Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) using a panel of Swedish listed firms. CMSs are owners who have a control stake of the firm’s votes while owning only a minority fraction of the firm’s equity. The study documents that families in control are almost exclusively CMSs through an extensive use of dual-class shares. The results show that increased ownership of votes by a controlling owner is associated with an economically and statistically significant decrease in firm value, but that the decrease in firm value is significantly larger for firms with family CMSs than for firms with financial institutions or corporations in control. This indicates that the agency costs of family CMSs are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners.Family Ownership, Control Considerations, and Corporate Financing Decisions: An Empirical Analysis analyzes the relation between concentrated family control and firms’ choice of capital structure for a panel of Swedish listed firms. The results suggest that the capital structure choices made by firms with families in control are influenced by the controlling families’ desire to protect their control, and that the resulting capital structures are likely to increase the agency costs of family control. The Choice between Rights Offerings and Private Equity Placements (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) analyzes the determinants of the choice between rights offerings and private equity placements using a sample of rights offerings and private placements made by listed Swedish firms. The results indicate that control considerations explain why firms make uninsured rights offerings. The evidence also suggest that private placements, and to some extent underwritten rights offerings, are made by potentially undervalued firms in order to overcome underinvestment problems resulting from asymmetric information about firm value. Furthermore, private placements are frequently made in conjunction with the establishment of a product market relationship between purchaser and seller, which is consistent with equity ownership reducing contracting costs in new product market relationships. Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist and Peter Högfeldt) studies diversification within the real estate industry, in which firms can diversify over property types and geographical regions. Similar to previous studies, this essay documents the existence of a diversification discount. However, the major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue non-focusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, and are predominantly family controlled. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs.  The Difference in Acquirer Returns between Takeovers of Public Targets and Takeovers of Private Targets shows, for a sample of Swedish takeovers, that the average acquirer abnormal return is positive and significant when the target firm is privately held but insignificant when the target firm is listed on a stock exchange. These results are robust when controlling for sample selection problems and other variables capable of explaining acquirer returns. The evidence is consistent with greater acquirer bargaining power and resolution of information asymmetries in takeovers of private targets. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2002

La corporation est une institution à multiples facettes. Elle est d'abord un outil juridique au service de l'entreprise mais aussi une entité où se rencontrent les intérêts de nombreuses personnes. On nomme de façon générale stakeholders, ces personnes qui ont un intérêt dans la corporation. Plusieurs facteurs ont une influence sur les relations entre une corporation et ses stakeholders; le mode de gouvernance de l'entreprise, les attributs de la corporation ainsi que le contenu du droit corporatif applicable déterminent les échanges entre les stakeholders ct la corporation. Le modèle traditionnel de la corporation, quoique justifiable sur la base de l'efficience, peut être contesté de différentes façons. Pour évaluer la pertinemce de ce modèle, il faut l'analyser du point de vue économique pour chaque type de stakeholders. En isolant chacune des relations impliquant la corporation et l'une des catégories de stakeholders, nous sommes en mesure d'identifier les risques d'externalités et les solutions possibles. De plus, cette analyse permet de prévoir l'effet d'une intervention législative et de mieux comprendre la corporation dans sa dynamique économique. Cet exercice tend à démontrer que la position de chaque stakeholder est dépendante de nombreuses variables sur lesquelles les législations ont parfois peu d'effet. Le contrôle des corporations est essentiellement établi par un processus d'ajustement automatique des intérêts où chacun y trouve son compte. / The corporation is a multifaceted institution. It is first of all a legal tool available to the enterprise but also the junction of the interests of numerous persons. We call stakeholders the people who have interests in the corporation. Many factors play a role in the relation between the corporation and the stakeholders; the corporate governance, the attributes of the corporation as weil as the corporate law applicable will affect the relation between the corporation and the stakeholders. The conventional model of corporation is often criticized although it is arguably the most efficient model from an economic standpoint. To understand the critics and the raison d'ètre of this model, we need ta analyze it under economic terms from the different points of view of the stakeholders. Analyzing one by one the relations between the corporation and each type of stakeholders, we are able to identify the problems related to externalities and possible solutions. Furthermore, this analysis will allow us to foresce the potential effects of a new legislation and understand better the corporation in its economic context. As a result of this analysis, it seems to be that the situation of each stakeholder depends on many variables on which legislation has little impact. The ultimate control of corporations is tinally settled by an automatic process of adjustment where everyone satisfies its own interests. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit Option recherche (LL.M)"

This thesis focuses on fraud in the entity, to methods for their detection and possibilities of improving the internal control system so that the risk of offending employee or manager has been reduced to a minimum.

