action. This research entails to revisit certain traditional topics such as jurisdictional syllogism, argumentation, interpretation, the motivation’s style or the normative jurisprudential power to both note and measure this evolution.

Le cabinet ministériel représente depuis plus d’un siècle un élément incontournable du système politique français. Équipe formée par les collaborateurs immédiats du ministre, nommée par lui, le cabinet est situé à un carrefour complexe d’interactions qui comporte les administrations, le Parlement, les groupes d’intérêt et les médias. Délaissée par les juristes, l’étude institutionnelle du cabinet ministériel est aujourd’hui l’apanage de la sociologie et des sciences politiques. À de rares exceptions près, la doctrine constitutionnelle l’a toujours considéré comme une institution juridiquement indissociable de la personne du ministre. Malgré l’ampleur du phénomène, elle observe à son égard un silence quasi unanime qui ne laisse pas de surprendre. Cette indifférence doctrinale ne peut être véritablement expliquée qu’à l’aune de l’histoire des représentations constitutionnelles. L’apparition et le développement des cabinets ministériels procèdent en effet des mutations subies par le Conseil d’État napoléonien tout au long du XIXe siècle. Par-delà les vicissitudes de l’histoire politique, les cabinets expriment la persistance coutumière d’un principe issu du constitutionnalisme révolutionnaire, selon lequel la fonction gouvernementale doit être organiquement séparée de la fonction administrative. Confondues à l’échelon du ministre, conformément à la logique propre du régime parlementaire, ces deux fonctions vont rester dissociées à l’intérieur même des ministères, grâce aux cabinets ministériels. Les réticences traditionnelles de la doctrine publiciste à l’égard de la notion de « fonction gouvernementale » expliquent en grande partie le caractère inédit d’une telle lecture de l’histoire constitutionnelle. / Since more than a century, the ministerial cabinet is an essential organ of the French political system. This team appointed by the Minister gathers his immediate staff. It is connected to administrations, to Parliament, to lobbies, to Medias, and sometimes to citizens. There are very few legal studies on this subject, which interests especially the political sciences and the sociology. With few exceptions, constitutional doctrine has always regarded the cabinet as an institution legally inseparable from the person of the Minister. Given the magnitude of this practice, the almost unanimous silence of doctrine is rather surprising. This doctrinal indifference finds an explanation in the history of constitutional representations. The emergence and development of ministerial cabinets since the monarchy’s Restoration in 1814 are related to the alterations undergone by the Napoleonic Council of State throughout the nineteenth century. Beyond the vicissitudes of political history, they express the persisting of a customary principle stemming from French revolutionary constitutionalism, according to which the governmental function must be organically separated from the administrative function. These two functions – merged at the Minister's level in accordance with the logic of the parliamentary system – will remain separated inside the ministry, by means of cabinets. The conventional reluctance of the French constitutional doctrine with regard to the notion of "governmental function" largely explains the novelty of such a reading of constitutional history.