Submitted by Rafael Gonzalez Moyano (rflgonzalez@gmail.com) on 2017-05-02T22:01:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 874971 bytes, checksum: cbbaddef3e884c775681b83a83490f48 (MD5) / Rejected by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br), reason: Rafael, boa noite Para que possamos aceitar seu trabalho junto à biblioteca, é necessário realizar o seguinte ajuste: Retirar a numeração romana que consta nas páginas anteriores a Introdução. Em seguida, submeter o arquivo novamente. Att Renata on 2017-05-03T00:20:42Z (GMT) / Submitted by Rafael Gonzalez Moyano (rflgonzalez@gmail.com) on 2017-05-03T01:16:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 875031 bytes, checksum: 5d58481302aae0d33c960c777c7de817 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2017-05-03T18:39:05Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 875031 bytes, checksum: 5d58481302aae0d33c960c777c7de817 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-03T19:38:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Moyano - Dissertação MPA.pdf: 875031 bytes, checksum: 5d58481302aae0d33c960c777c7de817 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-05 / This study is about premiums paid for corporate control in mergers and acquisitions in Brazil whose target company had, at the transaction date, shares traded on the stock exchange. This issue is relevant because it influences the amounts paid for equity interest when there is a change in corporate control, indicating that, under certain circumstances, the market value per share traded in the market may not represent its fair or trading value. This work analyzed the impacts in the premiums paid for corporate control caused by certain characteristics of the companies involved in those transactions, such as the size and degree of leverage of target companies, total shares acquired and the existence of foreign investors as the acquirer in part of those transactions. As a result, an average premium of 17.78% was paid for the acquisition of corporate control in publicly traded companies in Brazil. In addition, this study suggests that the size and degree of leverage of the target company positively influences the premium offered, while there is no statistical evidence that the total equity interest acquired and the existence of a foreign investor can influence the dimension of this premium / Este estudo trata da questão de prêmios pagos pelo controle corporativo em operações de fusões e aquisições no Brasil, cuja empresa-alvo possuía, na data da transação, ações negociadas na bolsa de valores. Tal questão é relevante porque influencia os valores pagos por participação acionária quando há a troca do controle corporativo, indicando que, sob determinadas circunstâncias, o valor por ação negociado no mercado pode não representar o seu valor justo ou transacionável. Neste trabalho foram analisados os impactos de determinadas características das empresas envolvidas nas transações analisadas, nos prêmios pagos pelo controle corporativo, tais como o tamanho e o grau de alavancagem das empresas-alvo, total de participação societária adquirida e existência de investidor estrangeiro em parte dessas transações. Como resultado, foi encontrado um prêmio médio de 17,78%, pagos pela aquisição do controle corporativo em empresas de capital aberto no Brasil. Além disso, por este trabalho sugere-se que o tamanho e grau de alavancagem da empresa-alvo influenciam, positivamente, o prêmio oferecido, por outro lado não houve evidência estatística de que a participação societária total adquirida e a existência de investidor estrangeiro possam, de alguma forma, influenciar na dimensão deste prêmio.

Dentre os atuais desafios do direito societário brasileiro, a estrutura da propriedade acionária das sociedades por ações de capital aberto e a identificação daqueles que as comandam merecem destaque. O aquecimento das transações realizadas via mercado de capitais e a consolidação dos segmentos especiais de governança corporativa no Brasil resultaram no chamado fenômeno de dispersão acionária, que evidenciou certa ruptura na tradicional estrutura de propriedade acionária exclusivamente concentrada, até então predominante nas companhias brasileiras. Diante desse cenário contrastante, de mudanças no perfil do poder de controle sobre as companhias brasileiras, o presente trabalho apresentará em seu capítulo terceiro, após breve análise das estruturas de capital identificadas em diferentes economias e de retrospectiva sobre a propriedade acionária das companhias brasileiras (a serem apresentadas em seu segundo capítulo), extensa pesquisa empírica realizada com o propósito de identificar a atual estrutura de propriedade acionária predominante entre as companhias brasileiras listadas no segmento especial do Novo Mercado da BMF&BOVESPA (Novo Mercado), e com o objetivo de averiguar a existência do chamado controle societário minoritário entre tais companhias, conforme detalhado nos apêndices desta dissertação. Referida pesquisa empírica representa, ainda, rico processamento da base de dados e informações divulgadas à Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) pelas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, e serve de base para a avaliação da necessidade de eventuais mudanças nos conceitos adotados pelo Direito Societário pátrio, tendo em vista entendimento divergente identificado na doutrina e em julgados da CVM no âmbito da possibilidade de existência de um controle societário exercido por acionista ou grupo de acionistas não detentores da maioria do capital social votante, conforme detalhado no quarto capítulo deste estudo. Por fim, serão apresentadas, no quinto e último capítulo, as considerações finais à análise proposta, com destaque para as principais conclusões obtidas na elaboração dos capítulos terceiro e quarto descritos acima, dentre elas a existência do controle societário interno não majoritário (controle minoritário) entre companhias listadas no Novo Mercado, bem como os reflexos dessa constatação no âmbito da prática do Direito Societário. / Among the current challenges of the Brazilian Corporate Law, the structure of the capital ownership of the corporations and the identification of those who exercises control over it remains an important aspect to be taken into consideration when analyzing the main aspects of the Brazilian capital market. The heat up of the transactions carried out through the capital market, and the consolidation of the special corporate governance segments in Brazil resulted in the so called phenomenon of the dispersed ownership, which revealed a rupture from the traditional structure of extremely concentrated ownership, that was prevailing until now among the Brazilian corporations. Given such contrasting scenario of changes in the profile of corporate power over Brazilian corporations, these thesis, after describing, over its first two chapters, the structures of capital ownership existent in different economies and providing a retrospective on the capital ownership of Brazilian corporations, presents, in its third chapter, an extensive empirical research performed with the purposes of identifying the current structure of capital ownership prevailing among the Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado, special segment of the Brazilian Exchange BMF&BOVESPA (the New Market), as well as ascertaining the existence of minority corporate control among such companies, as detailed in the appendixes hereto. The referred empirical research presents, furthermore, detailed data processing in connection with the information disclosed by such companies to the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and is also used as basis for reviewing the need of eventual changes in the concepts embodied by the Brazilian Corporate Law, in view of the divergent understanding identified in the Brazilian doctrine and judgments issued by the CVM in connection with the existence of a corporate control exercised by a shareholder or group of shareholders owner of shareholding not representative of the majority of the voting capital stock, as detailed in the fourth chapter of these thesis. Finally, the fifth and last chapter of these study presents the final considerations in connection with the review proposed hereto, highlighting the main conclusions obtained through the elaboration of the third and fourth chapters described above, among them the existence of a not majority internal control (minority control) in companies listed in the New Market, as well as the effects of such conclusion in the light of the practice of corporate law.

. / Corporate acquisitions are classified as part of “the market for corporate control” in which management teams are facing constant competition from other management teams. If the team that currently controls a company is not maximizing the value of the company’s assets, then an acquisition will likely occur and increase the value of the company by replacing its poor managers with good managers. This dissertation focus on two issues on mergers, the first compares the strategy between mergers and joint ventures. The second investigate how much liquidity should the acquirer preserve and what is the equilibrium price of the acquired firm in considering the merger strategy. Drawing upon the incomplete contract theory, I examine the criterion of the strategic choice between joint ventures (JVs) and mergers when two firms contemplate vertical integration. The model reaches the following conclusions: (1) some ownership provision to the acquired company after the mergers may prove to be more lucrative to the acquirer than 100% takeover; (2) given the same equity share arrangement for JVs and mergers I conclude that these two firms should choose to merge or be merged rather than JVs; (3) I derive the optimal equity share arrangement in both JVs and mergers when ownership provision is considered as a strategic means. In addition, I also compare the welfare and effort of both companies in JVs and mergers under symmetric cost structures, and find that mergers would provide greater social efficiency and welfare than 50-50 JVs when the acquirer’s equity share is between 30% and 65%. Firms are concerned that they may in the future be deprived of the funds that would enable them to take advantage of exciting growth prospects, strengthen existing investments or simply stay alive. I specifically examine a firm’s liquidity need in order to grasp any future opportunity of mergers and acquisitions. However, a firm’s manager (borrower) can shed his interim wrongdoings (misbehavior) under the pretext of further financial need for mergers and acquisitions because he knows that he can easily raise sufficient cash from lenders to cover any adverse shock. My study derives the conditions that when this soft-budget-constraint (SBC) problem will occur. It happens when the interim income is small. Moreover, I analyze how the purchase price of acquisition is affected by this soft-budget-constraint syndrome. If there is SBC problem, the acquisition price will be raised by the investors when the interim income is small. Besides, a firm with severe moral hazard problem will be merely able to offer a smaller purchase price for the acquisition. On the contrast, a firm with a stronger balance sheet will be able to secure a greater credit line and offer a more attractive price for the acquisition. The empirical study of U.S. firms during 1988 to 2006 supports my conclusions.