"L’Eglise s’est toujours considérée comme un ordre infra-étatique (l’Eglise dans l’Etat avec ses paroisses et ses diocèses), tout en obéissant aux règles posées par une autorité étrangère à l’Etat, la papauté. De ce fait, l’Eglise est un ordre juridique concurrençant l’Etat, car elle exerce une domination sur le même territoire et les mêmes sujets. Le Gallicanisme se présente comme la synthèse permettant de régler juridiquement ces conflits. Il prône l’indépendance de l’Eglise de France et de l’Etat face à la papauté et suppose l’intervention du Souverain dans les affaires ecclésiastiques. Deux mécanismes juridiques essentiels servent à remplir ces fonctions. D’une part, au moyen des techniques assurant la réception des règles ecclésiastiques dans l’Etat, le Gallicanisme produit un discours technicien ancré dans une doctrine de la souveraineté, pour préserver l’existence d’une « exception française » menacée par les prétentions hégémoniques romaines. D’autre part, inventée pour résoudre les conflits de compétence opposant les autorités étatiques et ecclésiales, la procédure de l’appel comme d’abus subordonne l’Eglise de France à l’Etat par le contrôle juridictionnel de ses actes. Elle désigne l’Etat comme l’instance titulaire d’un pouvoir exclusif de déterminer l’étendue de sa propre compétence et de celle de l’ordre ecclésial. Envisagé sous l’angle des rapports entre ordres juridiques, le Gallicanisme apparaît alors comme une étape incontournable dans la construction intellectuelle de l’Etat moderne, à laquelle il fournit des supports théoriques et techniques". / By the properties that characterize it, Catholic Church is often considered, following the example of the State, as a legal system which takes place inside and outside State. Before the 1905 Act, Gallicanism struggles for independance of the Church of France and the State against papacy, encouraging Sovereign’s interventions in ecclesiastical affairs. Gallicanism can be translated in terms of relations between two legal systems, and the matter of this study is to prove this movement has been a momentum in the intellectual building of Modern State through the reflexion of french jurist from the Ancient Monarchy to the end of the 19th century. Church and State are, by many ways, concurrent systems aiming to dominate the same territory and the same subjects. Gallican thoughts present themselves like an answer to these conflicts. Canonical rules promulgated by the Pope or a Council are not self-executing, and have to be approved by the Sovereign to be Law of the State. Gallicanism build a technical discurse based on State sovereignty to preserve a french particularism against the Roman hegemonic threath. Invented to resolve conflicts of competences between ecclesiastical and State’s authorities, the procedure named « appel comme d’abus » gives exclusive power to the State to determine the extent of its competence. Furthermore this procedure subordinates Church of France to State by the judicial review of its administrative acts.

La thèse étudie sous leurs aspects, historiques, juridiques, la convergence des jurisprudences du Conseil d’Etat et de la Cour de cassation en droit du travail. D’autres juridictions,nationales (Tribunal des conflits et Conseil constitutionnel), européennes (Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme et Cour de justice de l’Union européenne) concourent à ce rapprochement. La thèse aborde la convergence des objectifs sous deux angles ; l’un né d’une attraction réciproque, l’autre, d’une attraction amplifiée. La convergence jurisprudentielle est successivement qualifiée de « recherchée » et de « nuancée ». Le « juge répartiteur » exerce une influence indirecte, à laquelle s’ajoute celle, directe, des « juges prescripteurs ». A la convergence des objectifs s’ajoute une convergence de la méthode, perceptible à travers les modes d’articulation des sources et les techniques de construction jurisprudentielle. La thèse démontre que le droit du travail, qui s’est construit en réunissant les enseignements du droit civil – la force obligatoire du contrat – et les leçons du droit public – l’importance de l’intérêt général – se révèle être le domaine d’élection d’un échange technique inédit entre les deux ordres juridictionnels. Cette étude signale le passage d’une période d’indifférence mutuelle à celle d’une attention devenue traditionnelle. A l’instar du dialogue qui existe entre le juge et le législateur en matière sociale, se noue un « dialogue des juges » des deux Hautes Juridictions, pour prévenir des discordances majeures. / This dissertation aims at describing how the two Supreme Institutions — the Board of State and the Court of Cassation —, despite their respective traditions and status were able to make their Jurisprudences convergent. Beginning with an historical Introduction, the study goes in details into the reciprocal attraction of the the Board of State and of the Court of Cassation based on shared goals (Part I). This convergent movement is discussed according to both Jurisprudences (Title 1), then in relation with the Jurisprudences of the Disputes Tribunal of the Constitutional Council and of the European Courts (Title 2). Part II offers a methodological approach explaining how the sources of these Jurisprudences are selected in order to solve normative conflicts (Title 1). A cross-movement consisting in loans and exchanges of technics between both Institutions occurs for the sake of Law unity and in defense of the public and individual Rights (Title 2).

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.