Šiuo metu vyraujanti pasaulinė ekonominė krizė, taip pat ankstesni bendrovių bankrotų pavyzdžiai (tokių kaip Enron, Parmalat) signalizuoja apie būtinybę tinkamai sureguliuoti bendrovių valdymo teisinę bazę, o ypač aspektus susijusius su bendrovės akcininkų ir valdymo organo santykiais. Todėl šiame magistro darbe yra analizuojamos teisinės priemonės, kurios padeda sumažinti interesų konfliktus kylančius tarp bendrovių, kurių vertybiniais popieriais yra prekiaujama reguliuojamoje rinkoje, akcininkų ir valdymo organo. Šiam tikslui pasiekti yra išskiriamos penkios teisinio reguliavimo sritys: bendrovių kontrolės rinkos ir bendrovių perėmimo, informacijos atskleidimo, valdymo organo narių finansinio skatinimo, valdymo organo struktūros bei bendrovės akcininkų teisių teisinis reguliavimas. Kiekviena reguliavimo sritis yra aptariama dviem aspektais, pirmiausia, analizuojant Europos Sąjungos lygiu egzistuojantį teisinį reguliavimą, po to vertinant tokio reguliavimo įgyvendinimą Lietuvos Respublikoje bei pateikiant pastabas ir pasiūlymus. Darbe padaroma išvada, kad norint sumažinti neigiamas pasekmes atsirandančias dėl nuosavybės teisės ir valdymo atskyrimo bendrovėse, reikia, kad visos aukščiau išvardintos priemonės papildytų viena kitą ir būtų taikomos sistemiškai. / The ongoing economic crisis around the world and the recent events in corporate bankruptcy sector (including Enron and Parmalat cases) have shown a clear signal to regulate more efficiently the corporate governance laws and especially the relations between shareholders and the governance body of the company. This thesis paper addresses the regulatory framework issues, which mitigate the conflict of interests between the shareholders and the governance body of publicly traded companies. Five legal instruments are analyzed in order to achieve this objective: market for corporate control and takeovers, information disclosure, director remuneration, structure of governance body and shareholder empowerment. Each legal instrument is analyzed from two legal perspectives, first, the European Union legal framework is described and then analysis concentrates on the implementation of European law in the Republic of Lithuania. Comments and proposals are given to existing implementation problems. The conclusion emphasizes that a systematic use of all the above mentioned legal instruments is required in order to mitigate the costs of separation of ownership and control in publicly traded companies.

Submitted by Sarah Morganna Matos Marinho (sarah.momm@gmail.com) on 2015-04-30T14:02:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marinho, Sarah. Como são os laços do capitalismo brasileiro?.pdf: 5894212 bytes, checksum: b21e82cd1bbbfcf9fd6fec3cafe9196f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2015-04-30T18:42:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Marinho, Sarah. Como são os laços do capitalismo brasileiro?.pdf: 5894212 bytes, checksum: b21e82cd1bbbfcf9fd6fec3cafe9196f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-04T12:38:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marinho, Sarah. Como são os laços do capitalismo brasileiro?.pdf: 5894212 bytes, checksum: b21e82cd1bbbfcf9fd6fec3cafe9196f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-01 / O BNDES tem o objetivo de financiar empreendimentos que se relacionem com o desenvolvimento do país, sendo uma de suas modalidades o investimento por subscrição de ações. De um lado, tem-se que as regras elaboradas na estruturação societária de uma empresa podem variar de acordo com a origem do financiamento obtido, em função dos interesses que os diferentes investidores procuram proteger a partir da separação entre a sua propriedade e o controle. Por outro lado, o cenário econômico brasileiro passou por mudanças profundas nos últimos 60 anos, já que o modelo de industrialização baseado no dirigismo estatal – que marcou as décadas de 1950 a 1980 – transformou-se com o movimento de desestatização dos anos 1990. O Estado não se afastou da propriedade empresarial, mas atua agora principalmente como acionista minoritário. Hoje, paira dúvida acerca, em primeiro lugar, das reais motivações que levam determinadas empresas a receber participação do Sistema BNDES. Além disso, há pouca compreensão sobre os veículos jurídicos que viabilizam essas relações público-privadas. A partir de algumas pesquisas sobre o banco, conclui-se que a atuação da sua subsidiária de participações, a BNDESPAR, não ultrapassa objetivos de maximização de valor dos seus ativos. Não se descartou, no entanto, que a função do banco de desenvolvimento – incluindo a do seu braço de renda variável – fosse implementar políticas industriais, por mais que falhas pudessem vir a ocorrer nesse intento, reconhecido como um processo experimental. Assim, revelou-se quais interesses as regras de governança corporativa das companhias abertas financiadas pela BNDESPAR por participação acomodam para a subsidiária, elucidando-se importantes características do modelo contemporâneo de atuação empresarial do Estado e lançando-se luz sobre os objetivos que o levam a investir diretamente como acionista no cenário atual. No caso da BNDESPAR, trata-se de agente em busca de equilíbrio entre a maximização de retornos e a política industrial. De uma maneira mais geral, o BNDES procura ser auto-sustentável – como pré-requisito para existir e cumprir sua missão –, tratando sua subsidiária como a principal personagem desse objetivo dentro do Sistema. A BNDESPAR, por sua vez, acabou por se tornar executora de política voltada a apoiar a negociação das companhias brasileiras no mercado de capitais – atividade emanada da sua própria burocracia. / BNDES has the objective of financing projects related to Brazil’s development and equity purchases are one of its types of investment. On one hand, rules drawn up in a company’s corporate governance structure can vary according to the capital’s origin, since different interests that different investors seek to protect emerge from the separation of their property from the corporate control. On the other hand, Brazilian economic scenario went trough deep changes over the last 60 years, considering that the industrialization model based on State intervention, mainstream between the 1950s and the 1980s, was transformed by the privatization movement in the 1990s. This change, however, did not eliminate the State in corporate property: now it only acts more commonly as a minority shareholder. The present time is marked by doubt over the real motivation that leads some companies to receive equity investments by the BNDES System. Besides that, there is a lack of comprehension on the contractual vehicles that structure these public-private relations. Some researches concerning the bank indicate that its subsidiary investments would not undermine the objective for profit maximization. We have not ignored, however, that the development bank function – including its equity arm – might be executing industrial policies, even though failures are likely to occur during this effort, understood here as an experimental process. Thus, the research has revealed which BNDESPAR’s interests are protected through the corporate governance rules of the public traded companies invested, also revealing important features of the contemporary model of the State as an entrepreneur and clarifying some objectives that could lead the institution to purchase equity participations nowadays. BNDESPAR is an agent motivated by a balance pursuit between profit maximization and industrial policy purposes. Broadly speaking, BNDES seeks self-financial sustainability in order to continue and accomplish its mission, seeing its equity arm as the main executor of this objective inside its System. In this search for sustainability, BNDESPAR became executor of a policy effort for stock markets negotiation raised up among its own bureaucracy activities.

A presente dissertação é sobre a atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário, focando, em especial, no caso do Brasil. Em um primeiro momento, tratamos das possibilidades do uso das participações minoritárias, apontando que, embora estejamos falando de propriedade pública sobre parcelas do capital social de empresas privadas, essas participações não configuram, somente, forma de exploração direta da atividade econômica, devendo ser compreendidas como uma técnica jurídica ou uma ferramenta da qual o Estado pode se valer para realizar as diferentes modalidades de atuação na economia. Nesse sentido, mostramos como as participações minoritárias possibilitam a atuação do Estado como empresário, regulador, fomentador e investidor. Em seguida, falamos dos mecanismos societários que a Administração Pública pode utilizar para que, mesmo como acionista minoritária, possa influenciar a direção das empresas público-privadas, tais como os acordos de acionistas e as golden-shares. Após cuidarmos da natureza jurídica e das vantagens comparativas da atuação estatal na economia por meio de participações minoritárias, passamos a analisar os limites dessa atuação. Desse modo, deve-se distinguir entre o uso das participações públicas como opção legítima de atuação na economia versus sua aplicação como burla ao regime jurídico aplicável às empresas estatais mediante o controle societário disfarçado e a simulação de contratações administrativas. Por fim, tratamos da questão da escolha de parceiros privados pela Administração Pública, bem como dos controles públicos que incidem sobre as empresas participadas. / This dissertation is about the state action in the economy as a minority shareholder especially focusing on the Brazilian case. At first, we discuss the possibilities of the use of minority equity stakes pointing out that, although we are talking about public ownership of shares of private companies, this equity participations do not constitute only a means of direct exploration of an economic activity, instead they should be considered as a legal technique or a tool which the state can rely on to accomplish the different modalities of economic action. This way, we show how the minority positions enable the state to act as an entrepreneur, a regulator, a promoter of private action and an investor. Then we talk about the corporate mechanisms that the Public Administration can use to, even as a minority shareholder, influence the direction of public-private companies, such as shareholders agreements and golden-shares. After dealing with the legal nature and the comparative advantages of the state economic action as a minority shareholder, we proceed to examine the limits of such action. Thus, we must distinguish between the use of minority equity as a legitimate option of state action in the economy versus its application as a way to elude the legal framework applicable to the state-owned enterprises by the disguised corporate control of private companies and the simulation of administrative procurement. At last, we deal with the issue of the choice of private partners by the Public Administration, as well as the public controls which apply to the invested companies.

A presente dissertação é sobre a atuação do Estado na economia como acionista minoritário, focando, em especial, no caso do Brasil. Em um primeiro momento, tratamos das possibilidades do uso das participações minoritárias, apontando que, embora estejamos falando de propriedade pública sobre parcelas do capital social de empresas privadas, essas participações não configuram, somente, forma de exploração direta da atividade econômica, devendo ser compreendidas como uma técnica jurídica ou uma ferramenta da qual o Estado pode se valer para realizar as diferentes modalidades de atuação na economia. Nesse sentido, mostramos como as participações minoritárias possibilitam a atuação do Estado como empresário, regulador, fomentador e investidor. Em seguida, falamos dos mecanismos societários que a Administração Pública pode utilizar para que, mesmo como acionista minoritária, possa influenciar a direção das empresas público-privadas, tais como os acordos de acionistas e as golden-shares. Após cuidarmos da natureza jurídica e das vantagens comparativas da atuação estatal na economia por meio de participações minoritárias, passamos a analisar os limites dessa atuação. Desse modo, deve-se distinguir entre o uso das participações públicas como opção legítima de atuação na economia versus sua aplicação como burla ao regime jurídico aplicável às empresas estatais mediante o controle societário disfarçado e a simulação de contratações administrativas. Por fim, tratamos da questão da escolha de parceiros privados pela Administração Pública, bem como dos controles públicos que incidem sobre as empresas participadas. / This dissertation is about the state action in the economy as a minority shareholder especially focusing on the Brazilian case. At first, we discuss the possibilities of the use of minority equity stakes pointing out that, although we are talking about public ownership of shares of private companies, this equity participations do not constitute only a means of direct exploration of an economic activity, instead they should be considered as a legal technique or a tool which the state can rely on to accomplish the different modalities of economic action. This way, we show how the minority positions enable the state to act as an entrepreneur, a regulator, a promoter of private action and an investor. Then we talk about the corporate mechanisms that the Public Administration can use to, even as a minority shareholder, influence the direction of public-private companies, such as shareholders agreements and golden-shares. After dealing with the legal nature and the comparative advantages of the state economic action as a minority shareholder, we proceed to examine the limits of such action. Thus, we must distinguish between the use of minority equity as a legitimate option of state action in the economy versus its application as a way to elude the legal framework applicable to the state-owned enterprises by the disguised corporate control of private companies and the simulation of administrative procurement. At last, we deal with the issue of the choice of private partners by the Public Administration, as well as the public controls which apply to the invested companies.